CHAPTER XI

WHY DID JAPAN ENTER THE WAR?

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Japan's Statement. On 5 September 1914, Baron Kato, the Japanese Foreign Minister, addressing the Diet, said:

" Great Britain was at last compelled to take part in the contest, and early in August the British Government asked the Imperial Government for assistance under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of Alliance. . . . Therefore, inasmuch as she is asked by her Ally for assistance at the time when commerce in Eastern Asia, which Japan and Great Britain regard alike as one of their special interests, is subjected to constant menace. Japan, which regards that alliance as the guiding principle of her foreign policy, cannot but comply with such request and do her part." [1]

Duty under treaty — acknowledged, or only alleged as in this case — always coincides with interest, and so the Baron was able to add:

" Besides in the opinion of the Government the possession by Germany, whose interests are opposed to those of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, of a base of her powerful activities in one corner of the Far East is not only a serious obstacle to the maintenance of permanent peace of Eastern Asia, but is also in conflict with the more immediate interests of our own Empire. The Government, therefore, resolved to comply with the British request and, if necessary in doing so, to open hostilities against Germany and, after the imperial sanction was obtained, they communicated this resolution to the British Government. Full and frank exchange of views between the two Governments followed and it was finally agreed between them to take such measures as may be necessary to protect the general interest contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance." [2]

In other words, Germany's possession of Kiao-Chou was inimical to Japanese interests, and, as excuse for ousting her, a non-existing treaty

[1] American Ass'n for International Conciliation pamphlet No. 85, pp. 36–7.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

obligation was asserted. Rivalling the hypocrisies of European statesmen, Count Okuma, the head of the Japanese government, said:

"It will be our ambition at this time to show the West what it is slow to believe, that we can work harmoniously with great Occidental Powers to support and protect the highest ideals of civilization even to the extent of dying for them. Not only in the Far East, but anywhere else that may be necessary, Japan is ready to lay down her life for the principles that the foremost nations will die for. It is to be in line with these nations that she is at this time opposing and fighting what she believes to be opposed to these principles. Japan's relation to the present conflict is as a defender of the things that make for higher civilization and a more permanent peace."

That was not only quite untrue, but quite inconsistent with the previous assertion of performance of treaty obligation in pursuance of predatory purpose. Nevertheless, the Right Rev. Bishop Frodsham said of it that:

"Nothing finer has been said in this country than the dignified statement made in 1914 by Count Okuma." [3]

The "full and frank exchange of views" having resulted in satisfactory agreement as to the disposition to be made of the German properties, Japan (as the Baron said) believing:

"that she owed it to herself to be faithful to the Alliance and strengthen its foundation by ensuring the permanent peace of the East, and by protecting the special interests of our two allied Powers," [4]

entered the war. Upon all of which the proper comment is that: Nations act upon their interests, and disregard treaties. Italy left the Triple Alliance on the ground that the war was not a defensive war. And Japan joined with the other side, on the pretence that she was fulfilling her obligations to Great Britain.[5]

The Anglo-Japanese Treaties. We may be reasonably certain that the British government made no demand for Japanese intervention in pursuance of the Anglo-Japanese treaty of 13 July 1911, for the treaty had no application to the occasion; and, hidden underneath Baron Kato's words, "full and frank exchange of views between the two Governments," may easily be seen the nature of the bargain which Japan insisted should be agreed to before entering the war. The only relevant clauses in the treaty are as follows:

"*Preamble.* The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese agree-

[3] *The Nineteenth Century*, May 1919, p. 1031. *Falser* ought to be substituted for "finer."

[4] Am. Ass'n for International Conciliation pamphlet No. 85, p. 37.

[5] See article by James Brown Scott in *Am. Soc. Int. Law, Prcdgs.*, 1917, pp. 101–7.

ment of the 12th August 1905, and believing that a revision of that agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said agreement, namely:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all the Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of their special interests in the said regions."

"*Article II.* If by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power or Powers, either high contracting party should be involved in war in defense of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the other high contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it."[6]

That Japan was under no obligation to enter the war is clear, for:

1. There had been neither "unprovoked attack" nor aggressive action," as against the United Kingdom, on the part of Germany. It was the United Kingdom who had declared war on Germany, because her interests so required.[7]

2. If it could be said that Germany was the attacking party, there would still remain, for Japan, the difficulty that the United Kingdom was not "involved in war in defence of its territorial rights" in either Eastern Asia or India. Germany was making no attack upon either of those places, and was not in position to undertake operations there.

3. Nor was the United Kingdom "involved in war in defence of its . . . special interests mentioned in the preamble."

4. If it be said that the maintenance of "general peace" was one of the "special interests" (although it was not), the reply is that it was the Japanese attack upon the Germans in Kiao-Chou which disturbed the peace.[8]

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[6] *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, V, Supp., pp. 276–7.

[7] The subject is fully discussed in cap. V.

[8] On 12 Aug. 1914, the German Foreign Minister sent the following telegram to the German Ambassador in Japan: "East Asiatic squadron instructed to avoid hostile acts against England in case Japan remains neutral. Please inform Japanese Government": German White Bk., 1914, No. 28.

5. Mr. Winston S. Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty at the outbreak of the war, has said in his recent book, *The World Crisis:*

"No clause in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty entitled us to invoke the assistance of Japan. But it became evident before the war had lasted a week that the Japanese had not forgotten the circumstances and influences under which they had been forced, at the end of the Chinese war, to quit Port Arthur. They now showed themselves resolved to extirpate all German authority and interests in the Far East." [9]

6. In the Diet in December 1914, Baron Kato said (as we shall see) that:

"The purpose of the ultimatum to Germany was to take Kiao-Chou from Germany and so to restore peace in the Orient"

Very clearly, the reasons for Japan's action were that the presence of the Germans in China "conflicted with the immediate interests of the Japanese Empire," and that Japan desired to substitute herself for Germany in Kiao-Chou and elsewhere. It was the removal of Germany's political and economic competition, and the disposition to be made of Germany's assets in the Pacific that were the principal subjects discussed in the "full and frank exchange of views." The following considerations will amply sustain these assertions.

Ultimatum to Germany. Immediately after the arrangement between the United Kingdom and Japan had been made, the latter sent to Germany (15 August 1914) an ultimatum as follows:

"Considering it highly important and necessary, in the present situation, to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the Agreement of Alliance between Japan and Great Britain, in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia, establishment of which is the aim of the said Agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions:

"First. To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be so withdrawn.

"Second. To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese Authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chou with a view to eventual [10] restoration of same to China.

"The Imperial Japanese Government announce, at the same time, that, in the event of their not receiving by noon August 23, 1914, the answer of the Imperial German Government signifying an unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government,

[9] I, pp. 214–5.

[10] Did that mean at the end of the lease to Germany? If so, Japan was asking for an assignment of the lease to herself, and nothing for China.

they will be compelled to take such action as they may deem necessary to meet the situation." [11]

On the same day, the Japanese government advised their ambassador at Vienna of the presentation of the ultimatum, adding that:

"The grounds on which the Imperial Government base their present attitude is, as already mentioned, none other than to maintain the common interests of Japan and Great Britain, which are set out in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by establishing a basis of a lasting peace in the territory of Eastern Asia. The Japanese Government have in no respect the intention of embarking upon a policy of territorial expansion, nor do they entertain any other selfish designs. For this reason the Imperial Government are resolved to respect with the greatest care the interests of third Powers in Eastern Asia, and to refrain from injuring them in any degree." [12]

The language misled nobody. It was not out of harmony with the generally accepted conventions of diplomatic proprieties.

Declaration of War. No reply having been received to the ultimatum, the Japanese Emperor, on 23 August, declared war, saying:

"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which We view with grave concern, We on our part have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiaochou, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while its armed vessels, cruising seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening Our commerce and that of Our Ally. Peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

"Accordingly Our Government and that of His Britannic Majesty, after full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interests, contemplated in the Agreement of Alliance, and We on Our part being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, commended Our Government to offer with sincerity an advice to the Imperial German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, Our Government failed to receive an answer accepting their advice. It is with profound regret that We, in spite of Our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially at this early period of Our reign and while we are still in mourning for Our lamented

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[11] American Ass'n for International Conciliation pamphlet No. 85, p. 38; Hornbeck, *Contemporary Politics in the Far East*, pp. 286–7. What would Japan have done had Germany complied with the two demands? Would she have changed her alleged view as to her treaty obligation to the United Kingdom — taken Kiaochou and remained neutral? A statement by Baron Kato in December 1914 (*post*, p. 383) indicates that that is what would have happened.

[12] Aus. Red Bk., 1914, No. 66.

Mother. It is Our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valor of Our faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the Empire be enhanced." [13]

It will be observed that in neither the ultimatum nor the declaration of war is there any reference to British "territorial rights or special interests." The reason assigned is maintenance of:

"the common interests of Japan and Great Britain, which are set out in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by establishing a basis of a lasting peace in the territory of Eastern Asia."

By the treaty, Japan's obligation arose only in case the "territorial rights or special interests" in Eastern Asia or India of the United Kingdom were under attack.

Count Okuma's Declaration. In answer to unpleasant suggestions that the object of the Japanese was to secure more Chinese territory for themselves, Count Okuma cabled to the New York *Independent* on 24 August 1914 (the day after the declaration of war) a "message to the American people" in which he said:

"Every sense of loyalty and honor obliges Japan to co-operate with Great Britain to clear from these waters the enemies who in the past, the present, and the future menace her interests, her trade, her shipping, and her people's lives. The Far Eastern situation is not of our seeking.

"As Premier of Japan, I have stated and now again state to the people of America and of the world that Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other peoples of anything which they now possess. My Government and my people have given their word and their pledge, which will be as honorably kept as Japan always keeps her promises." [14]

Not defence, therefore, of either "common interests" or "special interests" was Japan's motive, but the ending of "the past, the present, and the future menace" by the presence of Germany at Kiao-Chou. Japan had made no promise to assist in removal of that menace.

Japan's Repudiation. It will be observed that the Japanese ultimatum required Germany to hand over Kiao-chou to Japan, "with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." Why the territory should go to Japan on its way to China, is something that Japan did not explain, but, having regard to her subsequent conduct, can easily be imagined. For, on several occasions, she repudiated the existence of any obligation to part with the property. In December 1914, for example, the following questions were put in the Diet to the Japanese government:

"(a) Whether Kiaochou will be returned to China?

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[13] Am. Ass'n Int. Conciliation pamphlet, No. 85, p. 31; Hornbeck, *op. cit.*, pp. 287–8.

[14] Hornbeck, *op. cit.*, p. 289; Millard: *Democracy and the Eastern Question*, pp. 81–2.

"(b) Whether the Imperial Government of Japan were pledged to China, or to any other Power, in the matter of the final disposition of Kiaochou?

"(c) Whether the clause in the ultimatum referring to the final restitution of Kiaochou to China did not bind the action of Japan?"

The replies of Baron Kato were as follows:

"(a) The question regarding the future of Kiaochou was, at present, unanswerable.

"(b) Japan has never committed herself to any foreign Power on this point.

"(c) The purpose of the ultimatum to Germany was to take Kiaochou from Germany and so to restore peace in the Orient. Restitution after a campaign was not thought of and was not referred to in the ultimatum."[15]

Again, by one of the twenty-one demands made by Japan (18 January 1915), China was required to agree to any disposition of the Shantung property to which Japan could force Germany to submit.[16] And finally, in the ultimatum which Japan delivered to China on 7 May 1915, the Japanese government declared:

"From the commercial and military points of view, Kiao-chou is an important place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese Empire sacrificed much blood and money, and, after the acquisition, the Empire incurs no obligation to restore it to China."[17]

Evidence of Japanese Motive. The action of Japan, with reference to China, in the early part of 1917, indicates, incontrovertibly, the character of the motive which induced her to enter the war. The Allies, for two reasons, were naturally anxious that China should declare war against the Central Powers; first, because a large number of German ships, which were enjoying the immunity of Chinese ports, would become available for the work of the Allies,[18] and secondly, because of the immense number of men whom, for labor purposes, China could supply. But Japan, who during the war established herself as dictator in China, declined to agree until assured that the war-booty which she coveted should be hers. She was unwilling that China should be given either a lesson in war, or a seat at the anticipated peace conference. Among the charges of unreasonable conduct with which Japan in May 1915 assailed China was that she had:

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[15] Millard, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 373.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 402. The ultimatum is quoted at greater length *post*, p. 386. *Cf.* Hornbeck, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

[18] Mr. Denman, who, as Chairman of the United States Shipping Board in 1917, discussed the subject with British representatives, has raised a corner of the curtain, and promised to lift it altogether if permitted by the President. Some of the phases, he said, approached the realms of the secret treaties affecting Shantung: *N. Y. Times*, 17 Dec. 1920.

"declared that she has the right of participation at the future peace conference to be held between Japan and Germany." [19]

China's Desire and Japan's Obstruction. Well aware that joining with Japan and the United Kingdom in the contemplated attack upon Kiao-Chou would give her beneficial standing, China offered to take part in the operations.[20] The offer was refused for the reasons above mentioned. Chinese assistance would have interfered with Japanese design, and the *entente* Powers were not in a position to quarrel with Japan. On 23 November 1915, the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, in an audience with Viscount Ishii (Japanese Foreign Minister), formally requested that he would join with them in an invitation to China to declare war on Germany.[21] Purporting to relate the reasons given by Viscount Ishii for his refusal, Mr. Millard alleged that:

"He said that Japan considered developments with regard to China as of paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japan could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation of the economic activities of a nation of 400,000,000 people." [22]

Denying part of this, but sufficiently admitting what is now asserted, Ishii, in a *communiqué* issued at Washington (24 April 1919), said that Japan had been endeavoring to educate and enlighten the Chinese:

"But inducing China to participate in the war of 1915 was another affair which I could not in conscience indorse."

China, he said, was at the time:

"on the verge of revolution and anarchy. . . . Again, from a humanitarian point of view, it was the duty of every belligerent to endeavor to restrict the spheres of war calamity, unless substantial military advantage were to accrue from their extension. I know my successor at the Foreign Office, took, two years later, a different view on this question. He had probably his own reason in the presence of the changed situation." [23]

The "different view" was not because China had emerged from her difficulties, but because the American rupture of diplomatic relations with

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[19] In Japan's ultimatum of 7 May 1915: Millard, *op. cit.*, p. 403.

[20] Dillon: *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference*, p. 338.

[21] Mr. Denman (Chairman of the U. S. Shipping Board), having stated that the French government had asked Japan to co-operate in the invitation to Japan, an official in the French Foreign Office said: "Well, France was fighting for her life against Germany and could not afford to miss any chances. China's entry into the war gave the Allies German ships at a time when ships were vitally needed. But any action that France may have taken was done not alone, but in concert with the Allies, and if the French Ambassador at Tokio undertook the *démarche* which Denman mentions, he was simply acting as the spokesman of the Allies as a body": *N. Y. Times*, 21 Dec. 1920.

[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 99.

[23] *Current History*, VIII, Pt. 1, p. 443.

Germany, and the American request to China to do likewise, had made continuation of Japanese obstruction impossible. Let us look at the intervening facts.

Japan's Twenty-one Demands. On 7 November 1914, Tsingtao, the German port in Shantung, surrendered, and Japan entered into possession. On 18 January 1915, taking full advantage of the war-engrossments of the European Powers — knowing that the *entente* Powers would not interfere and that the Central Powers could not [24] — Japan presented to China a formidable list of twenty-one demands,[25] including in Group V:

"*Article I.* The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs.

"*Article III.* . . . the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese, or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

"*Article IV.* China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent. or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government), or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly-worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

"*Article VI.* If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways and construct harbor-works (including dock-yards) in the Province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted."

After protracted negotiations,[26] Japan presented (26 April) a revised list of demands,[27] accompanying it with the statement that:
"on the acceptance of the revised proposals, the Imperial Government would, at a suitable opportunity, restore with fair and proper conditions, to the Chinese Government the Kiao-chou territory, in the acquisition of which the Imperial Government had made a great sacrifice." [28]
To this the Chinese government replied (1 May) by proposing certain concessions.[29] The negotiations then terminated, and Japan handed (7

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[24] Japan owed her success in her Chinese depredations partly to the pendency of the war, but partly also to the fact that revolution against Yuan-Shih-Kai had broken out in the south under the leadership of Dr. Sun-Yat-Sen.

[25] Millard, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–4, 373–6; Gibbons: *The New Map of Asia*, pp. 499–502. Japan had previously exerted pressure by sending troops to South Manchuria and Shantung (22 March), and declaring that they would not be withdrawn until negotiations as to the twenty-one demands had been brought to a satisfactory conclusion: Millard, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

[26] They are detailed in a statement issued by the Chinese government: Millard, *op. cit.*, pp. 382–94.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 377–81.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 402.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 394–401.

May) China an ultimatum [30] complaining that with reference to Japan's offer regarding Kiao-Chou, the Chinese government:

" did not manifest the least appreciation of Japan's good will and difficulties. From the commercial and military points of view, Kiao-chou is an important place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese Empire sacrificed much blood and money, and, after the acquisition, the Empire incurs no obligation to restore it to China. . . . Furthermore, the Chinese Government not only ignored the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government offering the restoration of Kiao-chou Bay, but also, in replying to the revised proposals, they even demanded its unconditional restoration; and again China demanded that Japan should bear the responsibility of paying indemnity for all the unavoidable losses and damages resulting from Japan's military operations at Kiao-chou; and still further in connection with the territory of Kiao-chou, China advanced other demands and declared that she has the right of participation at the future peace conference to be held between Japan and Germany. Although China is fully aware that the unconditional restoration of Kiao-chou and Japan's responsibility of indemnification for the unavoidable losses and damages can never be tolerated by Japan, yet she purposely advanced these demands and declared that this reply was final and decisive."

After these complaints, and an undertaking:

" to detach the Group V from the present negotiations and discuss it separately in the future,"

the document terminated with the following:

" The Imperial Government again offer their advice, and hope that the Chinese Government upon this advice will give a satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock P.M. on the 9th day of May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before and at the designated time, the Imperial Government will take steps they may deem necessary." [31]

China submitted.[32] Japan had established control. She had made clear that her engagement not to " deprive China or other peoples of anything which they now possess " was not among the promises which " Japan always keeps."

Japanese-Russian Treaty, 1916. On 3 July 1916, Japan and Russia signed a war-treaty by which they agreed as follows:

" *Article I.*: Japan will not be a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against Russia. Russia will not be a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against Japan.

" *Article II.*: Should the territorial rights or the special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties recognized by the other con-

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 401–5.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 402–4.

[32] The text of the submission may be seen *ibid.*, pp. 405–6. The ensuing agreements are in *ibid.*, pp. 406–20.

tracting party be threatened, Japan and Russia will take counsel of each other as to the measures to be taken in view of the support or the help to be given in order to safeguard and defend those rights and interests." [33] The British Foreign Office was pleased — so it said. It was not aware that, simultaneously, a secret treaty had been signed aimed at:
" the safeguarding of China against political domination by any third Power entertaining hostile designs towards Russia or Japan." [34]

Japan and the German Properties. The American rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany on 3 February 1917, and the invitation by that Power to others to do likewise [35] — an invitation immediately (4 February) delivered by the American Ambassador at Pekin to the Chinese Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs — raised again, under altered circumstances, the question of China's relations with Germany, and, in the attitude then assumed by Japan, we shall have some evidence of her purpose in entering the war. On 8 February, M. Krupensky, the Russian Ambassador at Tokio, telegraphed to Petrograd as follows (Italics now added).

" I never omit an opportunity for representing to the minister for foreign affairs the desirability, in the interests of Japan herself, of China's intervention in the war, and only last week I had a conversation with him on the subject. Today I again pointed out to him that the present moment was particularly favorable, in view of the position taken up by the United States, and the proposal made by them to the neutral Powers to follow their example, and more particularly in view of the recent speeches of the American minister at Peking. Viscount Motono replied that he would be the first to welcome a rupture between China and Germany, and would not hesitate to take steps in this direction at Peking if he were sure that the Chinese Government would go in that direction. So far, however, he had no such assurance, and he feared lest unsuccessful representations at Peking might do harm to the Allies. He promised me to sound the attitude of Peking without delay, and, in case of some hope of success, to propose to the cabinet to take a decision in the desired direction.

" On the other hand, the minister pointed out the necessity for him, in view of the attitude of Japanese public opinion on the subject, *as well as with a view to safeguard Japan's position at the future peace conference if China should be admitted to it, of securing the support of the Allied Powers to the desires of Japan in respect of Shantung and the Pacific islands.* These desires are for the succession to all the rights and privileges hitherto possessed by Germany in the Shantung province, and for the acquisition of the islands to the north of the equator which are now occupied by the Japanese.

[33] Gibbons, *The New Map of Asia*, pp. 503–4; Cocks, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–1.
[34] Cocks, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
[35] Millard, *op. cit.*, pp. 105, 110–11.

"Motono plainly told me that the Japanese Government would like to receive at once the promise of the Imperial [Russian] Government to support the above desires of Japan. In order to give a push to the highly important question of a break between China and Germany, I regard it as very desirable that the Japanese should be given the promise they ask; this the more so as, so far as can be seen here, the relations between Great Britain and Japan have been of late such as to justify a surmise that the Japanese aspirations would not meet with any objections on the part of the London cabinet." [36]

To the Japanese requirement of support in her designs, the British government made prompt reply (16 February), bargaining, at the same time, for Japanese support with reference to British desire for acquisition of some islands. The British Ambassador said that:

"His Majesty's Government accede with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being understood that the Japanese Government will in the eventual peace settlement treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator." [37]

On 19 February, Viscount Motono (Japanese Foreign Minister) addressed to the Russian and French Ambassadors at Tokio identical notes declaring that:

"in view of recent developments in the general situation, and in view of the particular arrangements concerning peace conditions, such as arrangements relative to the disposition of the Bosphorus, Constantinople, and the Dardanelles,[38] being already under discussion by the Powers interested, the Imperial Japanese Government believes that the moment has come for it also to express its desires relative to certain conditions of peace essential to Japan and to submit them for the consideration of the Government of the French Republic.

"The French Government is thoroughly informed of all the efforts the Japanese Government has made in a general manner to accomplish

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[36] Millard, *op. cit.*, pp. 106–7; Cocks, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–5.

[37] *Current History*, X, Pt. 1, pp. 441–2; Dillon, *The Inside Story of the Peace Conference*, p. 339. It may well be assumed that none of the negotiating Powers overlooked the political and economic advantage of the extrusion of Germany from China. In a telegram of 9 March to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, containing instructions with regard to the impending conference of the Allies, the Russian Foreign Minister said that "the question of driving the Germans out of the Chinese market is of very great importance, but must be postponed till Japan could have a representative present": Loreburn, *How the War Came*, p. 295.

[38] The allusion is to the arrangement of two years before by which the United Kingdom and France agreed that at the conclusion of peace Russia should have Constantinople, &c.

its task in the present war, and particularly to guarantee for the future the peace of Oriental Asia and the security of the Japanese Empire, for which it is absolutely necessary to take from Germany its bases of political, military, and economic activity in the Far East.

"Under these conditions, the Imperial Japanese Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace negotiations the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean.

"The Imperial Japanese Government confidently hopes the Government of the French Republic, realizing the legitimacy of these demands, will give assurance that, her case being proved, Japan may count upon its full support on this question." [39]

It will be observed that in these notes there is no suggestion of Shantung being passed on to China. No assurance of support for that purpose would have been required. The next day, the Russian Ambassador gave the required undertaking.[40] The French reply (1 March) intimated assent, but contained the following:

"M. Briand demands, on the other hand, that Japan give its support to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. The consequence of this in China should be the following:

"First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and Consuls.

"Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave Chinese territory.

"Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the disposition of the Allies following the example of Italy and Portugal. According to the information of the French Government, there are fifteen German ships in Chinese ports totalling about 40,000 tons." [41]

On 23 March, Italy undertook to raise no objection to Japanese acquisition of the properties.[42] Not waiting for this last assurance, Japan withdrew her opposition to Chinese intervention in the war, and China (14 March) handed the German Ambassador his passports.[43]

On 6 April, the American Congress adopted a resolution declaring war on Germany. That China did not at once follow the American

[39] *Current History*, X, Pt. 1, p. 442.

[40] Gibbons, *op. cit.*, p. 506; *Current History*, X, Pt. 1, p. 443. Motono seems to have required more formal assurance, and on 1 March asked the Ambassador if he had heard from Petrograd (Millard, *op. cit.*, p. 107; Cocks, *op. cit.*, p. 85). On the 21st, the request was complied with (Cocks, *op. cit.*, pp. 85–6). The outbreak of the revolution in Russia was probably the reason for the delay.

[41] *Current History*, X, Pt. 1, p. 442.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 443.

[43] Gibbons, *op. cit.*, p. 514.

example was due partly to internal considerations which need not now be considered.[44] It is sufficient to say that at length (14 August) China issued her declaration of war.

The Peace Treaty. Disposition of German territories being one of the items for settlement at the Peace Conference, and four of the Great Powers being pledged to allot the Shantung interests and the islands north of the equator to Japan, articles 156–58 of the treaty effected the transfer of the former, and a mandate gave control over the latter.[45] President Wilson (who theretofore had never heard of the agreements) offered objection, but (probably under Japan's threat to withdraw from the Conference) finally accepted some sort of assurance from Japan of her intention to return the territory to China, and assented.[46] He appears to have desired that the promise should be embodied in the treaty; but Japan declined, and neither in nor outside the treaty would she agree to fix a time for the fulfillment of her asserted purposes. In what terms the assurance was couched has not been revealed.[47] And in his evidence before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, said that:

"President Wilson alone approved the Shantung decision; that the other members of the American delegation made no protest against it; and that President Wilson alone knows whether Japan has guaranteed to return Shantung to China." [48]

Outside the Peace Conference, the cession to Japan was generally and bitterly assailed. That it was quite in line with much else that was done was usually overlooked. An American journal, describing the interest aroused, said:

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[44] See Millard, *op. cit.*, pp. 111, 114–6, 123–35; Gibbons, *op. cit.*, pp. 445–9.

[45] The mandate not having been concurred in by the United States (one of the five Powers to whom the German colonies had been assigned by the peace treaty) its provisions were the subject of subsequent negotiations.

[46] *Cf.* cap. XVIII of Mr. Lansing's book, *The Peace Negotiations*, pp. 243–67.

[47] At the Peace Conference at Paris, Baron Makino, as head of the Japanese delegation, issued the following: "Japan is now pledged to return to China this harbor and port built with German money, together with the territory of Kiaochou, which China will receive eighty years sooner than she could possibly have secured it. The treaty of 1915, under which this restoration is to be made, contains no secret clauses, and an agreement entered into in September 1918, regarding future Chino-Japanese co-operation in Shantung contains no stipulation which is more or less than a just and mutually helpful settlement of outstanding questions" (Millard, *op. cit.*, p. 83). But pledge of that sort was valueless, for the "treaty" and the "agreement" referred to had been repudiated by China as having been forced upon her. Dr. Dillon has alleged that, at the Peace Conference, Japan on three occasions gave specific promises to transfer the Shantung property to China (*The Inside Story of the Peace Conference*, p. 340); but the only statement he quotes is the following: "The acquisition of property belonging to one nation which it is the intention of the country acquiring it to exploit to its sole advantage is not conducive to amity or good will" (p. 336).

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 340.

"Shantung was at least a moral explosion. It blew down the front of the temple, and now everybody sees that behind the front there was a very busy market." [49]

China's protest may be seen in *Current History*, X, Pt. 1, pp. 444–6.

Why did Japan Enter the War? The question, Why did Japan enter the war? is easily answered.

1. It was not because of obligation under her treaty with the United Kingdom. Existence of obligation was mere pretence and excuse.

2. One reason for Japan's declaration of war was, as Baron Kato said, that Germany's possession of Kiao-Chou "conflicted with the more immediate interests of our own Empire." [50]

3. The other reason was Japan's desire to possess herself of Kiao-Chou; the associated German possessions; and German islands in the south Pacific.

The situation is not unfamiliar. In earlier days, the United Kingdom had to get rid of French association in Egypt; France had to get rid of British, Italian, and German interests in Morocco; Italy had to get rid of British, French, German, and Austro-Hungarian opposition in Tripoli and Cyrenaica; and, quite in accordance with precedent, Japan, taking opportunity by the forelock, bargained for assent of the Allies to her acquisitions in China. From the point of view of current international morality, no fault can be found with the operation. *Sacro egoismo* is as useful a principle in Japan as in Italy [51] and elsewhere. Might is right as well in China as in the Balkans and elsewhere. Nations "act upon their own interests," and disregard or misinterpret treaties.[52] The United Kingdom pretended that she was under obligation to defend Belgium. And Japan took vast interests in Shantung from Germany, on the pretence that she was fulfilling an obligation to the United Kingdom.

Sino-Japanese Settlement. The treaty between China and Japan of 4 February 1922 [53] necessitates no alteration in what has been said. While it is true that Japan has, in large measure, agreed to transfer the Shantung properties to China, much is left to negotiation between the two Powers, and certain properties in Kiao-Chou are to be retained by Japan. Japan is to transfer to China the Tsing-tao-Tsinanfu Railway. And:

"*Article XV.* China undertakes to reimburse to Japan the actual value of all the Railway properties mentioned in the preceding article.

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[49] *Ibid.*, p. 341.

[50] *Ante*, p. 377.

[51] See cap. VII.

[52] *Cf.* Address by James Brown Scott: Am. Soc. Int. Law, Predgs., 1917, pp. 101–7.

[53] *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, XVI, Supp., pp. 84–90; *Current History*, XV, pp. 1030–33.

The actual value to be so reimbursed shall consist of the sum of fifty-three million, four hundred and six thousand, one hundred and forty-one (53,406,141) gold Marks (which is the assessed value of such portion of the said properties as was left behind by the Germans), or its equivalent, plus the amount which Japan, during her administration of the Railway, has actually expended for permanent improvements on or additions to the said properties, less a suitable allowance for depreciation."

"*Article XVIII.* To effect the reimbursement under Article XV of the present treaty, China shall deliver to Japan simultaneously with the completion of the transfer of the Railway properties, Chinese Government Treasury Notes, secured on the properties and revenues of the Railway, and running for a period of fifteen years, but redeemable whether in whole or in part, at the option of China at the end of five years from the date of the delivery of the said Treasury Notes, or at any time thereafter upon six months' previous notice.

"*Article XIX.* Pending the redemption of the said Treasury Notes under the preceding Article, the Government of the Chinese Republic will select and appoint, for so long a period as any part of the said Treasury Notes shall remain unredeemed, a Japanese subject to be Traffic Manager, and another Japanese subject to be Chief Accountant jointly with the Chinese Chief Accountant and with co-ordinate functions. These officials shall all be under the direction, control, and supervision of the Chinese Managing Director, and removable for cause."

One of four special understandings, as recorded in the minutes of the conversations and explained by the American Secretary of State at the plenary session of 1 February, was as follows:

"The redemption of the Treasury Notes under Article XVIII of the Treaty will not be effected with funds raised from any source other than Chinese." [54]

In other words, China has to pay Japan the sum mentioned for a railway to which Japan had no title, as a method (presumably) of making China, instead of Germany, pay the Japanese war-expenditure; and until China can pay that amount without borrowing, Japan retains a fairly tight hold on the railway.

Of more importance (for present purposes) than are the terms of the treaty is the fact that if China had been unsupported in her negotiations with Japan, no such terms, hard as they are, could have been secured. Previous to the meeting at Washington, Japan stood upon her "treaty rights" and her twenty-one demands, while China insisted that the "rights" had been obtained by coercion, and that the demands were unconscionable. Facing the world at Washington, Japan was much more reasonable.

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[54] *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, XVI, p. 93; *Current History*, XV, p. 1034.

CHAPTER XII

WHY DID THE UNITED STATES ENTER THE WAR?

ALTHOUGH it is perfectly clear that the United States entered the war in defence of American lives and property as against attack by German submarines,[1] that is by no means the generally accepted view. It is much too self-regarding. It supplies no basis for self-laudation. Nobler and more magnanimous motives have been substituted for it. Reiterated pæans of self-applause have made assertion of it extremely unpopular. The inexorable facts, nevertheless, remain. Note them as they occurred in the two periods: (1) prior to the declaration of war; and (2) at the time of the declaration; and contrast them with (3) the subsequent assertions.

PRIOR TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR

Mr. President Wilson stated in his address to the Chamber of Deputies in Brussels, on 19 June 1919, that:

" it was the violation of Belgium that awakened the world to the realization of the character of the struggle." [2]

In other words, on 4 August 1914 (the day of the invasion of Belgium), the world realized that it had become necessary, as Mr. Wilson afterward said:[3]

" to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power."

If that be the fact, the course pursued by the President and the language which he used are inexplicable. In a letter to the Kaiser, for example, of 16 September of the same year, he said:

" I speak thus frankly because I know that you will expect and wish me to do so as one friend speaks to another, and because I feel sure that such a reservation of judgment until the end of the war, when all its events and circumstances can be seen in their entirety and in their true relations, will commend itself to you as a true expression of sincere neutrality." [4]

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[1] *Cf.* Scott: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, p. viii.
[2] *N. Y. Times*, 20 June 1919.
[3] *Post*, p. 401.
[4] *Current History*, I, p. 375.

Shortly afterwards, in his address to Congress (1 December 1914) — four months after "the violation of Belgium" — he expressed the friendship of the United States with all other nations — including Germany — as follows:

"We are at peace with all the world. No one who speaks counsel based on fact, or drawn from a just and candid interpretation of realities, can say that there is reason to fear that from any quarter our independence, or the integrity of our territory, is threatened. Dread of the power of any other nation we are incapable of. We are not jealous of rivalry in the fields of commerce, or of any other peaceful achievement. We mean to live our lives as we will; but we mean also to let live. We are, indeed, a true friend to all the nations of the world, because we threaten none, covet the possession of none, desire the overthrow of none. Our friendship can be accepted, and is accepted without reservation, because it is offered in a spirit, and for a purpose which no one need ever question or suspect. Therein lies our greatness." [5]

On 27 January of the next year (1915), Mr. Wilson sent birthday congratulations to the Kaiser:

"On behalf of the Government and people of the United States, I have the pleasure to extend to Your Majesty cordial felicitations on this anniversary of your birth, as well as my own good wishes for your welfare." [6]

On 4 February 1915, the German Government notified the United States that, by way of retaliation for the British declaration of a war-zone in the North Sea, it:

"will prevent by all the military means at its disposal all navigation by the enemy in those waters. To this end, it will endeavor to destroy, after February 18 next, any merchant vessels of the enemy which present themselves at the seat of war above indicated, although it may not always be possible to avert the dangers which may menace persons and merchandise. Neutral Powers are accordingly forewarned not to continue to intrust their crews, passengers, or merchandise to such vessels. Their attention is furthermore called to the fact that it is of urgency to recommend to their own vessels to steer clear of these waters. It is true that the German Navy has received instructions to abstain from all violence against neutral vessels recognizable as such; but in view of the hazards of war, and of the misuse of the neutral flag ordered by the British Government, it will not always be possible to prevent a neutral vessel from becoming the victim of an attack intended to be directed against a vessel of the enemy." [7]

In the course of his reply (10 February), the American Secretary of State said:

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[5] Scott: *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, p. 79.

[6] *The Ottawa Journal*. A similar message was sent in 1916.

[7] Scott: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, pp. 26–7.

" The Government of the United States views these possibilities with such grave concern that it feels it to be its privilege, and indeed its duty in the circumstances, to request the Imperial German Government to consider, before action is taken, the critical situation in respect of the relations between this country and Germany which might arise were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Admiralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessels of the United States or cause the death of American citizens." [8]

The German Government protested (16 February) that its action:

" merely represents an act of self-defence which Germany's vital interests force her to take against England's method of conducting maritime war in defiance of international law, which no protest on the part of neutrals has availed to bring into accordance with the legal status generally recognized before the outbreak of hostilities. . . . It is conceded that the intention of all these aggressions is to cut off Germany from all supplies and thereby to deliver up to death by famine a peaceful civilian population, a procedure contrary to law of war and every dictate of humanity. . . . If England invokes the powers of famine as an ally in its struggles against Germany with the intention of leaving a civilized people the alternative of perishing in misery or submitting to the yoke of England's political and commercial will, the German Government are to-day determined to take up the gauntlet and to appeal to the same grim ally. They rely on the neutrals who have hitherto tacitly or under protest submitted to the consequences, detrimental to themselves, of England's war of famine to display not less tolerance toward Germany, even if the German measures constitute new forms of maritime war, as has hitherto been the case with the English measures. . . . Proceeding from these points of view the German Admiralty has declared the zone prescribed by it the seat of war; it will obstruct this area of maritime war by mines wherever possible, and also endeavor to destroy the merchant vessels of the enemy in any other way.

" It is very far indeed from the intention of the German Government, acting in obedience to these compelling circumstances, ever to destroy neutral lives and neutral property, but on the other hand, they cannot be blind to the fact that dangers arise through the action to be carried out against England which menace without discrimination all trade within the area of maritime war. This applies as a matter of course to war-mines, which place any ship approaching a mined area in danger, even if the limits of international law are adhered to most strictly.

" The German Government believe that they are all the more justified in the hope that the neutral powers will become reconciled with this, just as they have with the serious injury caused them thus far by England's measures, because it is their will to do everything in any way compatible

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–8.

with the accomplishment of their purpose for the protection of neutral shipping even within the area of maritime war.

"They furnish the first proof their good will by announcing the measures intended by them at a time not less than two weeks beforehand, in order to give neutral shipping an opportunity to make the necessary arrangements to avoid the threatening danger. The safest method of doing this is to stay away from the area of maritime war. Neutral ships entering the closed waters in spite of this announcement, given so far in advance, and which seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military purpose against England, bear their own responsibility for any unfortunate accidents. The German Government on their side expressly decline all responsibility for such accidents and their consequences. . . . The German Government resign themselves to the confident hope that the American Government will recognize the full meaning of the severe struggle which Germany is conducting for her very existence, and will gain full understanding of the reasons which prompt Germany and the aims of the measures announced by her from the above explanations and promises." [9]

The American Secretary of State thereupon fruitlessly proposed (20 February) friendly conciliation of British and German methods.

Knowledge of "the character of the struggle" and the receipt of the German notification did not prevent the President saying in an address to the Associated Press, New York, 20 April 1915:

"We are, therefore, able to understand all nations; we are able to understand them in the compound, not separately, as partisans, but unitedly as knowing and comprehending and embodying them all. It is in that sense that I mean that America is a meditating Nation. The opinion of America, the action of America, is ready to turn, and free to turn, in any direction." [10]

Shortly afterwards, following upon the destruction of the *Falaba* (28 March), and the *Gulflight* (1 May), came the sinking of the *Lusitania* (7 May) with the death of more than one hundred American citizens. Nevertheless, while sending a protest to Germany, the American Secretary of State accompanied it (13 May) with a character-testimonial in the following form:

"Recalling the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the Imperial German Government in matters of international right, and particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; having learned to recognize the German views and the German influence in the field of international obligation as always engaged upon the side of justice and humanity. . . . Long acquainted as this Government has been with the character of the Imperial German Government and with the high prin-

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[9] Scott: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, pp. 29–35.
[10] Scott: *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, p. 87.

ciples of equity by which they have in the past been actuated and guided, the Government of the United States cannot believe that the commanders of the vessels which committed these acts of lawlessness did so, except under a misapprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial German naval authorities." [11]

That was written and forwarded nine months after "the violation of Belgium." In the various public speeches of the President during the rest of the year, no reference was made to the German attacks. Even in his annual address to Congress on 7 December 1915, no word of condemnation can be found. On the contrary, in his address at the Manhattan Club on 4 November, he said:

"No thoughtful man feels any panic haste in this matter. The country is not threatened from any quarter. She stands in friendly relations with all the world." [12]

The destruction of the *Sussex*, a French cross-Channel steamer, entailing the death of several Americans (24 March 1916), produced a somewhat sharp note from the American Secretary of State (18 April) in which he said that:

"the Government of the United States is forced by recent events to conclude that it is only one instance, even though one of the most extreme and most distressing instances, of the deliberate method and spirit of indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations which have become more and more unmistakable as the activity of German undersea vessels of war has, in recent months, been quickened and extended. . . . The Government of the United States has been very patient. . . . It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions, and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation. It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the German Imperial Government that that time has come. . . . If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines, without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether." [13]

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[11] Scott: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, pp. 44, 46.
[12] Scott: *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, p. 121.
[13] Scott: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, pp. 84–6.

In reply, the German Government, while insisting upon the necessity for continuation of submarine warfare, announced (4 May) its determination:

"to make a further concession in adapting the methods of submarine warfare to the interests of neutrals. . . . The German Government, moreover, is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents, thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which the German Government believes, now as before, to be in agreement with the Government of the United States. The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that the German naval forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance."

The new policy was, however, made contingent upon the United States insisting that:

"the British Government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law universally recognized before the war, as they are laid down in the notes presented by the Government of the United States to the British Government on December 28, 1914, and November 5, 1915. Should the steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain the object it desires to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government will then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve itself complete liberty of decision." [14]

The Secretary of State replied (8 May) that, accepting:

"the Imperial Government's declaration of its abandonment of the policy which has so seriously menaced the good relations between the two countries, the Government of the United States will rely upon a scrupulous execution henceforth of the now altered policy of the Imperial Government, such as will remove the principal danger to an interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany."

At the same time, the Secretary declared that the United States:

"cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way, or in the slightest degree, be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and noncombatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative." [15]

On 27 May, in the course of an address to *The League to Enforce Peace*, Mr. Wilson said:

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 91, 93–4.

[15] Scott: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, pp. 94–5.

"We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the rest of the nations of Europe and of Asia."

Referring to the war, he made the astounding statement that:

"With its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountain from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for, or to explore." [16]

The German note of 31 January 1917 indicated a complete change of policy. Throwing the blame upon the intensified rigor of the methods of the *entente* Powers, the United States was notified that:

"Under these circumstances Germany will meet the illegal measures of her enemies by forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to England, and from and to France, etc. All ships met within that zone will be sunk." [17]

THE DECLARATION OF WAR PERIOD

Thereupon the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the Secretary of State announcing (3 February 1917) as follows:

"In view of this declaration, which withdraws, suddenly and without prior intimation, the solemn assurance given in the Imperial Government's note of May 4, 1916, this Government has no alternative consistent with the dignity and honor of the United States but to take the course which it explicitly announced in its note of April 18, 1916, it would take in the event that the Imperial Government did not declare and effect an abandonment of the methods of submarine warfare then employed, and to which the Imperial Government now purpose again to resort.

"The President has, therefore, directed me to announce to Your Excellency that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed, and that the American Ambassador at Berlin will be immediately withdrawn, and in accordance with such announcement to deliver to Your Excellency your passports." [18]

On the same day, in an address to Congress, the President said:

"Notwithstanding this unexpected action of the German Government, this sudden and deeply deporable renunciation of its assurances given this Government at one of the most critical moments of tension in the relations of the two governments, I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. I cannot bring myself to believe that

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[16] Scott: *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, p. 190.

[17] Scott: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, p. 301.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

they will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own, or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them, and destroy American ships and take the lives of American citizens in the wilful prosecution of the ruthless naval programme they have announced their intention to adopt. Only actual overt acts on their part will make me believe it even now." [19]

On the 26th of the same month (February), the President again addressed Congress. The "overt acts" had not yet occurred, but apprehensions had increased:

"No thoughtful man can fail to see that the necessity for definite action may come at any time, if we are in fact, and not in word merely, to defend our elementary rights as a neutral nation. It would be most imprudent to be unprepared. . . . No one doubts what it is our duty to do. We must defend our commerce and the lives of our people in the midst of the present trying circumstances, with discretion but with clear and steadfast purpose. Only the method and the extent remain to be chosen, upon the occasion, if occasion should indeed arise. Since it has unhappily proved impossible to safeguard our neutral rights by diplomatic means against the unwarranted infringements they are suffering at the hands of Germany, there may be no recourse but to *armed* neutrality, which we shall know how to maintain, and for which there is abundant American precedent. . . . I am not now proposing or contemplating war, or any steps that may lead to it." [20]

On 23 March, Germany gave notice of extension of the submarine blockade to that part of the Arctic ocean lying east of the 24th degree of east longtitude and south of the 75th degree of north latitude.[21] On 2 April, the President in an address to Congress, said:

"When I addressed the Congress on the twenty-sixth of February last I thought that it would suffice to assert our neutral rights with arms, our right to use the seas against unlawful interference, our right to keep our people safe against unlawful violence. But armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping, it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed that merchantmen would defend themselves against privateers or cruisers, visible craft giving chase upon the open sea. It is common prudence in such circumstances, grim necessity indeed, to endeavor to destroy them before they have shown their own intention. They must be dealt with upon sight, if dealt with at all. . . . With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesi-

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[19] Scott: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, p. 308.
[20] Scott: *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, pp. 264–5.
[21] Scott: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, pp. 309–10.

tating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war." [22]

Acting upon the recommendation of the President, Congress adopted the following joint resolution (6 April):

"Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America, Therefore be it

"*Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States, and the resources of the Government, to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States." [23]

SUBSEQUENT TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR

The foregoing recital appears to make indisputable the thesis with which we started — that the United States entered the war in defence of American lives and property against the operations of German submarines; and we are now to notice the transformation from praise of "the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the Imperial German Government in matters of international right,"

to condemnation of "autocratic governments" in which "we can never have a friend"; and from the war-motive of mere self-defence, to actuation by regard for "suffering humanity" and "the civilization of the world."

Losing no time, in the same speech in which he had recommended war, the President supplied clever cues which the press and the platform assiduously developed. He said:

"Our object now, as then,[24] is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power, and to set up among the really free and self-governed peoples of the

[22] Scott: *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, pp. 277–9.

[23] Scott: *Diplomatic Correspondence*, pp. 338–9.

[24] The reference is to his speech of 26 February.

world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles. Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved, and the freedom of its peoples, and the menace to that peace and freedom lies in the existence of autocratic governments."

"A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic governments could be trusted to keep faith within it, or observe its covenants. . . . One of the things that has served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies, and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries, and our commerce."

"We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government following such methods, we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power, always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. . . . The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty."

"But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts — for democracy; for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments; for the rights and liberties of small nations; for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free." [25]

During the two years and eight months of neutrality — the period which had elapsed since
"the violation of Belgium" had "awakened the world to the realization of the character of the struggle" —
no such language had appeared to the President to be appropriate. On the contrary, he had proffered friendship with Germany; had praised its "high principles of equity"; had sent "cordial felicitations" to the Kaiser; had declared that America was "free to turn in any direction"; had repudiated interest in the causes and objects of the war; and had refused to believe evil intentions on the part of Germany until proved by "actual overt acts." Shortly after the declaration of war, in an address at the dedication of the Red Cross building, Washington (12 May), Mr. Wilson gave further fillip to popular enthusiasm, and further evidence of his insincerity (chargeable, let us say, to war-necessity), by making the following astonishing statements:

[25] *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, pp. 281, 282–3, 284–5, 287.

"I say the heart of the country is in this war because it would not have gone into it if its heart had not been prepared for it. It would not have gone into it if it had not first believed that here was an opportunity to express the character of the United States. We have gone in with no special grievance of our own, because we have always said that we were the friends and servants of mankind. . . . We look for no profit. We look for no advantage. . . . We go because we believe that the very principles upon which the American Republic was founded are now at stake and must be vindicated." [26]

Waxing much more violent and reckless, Mr. Wilson, in his Flag Day address (14 June 1917), expanded his charges against Germany as follows:

"It is plain enough how we were forced into the war. The extraordinary insults and aggressions of the Imperial German Government left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms in defense of our rights as a free people and of our honor as a sovereign government. The military masters of Germany denied us the right to be neutral. They filled our unsuspecting communities with vicious spies and conspirators, and sought to corrupt the opinion of our people in their own behalf. When they found that they could not do that, their agents diligently spread sedition amongst us, and sought to draw our own citizens from their allegiance — and some of those agents were men connected with the official Embassy of the German Government itself in our own capital. They sought by violence to destroy our industries, and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw Japan into a hostile alliance with her — and that, not by indirection, but by direct suggestion from the Foreign Office in Berlin. They impudently denied us the use of the high seas, and repeatedly executed their threat that they would send to death any of our people who ventured to approach the coasts of Europe. And many of our own people were corrupted. Men began to look upon their own neighbors with suspicion, and to wonder in their hot resentment and surprise whether there was any community in which hostile intrigue did not lurk. What great nation in such circumstances would not have taken up arms? Much as we had desired peace, it was denied us, and not of our own choice. The flag under which we serve would have been dishonored had we withheld our hand.

"But that is only part of the story. We know now as clearly as before we were ourselves engaged that we are not enemies of the German people, and that they are not our enemies. They did not originate or desire this hideous war or wish that we should be drawn into it; and we are vaguely conscious that we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it, as well as our own. They are themselves in the grip of the

[26] Scott: *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, p. 297.

same sinister power that has now at last stretched its ugly talons out and drawn blood from us. The whole world is at war because the whole world is in the grip of that power and is trying out the great battle which shall determine whether it is to be brought under mastery or fling itself free.

"The war was begun by the military masters of Germany, who proved to be also the masters of Austria-Hungary. These men had never regarded nations as peoples, men, women, and children of like blood and frame as themselves, for whom governments existed and in whom governments had their life. They have regarded them merely as serviceable organizations which they could by force or intrigue bend or corrupt to their own purpose. They have regarded the smaller states, in particular, and the peoples who could be overwhelmed by force, as their natural tools and instruments of domination. Their purpose has long been avowed. The statesmen of other nations, to whom that purpose was incredible, paid little attention; regarded what German professors expounded in their class-rooms and German writers set forth to the world as the goal of German policy as rather the dream of minds detached from practical affairs, as preposterous private conceptions of German destiny, rather than as the actual plans of responsible rulers; but the rulers of Germany themselves knew all the while what concrete plans, what well advanced intrigues lay back of what the professors and the writers were saying, and were glad to go forward unmolested, filling the thrones of Balkan states with German princes, putting German officers at the service of Turkey to drill her armies and make interest with her government, developing plans of sedition and rebellion in India and Egypt, setting their fires in Persia. The demands made by Austria upon Servia were a mere single step in a plan which compassed Europe and Asia, from Berlin to Bagdad." [27] Than this and the quotation which follows, there can be found, in the literary product of war-disturbed mentality, no wilder exhibitions of foolish rhodomontade. Nevertheless, they suited the occasion, and they answered the purpose — the implantation of war fervor.

In an address to Congress on 4 December 1917, Mr. Wilson said:

"I believe that I speak for them when I say two things: First, that this intolerable Thing of which the masters of Germany have shown us the ugly face, this menace of combined intrigue and force which we now see so clearly as the German power, a Thing without conscience or honor or capacity for covenanted peace, must be crushed, and, if it be not utterly brought to an end, at least shut out from the friendly intercourse of the nations; and, second, that when this Thing and its power are indeed defeated and the time comes that we can discuss peace . . . we shall be willing and glad to pay the full price for peace, and pay it ungrudgingly."

[27] Scott: *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, pp. 309–11.

"We can do this with all the greater zeal and enthusiasm because we know that for us this is a war of high principle, debased by no selfish ambition of conquest or spoliation; because we know, and all the world knows, that we have been forced into it to save the very institutions we live under from corruption and destruction. The purposes of the Central Powers strike straight at the very heart of everything we believe in; their methods of warfare outrage every principle of humanity and of knightly honor; their intrigue has corrupted the very thought and spirit of many of our people; their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our very territory away from us and disrupt the Union of the States. Our safety would be at an end, our honor forever sullied and brought into contempt were we to permit their triumph. They are striking at the very existence of democracy and liberty." [28]

And, reversing his assertion that with the causes and objects of the war "we are not concerned," Mr. Wilson, in an address to Congress on 12 February 1918, gave to the crowd this lead also:

"This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life." [29]

In adopting his altered phraseology, the President was, no doubt, acting upon the principle formulated by M. Ollivier, the head of the French government in 1870 — when war has become inevitable, it is our duty to make it popular.[30] What better pleas than that: "we have no special grievance of our own;" that we are fighting "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice;" "for the rights and liberties of small nations;" "for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments;" for the release of "the whole world" from "that power;" for the overthrow of "autocratic governments;" for "the very principles upon which the American Republic was founded;" for the suppression of spies, intrigues, and secret diplomacy, in order that the world may "be made safe for democracy?"

Many Americans contemned the responding and resounding popular chorus, but it remained for Colonel Harvey (the Ambassador at London appointed by the new President) conspicuously to challenge it all in a notably courageous speech at the annual dinner of the Pilgrims Society (London, 19 May 1921). He said:

"Even to this day, at rare intervals, an ebullient sophomore seeks applause and wins a smile by shouting that 'we won the war.' Far more prevalent until recently was the impression — and this was, and

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[28] *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, pp. 341–2, 352.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 369.
[30] See *post*, cap. XVIII.

still is, in a measure sincere — that we went into the war to rescue humanity from all kinds of menacing perils. Not a few remain convinced that we sent our young soldiers across the sea to save this kingdom, and France, and Italy. That is not the fact. We sent them solely to save the United States of America. We were not too proud to fight, whatever that may mean. We were not afraid to fight. That is the real truth of the matter. And so we came along toward the end and helped you and your Allies to shorten the war. That is all we did, and all we claim to have done." [31]

But the truth was explosively unpopular in the United States, and President Harding, by way of dissociating himself from it, when alluding to deceased soldiers, said (23 May 1921):

"These heroes . . . saw democracy challenged and defended it. They saw civilization threatened and rescued it." [32]

A few days afterwards (29 May), he said:

"We unsheathed a sword in behalf of suffering humanity and were brought into a supreme and sublime effort to save the civilization of the world." [33]

Mr. Charles E. Hughes, Mr. Harding's Secretary of State, in an address at Brown University added his contradiction of Colonel Harvey:

"Our men did not go forth to fight for this nation as one of imperialistic designs and cunning purpose, or to protect a land where avarice might find its surest reward. They offered their lives, and all the energies of the country were harnessed in the supreme effort, because we loved the institutions of liberty and intended to maintain them, because we hated tyranny and the brutality and ruthlessness which found expression in the worship of force, and because we found our fate linked with that of the free peoples who were struggling for the preservation of the essentials of freedom. With them we made common cause, and, as from one end of the country to the other, rang appeals in the name of civilization itself, the whole nation responded. . . . It was America, the exemplar of free institutions, aiding humanity in their preservation, that called forth the supreme endeavor." [34]

But the truth, nevertheless, survived, and it was the same Mr. Hughes who, at the Washington Conference (November 1921–February 1922) read to its members a memorandum in which was the following:

"The unlimited use of submarines by Germany against commerce brought down upon her the wrath of the world, solidified it against the common enemy, and was undoubtedly the popular cause of the United States entering the war." [35]

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[31] *The Times* (London), 20 May 1921.
[32] *N. Y. Times*, 1 June 1921.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *N. Y. Times*, 16 June 1921.
[35] *Current History*, XV, p. 705.

Why did the United States enter the war of 1914–18? There ought to be, one would imagine, some simple and unanimously agreed reason. But, as a matter of fact, while Congress confined itself to an unqualified statement of the simple truth, Americans, like other people, want to believe that they were actuated by generous, unselfish, and heroic motives; that they were fighting for liberty and democracy and civilization — that they were "aiding humanity in their preservation," &c., &c. Some excuse for pandering to crowd-desire of that sort existed during the war.

CHAPTER XIII

WHY DID CANADA ENTER THE WAR?

Offer of Assistance, 408. — The Motive, 409. — The Chain, 410. — The Future, 411.

Offer of Assistance. On 1 August 1914 (The United Kingdom was not at war until the 4th), Canada's Governor General sent a cable message to the Colonial Secretary as follows:

"In view of the impending danger of war involving the Empire, my Advisers are anxiously considering the most effective means of rendering every possible aid, and they will welcome any suggestions and advice which Imperial Naval and Military authorities may deem it expedient to offer. They are confident that a considerable force would be available for service abroad. A question has been mooted respecting the status of any Canadian force serving abroad as, under section sixty-nine of the Canadian Militia Act, the active militia can only be placed on active service beyond Canada for the defence thereof. It has been suggested that regiments might enlist as Imperial troops for stated period, Canadian Government undertaking to make all necessary financial provision for their equipment, pay and maintenance. This proposal has not yet been maturely considered here, and my advisers would be glad to have views of Imperial Government thereon." [1]

On the same day, the Governor General sent another cable, as follows:

"My Advisers while expressing their most earnest hope that peaceful solution of existing international difficulties may be achieved, and their strong desire to co-operate in every possible way for that purpose, wish me to convey to His Majesty's Government, the firm assurance that, if unhappily war should ensue, the Canadian people will be united in a common resolve to put forth every effort, and to make every sacrifice necessary to ensure the integrity and maintain the honor of our Empire." [2]

On the 4th, King George cabled all the Dominions as follows:

"I desire to express to my people of the Overseas Dominions with what appreciation and pride I have received the messages from their respective Governments during the last few days. These spontaneous assurances of their fullest support recalled to me the generous self-sacrificing help given by them in the past to the Mother Country. I shall be strengthened in the discharge of the great responsibilities which rest

[1] Canada: *Docs. relating to the European War*, p. 41.

[2] *Ibid.*

upon me by the confident belief that, in this time of trial, my Empire will stand united, calm, resolute, trusting in God." [3]

The Canadian Governor General replied:

"In the name of the Dominion of Canada, I humbly thank Your Majesty for your gracious message of approval. Canada stands united from the Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to uphold the honor and tradition of our Empire." [4]

Early on the 4th, Germany crossed the Belgian frontier; and on the same day, the Colonial Secretary cabled to the Governor General:

"Though there seems to be no immediate necessity for any request on our part for an expeditionary force from Canada, I think, in view of their generous offer, your Ministers would be wise to take all legislative and other steps by which they would be enabled, without delay, to provide such a force in case it should be required later." [5]

On the 5th, the Governor General cabled to the Colonial Secretary:

"My Government being desirous of putting beyond doubt status of Canadian volunteers, request that His Majesty may be pleased to issue an order bringing these volunteers under Sections 175 and 176 of the Army Act." [6]

On the 6th, the Colonial Secretary cabled:

"With reference to my telegram of August 4th, His Majesty's Government gratefully accept offer of your Ministers to send expeditionary force to this country, and would be glad if it could be despatched as soon as possible. Suggested composition follows." [7]

On the 7th, the Colonial Secretary cabled:

"My telegram of 6th August, Army Council consider one division would be suitable composition of expeditionary force." [8]

The Motive. The motive actuating Canada's offer of assistance was not the Austro-Hungarian attack upon Serbia. Canada knew nothing of the merits of the Balkan quarrel, and, as we have already seen,[9] the United Kingdom had declared herself to be uninterested in a Balkan war.

Nor was it because of the invasion of Belgium. That did not occur until three days afterwards.

Nor was it because of the British "obligation of honour" to co-operate with France.[10] Canadians knew nothing of the secret arrangements in which it was embodied. Sir Edward Grey did not deliver his revealing speech until the 3d August.

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[3] *Ibid.*, p. 42.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[9] *Ante*, p. 113.
[10] *Ante*, pp. 115–122.

The only reason for the offer was Canada's political association with the United Kingdom.[11] Canada did not know what reason for entering the war would be alleged by the United Kingdom. Indeed, the British government had not decided to become belligerent. It was still considering what it would do if Belgium should be invaded.[12] Nevertheless:

"Canada stands united from the Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to uphold the honor and tradition of our Empire"

— so said the Canadian Government. And not one of its members had the slightest idea what was meant by the words — indeed, there was no meaning. Assertion that Canada's political association was the only reason for Canada entering the war, does not, of course, exclude operation of the sentiment which supported that association, or any feeling of pride in the association, or any belief in its advantages. What is meant is that but for the existence of the political association, the telegrams of 1 August would not have been sent.

The Chain. Lord Loreburn said in his notable book *How the War Came:*

"It arose in the way we all know. Serbia gave offence to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, cause of just offence, as our Ambassador admits in the published despatches. We had no concern in that quarrel, as Sir Edward Grey says in terms. But Russia, the protectress of Serbia, came forward to prevent her being utterly humiliated by Austria. We were not concerned in that quarrel either, as Sir Edward Grey also says. And then Russia called upon France under their treaty to help in the fight. France was not concerned in that quarrel any more than ourselves, as Sir Edward Grey informs us. But France was bound by a Russian treaty of which he did not know the terms, and then France called to us for help. We were tied by the relations which our Foreign Office had created, without apparently realizing that they had created them."[13]

Taking in inverse order the links by which Canada was dragged into the war, we have the following:

Canada entered the war because she was tied to the United Kingdom.

The United Kingdom entered the war in pursuance of obligation to France,[14] and in order to save France from subordination to Germany.

France entered the war because she was tied to Russia.

Autocratic Russia desired to occupy Constantinople, and, in order to block Germany and Austria-Hungary, aligned herself with Serbia.

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[11] At the Imperial War Conference of 1917, Mr. Massey, the Premier of New Zealand, said: "We came into the war as oversea Dominions of the Empire, because we are part of the Empire, and because the Empire to which we belong was being attacked": Proceedings, p. 45. The first reason was accurate. Everybody at the Conference knew that the second was not.

[12] *Ante*, pp. 132–5.

[13] Pp. 16, 17. And see p. 107.

[14] So Lord Loreburn, but see *ante*, cap. V, pp. 129–130.

And democratic Russia afterwards declared that she had no desire to occupy Constantinople or any other foreign territory — that the whole enterprise was a mere bit of Czaristic imperialism, which must be repudiated.[15] With this Russian declaration:

The reason for Russia entering the war stood acknowledged as a mistake.

The reason for France entering the war disappeared.

The reason for the United Kingdom entering the war ceased.

And the engulfment of Canada became a needless tragedy.

The Future. General Smuts, having on one occasion said that "The British Empire came to an end in 1914," afterwards explained himself by saying:

"What I meant was this: From unavoidable causes, Great Britain, on being suddenly thrust into the late war, was unable to consult the Dominions. She went on in the faith that they would not fail her, and trusted in their coming to her aid. But I do not think that can happen again. The self-governed Dominions in future must exercise the right to say whether, after full deliberation, they will join in a war in which any portion of the Empire may be engaged." [16]

Mr. Lloyd George is of different opinion. When speaking in the House of Commons (14 December 1921) on the Irish question, he said:

"The position of the Dominions in reference to external affairs has been completely revolutionized in the course of the last four years. I tried to call attention to that a few weeks ago when I made a statement. Since the war, the Dominions have been given equal rights with Great Britain in the control of the foreign policy of the Empire. . . . They said: 'You are putting us in this position — either we have to support you in a policy which we might or might not approve, or we have to desert the old country in the time of trouble. That is a dilemma in which you ought never to put us. Therefore in future you must consult us before the event.' That was right, that was just. That was advantageous to both parties. We acceded to it gladly.

"The machinery is the machinery of the British Government — the Foreign Office, the Ambassadors. The machinery must remain here. It

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[15] Prince Lvoff, in his manifesto of 9 April 1917, announced that: "The Government deems it to be its right and duty to declare now that free Russia does not aim at dominating other nations, at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying by force foreign territories; but that its object is to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny. The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to subjugate or to humiliate anyone": *Ann. Reg.*, 1917, p. [248. In the Russian declaration of the following month (1 May), the phrase "a peace without annexations or indemnities" first officially appeared: *ibid.*, p. [249. *Cf. The Nineteenth Century*, Nov. 1917, p. 1022.

[16] In conversation with Dr. Miller, Principal of Ridley College, St. Catharines, Ont.

is impossible that it could be otherwise, unless you had a Council of Empire, with representatives selected for the purpose. Apart from that, you must act through one instrument. The instrument of the foreign policy of the Empire is the British Foreign Office. That has been accepted by all the Dominions as inevitable. But they claim a voice in determining the lines of our future policy. At the last Imperial Conference they were there discussing our policy in Germany, our policy in Egypt, our policy in America, our policy all over the world, and we are now acting upon the mature, general decisions arrived at with the common consent of the whole Empire. The sole control of Britain over foreign policy is now vested in the Empire as a whole. That is a new fact, and I would point out what bearing it has upon the Irish controversy.

"The advantage to us is that joint control means joint responsibility, and when the burden of Empire has become so vast it is well that we should have the shoulders of these young giants under the burden to help us along. . . . Ireland will share the rights of the Empire and share the responsibilities of the Empire. She will take her part with other Free States in discussing the policy of the Empire. That, undoubtedly, commits her to responsibilities which I believe her people will honor, whatever may ensue as a result of the policy agreed upon in the Council Chamber of the Empire. That is a general summary of the main proposition which is involved in these Articles of Agreement. . . . We shall welcome her co-operation just as we would welcome the co-operation of the great Dominions in naval defence and in all the other defence that is necessary for the Empire."[17]

There is much objection to doctrine of that sort in Canada.

[17] Hansard, CXLIX, cols. 28–29, 30–31, 38; *The Lloyd George Liberal Magazine*, Jan. 1922, pp. 341–2, 345.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BELGIAN TREATY

BELGIAN HISTORY

THAT the United Kingdom did not enter the war because of the invasion of Belgium has been demonstrated in a previous chapter.[1] The following pages will be devoted to an exposition of the treaties of 1839 (usually referred to as the Belgian treaty) for the purpose of showing that the United Kingdom was not bound, by anything contained in them, to intervene in the war. And this is necessary, for, without it, notwithstanding what already has been said, many people will assert that the United Kingdom must have joined in the war because she was under obligation so to do.

Belgium in 1815. Freedom from menace on the North Sea coast having been the reason for British intervention in the war of Prussia and Austria against revolutionary France,[2] the most important question for the United Kingdom, on the conclusion of that war, was the disposition to be made of Belgium. Prior to the war, Holland had been

[1] Cap. V.

[2] *Post*, cap. XX.

(since 1648) an independent state, but Belgium had been first Spanish and afterwards Austrian. Napoleon had added both countries to France, and on his disappearance, while Holland resumed her status, Belgium, through Austrian indifference, was derelict. What was to become of her?

Union with Holland. As early as 1799, Pitt had determined that Belgium should be united to Holland, under the Dutch king, and, largely through the insistence of Castlereagh (the British plenipotentiary at the Congresses of Paris and Vienna), that policy was adopted by the Powers and established by the treaty. The assent of Belgium was not asked, nor were her interests or her inclinations considered. The United Kingdom wanted two things: first, that neither France nor Prussia should acquire Belgium, and, secondly, that Belgium should be strong enough to offer resistance to annexation projects from both sides. Pitt believed that these objects could be achieved by uniting Belgium with Holland.[3]

For the accomplishment of his purpose, however, he found that the support of Russia was necessary, and that, for such support, some consideration must be given. Terms were arranged. Russia having required payment by the Netherlands of fifty million florins (by way of compensation for securing release from French domination), the British Government agreed (19 May 1815) to pay one half of the amount in annual instalments, but under two conditions: (1) that payments should cease if the new political arrangements were interrupted; and (2) that Russia:

"would, on all questions concerning Belgium, identify her policy with that which the Court of London has deemed the best adapted for the maintenance of a just balance of power in Europe."[4]

Russian influence having, in this way, been secured, Pitt's plan went into operation. Of the union, Mr. C. Grant Robertson has said:

"A France 'of the natural frontiers' was a menace to the balance of power and the independence of the central European States. . . . Belgium (the former Austrian Netherlands), not strong enough in itself, must be artificially stiffened, and the requisite 'buffer State' was created by uniting Holland and Belgium into a single Kingdom under the friendly and allied House of Orange — the realization of an idea never out of the minds of our Foreign Office since 1689 and 1713. No principle, indeed, of British policy was more tenacious in its grip on Whig and Tory alike than that the littoral opposite our shores from the Helder to Ushant must not be in the occupation of a single, and possibly hostile, Power. The sea frontier, broken at Calais, must be colored differently to the east, from its coloring to the west of that arbitrary point."[5]

The Cambridge Modern History refers to the same subject in this way:

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[3] Hassall: *Viscount Castlereagh*, p. 185.

[4] Fuehr, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[5] *England under the Hanoverians*, pp. 464–5.

"Thus was introduced into the European family of States, a Power of considerable strength, though of secondary rank, deliberately intended to serve as a barrier against France, in the interests, more especially of the Low Countries themselves, of Germany, and of Great Britain." [6]

Separation of Holland and Belgium. The union was unnatural and ephemeral. In 1830, Belgium declared for separation, and, after a period of fighting and negotiating, succeeded in establishing her independence. In his *Life of Palmerston*, Mr. Ashley has said:

"We had sufficiently learned the danger and the cost of having to watch, and defend ourselves against an enemy possessing the long line of coast by which we had been hostilely confronted during the reign of Napoleon. We had desired at his fall to take all possible precautions against being again exposed to similar dangers; and our main object at the Congress of Vienna was to guard the Netherlands from future invasion. We had imagined that we had done so by uniting Holland with Belgium, hoping thus to have created a powerful kingdom, of which we had protected the frontier by fortresses raised under our inspection and in some degree at our expense." [7]

Pitt's plan had failed.

Conference of 1830–39. Afraid of both France and Prussia, but especially France — afraid that one or both might, by expansion over Belgium, became a menace on the North Sea coast — British statesmen arranged a conference of the Powers at London, out of which eventually emerged the treaties of 1839.[8] On 20 December 1830, the Conference declared the principle upon which it intended to proceed, as follows:

"In forming, by the treaties in question, the union of Belgium with Holland, the Powers who signed those treaties, and whose plenipotentiaries are at this moment assembled, had in view to found a just equilibrium in Europe, and to secure the maintenance of general peace. . . . The Congress will consequently proceed to discuss and to concert new arrangements, most calculated to combine the future independence of Belgium with the stipulations of the treaties, with the interest and the security of the other Powers, and with the preservation of the balance of Europe." [9]

The Eighteen Articles. By 27 January 1831, the Conference had agreed upon a series of eighteen articles styled:

"Bases destined to establish the separation of Belgium from Holland." [10]

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[6] IX, p. 655. And see pp. 605–6, 654.

[7] I, p. 215.

[8] The proceedings of the Conference and other documents may be seen in the British *Accounts and Papers*, and in the *Ann. Reg.* 1831, pp. 361–407 [372–415; and 1839, pp. 421–7. An article relating to the history of the treaty appeared in the *Quarterly Rev.* of April 1918, p. 321

[9] *Ann. Reg.*, 1831, p. 361.

[10] Fuehr, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

On 26 June of the same year, some alterations were made in these articles, clauses V and VI taking the following form (Italics now added):

"*Article IX.* Belgium, within the limits such as they shall be traced in conformity with the principles laid down in the present preliminaries, shall form a perpetually neutral state. The five Powers, without wishing to interfere in the internal administration of Belgium, *guarantee to it* that perpetual neutrality, as well as the integrity and the inviolability of its territory within the limits mentioned in the present Article.

"*Article X.* By a just reciprocity, Belgium shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other States, and not to make any attempt against their internal or external tranquillity, reserving itself, however, the right of defending itself against all foreign aggression." [11]

The Twenty-Four Articles. Holland having refused assent to the eighteen articles, the Conference framed a series of "Twenty-Four Articles," declaring that they contained "the final and irrevocable decision" of the Powers, and agreeing that the execution of them would be guaranteed. In these articles (in partial substitution for the above IX and X) was the following important clause:

"*Article VII.* Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I, II, and IV, shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality toward all other States." [12]

Belgium having agreed to the twenty-four articles, they were, with three additions, embodied in treaty form (15 November 1831). One of the added clauses was as follows:

"*Article XXV.* The Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia guarantee to His Majesty the King of the Belgians the execution of all the preceding Articles." [13]

Note that thus far the proposed guarantee is to Belgium.

The Belgian Treaty. Holland was still recalcitrant, and it was not until 1839 that finality was reached. In that year three treaties were executed. One — the separation treaty between Belgium and Holland — was largely a reproduction of the twenty-four articles. Article VII, above quoted, remained unchanged, but Article XXV was dropped. Of the other two treaties, one was between the five Powers and Belgium, and the other between the five Powers and Holland. To each of these latter treaties were annexed the articles of the separation treaty; and in each was the following clause (Italics now added):

"*Article II.* Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the King of the French, His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, declare that the articles mentioned in the preceding article [14]

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 46.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 49.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[14] The reference is to the twenty-four articles.

are considered as having the same force and validity as if they were textually inserted in the present Act, and that *they are thus placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties.*" [15]

Inasmuch as these treaties superseded the uncompleted treaty of 1831, its twenty-fifth article is useful only so far as it may serve to throw light upon the interpretation of the guarantee of 1839. Upon the construction of Article VII (transferred from the separation treaty) and Article II last above quoted (considered with reference to the circumstances then existing), turns the question of the nature of the obligation of the five Powers.[16]

British Insistence upon New Arrangements. The great importance which the United Kingdom attached to the maintenance of freedom from menace on the Belgian coast was illustrated by two of the incidents of the proceedings of the Conference. First, as in 1814–15,[17] the support of Russia was purchased by British re-assumption of the payments above referred to;[18] and second, when France dallied in her retirement of troops sent into Belgium as aid against Holland, Palmerston demanded unconditional withdrawal.

"One thing is certain," he said (17 August 1831), "the French must go out of Belgium, or we have a general war, and war in a given number of days." [19]

France proposed partition of Belgium, but Palmerston was obdurate and the troops were withdrawn. For maintenance of freedom on the North Sea coast, the United Kingdom was willing to war with France and to pay tribute to Russia.

Neutrality not wanted by Belgium. One of the attending circumstances which must not be lost to view is that Holland and Belgium had very little to say as to the terms upon which they were being separated. The five Powers settled these as they wished, and forced their acceptance upon both Belgium and Holland.[20] How little Belgium wanted a

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[15] Sanger and Norton: *England's Guarantee to Belgium and Luxemburg*, p. 126.

[16] It may be interesting to notice that the neutrality of Switzerland is founded upon nothing but her own voluntary declaration, which she may rescind at any moment. Her integrity is guaranteed by the Powers, who, by the Paris Act of 20 Nov. 1815, declared "their formal and authentic acknowledgment of the perpetual Neutrality of Switzerland, and they Guarantee to that country the Integrity and Inviolability of its Territory . . . ;" they "acknowledge, in the most formal manner, by the present Act that the Neutrality and the Inviolability of Switzerland, and her Independence of all foreign Influence enter into the true Interests of the Policy of the whole of Europe"; Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 31. See *The Nineteenth Century*, June 1916, pp. 1233–35.

[17] *Ante*, p. 414.

[18] Fuehr, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–8.

[19] Ashley: *Life of Lord Palmerston*, I, p. 267.

[20] See *Ann. Reg.*, 1831, pp. 361–407; and [372–415.

guarantee of neutrality may be gathered from a letter to Queen Victoria (15 February 1856) in which the King of the Belgians said:

"This neutrality was in the real interest of this country, but our good Congress here did not wish it, and even opposed it; it was *imposé* upon them." [21]

In the *Fortnightly Review* of April 1916 [22] was the following:

"Belgium did not ask for a condition of neutrality. There was as much opposition to it as support for it in the National Congress. It was imposed or forced upon her, not for her good or advantage, but as the diplomatists' device for 'preserving the peace of Europe and maintaining the balance of power' at that particular juncture."

That was the view of a Commission appointed during the Peace Conference at Paris, after the 1914–18 wars, by the Supreme Council. The Chairman, M. André Tardieu, has summarized part of the report as follows:

"Following the same line, the Commission showed the Treaty of 1839 originally negotiated not on behalf of Belgium but against her by the authors of the Treaty of 1815; all the Belgian claims of 1839 concerning the freedom of the Scheldt, Limburg, and Luxemburg ruthlessly rejected by the future guarantors; Belgium, eight years later declaring on the eve of the signature that 'she was yielding to the imperious law of necessity.' Our report established that these Treaties born of a so-called 'higher interest' — foreign in any case to Belgium and to Holland — had, in no degree and at no time, expressed the self-determination of the two principal countries involved; and that moreover if they had imposed on Belgium undisputed and onerous servitudes, they had not in the hour of danger given her the promised security."

The Commission recommended a revision of the treaty of 1839 in order: "to liberate Belgium from the limitations of sovereignty imposed upon her by the Treaty of 1839, and to suppress, as much for her sake as for that of peace in general, the various risks and inconveniences resulting from the said Treaties." [23]

QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION

We are now in position to enquire whether, by the terms of the treaties of 1839, any obligation of armed intervention in defence of Belgian independence and neutrality was imposed upon the United Kingdom, and for that purpose the following questions must be considered:

I. Do the words "placed under the guarantee" impose a duty of military activity in defence of Belgian neutrality?

[21] *Letters of Queen Victoria*, III, p. 172. And see Oakes and Mowat: *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century*, p. 136, note.

[22] P. 660. See *Ann. Reg.*, 1831, pp. 361–407, and [372–415; and Fuehr, *op. cit.*, p. 58 and *passim*.

[23] Tardieu: *The Truth about the Treaty*, pp. 219–20.

II. If any such obligation was intended, was it one of joint, or of joint and several, character?

I. "PLACED UNDER THE GUARANTEE"

Meaning of "Guarantee." Reply to the first of the above questions will be aided by consideration of the meaning to be attached to the word "guarantee" in other treaties.

By the peace treaty of 1763 between the United Kingdom and France (The italics in the following quotations are now added):

"His Most Christian Majesty renounces all pretensions which he has heretofore formed, or might have formed, in Nova Scotia or Acadia in all its parts, and *guarantees* the whole of it, and with all its dependencies, to the King of Great Britain."

"His Most Christian King cedes and *guarantees* to his Britannick Majesty, in full right, the islands of Grenada and the Grenadines." [24]

Very clearly, these clauses imposed no obligation upon France to supply armed, or any other kind of support to the British King, in case of an attack upon the ceded territories. On the other hand, the word *guarantee* in the treaty between France and the United States of 1778 might be taken to include a promise of armed assistance.[25]

"*Article XI.* The two parties *guarantee* mutually, from the present time and for ever, *against all other powers*, to wit — The United States to His Most Christian Majesty the present possessions of the crown of France in America, as well as those which it may acquire by the future treaty of peace; and His Most Christian Majesty guarantees on his part to the United States, their liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited, as well in matters of government as commerce, and also their possessions."

The treaty between France, Austria, and the United Kingdom of 15 April 1856 was intended to make obligation of activity clear:

"The High Contracting Parties *Guarantee, jointly and severally*, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, recorded in the Treaty concluded at Paris on the 30th of March 1856."

"Any infraction of the stipulations of the said Treaty will be considered by the Powers signing the present Treaty as a *casus belli*." [26]

In each of the cases just referred to, interpretation of the word is aided by the circumstances of the treaty and by the context. In other

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[24] Secs. 4 and 9. See also sec. 10.

[25] The absence of any limit of time for the duration of the guarantee would be a strong argument in favor of the negative.

[26] Arts. 1 and 2: Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 34. See speech of Lord Derby, 6 Feb. 1877: *Hansard*, III, Vol. 232, col. 41: quoted Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–9. The precision of the language was due to the fact that Russia disclaimed obligation of activity under the quadruple treaty which had been signed ten days previously — 30 March.

cases, however, no help is afforded, and interpretation becomes more difficult. For example, what is to be made of the following clause in the treaty of 1815:

"Austria, Russia, Great Britain, and France *guarantee* to His Majesty the King of Prussia, his descendants and successors, the possession of the countries marked out in Article XV, in full property and sovereignty"? [27]

And what of the following in the treaty of 13 July 1863:

"Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark, and *the Guarantee of the three Courts*, forms a Monarchical, Independent, and Constitutional State"? [28]

And what of a clause in the treaty of 30 March 1856, between the United Kingdom, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey, by which, after referring to a recited stipulation with regard to the navigation of rivers, the Powers:

"declare that its arrangement henceforth forms a part of the Public Law of Europe, and take it under their guarantee"? [29]

And what of the following (in the same treaty):

"The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia shall continue to enjoy under the suzerainty of the Porte, and *under the Guarantee of the Contracting Powers*, the Privileges and Immunities of which they are in possession"? [30]

And what of the clause (in the same treaty) by which the six monarchs: "declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (concert) of Europe. Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and the Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire; *Guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement;* and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation as *a question of general interest*"? [31]

The protocols of the negotiations which preceded this last treaty make clear that, in signing it, Russia did not recognize that she was assuming any obligation to be active in upholding "the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire." And it was because of that announced attitude that the other three Powers (Austria, France, and Prussia), two weeks afterwards (15 April), entered into the treaty (above referred to) by which they, "jointly and severally," guaranteed "the independence and integrity" of Turkey, and declared that any infraction should be "a *casus belli*." [32]

Guarantee as a Right to Intervene. These and other instances

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[27] Art. 17: Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[28] Treaty, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Denmark, art. 3; *ibid.*, p. 35. See *ante*, cap. X, p. 362.

[29] Art. 15: *ibid.*, p. 33.

[30] Art. 22: *ibid.*

[31] Art. 7: *ibid.*

[32] The clauses appear *ante*, p. 419.

indicate that the word *guarantee* frequently occurs in treaties; that it is used loosely and without settled meaning; and that it cannot, in itself, be said to imply obligation of military activity. In the opinion of some British statesmen (prior to the recent war), the usual effect of guarantee treaties is merely to give a right of intervention. Mr. Gladstone, for example, when dealing (10 August 1870) with the effect of the Belgian Treaty, said:

"It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the obligations of that treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities on foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen — such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston — never, to my knowledge, took that rigid, and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of a guarantee. The circumstance that there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration." [33]

Upon a subsequent occasion (12 April 1872), Mr. Gladstone said (Italics now added):

My honourable friend "appears to be of opinion that every guarantee embodied in a Treaty is in the nature of an absolute unconditional engagement, binding this country, under all circumstances, to go to war for the maintenance of the state of things guaranteed in the Treaty — irrespective of the circumstances of this country itself; irrespective of the causes by which that war might have been brought about; irrespective of the conduct of the Power on whose behalf the guarantee may have been invoked, and which may itself have been the cause of the war; and irrespective of those entire changes of circumstances and relations which the course of time frequently introduces, and which cannot be overlooked in the construction of these engagements. I have often heard Lord Palmerston give his opinion of guarantees both in this House and elsewhere; and it was a familiar phrase of his, which, I think, others must recollect as well as myself, that *while a guarantee gave a right of interference it did not constitute of itself an obligation to interfere.*[34] Without adopting that principle as a rigid doctrine or theory applicable to this subject — on which it is very difficult and perhaps not very convenient

[33] *Hansard*, III, v. 203, col. 1787; Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–7. The above extract was quoted by Sir Edward Grey in his speech of 3 Aug. 1914.

[34] Lord Palmerston also said, in the House of Commons on 8 June 1855: "I know that obligatory treaties have guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, but am hardly disposed to attach great importance to declarations of this kind": Fuehr, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

to frame an absolute rule — yet I think there is very great force in Lord Palmerston's observation; and that . . . it ought to remove that apprehension with respect to a guarantee under which the honourable Mover and Seconder of the Resolution appear more or less to labour." [35]

Guarantee as a Declaration of Policy, or Moral Sanction. In the course of the speech just quoted, Mr. Gladstone referred to the Turkish treaty of 1856,[36] which contained a guarantee of "the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire," followed by agreement to treat infraction as a *casus belli*, and then proceeded:

"But undoubtedly that Treaty constitutes an exception, and other Treaties which exist are rather in the nature of general declarations and strong declarations of policy and general intention, than in the nature of covenants of a specific and determinate character the obligation of which can, under all circumstances, be exacted."

"It is not possible, I think, to contend from the nature of these general guarantees that they are such as to exclude a just consideration of the circumstances of the time at which they may be supposed to be capable of being carried into effect. I believe that consideration of circumstances will always have a determining influence, not only without derogation to good faith, but in perfect consistency with the principles of good faith, upon the practical course to be pursued." [37]

Lord Stanley declared (14 June 1867) that the guarantee in the Luxemburg treaty of 11 May 1867 [38] had:

"rather the character of a moral sanction to the arrangements which it defends than that of a contingent liability to make war. . . . Take an instance from what we have done already. We have guaranteed Switzerland; but if all Europe combined against Switzerland, although we might regret it, we should hardly feel bound to go to war with all the world for the protection of Switzerland. We were parties to the arrangements which were made about Poland; they were broken, but we did not go to war. I only name those cases as showing that it does not necessarily and inevitably follow that you are bound to maintain the guarantee under all circumstances by force of arms." [39]

II. WAS THE GUARANTEE JOINT, OR JOINT AND SEVERAL?

It may have been observed that in the treaties above referred to the word *guarantee* sometimes appears without qualification, while on other occasions it is accompanied by an associated word — "under the collective guarantee," or "guarantee in common," or "guarantee, jointly and severally." Have the associated words any qualifying effect?

[35] *Hansard*, III, v. 210, cols. 1178–9.
[36] *Ante*, p. 419.
[37] *Hansard*, III, vol. 210, col. 1180; Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 98, 9.
[38] *Post*, p. 423.
[39] *Hansard*, III, vol. 187, col. 1922; Fuehr, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

Legal View. Lawyers are very familiar with the difference between a joint and a several obligation. In the former case, all the obligors are regarded as a unit. No one of them can be sued, or be required to act in the absence of any of the others; and if one of them be released, the obligation is gone. In the latter case, the obligation is that of each individual; there is no association between the obligors; each one is separately responsible for performance of the obligation in its entirety.

According to English law, the unqualified obligation of several persons is a joint, and not a several obligation. For example, a promissory note commencing with the words "We promise to pay" is a joint note. It means "We jointly promise to pay." The insertion of the word *severally* after the word *we*, or the employment of some equivalent expression, is necessary for the formation of a several obligation. If the same rule be carried into the interpretation of treaties, there is no difference between the words "guarantee," "guarantee in common," and "jointly guarantee." In each case the obligation is of joint, and not of separate character.[40] And if that view be accepted, the guarantee of the Belgian treaties ("placed under the guarantee of their said Majesties") is one of joint character. That is clear enough to a lawyer; but British statesmen have expressed opposing opinions.

The Luxemburg Treaty. The question arose in connection with the latter part of a clause in the Luxemburg treaty of 11 May 1867. The whole clause is as follows (Italics now added):

"The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of the 19th of April 1839 under the guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually neutral State.

"It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other States.

"The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Article.

"That principle is and remains placed *under the sanction of the collective guarantee* of the Powers, signing parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State."[41]

Defending, in parliament, the making of this treaty, Lord Stanley, who negotiated its terms, and Lord Derby (his father), the Prime

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[40] Misunderstanding of such a simple, although technical, point may be noted in books even as useful as that of Oakes and Mowat, *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century*, in which, after saying that the Luxemburg guarantee was collective while the Belgian was individual, the authors added: "An individual guarantee is, if anything, more emphatic than a collective one, but the moral obligation imposed by one or the other is just the same" (p. 135).

[41] Art. II: Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 143. The treaty is in *Accounts and Papers*, vol. 74, p. 415.

Minister, had no difficulty in maintaining that the obligation was of joint, and not of separate character. Lord Derby said, on 4 July 1867:

"I can give no further interpretation of the Treaty than this — that, as far as the honor of England is concerned, she will be bound to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg; and I expect that all the other Powers will equally respect it; but she is not bound to take upon herself the quixotic duty, in the case of a violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by one of the other Powers, of interfering to prevent its violation — because we have only undertaken to guarantee it in common with all the other Great Powers of Europe." [42]

In the same speech, Lord Derby, falling into unaccountable error, when combating the suggestion of having misled the Prussian government as to the meaning of the treaty, said:

"The Prussian Minister must have been perfectly well aware of the terms of that Treaty (1839) by which the five Powers, acting individually, guaranteed the independence of Belgium; yet if he thought the one kind of guarantee equal to the other, I want to know why should he have studiously altered the words and asked not for a separate and several guarantee, but for a collective guarantee by the Great Powers for the integrity and independence of Luxemburg." [43]

"The engagement 'each on his part' and 'guarantee in common' are precisely the terms introduced into the Treaty of May 1867 on the request of the Prussian Minister, and the security his government desired to obtain." [44]

The statement is full of inaccuracies: (1) The draft treaty submitted to the Conference contained the first three sentences of the clause as above quoted. It contained no guarantee of any kind. There was merely an engagement "to respect the principle of neutrality." (2) The Prussian Minister did not propose an alteration of any of the words; nor did he ask for a collective, in preference to a separate and several, guarantee. (3) The words "each on his part" were not introduced into the treaty. (4) If the Prussian Minister wanted a collective guarantee, and not a several guarantee, he certainly would not have asked for introduction of the words "each on his part"; for these import a several guarantee. (5) In truth, Lord Stanley's draft of the treaty remained unaltered, with the exception that, at the request of the Prussian Minister, a fourth sentence (as above) was added to it. (6) That there was no idea of suggesting a collective rather than a separate guarantee, was made clear to Stanley [45] by the language of the Prussian Minister, who expressed:

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[42] *Hansard*, III, vol. 188, p. 974; Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–80. Lord Derby had previously (20 June) spoken to the same effect: *Hansard*, III, vol. 188, p. 157.

[43] *Hansard*, III, vol. 188, pp. 971–2; Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

[44] *Hansard*, III, vol. 188, p. 972; Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

[45] "To Stanley," for that gentleman believed that the obligation of the Belgian treaty was one of separate character.

"the hope of seeing the same guarantee given by the Powers to the neutrality of Luxemburg as is enjoyed by that of Belgium." [46]

During the course of the debate, Lord Clarendon said (20 June 1867):

"I look upon the guarantee in our case of Belgium as an individual guarantee, and have always so regarded it; but this is a collective guarantee. No one of the Powers, therefore, can be called upon to take single action, even in the improbable case of any difficulty arising." [47]

Lord Granville pointed out that if the treaty really amounted to nothing, as the previous speaker had indicated, it was difficult to understand the importance which Prussia attached to it:
"without which" (he said), "she was prepared to go to war with the greatest military nation in the world;"
or why Lord Stanley, the British plenipotentiary, had shown so much hesitation in assenting to it.[48] Speaking at a later date (10 August 1870), Lord Granville said:

"We are not now in a position like that described by a Conservative Government, when we joined in a treaty guaranteeing Luxemburg, and when, almost before the ink which signed it was dry, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of this country announced, to the surprise of France and the indignation of Prussia, that we had signed as a collective guarantee, and as the co-operation of the Powers was the only case in which the guarantee could possibly be brought into question, England had brought herself under no new obligation at all." [49]

Treaties of 30 March and 15 April 1856. Discussing the words "guarantee in common the strict observance," as they occur in the Turkish treaty of 30 March 1856, above quoted,[50] Lord Derby (the Lord Stanley of 1867) said (8 February 1877):

"We guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement — that is, we each undertake to observe it, and to do what we can to make others observe it; but there is no shadow of a promise in that treaty to make non-observance by other Powers a *casus belli*." [51]

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[46] Protocols in *Accounts and Papers*, 1867, vol. 74, p. 425. In a despatch of 7 May 1867, the British Ambassador at Berlin reported that Bismarck had said that such a proposal as that of Lord Stanley "would not be of any value for the case of Luxemburg; and Prussia must demand a more complete safeguard for the German frontier which could only be afforded by a European guarantee": *Ibid.* According to the British interpretation of the guarantee agreed to, it amounted to nothing at all.

[47] *Hansard*, III, vol. 188, col. 152; Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

[48] *Hansard*, III, vol. 188, col. 154; Fitzmaurice: *Lord Granville*, II, p. 360. And see Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–5.

[49] *Hansard*, III, vol. 203, col. 1756; Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 85. The diplomacies which preceded the treaty are shortly referred to in Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–21.

[50] *Ante*, p. 420.

[51] *Hansard*, III, vol. 232, col. 41; Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

Note the confusion — a guarantee "in common" is said to be an undertaking by "each." [52] The earlier Derby had been better advised when he said that a "collective guarantee" is a joint obligation only. This Turkish treaty is a good example of the indeterminate employment of the phrases under consideration. Articles 15 and 22 have "under the guarantee." Article 28 has "under the collective guarantee." Article 7 has "guarantee in common." And yet there is no reason for thinking that any difference in the nature of the obligation was intended.

Lord Birkenhead. While still known as Sir F. E. Smith, the one-time Lord Chancellor of England wrote in his *International Law* as follows:

"Such treaties" (that is of guarantee) "are sometimes difficult to construe, especially when the guarantee is jointly made by several powers. . . . Of a collective guarantee a well known instance was the treaty by which the great powers in 1831 asserted the perpetual neutrality of Belgium. It has been much disputed whether, if the other parties to such a guarantee decline to intervene on occasion, a single signatory is released from his obligations."

After stating Lord Derby's doctrine, the learned author continued:

"On principle Lord Derby's contention is unanswerable. If a State undertakes a duty in concert with others, on what principle is it committed to an isolated performance? It was never pledged to such action, and its unassisted resources may fall far short of the occasion." [53]

Doubts Removed. It has not been observed that the United Kingdom and France, by their treaty of 22 October 1832, sufficiently declared that, by the use of the word "guarantee" in the Belgian treaties, they meant to provide for a joint obligation. After Holland had refused to agree to the twenty-four articles, as settled by the Powers in 1831, France sent military forces into Belgium as protection against the Dutch. And the United Kingdom, fearing that the troops might remain there, secured the assent of France to a treaty which stated its purposes as being (Italics now added):

"to carry into execution the stipulations of the Treaty relative to the Netherlands, concluded at London on the 15th of November 1831, the execution whereof, by the terms of Article XXV of the said Treaty, *has been jointly guaranteed* by their said Majesties, and by their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Russia." [54]

In other words, article 25 of the treaty of 1831, which was as follows:

"The Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia

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[52] On 6 March 1871, Lord Salisbury said that the obligation was "joint and several": *Hansard*, III, vol. 204, col. 1363; Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

[53] 4th ed., p. 99. Quoted by Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–40.

[54] Hertslet: *Map of Europe by Treaties.* Quoted by Fuehr, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

guarantee to His Majesty the King of the Belgians the execution of all the preceding articles," [55]

was declared to be a joint guarantee. The same Powers, by the use of the same word in 1839, must have meant the same thing.

Now that Sir Edward Grey has indicated, in effect, that in his view the Belgian treaty did not impose upon the United Kingdom an obligation to defend Belgian neutrality in the recent war,[56] no further doubt can be entertained. And that the view of the Foreign Office, seven weeks after hostilities had commenced, coincided with that previously expressed by its chief, was made clear by the "Introductory Narrative of Events" issued by that Office on 28 September 1914 (Italics now added):

"This was the situation when very early on Sunday morning, the 2nd August, German troops invaded Luxemburg, a small independent State whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as *the similar guarantee of Belgium.*" [57]

Admittedly, the Luxemburg treaty imposed no obligation of individual action.[58] It was, in terms, a "collective guarantee." And the guarantee of the Belgian treaty was of "similar" character.

Oxford Faculty. It is noteworthy that the "Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History," who wrote the widely-circulated pamphlet "*Why We Are At War,*" declared that:

"Under existing treaty law the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg stands for all practical purposes in the same legal position as its northern neighbor; and the ruler of Luxemburg has protested against the German invasion [59] of her territory no less emphatically than King Albert, though with less power of giving expression in action to her just resentment. If the defence of Belgium has appealed more forcibly to the ordinary Englishman, it is because he is more familiar with the past history of Belgium and sees more clearly in her case the ultimate issues that are involved in the German violation of her rights. As the following narrative will show, the neutrality of Luxemburg was guaranteed in the interests and at the instance of the Prussian state, as a protection against French aggression. The legal case could not be clearer, and it might perhaps be asked why the attack on Luxemburg, which preceded that on Belgium, was not treated by this country as a *casus belli*. England's attitude towards Luxemburg is that which she has consistently adopted towards those smaller states of Europe which lie outside the reach of naval power. It is an attitude which she has maintained in the case of Servia even more clearly than in that of

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[55] *Ante*, p. 416.
[56] *Ante*, pp. 132–3.
[57] Price: *The Diplomatic History of the War*, pp. viii–ix.
[58] *Ante*, pp. 423–5.
[59] Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 147.

Luxemburg. England holds herself bound to exert her influence in procuring for the smaller states of Europe equitable treatment from their more powerful neighbors. But the duty of insisting upon equitable treatment falls first upon those Powers whose situation enables them to support a protest by effective action. Just as Servia is the special concern of Russia, so Luxemburg must look to France in the first instance for protection against Germany, to Germany if she is assailed from the French side. In either case we should hold ourselves bound to exercise our influence, but not as principals. Any other course would be impossibly quixotic, and would only have the effect of destroying our power to help the states within our reach." [60]

It is not very clear whether the authors were of opinion that the United Kingdom was or was not under obligation to defend Belgian neutrality. But, agreeing that the legal obligations under the Belgian and Luxemburg treaties were identical, they endeavor to explain why the United Kingdom took up arms in one case and not in the other. (She did not even enter a protest in the other). It was, they argue, because Luxemburg:

"must look to France in the first instance," while "we should hold ourselves bound to exercise our influence, but not as principals. Any other course would be impossibly quixotic."

To which the replies are: (1) The treaty makes no reference to primary and secondary responsibility. (2) If British action would have been quixotic, that ought to have been thought of before obligation was assumed. (3) War against Germany would have been no more quixotic because she violated the Luxemburg treaty than because she violated the Belgian. (4) The real reason why the United Kingdom defended Belgium and refrained from protest against the invasion of Luxemburg — did not even "exercise our influence" — was that the United Kingdom had a supreme interest in keeping Germany off the North sea coasts, and not enough interest in Luxemburg to raise a quarrel about her submergence.

Viscount Haldane. The opinion of Viscount Haldane (who at the outbreak of the war was Lord Chancellor [61]) as to the existence of a treaty-obligation to defend Belgian neutrality coincided with that of Sir Edward Grey. In his book *Before the War*, the Viscount wrote:

"We were among the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, and it was of course conceivable that, if she called on us to do so, we might have had to defend her." [62]

An obligation which entails action not upon demand for performance, but only contingently upon the happening of unstated circumstances ("we might have had"), is clearly not one of categorical

[60] Pp. 20–1.

[61] He had previously been Secretary of State for War.

[62] P. 181.

character. Viscount Haldane no doubt used the word "guarantee" in the sense which it customarily carries in treaties.

Lord Loreburn. The Lord Chancellor who preceded Lord Haldane held the same view. In his book *How the War Came*, Lord Loreburn said:

"Very few people will be found to deny that we have great interests in preventing a great military Power, be it Germany or be it France, from securing a mastery of the Belgian coast. . . . In these circumstances it does not much signify whether or not we were in 1914 bound by Treaty to defend Belgium against invasion. For the sake of historical accuracy, however, it is right to say that we were not so bound, either by the Treaty of 1839 or by any other instrument. All that we did in 1839 was to sign, together with Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Holland, an agreement that Belgium should be a perpetually neutral State. We bound ourselves, as did others, not to violate that neutrality, but did not bind ourselves to defend it against the encroachment of any other Power." [63]

In *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* is the following:

"The Guarantee of 1839, as Palmerston pointed out, gave a right, but did not impose an obligation, to defend Belgian neutrality. Gladstone's Treaties with France and Russia in 1870 were only necessary because that of 1839 did not automatically invoke action." [64]

The considerations developed in this and the preceding pages amply warrant the assertions, (1) that the language of the Belgian treaties imposed no duty of military defence of the neutrality of Belgium; and (2) that if it did, the liability was one of joint, and not individual character.

THE TREATIES OF 1870

The Treaties. At the commencement of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the United Kingdom — Mr. Gladstone being then Prime Minister — entered into treaties (9 and 11 August) with Prussia and France respectively, providing that if either of the belligerents should violate the neutrality of Belgium, the United Kingdom would co-operate with the other Power:

"for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon."

"and, on the expiration of that time, the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the high contracting parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the 1st article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April 1839." [65]

Reason for the Treaties. Very clearly, if by the treaty of 1839,

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[63] Pp. 227–8.

[64] P. 503, note.

[65] *Ann. Reg.*, 1870, p. 205.

each of the signatory Powers was under separate obligation to defend single-handed (if need be) the neutrality of Belgium, the treaties of 1870 would have been quite necessary. For they provided, merely, that at least two of the Powers would fulfil their obligations. If there had been no new treaties, and France had invaded Belgium, the United Kingdom and Prussia would each have been bound, under the old treaty, to co-operate against the invaders. And if Prussia had violated the neutrality, the United Kingdom and France would each have been under the same obligation. No new promises of similar character could have made co-operation more obligatory or more secure. As Mr. Osborne said during the debate in the House of Commons:

"The Treaty is entirely superfluous, if the Treaty of 1839 is worth anything at all." [66]

But the old treaty was worth very little. It fell short in two respects: (1) in Gladstone's opinion, the guarantee did not necessarily imply a promise to take up arms;[67] and (2) the guarantee was of collective character only. Explaining, in the House of Commons, his reason for new treaties, Mr. Gladstone said:

"we should have had to act under the treaty of 1839 without any stipulated assurance of being supported from any quarter whatever against any combination, however formidable; whereas by the treaty now formally before parliament, under the conditions laid down in it, we secure powerful support in the event of our having to act — a support with respect to which we may well say that it brings the object in view within the sphere of the practicable and attainable, instead of leaving it within the sphere of what might have been desirable, but which might have been most difficult, under all the circumstances, to have realized." [68]

In other words, either because the old treaty contained no obligation at all — no "stipulated assurance of being supported" — or because the obligation was merely collective, and therefore under the circumstances inapplicable,[69] new treaties, which created obligations of concerted action, were agreed to. Writing to John Bright (4 August — a few days prior to the date of the treaties), Gladstone said:

"The sole or single-handed defence of Belgium would be an enterprise which we incline to think Quixotic; if these two great military Powers" (Prussia and France) "combined against it — that combination is the only serious danger; and this it is which by our proposed engagements we should, I hope, render improbable to the very last degree." [70]

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[66] *Hansard*, III, vol. 203, p. 1777. Quoted by Fuehr, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

[67] *Ante*, pp. 421–2.

[68] *Hansard*, III, vol. 203, col. 1789; *Ann. Reg.*, 1870, pp. [107–8.

[69] Inapplicable, because two of the joint obligors could not act together.

[70] *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, pp. 40–1.

If the 1839 treaty had contained a several obligation, and if the "two great military Powers" had combined against Belgium, the United Kingdom would have been bound to undertake the "quixotic" enterprise. Very evidently, the new treaties were arranged because the old treaty contained no individual obligation to take up arms.

BRITISH ATTITUDE IN 1887

The British attitude in 1887 (when danger of war between France and Germany appeared) toward the guarantee clause of the Belgian treaty, if not very creditable, was at all events quite in accord with international practice. That some sort of obligation of military intervention on behalf of Belgium existed, was popularly assumed, and, just as popularly, some "convenient pretext" was devised as reason for failure in performance. Sir Charles Dilke opened the discussion (January) with a series of articles in the *Fortnightly Review* on European policies,[71] and in the forefront raised the question whether, in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality, the United Kingdom would intervene.

Diplomaticus. Very shortly afterwards (4 February) there appeared in *The Standard*, the principal organ of the governmental party,[72] a letter, signed "Diplomaticus,"[73] which was generally regarded as semi-official. It was as follows (Italics now added):

"Sir: — It is with no wish to add to the fears that prevail on all sides at the present moment, but simply from a desire, which I think you will hold to be pardonable, that the English people should reflect, in good time, what may prove to be the nature and extent of their difficulties and responsibilities in the event of war between France and Germany, that I take up my pen to urge you to lay before them the following considerations.

"Military experts are of opinion that France has spent so much money, and spent it so well, during the last sixteen years in providing herself with a fresh military frontier, that a direct advance by the German armies into France, past the new fortresses and forts that have been erected and linked together, would be, even if a possible, a very hazardous undertaking.

"But if Germany was, or considered itself to be, provoked into a struggle of life and death with France, would Prince Bismarck, with the mighty forces he can set in motion, consent to be baffled by the artificial obstacles to which I have alluded so long as there existed a

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[71] Afterwards included in his book, *The Present Position of European Politics*.

[72] In its issue of the same day (afternoon), *The Pall Mall Gazette* referred to *The Standard* as "at present the Governmental Salisburian organ."

[73] Supposed to be Alfred Austin, a keen Conservative and a contributor to the editorial columns of *The Standard*.

natural and undefended road by which he could escape from his embarrassment.

"Such a road or way out does exist. It lies in Belgian territory. *But the neutrality of Belgian is protected by European guarantee, and England is one of the guarantors.*

"In 1870, Earl Granville, then at the head of the English Foreign Office, alive to this danger, promptly and wisely bound England to side with France if Prussia violated Belgian territory, and to side with Prussia if France did so.

"Would Lord Salisbury act prudently to take upon himself a similar engagement in the event of a fresh conflict between those two countries? It is for Englishmen to answer the question. But it seems to me, as one not indifferent to the interests and the greatness of England, that such a course at the present moment would be unwise to the last degree. However much England might regret the invasion of Belgian territory by either party to the struggle, *she could not take part with France against Germany* (even if Germany were to seek to turn the French flank by pouring in armies through the Belgian Ardennes), *without utterly violating and destroying the main purposes of English policy all over the world.*[74]

"But, it will be asked, *must not England honour its signature and be faithful to its public pledges?* I reply that your Foreign Minister ought to be equal to the task of meeting this objection without committing England to war. *The temporary use of a right of way is something different from a permanent and wrongful possession of territory;*[75] and surely England would easily be able to obtain from Prince Bismarck ample and adequate guarantees that, at the close of the conflict, the territory of Belgium should remain intact as before?

"You will see, Sir, I raise, in a very few words, an exceedingly important question. It is for the English people to perpend and pronounce. But it is high time they reflected on it.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

DIPLOMATICUS."[76]

The Standard. Upon this letter, *The Standard* (of the same date) commented as follows (Italics now added):

"We are reminded this morning, by a Correspondent who speaks with high authority, that while *we are all wondering how long it will be before a fresh conflict breaks out between France and Germany*, Englishmen are shutting their eyes to a question closely, and perhaps inevitably allied with that contingent event, and affecting the interests

[74] At that date, British foreign policy was strongly anti-French, and inclined to be pro-German.

[75] During the Boer war, Portugal, a neutral nation, permitted the passage of British troops through Portuguese territory: Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[76] Quoted, *ibid.*, pp. 99–101.

of this country more vitally than they could be affected even by any probable result from the struggle between these two powerful States. 'Diplomaticus' writes with unprofessional terseness; but his observations are to the point, and are expressed with significant lucidity. Nor can there be any doubt as to the nature or as to the gravity of the question raised in his communication. In the event of war between Germany and France, and in case either Germany or France were to disregard the neutrality of Belgian territory, what ought England to do? That is the question, and *he indicates pretty plainly a reply with which, we may say at once, we do not believe the English people will be disposed to quarrel.* In order, however, to enable them to respond to the inquiry with full knowledge and deliberate judgment, it is necessary to lay before them the facts and contingencies of the situation somewhat more amply and more *in extenso* than is done by 'Diplomaticus.' On the Declaration of War by France against Prussia in 1870, Earl Granville, as we all know, with more promptness and decision than he usually displayed, sought to secure respect for Belgian territory by notifying that, should either combatant ignore the neutrality secured to it by public treaty, England would side actively with the other combatant. It may be said why cannot the same course be pursued once more in the event of a similar condition of affairs coming into play? *The answer is, that a similar condition of affairs no longer exists.* In the first place, in 1870 neither of the combatants had any pressing temptation to resort to a violation of Belgian territory, in the execution of their military designs. The territory of Germany was avowedly vulnerable in several places; and France was so assured of its military superiority, and so confident that 'A Berlin!', not 'nach Paris!', would prove the successful war cry of the struggle, that no precautions had been taken against the possibility of France being invaded. As the event proved, even such magnificent fortresses as Metz and Strasburg, with their large civil population and their imperfect stores of provisions, proved an encumbrance and a source of danger rather than one of safety; and these once invested, there was nothing to stop the march of the victors of Sedan towards the French capital. Metz and Strasburg are now German fortresses; and no one requires to be told that Germany has neglected no precautions or expedients to render an invasion of the Fatherland a difficult, if not an impracticable undertaking. Armed to the head for offence, Germany is likewise armed to the heel for defence. She is more invulnerable than Achilles for there is no point uncovered.

"How stands it with France as regards defence against invasion? During the last sixteen years all that money profusely spent, and military skill judiciously applied, could do to provide her with a strong military frontier against Germany, has been quietly, but steadily and unremittingly, carried forward. Not only does France possess a first line of fortresses, contiguous to German territory in Belfort, Epinal,

Toul, and Verdun; but all four are linked with each other, in succession, by another line of detached forts. Not to encumber ourselves here with military details, the full exposition of which would demand considerable space, we may say that 'Diplomaticus' is guilty of no exaggeration when he declares that military experts are of opinion that France has spent so much money, and spent it so well, since the last war in providing herself with a fresh military frontier, that a direct advance by the German armies into France past the new fortresses and forts that have been erected and linked together would be, even if a possible, a very hazardous undertaking. There are, however, two other ways of entering France from Germany. One is through Switzerland; the other is through Belgium. Both are what is understood by 'neutral territory'; but the mountainous character of Switzerland renders access to France through its passes more arduous and less available than through the territory of Belgium. In case the German armies found themselves practically prevented from engaging in offensive military operations against France by the admirable line of defence with which she has provided herself, *would Prince Bismarck, and the great soldiers whom he would inspire, consent to be thwarted by the inviolability of Belgium as guaranteed by European Treaty?* 'Diplomaticus' put the question with undiplomatic bluntness. He forbears from answering it; and so must we. But it will be obvious to everybody that there is a possibility, a danger, of Germany not being willing to be debarred from invading France by *an obstacle that has grown up since the Treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium was signed.* Our readers will at once perceive that the situation is absolutely different from the one that existed in 1870, when Earl Granville quickly and cheerfully imposed on England the obligation to take part against either combatant that violated Belgian soil. Neither combatant was much tempted to do so; and thus the engagement assumed by England — a very proper one at the time — was not very serious or onerous, and saved appearances rather than created responsibility. *Now the position is entirely changed.* If England, with a view to securing respect for Belgian territory, were to bind itself, as in 1870, to throw its weight into the balance against either France or Germany, should either France or Germany violate Belgian ground, we might, and probably should, *find ourselves in a war of giants on our own account.*

"We think that 'Diplomaticus' understands the English people when he hints his suspicions that such a result would be utterly alien alike to their wishes and to their interests. For, over and above the fact that, as we have seen, the temptation to violate Belgian territory by either side is much greater than it was in 1870, *the relations of England with the European Powers have necessarily and naturally undergone considerable modification during that period.* We concur with our Correspondent in the opinion he expresses that for England

and Germany to quarrel, it matters not upon what subject, would be highly injurious to the interests of both. Indeed, he is right when he says that the main outlines of our policy would be blurred and its main purposes embarrassed, if not defeated, were we suddenly to find ourselves in a state of hostility to Germany, instead of one of friendliness and sympathy. No doubt if Germany were to outrage the honour, or to disregard the interests of England, we should be ready enough to accept the challenge thrown down to us. *But would the violation of Belgian territory, whether by Germany or France, be such an injury to our honour and such a blow to our interests? . . . It might be so, in certain circumstances; and it would assuredly be so if it involved a permanent violation of the independence of Belgium.* But, as 'Diplomaticus' ingeniously suggests, there is all the difference in the world between the momentary use of a 'right of way,' even if the use of the right of way be, in a sense, wrongful, and the appropriation of the ground covered by the right of way.[77] We trust that both Germany and France would refrain even from this minor trespass. But if they did not? If one or the other were to say to England, 'All the military approaches to France and Germany have been closed; and only neutral approaches lie open to us. This state of things is not only detrimental, but fatal to our military success, and it has arisen since the Treaty guaranteed the sacredness of the only roads of which we can now avail ourselves. We will, as a fact, respect the independence of Belgium and we will give you the most solemn and binding guarantees that, at the end of the conflict, Belgium shall be as free and independent as before.' If Germany — and, of course, our hypothesis applies also to France — were to use this language — though we trust there will be no occasion for it — *we cannot doubt what would be the wise and proper course for England to pursue, and what would be the answer of the English Government. England does not wish to shirk its true responsibilities. But it would be madness for us to incur or assume responsibilities unnecessarily, when to do so would manifestly involve our participation in a tremendous war.*"[78]

The Morning Post. *The Morning Post* expressed its view as follows:

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[77] An argument in support of this view may be deduced from a comparison of the language of clause 5 of the proposed treaty of eighteen articles between Belgium and Holland with clause 7 of the twenty-four articles by which the earlier draft was superseded. Originally the guarantee was to extend to "perpetual neutrality as well as the integrity and inviolability of its territory." That language was reduced to "an independent and perpetually neutral state" — the word "inviolability" being omitted. Only in more modern times has permission to pass through a state been deemed a breach of neutrality. It was forbidden by the Hague "Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in case of War on Land."

[78] Quoted, Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 102–7; Fuehr: *The Neutrality of Belgium*, pp. 237–42.

"It is not likely that *we should allow treaties to be violated with impunity without a protest.* People may remark that protests are a very poor sort of compensation. But it will be far more natural and far more dignified for us to protest against a violation of Belgian territory, than to look complacently on while such Powers as France and Germany march their armies across Belgium, satisfying themselves with the assurance that at the close of the conflict the territory of Belgium shall remain intact as before." [79]

The Spectator. *The Spectator* of 5 February had the following: ". . . the general idea is that England will be kept out of this war. . . . That she will try to do so we do not doubt, but there is the Belgian difficulty ahead. *Our guarantee for her is not a solitary one, and would not bind us to fight alone;* but there are general interests to be considered. The probability is that we shall insist on her not becoming a theatre of war but shall not bar — as indeed we cannot bar — the traversing of her soil." [80]

The Pall Mall Gazette. In its issue of 4 February, *The Pall Mall Gazette*, then a Liberal organ, had a special article headed: "England and Belgium: Are we bound to intervene? There is no Guarantee." It discussed the treaties, and declared that "There is, therefore, no English guarantee to Belgium." [81]

Sir Charles Dilke. Various other articles appeared, and, in the June number of *The Fortnightly*, Dilke summed the result of the discussion as follows (Italics now added):

"In January last, there was the gravest doubt in my mind as to what would be the response that the questions asked by me with regard to Belgium would produce; I did not know whether or not England meant to fight for Belgium, but I did feel certain that England ought to know her mind upon the point, and I thought it right that marked attention should be directed to a matter so important. *A great discussion followed, but that discussion has been all one way, and my questions of last January now read like some of the speculations of ancient history.* The principal party organ of the Conservatives of England has declared that our intervention in support of Belgium, which up to last year was assumed as a matter of course by both parties in the State, 'would be not only insane, but impossible.' It has been suggested by 'Diplomaticus' and the *Standard* that we are to allow Belgium to be temporarily utilized as 'a right of way,' and the *National Review* has endorsed the suggestion of 'Diplomaticus,' and told us that it might be possible to obtain a guarantee that the territory of Belgium,

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[79] Issue of 4 Feb. 1887. Quoted by Dilke in *Fortnightly Rev.* of June 1887: See Egerton, *British Foreign Policy in Europe*, pp. 24–7.

[80] Quoted by Fuehr, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

[81] See *ibid.*, pp. 243–6. On the following day, *The Pall Mall Gazette* published another article; *ibid.*, p. 246.

if traversed for military purposes, should not be permanently violated, and that, at the end of the struggle, the neutrality and independence of that country should be religiously respected.

"It is hardly necessary to argue seriously upon the religious respect which the neutrality of Belgium would receive after the non-permanent violation. My belief remains as strong as when I wrote in January and February last that, *when once the neutrality is violated, the independence of Belgium is gone.* It is the Belgians who, when Germany and France fall out, if the struggle is a long or doubtful one, will have to pay the piper. The erection of Belgian fortresses on the Meuse, and the proposed adoption of personal service . . . has caused a great accumulation of books and papers upon my table, but I put them aside into their drawers with the feeling that *a question which was worth arguing at length six months ago has now been solved in England.*"

After discussing the measures proposed to be taken by the Belgians for their own defence, Dilke added:

"They will be safer in their own hands than the outcome of the recent discussion shows them to have been in ours."

He then referred to the language of the *Morning Post* above quoted, and proceeded:

"'Diplomaticus' and the *Standard* would have us come to an understanding to give the right of way, while the *Morning Post* would have us protest against its use. I do not myself think the Belgians, who are after all the people most concerned, would see much difference.

"*The response to my first chapter has been virtually unanimous, and it is clear that my question, whether we intend to fight for Belgium according to our treaty obligations, or to throw treaty obligations to the wind, under some convenient pretext, is already answered.* On the other hand, it is now plain that Belgium desires, although still in a rather tepid way, to preserve her neutrality, and, through it, her independence. She is gradually learning the lesson that she will have to preserve it by the power to give hard knocks. Unfortunately we have misled Belgium for many years. The highest modern strategic opinion upon the existing system of defences in Belgium, written only in 1884, runs as follows: 'All has been sacrificed to the intention to afford a landing-place to the army of succour to be furnished by a great naval power. It is England that is meant, for the neutrality and independence of Belgium have no more firm defender than Great Britain.' This was written three years ago when a Liberal Government was in power; but it could not be repeated now, although we are under the rule of the party which is supposed to be the most inclined to interfere abroad. Treaties, no doubt, die out in time. The treaty of 1839 with regard to Belgium is after all much older than the treaty of the 21st November, 1855, with regard to Sweden. *France and England would now think it an insane idea that they should attempt to preserve*

the integrity of Sweden against Russia, and similarly to all appearances, thinks England with regard to Belgium now." [82]

The integrity of Sweden had been provided for by article 11 of the treaty of Stockholm (21 November 1855), between the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden and Norway. It was as follows (Italics now added):

"In case Russia should make to His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway any Proposal or Demand having for its object to obtain either the Cession or the Exchange of any part whatsoever of the Territories belonging to the Crowns of Sweden and Norway, or the power of occupying certain points of the said Territories, or the Cession of Rights of Fishery, of Pasturage, or of any other Right upon the said Territories and upon the Coasts of Sweden and Norway, His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway engages forthwith to communicate such Proposal or Demand to Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the Emperor of the French; and their said Majesties, on their part, *engage to furnish to His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway sufficient Naval and Military Forces* to co-operate with the Naval and Military Forces of His said Majesty, for the purpose of resisting the Pretensions of Aggressions of Russia. The description, number, and destination of such Forces shall, if occasion should arise, be determined by common agreement between the three Powers." [83]

Dilke thought that "England" would not implement that promise.

Comment. The foregoing extracts afford food for reflection. Dilke evidently believed that the United Kingdom ought:

"to fight for Belgium according to our treaty obligations, or to throw treaty obligations to the wind under some convenient pretext;" [84]

and he was furnished with a whole sheaf of pretexts for inactivity:

1. Intervention would be "unwise in the last degree." It would not be possible.

"without violating and destroying the main purposes of English policy all over the world."

2. "The temporary use of a right of way is something different from a permanent and wrongful possession of territory."

3. The situation has "necessarily and naturally undergone considerable modification" since the guarantee was given.

4. "But it would be madness for us to incur or assume responsibilities unnecessarily, when to do so would manifestly involve our participation in a tremendous war" — "in a war of giants."

5. A protest would be sufficient.

6. The guarantee was of joint character. It "would not bind us to fight alone."

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[82] Quoted by Egerton in *British Foreign Policy in Europe*, pp. 24–27.

[83] Sanger and Norton, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–11.

[84] *Ante*, p. 437.

7. "There is no English guarantee to Belgium."

Dilke himself declared that:

"France and England would now think it an insane idea that they should attempt to preserve the integrity of Sweden against Russia; and similarly, to all appearance, thinks England with regard to Belgium now."

And he summed popular opinion as follows:

"The response to my first chapter has been virtually unanimous, and it is clear that my question, whether we intend to fight for Belgium according to our treaty obligations, or to throw treaty obligations to the wind, under some convenient pretext, is already answered." [85]

Effect in Brussels and Vienna. Dilke's article, the Diplomaticus letter, and the newspaper comment created great interest in Belgium, and, thanks to the publication of documents discovered by the Germans when recently at Brussels,[86] we are able to follow some of the diplomatic interchanges of the period. On 27 January (1887), Lord Vivian (British Ambassador at Brussels) assured the Belgian government that "Belgium might count upon England in case of war." This, however, was prior to the issue of *The Standard* (4 February), although after the raising of the question by Dilke, and was a statement which, in accordance with previously understood policy, the Ambassador, acting on his own responsibility, might very well have made. Shortly after the 4th February, Vivian had another conversation with the Belgian Minister, Prince Chimay, in which he indicated a complete change of attitude. It is referred to in a Belgian governmental notebook marked "Guarantie de Neutralité," under the heading "Conversations of the Minister with the British Envoy"; it indicates the arrival of a communication from London; and continues:

"Belgium wants to make sure if England would act as she did in 1870. London evades giving assurances to meet a mere possibility. It would be best for us, says Lord Vivian, to make preparations as if we had to act for ourselves."

The ensuing perplexity of the King of the Belgians is indicated by his letter to Count Lambermont, Minister of State and General Secretary (13 February 1887):

"It would be vain to hope that the English will now make a new treaty to guarantee our neutrality, but it would not be impossible that the French should undertake towards us an obligation to respect our neutrality if we can defend it. I should not even be surprised if they wanted more, viz., the promise that Belgium should become an ally of France if the Germans violate her neutrality. If it comes to that, we must manœuvre so as to avoid this, and to induce France to declare,

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[85] *Ante*, p. 437.

[86] Their authenticity has not been impeached.

as formally as possible, that she abandons this in favor of our neutrality. When we have prevailed upon the French to do this, we shall request the Germans kindly to give us similar assurances."

There was a simultaneous and similar change of British attitude at Vienna. The notebook (alluded to above) refers to a report from Count Jongha d'Ardoye (the Belgian Ambassador at Vienna) of a conversation with Sir Augustus Paget, the British Ambassador there:

"Conversations of our Envoy at Vienna with the British Ambassador re the article by Sir Charles Dilke in the *Fortnightly Review* (January 13). Sir Augustus Paget declared that England must certainly defend the Belgian neutrality, as she did in 1870, if she does not want to resign her influence hitherto exercised in Europe."

The conversation was prior to the issue of *The Standard*. The entry in the notebook is followed by another with reference to a later report from Vienna — evidently after Sir Augustus had received his later directions:

"*Idem* re article signed 'Diplomaticus' in the *Standard* (February 12). The Ambassador first of all said, as a general remark, that newspaper articles are without great importance, and then added that England was not under a different obligation from that of the other guaranteeing Powers; that she was not bound to defend our neutrality if the other Great Powers remained inactive. Belgium would do well to look to her defence herself."

The notebook continues:

"This language which, as our Vienna Envoy points out, is so diametrically opposite to that of a former conversation, proves the alteration which the traditional policy of England has undergone. The *Standard* has doubtless the task of preparing public opinion." [87]

Diplomaticus and *The Standard* had not assumed to speak for the British government, but evidently they had succeeded in indicating very accurately the governmental view. And observe that the reason assigned by Sir Augustus Paget for the absence of obligation to defend Belgium was that the guarantee of the Belgian treaty was one of joint, and not of individual character. That was correct interpretation of the language of the treaty.

Documents from another source enable us to see not only the reason for the British change of attitude, but why it was necessary to tell Belgium that she "would do well to look to her defence herself." For the United Kingdom was at the time engaged in arranging a treaty (by exchange of letters) with Austria-Hungary and Italy (two members of the Triple Alliance) with reference to the maintenance of the *status quo:*

[87] The above statements with reference to Lord Vivian and Sir A. Paget are taken from the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (Berlin semi-official) of 19 Aug. 1917, as translated by the *Cambridge Magazine* of 3 Nov. 1917.

"on the shores of the Euxine, the Ægean, the Adriatic, and the northern coast of Africa." [88]

Negotiations leading to this treaty (aided by Bismarck) had been carried on simultaneously with negotiations for a renewal of the Triple Alliance and of two associated treaties — one between Germany and Italy, and the other between Austria-Hungary and Italy; and the British treaty was intended to be complementary to these other treaties. Observe the sequence of events:

Negotiations for renewal of the Triple Alliance and the two associated treaties: (1) Germany and Italy and (2) Austria-Hungary and Italy.

Simultaneous negotiations for the treaty between the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.

Dilke's article in *The Fortnightly Review*	January.
Lord Vivian's assurance of support to Belgium	27 January.
Sir Augustus Paget's assurance about same time.	
Diplomaticus in *The Standard*, and *The Standard* article	4 February.
Letters of Count Conti (Italy) and Lord Salisbury formulating the British treaty	12 February.
Belgian King's perplexity	13 February.
Signatures affixed to the Bismarck treaties	20 February.
Letter of Count Karolyi (Austria-Hungary) adhering to the formulation of the Anglo-Italian treaty, and so completing it	24 March.

These facts make clear why it was impossible for Lord Salisbury to permit Belgium to remain under the impression derived from Lord Vivian's assurances — why the Ambassador was instructed to substitute the suggestion that she "would do well to look to her defence herself." The British treaty has, not inaptly, been referred to as a moral extension of the Triple Alliance across the English Channel.[89]

Diplomaticus Repudiated. During the recent war, the British government issued the following statement:

"On January 18 the Foreign Office issued a categorical denial to statements made in the German Press to the effect that, in 1887, the British Government had determined not to oppose a violation of Belgian neutrality by foreign troops, provided that all damage done by the invaders were paid for.[90]

"In spite of this denial, the German Press continues its endeavors to

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[88] Pribram, *op. cit.*, I, p. 94.

[89] H. Oncken: *Das alte und das neue Mitteleuropa*, p. 47; referred to by Pribram, *op. cit.*, II, p. 83. Bismarck assisted in the negotiation of the British treaties, see *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, p. 246; *The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, II, p. 162.

[90] The denial may be seen in *The Times*, 19 Jan. 1917. In *The Times* of 29 Jan., there is reference to a reply to this "categorical denial" which covered a whole page of *The North German Gazette*.

excuse the violation of Belgium in 1914 by falsely attributing to the British Government of 1887 certain views which were expressed in an anonymous letter written to the *Standard* on February 4, 1887. It is true that such a letter appeared in the *Standard* on the date mentioned, and that it was afterwards commented on in the British Press. As it was feared that misrepresentations of the official British attitude might be possible in consequence of the Press statements, H. M. Minister at Brussels (Lord Vivian), with the approval of the British Government, informed the Belgian Government that no importance should be attached to newspaper articles on the subject of Belgian neutrality, as they were not inspired by, and did not represent the views of the British Government. Lord Vivian, moreover, told the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs (the Prince de Chimay) that if the Belgian Government thought that the British Government endorsed the views of the newspapers in question, it would cause the British Government most serious concern. The British Government never had at any time contemplated the violation of Belgian neutrality. Nor did they, as a party to the treaty of 1839, by which the five Powers guaranteed the independence of Belgium, contemplate condoning the violation of that neutrality by any other Power. The events of 1914 are clear proof of this, if proof be needed." [91]

The *démenti* was carefully phrased, and falls far short of the first assurances of Vivian and Paget, namely, that "Belgium might count upon England in case of war." The chief significance, moreover, of the Diplomaticus incident is not its relation to governmental attitude, but the fact that, as Dilke said:

"The response to my first chapter has been virtually unanimous, and it is clear that my question, whether we intend to fight for Belgium according to our treaty obligation, or to throw treaty obligations to the wind, under some convenient pretext, is already answered."

Such being the attitude of the public, the goverment would no doubt have limited its action to a more or less peremptory refusal to "condone" an invasion of Belgium, or, at the best, to arrange for restoration and recompense after the hostilities had ceased.

BRITISH ATTITUDE IN 1914

Such was the British attitude toward the Belgian treaty in 1887. When, in 1914, Germany proposed to invade Belgium, and offered

"at the conclusion of peace to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full." [92]

that attitude was entirely changed. Why? Because of the change in British feeling toward Germany. In 1887, a guarantee from

[91] *The Times*, 14 March 1917.

[92] Belgian Grey Book, No. 20.

Germany that she would not permanently occupy Belgium would have sufficed as a pretext for acquiescence in German encroachment. But in 1914, pretexts for acquiescence were not wanted. On the contrary, Mr. Asquith gave, as a popular pretext for activity, a breach of the Belgian treaty. Excuses for any desired course of action, or inaction, are easily found. That the United Kingdom was under no treaty-obligation to defend Belgium or Belgian neutrality, the reader, it is hoped, has been convinced by his perusal of the earlier part of the present chapter. That, in Sir Edward Grey's opinion no such obligation existed, and that he declined to agree to the maintenance of British neutrality on condition that Germany refrained from invasion of Belgium, have been demonstrated in a previous chapter.[93]

CONCLUSIONS

From what has been said, the following conclusions may safely be deduced:

1. Belgium, in 1831–9, did not desire to be transformed into a neutral state. That status was forced upon her in the supposed interests of the Great Powers, and chiefly in the interest of the United Kingdom.

2. The word *guarantee* is of uncertain import. Usually, it cannot be interpreted as an obligation to military activity.

3. Unless there is a clear indication to the contrary, guarantee treaties

"are rather in the nature of general declarations, and strong declarations, of policy and general intention, than in the nature of covenants of a specific and determinate character, the obligation of which can, under all circumstances, be exacted." [94]

4. As used in the Belgian treaty, the word *guarantee* cannot be construed as a promise of military action.

5. Russia's known attitude with reference to the Turkish treaty of 30 March 1856, makes improbable the assertion that she intended in 1839 to assume an obligation of military activity. The obligation of the other Powers could not be of a character different from Russia's.

6. If the word *guarantee* in the Belgian treaty can be treated as a promise, it is one of joint, and not of several character — a promise, therefore, which one party was not obliged to implement without the co-operation of the other four.

7. Geographical considerations are alone sufficient to indicate that military activity cannot have been within the intention of the parties. It is inconceivable that Russia or the United Kingdom contemplated individual action without the co-operation of the other four Powers — or, possibly, in opposition to the other four.

[93] Cap. V.

[94] *Ante*, p. 422.

8. The action of the United Kingdom in 1870 was inconsistent with the idea of existing obligation to defend Belgian neutrality.

9. British opinion in 1887 repudiated liability to withstand the passage of German armies through Belgium.

10. Sir Edward Grey's attitude in 1914, as revealed in the diplomatic correspondence, was inconsistent with the idea of the existence of treaty obligation to defend Belgian neutrality.

11. It is clear therefore that the United Kingdom was under no treaty obligation to intervene in the war.[95]

SCRAPS OF PAPER

Nevertheless, by the treaty of 1839, Germany was bound to respect the neutrality of Belgium. She violated her promise. Justification for that action upon grounds of purely ethical value is impossible. What can be urged in her defence?

This first, that nobody believed that either Germany or France would respect her obligation if success could be obtained, or failure be averted, by its violation. Indeed, it is an oft-time repeated accusation against Germany that, by her construction of strategic railways and adaptation to military purposes of those leading to Belgium, she had made her purpose clear.[96] And when Holland commenced the fortification of Flushing (at the mouth of the Scheldt), at the instance, it was said, of Germany, the French government saw in it but another evidence of the same design. Reporting on 2 February 1911, the Russian Ambassador at Paris said:

"If Pichon and his colleagues retain their composure, it is due to the fact that the conviction prevails here that Germany, in a new Franco-German war, would in any case violate Belgian neutrality. For this reason, the fortification of Flushing is considered a less important detail of the general German plan of attack upon France."[97]

The elaborate preparations of the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium for the purpose of countering German invasion through Belgium[98] make unnecessary further proof of the existence of the general anticipation.

Repudiations. Furthermore, students of history will agree with the following from Dr. James Brown Scott, the Editor in Chief of *The American Journal of International Law* and the author of many valuable books:

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[95] *Cf.* an address by James Brown Scott, and the discussion by which it was followed, as reported in the American Society of International Law Proceedings, April 1917, pp. 101–24. Even in Belgium, jurists disagreed upon the point (*ibid.*, p. 126).

[96] See, for example, Sir Charles Oman: *The Outbreak of the War, 1914–18*, pp. 122–3; Mr. Winston S. Churchill: *The World Crisis*, I, pp. 53–4.

[97] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 545–6

[98] See cap. XVII.

"For, if you examine any collection of treaties, you will find that not merely one nation, or a second nation, or a third nation, has failed in its international agreements, but that all nations are tarred with the same stick. Whenever a treaty has been entered into which has borne rather hardly or harshly against a nation, that nation has either interpreted the obligation out of existence, or it is declared not to be binding, or it has flatly refused to honor its obligations, alleging, if you please, a change of circumstances . . . the fact is that, in times past, nations have insisted on living up to agreements when in harmony with their interests, and they have not lived up to them when they have not been to their interest. I bemoan this fact. I wish it were not so, but you do not cure this tendency in nations merely by duplicating evils. . . . My proposition is that nations, in the long run, act upon their own interests; that they act upon those interests whether those interests are stated and guaranteed by treaty; that after they put their hands and seals to a treaty, and it is not to their interest to observe the terms of that treaty, there are diplomats and there are lawyers shrewd enough to prove to the unwary and to the layman and to the world at large that the nation is not bound by the terms of the treaty." [99]

Among the more customary excuses for inattention to treaty obligation are the following:

Salus reipublicæ est suprema lex. The safety of the state is the supreme law. It is supreme in the sense in which "self-preservation is the first law of nature." Machiavelli taught it, and has ever since been villified in language, and approved in practice. "We must first secure a livelihood, and then practice virtue," said Aristotle, and if Dr. Johnson peevishly declared that he saw no necessity for livelihood, he would probably not have gone to his death in support of his assertion. Hugo Grotius, the father of international law, declared that:

"Necessity, the great protectress of human infirmity, breaks through all human laws, and all those made in the spirit of human regulations." [100]

Captain Mahan's reputation is better than Machiavelli's, but he agrees that self-preservation is:

"the first law of States even more than that of men; for no Government is empowered to assent to that last sacrifice, which the individual may make from the noblest motives."

Sir Francis Piggott, speaking as an upholder of British naval operations during the war, quotes Mahan approvingly, and adds:

"That this is the fundamental principle of warlike action in its relation to neutrals, that the rightness and wrongness of that action must

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[99] *Am. Soc. Int. Law Procdgs.*, April 1917, pp. 102–4.

[100] *Rights of War and Peace*, vol. 2, cap. 2, para. 7. Quoted by Fuehr, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

ultimately be referred to that simple criterion, is the thesis of this article." [101]

Bismarck was equally frank. He said:

"All contracts between great states cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by 'the struggle for existence.' No great nation will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to contract when it is compelled to choose between the two." [102]

In Mr. Hall's book, *A Treatise on International Law*, is the following:

"The right of self-preservation in some cases justifies commissions of acts of violence against a friendly or neutral state, when from its position and resources it is capable of being made use of to dangerous effects by an enemy, when there is a known intention on his part to make use of it, and when, if he is not forestalled, it is almost certain that he will succeed, either through the helplessness of the country or by means of intrigues with a party within." [103]

From a military point of view, the German Chancellor was quite right when he explained to Sir Edward Grey in August 1914 that:

"If we have violated the neutrality of Belgium, we were constrained by the duty of self-preservation." [104]

In his book, *Reflections on the World War*, the Chancellor admitted that German invasion of Belgium was wrong, but:

"at the same time adduced our dire need as both compelling and condoning it." [105]

To the question whether Germany feared that, during the course of the war, Belgium would be made use of by France, a conclusive answer was given by the "Introductory Narrative of Events" which emanated from the British Foreign Office on 28 September 1914: [106]

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[101] *The Nineteenth Century*, April 1918, p. 869. The decision of the British Privy Council in the *Stigstad* case (1919, A. C. 279) amply justifies the view of Sir Francis Piggott. For it was there held that when the British navy was engaged in retaliatory operations against Germany (that is to say, in operations forbidden by international law, and to be justified as against Germany only as reply to other forbidden actions), the rights of neutrals very largely disappeared. The court said that: "Its function is, in protection of the rights of neutrals, to weigh on a proper occasion the measures of retaliation which have been adopted, and to inquire whether they are in their nature or extent other than commensurate with the prior wrong done, and whether they inflict on neutrals, when they are looked at as a whole, inconvenience greater than is reasonable under all circumstances." After many years of experience in world affairs, Lord Dufferin, the great British diplomatist, felt himself justified in saying that "force and not right is still the dominant factor in human affairs" (Speech in Belfast 28 Oct. 1896, quoted in *Fortnightly Review*, 1896, p. 904).

[102] *Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, p. 270. [103] P. 275.

[104] Telg. to London, 3 Aug. 1914; Kautsky Docs., No. 790.

[105] Pp. 146–9.

[106] May be seen in Price: *The Dip. Hist. of the War*, pp. iii–ix. The document was not included in *Coll. Dip. Docs.*

"Germany's position must be understood. She had fulfilled her treaty obligations in the past; her action now was not wanton. Belgium was of supreme military importance in a war with France; if such a war occurred, it would be one of life and death; Germany feared that, if she did not occupy Belgium, France might do so. In face of this suspicion, there was only one thing to do. The neutrality of Belgium had not been devised as a pretext for wars, but to prevent the outbreak of wars. The Powers must reaffirm Belgian neutrality in order to prevent the war now threatened. The British Government, therefore, on Friday the 31st July, asked the German and French Governments for an engagement to respect Belgium's neutrality, and the Belgian Government for an engagement to uphold it. France gave the necessary engagement the same day; Belgium gave it the day after; Germany returned no reply. Henceforward there could be no doubt of German designs."

Germany feared, as well she might, that France, notwithstanding her treaty-promise of 1839, would attack her through Belgium; and, in order to remove that fear, the British government asked France to give a further promise of the same unreliable kind! She gave it; but if, because of German concentration upon Verdun and Belfort in the south, a flank attack by France through Belgium had become necessary for the salvation of Paris, excuse for it would, most assuredly, not have been wanting. Germany's view is embodied in the first four sentences of the quotation.

The action of the United Kingdom and France in Greece, during the war, can be justified only upon the *salus reipublicæ* doctrine.[107] A friend endeavored to quiet my doubts as to the propriety of British and French action in that country by asking me whether "the present was a proper time to stand on ceremony"! The British government, just prior to the commencement of the war, took possession of two warships of neutral Turkey, and the British King offered as excuse "the exigencies of the defence of his dominions."[108] For justification of the action of Japan in entering Chinese territory in order to cooperate with the British in an attack upon Tsing-tao, the doctrine under discussion is not sufficient excuse.

Ultra posse nemo obligatur. No one is bound to attempt the impossible. It is a maxim of English civil law that impossibility of accomplishment excuses non-performance of contracts, and the reason of the rule is applicable to international treaties. That British action in defence of the neutrality of Luxemburg "would be impossibly quixotic," was offered by some "Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History"

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[107] See cap. X. The seizure of Corfu was a breach of a neutrality guarantee. *Cf.* Phillimore: *Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace*, p. 142.

[108] *Ante*, cap. VI, p. 210.

as an excuse for confining action to the "exercise of our influence."[109] And the King of Greece pleaded similarly with reference to his war-treaty with Serbia.[110] Bismarck held the same view. He said:

"The maxim '*ultra posse nemo obligatur*' holds good in spite of all treaty formulas whatsoever; nor can any treaty guarantee the degree of zeal and the amount of force that will be devoted to the discharge of obligations, when the private interest of those who lie under them no longer reinforces the text and its earliest interpretation."[111]

If circumstances had made necessary the formulation of an excuse for non-performance by the United Kingdom of obligation under the Swiss and Polish treaties,[112] one reason, no doubt, would have been the maxim under discussion. When Lord Salisbury was asked to protect the Armenians against Turkey, in pursuance of the treaty of 4 June 1878, part of his reply was that the Admiralty had not been able to discover any means by which the British fleet could get through the Taurus mountains. Sir Charles Dilke declared, as we have seen,[113] with reference to the treaty with Sweden, that:

"France and England would now think it an insane idea that they should attempt to preserve the integrity of Sweden against Russia, and similarly, to all appearance, thinks England with regard to Belgium now." Whether that was upon the ground of *ultra posse*, or of the maxim next to be referred to, Dilke did not say.

Rebus sic stantibus. Obligation continues only while circumstances remain unchanged. This rule has been said to be a tacit stipulation of every treaty.[114] It was pleaded by Russia in 1871, in justification of her disregard of treaty obligations with reference to the Black Sea and Batoum; but, when brought to book, she agreed to the London protocol declaring:

"that it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers, by means of an amicable arrangement."[115]

In Bismarck's opinion:

"International policy is a fluid element which under certain conditions will solidify, but on a change of atmosphere reverts to its original diffuse condition. The clause *rebus sic stantibus*[116] is tacitly understood in all treaties that involve performance."[117]

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[109] *Ante*, p. 428.
[110] Cap. X, p. 361.
[111] *Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, p. 270.
[112] Lord Stanley's statement, *ante*, p. 422.
[113] *Ante*, pp. 437–8.
[114] Bynkershoek: *Quest. jur. pub.*, II, c. 10.
[115] *Ency. Brit.* (11th ed.), XXVII, p. 230.
[116] Conditions remaining unchanged.
[117] *Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, p. 280.

President Wilson's argument in support of his contention that the *entente* Allies were, in April 1919, not bound by the treaty of 1915 upon the faith of which Italy entered the war, is a striking illustration of the ease with which an obligation may be repudiated. The treaty had made disposition of territory on the east side of the Adriatic, contrary to the President's idea of the principles:

" for which America fought . . . upon which she can consent to make peace,"

and he urged that it had ceased to be obligatory because:

" When Italy entered the war she entered upon the basis of a definite private understanding with Great Britain and France, now known as the Pact of London. Since that time the whole face of circumstances has been altered. Many other powers, great and small, have entered the struggle, with no knowledge of that private understanding. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, then the enemy of Europe, and at whose expense the Pact of London was to be kept in the event of victory, has gone to pieces and no longer exists. Not only that, but the several parts of that empire, it is agreed now by Italy and all her associates, are to be erected into independent States and associated in a League of Nations, not with those who were recently our enemies, but with Italy herself and the powers that stood with Italy in the great war for liberty. We are to establish their liberty as well as our own. They are to be among the smaller States whose interests are henceforth to be safeguarded as scrupulously as the interests of the most powerful States." [118]

Treaty Interpretation. A method of avoiding treaty-obligation, often quite as simple as that employed by President Wilson, is to twist its interpretation. When, in 1887, the United Kingdom was disinclined to take up arms in defence of Belgian neutrality, argument was at hand to prove her freedom to refrain. But when, in 1914, she desired to avail herself of an appealing reason for war with Germany, the existence of obligation was asserted. War in defence of Luxemburg in 1914 not being popular, the guarantee treaty was interpreted by the " Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History " as meaning that the United Kingdom was not a principal, and was bound only " to exercise our influence." [119] When Japan wanted to join in the war against Germany, she alleged a non-existing obligation under her treaty with the United Kingdom.[120] If Italy and Roumania had desired to implement their war-treaties with Germany and Austria-Hungary, they would have alleged their obligation, upon the ground that Russia was the assailant. Desiring (in order to acquire territory from Austria-Hungary) to join the *entente* Allies, they declared that Germany and Austria-Hungary were not engaged defensively. Were Bismarck alive to-day, he might

[118] *N. Y. Times*, 24 April 1919.
[119] *Ante*, p. 428.
[120] *Ante*, p. 377–80.

very well, in view of recent occurrences, including the scandalous departure of the Versailles peace treaty from the terms agreed to in the armistice, supersede his various statements with the simple declaration that treaties, no matter how "plain and searching" the language, are not now regarded as obligations.

"Conscientiousness" disliked. In conclusion, we may note that the impatience of imperialistically inclined peoples with considerations of international morality [121] which stand in their way, was well illustrated by Dr. Conan Doyle's reference to the negotiations which preceded the Boer war. He said that:

"throughout the negotiations the hand of Great Britain was weakened, as her adversary had doubtless calculated that it would be, by an earnest but fussy minority. Idealism and a morbid, restless conscientiousness are two of the most dangerous evils from which a modern progressive State has to suffer." [122]

Unprofitable scraps of paper are very easily scrapped, and other action must not be expected.

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[121] For the purpose of the above sentence, "international morality" is assumed to forbid wanton attack by one nation upon another.

[122] *The Great Boer War*, p. 46. Defending his country, in language singularly out of harmony with so much that we have recently heard, a representative Englishman, Colonel Amery (for a time Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, and now First Lord of the Admiralty), said: "Much sympathy has been wasted on little peoples 'rightly struggling to be free,' whose chief struggle has been to wreck satisfactory political institutions and create unprovoked discords, for the sake of politically isolating some stray fragment from the world's ethnological scrap heap, or of propagating some obscure and wholly superfluous dialect. Little sympathy is bestowed on the great peoples rightly struggling for mastery, for the supremacy of higher civilization, and higher political principle" (*The Times History of the War in South Africa*, I, p. 22).

CHAPTER XV

GERMANY AND WORLD DOMINATION

GERMAN AMBITION

THAT the cause of the war was the ambition of Germany to dominate the whole world, has been alleged by scores of speakers and writers, in language similar to that used by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons on 24 December 1917:

"But what brought the war about? Does any one doubt who has read the whole history of that restless and vicious, arrogant military caste of Prussia, determined to force their dictation and domination over Europe, and through Europe over the world? They planned and they plotted for years for this war. They were even prepared (and everybody in Germany knew it) to overthrow their own ruler in order to help another ruler who was more in sympathy with their ambitious designs. It was common talk in Germany and there were pamphlets on the subject circulated through Prussia and the whole of Germany."

In a former speech (London, 4 August 1917), Mr. Lloyd George said that if Germany won, the Monroe doctrine would be treated as a scrap of paper:

". . . we know her ambitions in South America. Not a year after the termination of this peace would have elapsed before she would have started realizing them, and America would have been helpless."

Sir Robert Borden, in a speech at the Savoy Hotel, London, said:

"We know now, beyond peradventure, that this war was cruelly, foully, and deliberately planned and forced upon the world, to gratify an insensate lust of power dwelling in spirits of evil that bore the guise of men. The foulness of the purpose was unequalled save by the

deliberate and brutal savagery of the methods through which its consummation was attempted. Neither in the purpose, monstrous as it was, nor yet in the still more horrible methods of its attempted execution, did the people of the enemy nations hold back. That most significant and deplorable fact will not easily fade from our memories. Germany sought to conquer the world and failed." [1]

In the same vein, *The Round Table* declared that:

" the real cause of the war was . . . a state of mind in the German and Magyar peoples," namely, " such a spirit of aggression, so deep a passion to impose German will on the world, coupled with so boundless a confidence in Germany's power to enforce it. . . . Russia and France were to be crippled first, then Britain, and lastly America. When once all this was achieved, South America, Africa and Asia would have lain at the German's feet." [2]

Mr. Lansing, the United States Secretary of State, in an address at Sacket Harbor, N. Y. (9 July 1917), said:

" Imagine Germany victor in Europe, because the United States remained neutral. Who, then, think you, would be the next victim of those who are seeking to be masters of the whole earth? Would not this country with its enormous wealth arouse the cupidity of an impoverished, though triumphant Germany? Would not this democracy be the only obstacle between the autocratic rulers of Germany and their supreme ambition? Do you think that they would withhold their hand from so rich a prize "? [3]

During the first two years and eight months of the war, while his country remained neutral, Mr. Lansing had no such apprehension, and subsequent necessity for rousing the war-spirit would probably be his apology for his speech.

After the war, M. Clemenceau, as part of *The Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace*, said:

" For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the Prussian tradition, strove for a position of dominance in Europe. They were not satisfied with that growing prosperity and influence to which Germany was entitled, and which all other nations were willing to accord her in the society of free and equal peoples. They required that they should be able to dictate and tyrannize to a subservient Europe, as they dictated and tyrannized over a subservient Germany." [4]

The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, when referring to the period of the ascension to the German throne of William II, has the following:

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[1] *The Times* (London), 29 Nov. 1918.

[2] March 1919, pp. 240–1.

[3] *N. Y. Times*, 30 July 1917. See also *ante*, p. 12, and *post*, p. 493.

[4] P. 2.

"The German people were being gradually trained under their young Sovereign's ambitious aspiration to look upon 'world-dominion' as their rightful goal, and the British Empire as the chief obstacle to its attainment." [5]

Several pages might easily be filled with quotations such as the foregoing. One more, especially vivid, must suffice. It is from the pen of Mr. E. Bruce Mitford:

"The neutrality of Belgium relegated to the limbo of polite fictions, that hapless State should form at once an avenue through which the invasion of Russia's western ally could be swiftly and remorselessly achieved, and a *pied à terre* for still more imposing schemes. By this, no doubt, the deluge, but upon its crest the Fatherland would ride to world-power, while among the flood-wrack lay the débris of the British Empire." [6]

Replying to such assertions, the German Foreign Minister, von Kuhlmann, said (July 1918) as follows:

"This legend does not become truer through constant repetition. I do not believe that any intelligent man in Germany ever entertained, before this war, the hope or the wish that Germany should attain world domination. I do not believe that any responsible man in Germany (not to speak of the Kaiser or the Imperial Government) ever, even for a moment, thought that they could win world-domination in Europe by unchaining war. The idea of world domination in Europe is Utopian. Napoleon's example showed that. A nation which tried to achieve it would, as happened in France, bleed to death in useless battle, and would be most grievously injured and lowered in her development." [7]

Hysteria. That the attribution to Germany of such a wildly impracticable purpose as world domination was accepted by millions of people, can be explained only by the mental unsettlement produced by the war.[8] For, conceding that sixty-five, or even seventy-five [9] million Germans might possibly be able eventually to establish their military predominance over [10] 160 million Russians; 35 million Turks; 14 million Czecho-Slavs; 8 million Yugo-Slavs; 15 millions more in the Balkan States; 12 million Poles; 10 million Magyars; 34 million Italians; 40 million French; 4 million Swiss; 24 million Spaniards; 5 million Portu-

[5] III, p. 273. It is a pity that an otherwise excellent work should have been to some extent spoiled by an attempt to combine (as the editors say in their Preface) with "a strict adherence to historical truth" "a national point of view — in other words, an avowed regard for the interests, and above all for the honour of Great Britain."

[6] *Fortnightly Rev.*, July 1916, p. 48.

[7] *The Times* (London).

[8] Von Bethmann-Hollweg traced the notion to "boyish and unbalanced ebullience": *Reflections*, p. 95; and see p. 163.

[9] Adding the Austro-Germans.

[10] The figures are only approximations.

guese; 10 million Scandinavians; 6 million Dutch; and 7 million Belgians — conceding that 75 million Germans might succeed in establishing their rule over these 380 million Europeans, there would still remain for them the difficult task of rendering their position so secure over the subject territory (permanent military occupations everywhere) that they could devote sufficient of their remaining strength to the reduction of the 45 millions in the British Isles, who, by that time, would, no doubt, have secured the willing assistance of the whole of the yet unconquered world.

The British subdued, the work of world-domination would still be only half done, or rather not done at all. For as Napoleon could defeat one nation after another, but could neither persuade nor compel them to remain defeated, so Germany would find that, pending the completion of her enterprise, Russia would recuperate and fight as at Leipsic; Prussia would revive and fight as at Leipsic and Waterloo; Spain would turn and drive the invaders across the Pyrenees; the British, the Turks, the Magyars, the Italians, the Scandinavians would break their bonds and fight again.[11]

Europe, including the United Kingdom, in constant insurrection, we are asked to believe that from it could be spared a sufficient number of Germans to attack the one hundred millions in the United States, assisted by the many more millions in the American hemisphere, who, having been witnesses of the progressive subjugation of all Europe, would have been rapidly preparing for the proposed invasion; and preparing in such a way as to make the transportation of troops across the Atlantic somewhat impracticable.

North and South America having all been occupied and dominated, they too must be kept in subjection while Germans still available for further enterprise proceed to cross the Pacific for the subjugation of fifty million Japanese, who meanwhile have not neglected to prepare for attack upon the transport ships during their three weeks' voyage.

The difficulties of conquest by Germany of the world may, in some measure, be realized if we ask what would have been her prospects of success had she undertaken to subdue the United States alone, or Japan alone, or even the United Kingdom alone.[12]

Probably the charge of intended world-domination ought, in many cases, to be attributed to the prevailing habit of indulgence in exaggerated phraseology. If not, how can it be explained that Lord Northcliffe

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[11] Writers and speakers who think that in Germany's efforts for world-domination, Austria-Hungary (apart from the Germans there), Turkey, and Bulgaria would fight steadily upon the German side, know little either of the races which inhabit those countries, or of human nature.

[12] Paradoxically, Germany could more easily have defeated the United Kingdom and France in alliance, than the United Kingdom alone — unweighted by responsibility for protection of France. See *post*, cap. XXVII.

repeated, as exhibiting the opinion of "one of our most distinguished authorities in the Far East," the following colloquy:

"What is the object of Japan?" "The control of China?" "And then?" "The control of the world: for who controls China could control the world."[13]

GERMAN AUTHORS

Popular acceptance of the idea that Germany instituted the war for the purpose of securing world-domination was due, very largely, to the belief that Nietzsche, Treitschke, and Bernhardi, by their advocacy of German domination of the world, had made it a national ambition[14] — an ambition which was enthusiastically proclaimed in the national song, *Deutschland über Alles*. Nothing could be farther from the truth. This is not the place for elaborate discussion of the works of the men just mentioned; but a few words as to each may be useful.

Nietzsche. Nietzsche was a poet-philosopher whose writings, brilliantly analytical as they undoubtedly are, contain such masses of contradictions that hardly one of his statements is left without confutation. He was not an historian like Treitschke, nor a military officer like Bernhardi. His enquiry was as to the impulses which move mankind. The hedonists had insisted that in pleasures and pains could be found the incentives which determine action. Schopenhauer had postulated the universal spirit of pity. Christians had made self-denial their stimulus. Benthamites argued for utility. And Nietzsche, differing with them all, declared that "the will to power" was that which dominated conduct: The truly healthy man, and all other organisms, he said, undegenerated by weakly sentimentalities, desiderated power and the opportunity to exercise it. To him, war — any war — is biologically good, and peace on earth a character-softening evil:

"Ye shall love peace," he said, "as a means to new wars, and the short peace more than the long."[15]

But, at the same time, as an individualist, he made:

"constant protest against that dominance of the State which is the first

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[13] *The Times*, 18 April 1922, under the caption "Watch Japan."

[14] Dernburg, a former Colonial Secretary of the German Empire, said that "three men, Nietzsche, Treitschke, and Bernhardi, are being pilloried by the foreign press as typical spokesmen of German statecraft" (*Saturday Evening Post*, 21 Nov. 1914; referred to by Prof. J. L. Stewart of Dalhousie University in *Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany*, p. 149). Mr. Frederick Bausman, for example, in his book *Let France Explain*, has the following: "Very justly do we condemn those German writers who at one time preached world dominion and the superman, some of whom in the language of Burke may be called cannibal philosophers" (p. 96).

[15] *Zarathustra*, vol. I, p. 10. And see Stewart: *Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany*, p. 98.

principle of Treitschke, and which notoriously pervades the Prussian régime." [16]

He found:

"the spirit of Nationality, no less than the spirit of Socialism, inimical to outstanding genius, and one might conjecture that he had the Prussian bureaucracy in mind when he wrote of those who 'hate and envy prominent self-evolving individuals, who do not willingly allow themselves to be drawn up in rank and file for the purpose of a collective effort.'" [17]

He made:

"several direct attacks upon the rising military spirit which seemed to menace German culture, and he had occasional sneers, more or less thinly veiled, against the system of Bismarck." [18]

Concerning Prussian success against France in 1870–1871, he said:

"The State and civilization are antagonistic; Germany has gained as to the former, but lost as to the latter." [19]

He condemned militarism on the ground that it was opposed to civilization, and because it interfered with individual choice in the activities of life. He repudiated the name of patriot, and asserted the propriety of a detached heart "even from a victorious Fatherland." [20]

"He thus earned the hatred of Treitschke, who thought him a 'bad Prussian'; while for the historian at Berlin, Nietzsche has only a passing sneer." [21]

"Nietzsche denounced race hatred, and looked for a cosmopolitan blending of nations" [22]

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[16] Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[17] *Ibid.*, quoting from *Human, All-too Human*, p. 480.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 155–6. "'The State — what is that?' cried Zarathustra in Nietzsche's favourite work: 'The State is called the coldest of cold monsters. And coldly it lieth. And this lie creepeth out of its mouth: "I, the State, am the people. . . . On earth there is nothing greater than I: God's regulating finger am I," thus the monster howleth. And not only those with long ears and short sight fall upon their knees. . . . The new idol would fain surround itself with heroes and honest men. It liketh to sun itself in the sunshine of good consciences — the cold monster! It will give you anything if you adore it, the new idol; thus it buyeth for itself the splendour of your virtue and the glance of your proud eyes. . . . What I call the State is where all are poison-drinkers, the good and the evil alike": Quoted in *Round Table*, March 1915, pp. 419, 420.

[19] Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[21] Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 157. Prof. A. S. Ferguson, in an article, "Nietzsche and German Culture," in *The University Magazine*, April 1915, wrote as follows: "One of the minor ironies of this war is the coupling of Nietzsche and Treitschke as joint inspirers of the German mind, and the Cosmic Spirit has equal cause to smile at the efforts of Nietzsche's defenders to prove him perhaps more blameless than he is" (218). "In a word, when the distinction between Nietzsche and Treitschke is pushed to an issue, the latter is a decorous authoritarianism, while Nietzsche shatters all authority and all institutions and many men to give the rare individual his full scope" (227).

[22] Stewart, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

— but under some dominant 'exploiting' class. And, as one might imagine, being a Pole:

"he saw in Germany much to despise"; "he had no high opinion of the Germans"; and "sometimes he saw the root of permanence in Russia." [23]

In a magazine article of 1915, Professor A. S. Ferguson asked:

"Would the ideal of a greater Germany, with a hegemony over Europe, unite Nietzsche's ideal and Treitschke's?"

and, answering for Nietsche negatively, he replied that:

"It would still further impoverish civilization, by imposing uniformity upon the healthy variety of cultures."

Quoting from Nietzsche, the Professor added:

"As many international powers as possible, so as to produce world-perspective." "If men occupy themselves with power, world-trade, parliamentarianism, military interests — if they squander on this side the amount of intelligence, interest, will, self-mastery, that makes them, then there is a gap on the other side. Culture and State — be not deceived — are antagonists. Culture-state is a purely modern notion." (It is Treitschke's.) "The one lives upon the other, the one spreads at the cost of the other." [24]

Very evidently, it is not in Nietzsche that we can find advocacy of German domination of the world.

Treitschke. If Treitschke were being indicted as a contributor to the crime of the invasion of Belgium in breach of treaty obligation, something could be said in support of the charge.[25] But so far from urging the reduction of the world to the dictation of one controlling power, Treitschke would have seen in such a proposal the destruction of the nobility of life — both in the conquering and in the conquered nations.

"The State is power," he said, "precisely in order to assert itself as against other equally independent powers. War and the administration of justice are the chief tasks of even the most barbaric States. But these tasks are only conceivable where a plurality of States are found existing side by side. Thus the idea of one universal empire is odious — the ideal of a state co-extensive with humanity is no ideal at all." [26]

"The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations, and it is simply foolish to desire the suppression of their rivalry." [27]

After reference to the attempted world-empires of Alexander and Napoleon, Treitschke said:

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[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 157, 161, 162.

[24] *The University Magazine*, April 1915, pp. 224, 225.

[25] See his *Politics* (the English translation), vol. I, pp. 15, 27–9; vol. II, pp. 596, 602–4.

[26] Vol. I, p. 19.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

"The unhappy attempt to transform the multiplicity of European life into the arid uniformity of universal sovereignty has produced the exclusive sway of nationality as the dominant political idea. Cosmopolitanism has receded too far. These examples show clearly that there is no prospect of a settlement of international contradictions." [28]

"It was a sin against the spirit of history which strove to turn the rich diversity of nations, knit by a bond of brotherhood, into the empty form of a single World Empire.[29]

"The rational task of a legally constituted people, conscious of a destiny, is to assert its rank in the world's hierarchy, and, in its measure, to participate in the great civilizing mission of mankind." [30]

". . . we see at once that it cannot be the destiny of mankind to form a single state, but that the ideal towards which we strive is a harmonious comity of nations, who, concluding treaties of their own free will, admit restrictions upon their sovereignty without abrogating it." [31]

"The blind worshipper of an eternal peace falls into the error of isolating the state, or dreams of one which is universal, which we have already seen to be at variance with reason." [32]

Notwithstanding all this (very much more in the same line could be quoted), Sir Percy Fitzpatrick has permitted himself to say:

"The prize [33] has been defined by Germans themselves in the single phrase, 'World Power,' and both the aim and the means have been national public property for a generation and more. The great German historian and most influential writer and political teacher, Treitschke, whose works are a kind of National Bible to Germany, taught consistently that Germany's destiny was to rule the world, that this must be achieved by war deliberately planned." [34]

In proof of his statements, Sir Percy proceeded to quote, not from any of the writings of Treitschke, but:

"some extracts from the writings of one who himself looked to Treitschke as the great teacher."

He referred to Bernhardi, from whose book (*Germany and the Next War*) the various extracts were taken. Every one of them, however, is irrelevant for the purpose indicated, except the title of the fifth chapter, "*Weltmach oder Niedergang*," the meaning of which Sir Percy evidently misunderstood.[35]

Bernhardi. Bernhardi has been brought into jeopardy of conviction for stimulating German ambition for world-domination by first,

[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 97.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[33] The prize for which Germany risked the war.
[34] *The Origin, Causes, and Object of the War*, p. 66.
[35] *Post*, p. 459.

an unfortunate rendering of his language by his English translator, and, secondly, by the misrepresentations of his prosecutors. Bernhardi placed at the head of the fifth chapter of his book the caption above quoted, but by "*Weltmach*" he did not mean, as Germany's enemies have been taught to believe, world-dominion or world-domination. Germany was a European Power — was she to become a World Power? Bernhardi used the word in the same sense as did John Bassett Moore when he wrote:

"Nothing could be more erroneous than the supposition that the United States had, as the result of certain changes in its habits, suddenly become within the past few years a 'world-power.' The United States has always been, in the fullest and highest sense, a world-power." [36]

The Messrs. Hurd employed the phrase with the same significance when they said of the United Kingdom:

"This country is no longer a European Power, but a world-Power." [37]

President Wilson was not misunderstood when (10 July 1919) he said to the Senate of the United States:

"There can be no question of our ceasing to be a world power. The only question is whether we can refuse the moral leadership that is offered us, whether we shall accept or reject the confidence of the world." [38]

And Mr. James Fairgrieve of the University of London, in giving to his book the title *Geography and World Power*, had no idea that anybody would think that he meant "Geography and World Domination."

Although Bernhardi's meaning is unmistakable, his translator has been the means of misleading many thousands — perhaps (through newspaper and magazine repetitions) many millions of people, by rendering *Weltmach* as "World Power." Not that the word *power* is altogether unwarranted (for it may be taken to signify strength or might), but that it is ambiguous, and, when prefaced by *world* without the indefinite article *a*, World Power suggests the idea of power over the world. Sir Percy Fitzpatrick evidently so understood the word when, in proof of his assertion that Germany's object was to rule the world, he wrote:

"General von Bernhardi, with characteristic candour, boldly states it in the headlines of the most important chapter of his book: 'World Power or Downfall.' That is the terse, and, one must admit, inspiring title that he flings to his people." [39]

It is more surprising to find Mr. Frederick Scott Oliver saying:

"Power, more power, world-power; these according to German

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[36] *American Diplomacy*, Preface.
[37] *The New Empire Partnership*, p. 110.
[38] *Current History*, X, Pt. 2, p. 214.
[39] *The Origin, Causes, and Object of the War*, p. 79.

theory, as well as practice, should be the dominant principles of the State." [40]

Lord Roberts well understood the *Weltmach* at which Germany was aiming and, in his propaganda speech at the Mansion House, 22 July 1912, said:

"At the same time there is Germany, a great homogeneous State with a population of 66,000,000, which is consciously aiming at becoming a world-Power with 'a place in the sun,' where its vigorous progeny may develop a German life, actuated by German thought and ideals." [41]

In various places in the English edition of Bernhardi's book, the article *a* precedes "world-power." [42] He frequently refers to the "other world Powers," [43] and all that he insisted upon was a "place among the world Powers." [44] It may well be assumed that if he desired German *Weltmach* in the sense of world-domination, advocacy of it would be found in the chapter carrying the caption above referred to, *Weltmach oder Niedergang;* but search for it there (as elsewhere) would be fruitless. In his chapter, the author reminds us that:

"There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth and development";

and adds:

"We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression, and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually, and advance slowly, so long as the struggle against us was waged with peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced upon us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavorable to us, then, if our aims met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and we should rapidly sink down." [45]

In these words, the author indicates the tendencies which end in *Weltmach oder Niedergang*. Advocating progress, he devotes all but a few of the thirty pages of his chapter to a review of international relationships,[46] and to recommendations as to German policy. He then deplores the fact that:

"The political and national development of the German people has

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[40] *The Ordeal by Battle*, p. 144. But see pp. 174, 5.
[41] *Message to the Nation* (pamphlet), p. 36.
[42] For example, at pp. 114, 164.
[43] For example, p. 81.
[44] For example, pp. 85, 164, 239, 241.
[45] Pp. 104–105.
[46] He himself so describes his work, pp. 86, 112.

always, so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the hereditary defects of its character — that is, by the particularism of the individual races and states, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national objects, from want of patriotism and of political common sense; often, also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it is painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in fruitless quarrels among themselves." [47]

The conclusion is:

"Our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcome these hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy, consistent development of our power. . . . We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense, together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, not only life and property, but also private views and preferences in the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our great duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a great part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit." [48]

Recognizing in France an irreconcilable enemy, Bernhardi argued that, in the war which he regarded as inevitable,[49] she should be crushed.[50] Colonies needed for "the overflow of our population" may be obtained, as previously, by negotiation, and in pursuance of an existing agreement with the United Kingdom as to the Portuguese estates. "If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of a successful European war." [51] To that extent Bernhardi envisaged territorial expansion. He sought no annexations in Europe, and of the crushing of any nation, other than France, he said not a word. In one of his chapters, he quoted what Lord Rosebery, in a patriotic speech (1 March 1893) had declared:

"It is said that our Empire is already large enough and does not need expansion. . . . We shall have to consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future. . . . We have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character." [52]

Bernhardi's comment was as follows:

"That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed. If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if we survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England,

[47] Pp. 112–113.
[48] Pp. 113–114.
[49] P. 103.
[50] P. 105.
[51] P. 107.
[52] P. 79.

we must admit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does not here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of the English spirit is proclaimed in plain language." [53]
Bernhardi's ambition was to:
"secure to German nationality, and German spirit throughout the Globe, that high esteem which is due to them." [54]

To put into Bernhardi's *Weltmach* the idea of world-domination would be not merely to do violence to his meaning, but to attribute to him an aspiration which he would repudiate as being both undesirable and unattainable. For to him, war is to national life what moisture is to vegetable growth, and world-domination would eliminate it. The book is full of such sentences as the following:

"From this standpoint I must first of all examine the aspirations for peace, which seem to dominate our age and threaten the soul of the German people, according to their true moral significance. I must try to prove that war is not merely a necessary element in the life of nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true civilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality." [55]

"This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anæmic, and marks a decay of spirit and political courage such as has often been shown by a race of Epigoni. 'It has always been,' H. von Treitschke tells us, 'the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have played with the dream of perpetual peace.'" [56]

"Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of nature, and the instinct of self-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be a natural condition of existence. 'Man is a fighter.'" [57]

"Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social petrifaction and stagnation. It is well the transitoriness of the goods of this world is not only preached, but is learnt by experience. War alone teaches this lesson." [58]

"If we sum up our arguments, we shall see that, from the most opposite aspects, the efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not only be termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race. To what does the whole question amount? It is proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrifice their highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, and thus to realize the highest moral unselfishness."

"With the cessation of the unrestricted competition, whose ultimate appeal is to arms, all real progress would soon be checked, and a moral

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[53] *Ibid.*
[54] P. 81.
[55] *Germany and the Next War*, p. 14.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.

and intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in degeneration." [59]

"We can imagine a Court of Arbitration intervening in the quarrels of the separate tributary countries when an empire like the Roman Empire existed. Such an empire never can or will rise again. Even if it did, it would assuredly, like a universal peace league, be disastrous to all human progress, which is dependent on the clashing interests and the unchecked rivalry of different groups." [60]

Bernhardi's aspiration for Germany was limited to the attainment of "an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world." [61]

"A reckless policy," he said, "would be foreign to our national character and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even at the risk of war." [62]

In his opinion, the United Kingdom and France exercised unduly preponderant influence in extra-European affairs; and he insisted upon Germany's right to "that fit recognition" to which her recently acquired strength gave her good title. He said (Italics now added):

"The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy of attention since an *entente* prevails between the two countries. In the face of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of its importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place in the sun, as Prince Bülow used modestly to express it, but *to aspire to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the limits of its present sphere of influence.* But we can only reach this goal by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can never again be questioned. Then, only, we need no longer fear that we shall be opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international politics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely *in fair rivalry with the other World Powers,* and secure to German nationality and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to them." [63]

"Then alone shall we discharge our great duties of the future, grow into *a World Power,* and stamp a great part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit." [64]

Speaking, by anticipation, of the recent war, Bernhardi said:

"In this war we *must* conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves to be defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position *as a World Power by the side of, and in spite of, England.*" [65]

"If we do not to-day stake everything on strengthening our fleet, to

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 34.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[61] See *infra.*
[62] *Germany and the Next War*, p. 85.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 114.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

insure at least the possibility of a successful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gain a start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, we must renounce for many years to come *any place among the World Powers.*" [66]

"The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readiness for war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in the first place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in the long years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to define and strengthen *our place among the Powers of Europe.*" [67]

"The policy of peace and restraint has brought us to a position in which we can only assert *our place among the Great Powers* and secure the conditions of life for the future by the greatest expenditure of treasure, and, so far as human conjecture can go, of blood." [68]

On 23 April 1915, appeared in *The Times* (London) the first part of an article from Bernhardi's pen. In it he said:

"'World power or decline?' In my book, *Germany and the Next War*, I have put this question as decisive for the future of the German nation; not world *dominion*, but world *power*. There is a tremendous difference! It has never been our intention to conquer and subjugate foreign States; in doing so we should only create new enemies."

To the foregoing observations and quotations may well be added that Bernhardi's teaching as to the beneficial effects of war had made little impression in Germany. Prior to the war, few people imagined that it had. And since the outbreak of the war Viscount Bryce wrote as follows:

"What are these doctrines? I do not for a moment attribute them to the learned class in Germany, for whom I have profound respect, recognizing their immense services to science and learning; nor to the bulk of the civil administration, a body whose capacity and uprightness are known to all the world; and least of all to the German people generally. That the latter hold no such views appears from Bernhardi's own words, for he repeatedly complains of, and deplores, the pacific tendencies of his fellow countrymen." [69]

Lord Roberts. To the present writer, a great deal that Bernhardi has said is objectionable, and his adulation of war is particularly offensive. But to a man like Lord Roberts, he appeared in a very different light, for it was Lord Roberts who said of him:

"For how was this Empire of Britain founded? War founded this Empire — war and conquest! When we, therefore, masters by war of one-third of the habitable globe, when *we* propose to Germany to dis-

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 239.
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 241.
[69] *Essays and Addresses in War Time*, pp. 4–5; *Current History*, I, pp. 344, 348–9.

arm, to curtail her navy or diminish her army, Germany naturally refuses; and, pointing, not without justice, to the road by which England, sword in hand, has climbed to her unmatched eminence, declares openly, or in the veiled language of diplomacy, that by the same path, if by no other, Germany is determined also to ascend! Who amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and the past of all nations and cities that have ever added the lustre of their name to human annals, can accuse Germany, or regard the utterance of one of her greatest Chancellors a year and a half ago,[70] or of General Bernhardi three months ago, with any feelings except those of respect? " [71]

Joseph Chamberlain. While detached passages from the writings of the three German writers above referred to may, if one wishes, be construed into a desire for world-domination, little, if anything, can be found to equal in that respect the language of some Englishmen. Mr. Chamberlain, for example, while a member of the British government, preached fervently from the " think Imperially " text. Early in 1897, at the Jewellers' dinner in Birmingham, he (as summarized by his biographer):

" complained that the leaders of the Opposition gave excessive attention to domestic controversies — ' which after all, whichever way they are settled, are of minor importance ' — and forgot the great part which the country had played and was called upon to play in the history of the world. ' Let the Little Englanders say what they like, we are a great governing race, predestined by our defects as well as by our virtues, to spread over the habitable globe, to enter into relations with all the countries of the earth. Our trade, the employment of our people, our very existence depends upon it. We cannot occupy an insular position, and we cannot occupy ourselves entirely with parochial matters.' " [72]

At Glasgow on 4 November 1897, he said:

" We believe in the greatness of the Empire. We are not afraid of its expansion. We think that a nation, like an individual, is the better for having great responsibilities and great obligations." [73]

Shortly afterwards, promising (with the same curious confidence as had Kaiser Wilhelm) that God would give success, Mr. Chamberlain said:

" The Providence that shapes our ends intended us to be a great governing power — conquering, yes conquering, but conquering only to civilize, to administer and to develop vast races in the world, primarily for their advantage, but no doubt for our advantage as well." [74]

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[70] The reference is to von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech of March 1911.

[71] *Message to the Nation* (1912), pp. 8–9. See other quotation from Lord Roberts, *ante*, p. 460.

[72] Mackintosh: *Joseph Chamberlain*, pp. 216–7.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

[74] Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

Cecil Rhodes. There is nothing new in the patriotic idea of domination with God's assistance. The Old Testament is full of it. The curious thing is that it still persists, and that men like Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes should in the twentieth century be found claiming, as did Moses, a monopoly of Jehovah as a war-ally. Of Rhodes, his most recent biographer (Mr. Basil Williams) gives us this picture:

"[On] the broadest view of life and history, he argued, God was obviously trying to produce a type of humanity most fitted to bring peace, liberty, and justice to the world and to make that type predominant. Only one race, so it seemed to him, approached God's ideal type, his own Anglo-Saxon race; God's purpose, then, was to make the Anglo-Saxon race predominant, and the best way to help on God's work and fulfil his purpose in the world was to contribute to the predominance of the Anglo-Saxon race, and so to bring nearer the reign of justice, liberty, and peace." [75]

No two men of their time appealed more to British imagination than Chamberlain and Rhodes. It was they and Mr. (now Viscount) Milner who helped "on God's work" by subjugating the Boer republics, concerning which Professor Cramb very truly has said:

"For it grows ever clearer, as month succeeds month, that it is by the invincible force of this ideal, this of Imperial Britain, that we have waged this war and fought these battles in South Africa."

"The war in South Africa, as we saw in the opening lecture, is the first event or series of events upon a great scale, the genesis of which lies in this force named Imperialism. . . . No other war in our history is, in its origins and its aims, so evidently the realization, so exclusively the result of this imperial ideal."

"This, then, is the first characteristic of the war of conflict between the two principles, the moribund principle of nationality — in the Transvaal an oppressive, an artificial nationality — and the vital principle of the future." [76]

Mr. Oliver. The present writer sees no reason for differing with Mr. Frederick Scott Oliver, who, in sharp contradiction of the passage already quoted from him,[77] said (Italics now added):

"It is clear from all this that the greater part of the German people regarded war in exactly the same light as the whole of the English people did. In itself, it was a curse; and the man who deliberately contrived it for his own ends, or even for those of his country, was a criminal. The German people applied the same tests as we did, and it is not possible to doubt that in so doing they were perfectly sincere. They acted upon instinct. They had not learned the later doctrines of the pedantocracy, or how to steer by a new magnetic pole. They still held by the old

[75] *Cecil Rhodes:* Makers of the Nineteenth Century Series. Quoted from review in *The Times* (London).

[76] *Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain,* pp. 23, 89, 96.

[77] *Ante,* pp. 459–60.

Christian rules as to duties which existed between neighbours. To their simple old-fashioned loyalty, what their Kaiser said must be the truth. And what their Kaiser said was that the Fatherland was attacked by treacherous foes. That was enough to banish all doubts. For the common people that was the reality and the only reality. *Phrases about world-power and will-to-power — supposing they had ever heard or noticed them — were only mouthfuls of strange words, such as preachers of all kinds love to chew in the intervals of their discourses.*" [78]

DEUTSCHLAND ÜBER ALLES

That a poet wrote, and the German people sang, *Deutschland über Alles*, is taken by many as conclusive proof of Germany's determination to dominate the world. It may be translated as follows:

"*Deutschland, Deutschland over everything, over everything in the world,*[79]
If it always holds together fraternally for defence and offence,
From the Meuse to the Memel, from the Adige to the Belt,
Deutschland, Deutschland over everything, over everything in the world!

German women, German fidelity, German wine and German song,
Shall in the world retain their old beautiful clang,
Us to nobler deeds inspiring our whole life long.
German women, German fidelity, German wine and German song!

Unity and Right and Freedom for the German Fatherland,
For that let us strive like brothers with heart and hand,
Unity and Right and Freedom are the pledges of happiness.
Bloom in the splendor of this good fortune, flourish German Fatherland!"

With the outbreak of war, it came to be asserted that *Deutschland über Alles* meant physical domination by Germany over the world. The words carry no such signification, and the other words of the song are inharmonious with it. *Das geht mir über alles* means *That is dearer to me than anything else. Ich liebe dies über alles* means *I love this above everything.* And so the words which are supposed to express a desire for world domination mean merely *Germany is dearer to me than anything else in the world.*[80] The Ontario educational authorities had no idea of

[78] *The Ordeal by Battle*, pp. 174–5.

[79] The German words are: *Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles, über alles in der Welt.*

[80] M. Poincaré, in his book *The Origins of the War*, adopted the fanciful meaning of the words. He said that when France "hears the singing on the other side of the Rhine of the chorus of '*Deutschland über alles*,' she understands full well that it is against her that the threat is primarily directed" (p. 35).

spreading a German world-domination idea when it included *Deutschland über Alles* in the German school reader.

English verse of similar sort is properly regarded as poetic expression of patriotic feeling rather than as declaration of national determination; while English enjoyment of undisputed sea-domination is, comfortably and quite boastfully, declared in enthusiastic prose. Three centuries ago, Raleigh, in his *Discourse on the First Invention of Ships and the Several Parts thereof*, declared that:

"Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world; and consequently the world itself."

And he confidently and joyfully asserted that:

"the shipping of England, with the great squadron of his Majesty's Navy Royal, are able, in despight of any prince or State in Europe, to command the great and large fields of the ocean." [81]

During the last hundred years the United Kingdom has unchallengeably occupied that happy eminence. At the time of the 1812 war, the motto of the *Naval Chronicle* was:

> "*The winds and waves are Britain's wide domain,*
> *And not a sail but by permission spreads.*" [82]

Tennyson's verse did good service during the recent war:

> "*We sailed wherever ships could sail,*
> *We founded many a mighty state,*
> *Pray God our greatness may not fail*
> *Through craven fears of being great.*" [83]

The favorite British song, with its assumption of Britannia's heavenly origin attended by angels singing *Rule Britannia* would, were it taken seriously, be more objectionable to the Germans than is *Deutschland über alles* to the British. Observe, particularly, the last two lines of the penultimate verse:

> "*When Britain first, at Heaven's command,*
> *Arose from out the azure main,*
> *This was the charter of the land,*
> *And guardian Angels sang the strain:*
> *Rule, Britannia, rule the waves!*
> *For Britons never will be slaves!*

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[81] Quoted by Archibald Hurd: *Fortnightly Rev.*, Dec. 1918, p. 856.

[82] *National Intelligencer*, 1 Nov. 1814. Quoted by Updyke: *The Diplomacy of the War of 1812*, p. 371.

[83] The verse was displayed on the cover of *Overseas*, the monthly journal of the Overseas Club and the Patriotic League of Britons, in Dec. 1915.

"*The nations not so blest as thee*
Must, in their turn, to tyrants fall;
Whilst thou shalt flourish, great and free,
The dread and envy of them all.
Rule, Britannia! etc.

"*Still more majestic shalt thou rise,*
More dreadful from each foreign stroke;
As the loud blasts that tear the skies
Serve but to root thy native oak.
Rule, Britannia! etc.

"*Thee, haughty tyrants ne'er shall tame;*
All their attempts to bend thee down
Will but arouse thy generous flame,
And work their woe — but thy renown.
Rule, Brittania! etc.

"*To thee belongs the rural reign;*
Thy cities shall with commerce shine;
And thine shall be the subject main,
And every shore it circles thine.
Rule, Britannia! etc.

"*The Muses, still with Freedom found,*
Shall to thy happy coast repair;
Blest Isle! with matchless beauty crowned,
And manly hearts to guard the fair.
Rule, Britannia! etc." [84]

The refrain of another favorite song, *Land of Hope and Glory*, is:

"*Wider still and wider*
May thy bounds be set.
God, who made thee mighty,
Make thee mightier yet." [85]

While the United Kingdom was engaged in adding the South African states to her empire, Canon F. G. Scott of Quebec produced the *Hymn of Empire*, one verse of which is as follows:

"*Strong are we? Make us stronger yet:*
Great? Make us greater far.
Our fleet antarctic oceans fret,
Our crown the polar star.

[84] James Thomson (1700–1748). May be found in *A Library of Poetry and Song* compiled by William Cullen Bryant.

[85] The song may be seen in the Music shops.

Round Earth's wild coasts our batteries speak,
Our highway is the main,
We stand as guardians of the weak,
We burst the oppressor's chain." [86]

With little care for the adaptation of sentiment to period of time, Mr. Arthur Bennett, while his country was waging the recent war against (as some said) world-dominating ambitions, published his *God Save the Empire:*

"*God save our Empire grand,*
The freeman's fatherland,
Wide as the world!
Still may its frontiers grow,
Its sons be swift to go
To greet all winds that blow,
With flag unfurled!" [87]

Mr. Bennett's prayer for frontier-growth has been abundantly answered. Finally, if *Deutschland über Alles* be reprehensible, what must — or rather ought to be said of the following?

"*And this our glory: — to bear the palm*
In all true enterprise,
And everywhere, in tempest and in calm,
To front the future with unfearing eyes,
And sway the seas where our advancement lies.
With freedom's flag uplifted, and unfurled;
And this our rallying-cry, whate'er befall,
Goodwill to men, and peace throughout the world,
But England, — England, — England over all!" [88]

For the assertion that Austria desired to dominate the world, there was better proof than patriotic poetry, for on the *façade* of the imperial palaces at Vienna are the words, "Austriæ est imperare orbi universo." [89] That, too, may well be regarded as ostentatious boast, rather than as fixed resolution.

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[86] Mr. Joseph Chamberlain made good use of the hymn. See *Overseas Poetry*, by Sir Herbert Warren: *United Empire*, July 1918, p. 322.

[87] *United Empire*, Dec. 1918, p. 484.

[88] Written by Eric Mackay (1851–1899), son of the Scotch writer Charles Mackay, and known principally by his *Love Letters of a Violinist.* He was the foster brother of Miss Marie Corelli. The whole poem may be seen in a 350-page volume entitled *Patriotic Songs.*

[89] Larmeroux: *Austria-Hungary: Foreign Policy*, p. v.

THE CHIEF INFLUENCE

If, instead of charging Germany with a determination to dominate the world, we were to attribute to her a desire to exercise the chief influence in world affairs, as, from time to time, questions for solution arose, we would evoke no denial. On the contrary, Germany would ask in return, Is there in that ambition any impropriety? Is not that a position which every nation with world interests desiderates? Is not that precisely what the United Kingdom has had, and has insisted upon having, during the last hundred years? Distinction between world-domination and chief influence is important, but very frequently overlooked. And it is probably due, to some extent, to confusion of thought that the indictment of Germany for aiming at world-domination has found such easy acceptance. When Lord Cromer, in his *Political and Literary Essays*, wrote:

" Nevertheless, at a moment when a desperate effort is being made to substitute German for British world-power," [90]

he meant not domination of the world, but chief influence in it.

The United Kingdom. It would be foolish to charge the United Kingdom with a desire to dominate the world in the sense of dictating all that takes place in it. But her people assert, quite frankly and with much truth, that they do exercise the chief influence in the world, adding that their merits entitle them to the place to which God himself has assigned them. Lord Salisbury, for example, asserted that:

" the course of events, which I should prefer to call the acts of Providence, have called this country to exercise an influence over the character and progress of the world such as has never been exercised in any Empire before." [91]

Mr. J. R. Green's prediction, in 1874, was as follows:

" In the centuries that lie before us, the primacy of the world will lie with the English people. English institutions, English speceh, English thought, will become the main features of the political, the social, and the intellectual life of mankind." [92]

Mr. Evans Lewin has said that the United Kingdom:

" is the predestined owner of a great part of African soil." [93]

The title of Professor Cramb's book, *The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain*, indicates his thesis, and he writes as follows:

" With the rise of this spirit, this consciousness within the British race of its destiny as an imperial people, no event in history can fitly be compared."

" As an artist, by the very law of his being, is compelled to body forth

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[90] P. 5.
[91] Quoted in Hobson: *Imperialism*, p. 205.
[92] *Short History of England*, IV, p. 263.
[93] *The Germans and Africa*, p. 264.

his conceptions in color, in words, or in marble, so the race dowered with the genius for empire is compelled to dare all, to suffer all, to sacrifice all for the fulfilment of its fate-appointed task."

"Thus in a race dowered with the genius for empire, as Rome was, as Britain is, Imperialism is the supreme, the crowning form, which in this process of evolution it attains."

"Rome does not die there. Her genius lives on in the Gothic race, deep, penetrating, and all-informing, and, in the picked valor of that race, which for six hundred years spends itself in forging England, it is deepest, most penetrating, and all-informing. . . . And now in this era, and at this latest time, behold in England the glory has once more alighted, as once for a brief space by the Rhine and Seine, but surely to make here its lasting mansionry. For, in very truth, in all that freedom and all that justice possess of power towards good amongst men, is not England as it were earth's central shrine and this race the vanguard of humanity?"

"Nature seems pondering some vast and new experiment, and an empire has arisen whose future course, whether we consider its political or its economic, its physical or its mental resources, leaves conjecture behind."[94]

In continental Europe, specifically and for Europe's good, the United Kingdom ought, as Mr. Oliver thinks, to wield the chief influence:

"Europe's greatest need therefore was that Britain should possess an army formidable not only in valor, but also in numbers. . . . For by reason of England's peculiar interests — or rather perhaps from her lack of all direct personal interests in European affairs, other than in peace and the balance of power — she was marked out as the natural mediator in Continental disputes."[95]

Indeed, to Sir J. A. R. Marriott, the United Kingdom already exercises "the world-power":

"For some years past Germany has been consumed by the ambition to challenge the world-power of the British Empire. . . . But this, as it seemed to the disciples of this school [the "Prussian school of historians"], could be accomplished only by the development of sea-power and by a successful challenge to the world-empire of Britain."[96]

The author credits Queen Elizabeth with the re-establishment of:

"England's position as the sustainer of the European equilibrium, and the arbiter in European diplomacy."[97]

That the result of the recent war has intensified British desire for dictatorial authority — either alone or in conjunction with others (preferably the United States and France) — is very clear. The speech of

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[94] Pp. 5, 13, 91, 186, 196–7.
[95] *Ordeal by Battle*, p. 316.
[96] *The European Commonwealth*, p. 95.
[97] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (Chief of the Imperial General Staff), at the Empire Day dinner (24 May 1921), was typical of many utterances:

"I would like to suggest that . . . we should try to rise to such a position that we can say at any given time at any given place (if we think it right to say so) — 'There shall be no war,' and there will be no war (Cheers)." [98]

British determination to wield the chief influence is indicated in the United Kingdom's frankly expressed determination to dominate the seas — a domination that is held to be necessary not merely for home defence, but for the exercise of diplomatic power. In a letter to *The Times* (London), Mr. T. Gibson Bowles very truly said:

"Our resources are vast. For so long as we keep our Sea Power we keep the ocean in fee, and a mortgage over half the land of the world." [99]

Mr. Winston Churchill, in a speech at Dundee, 26 November 1918, said:

"From the battle of Trafalgar to the end of the nineteenth century, nearly 100 years, we were absolutely supreme at sea. All the other nations together could not have faced us."

"Nothing in the world that you can think of, or dream of, or anyone may tell you; no arguments, however specious; no appeals, however seductive, must lead you to abandon that naval supremacy on which the life of our country depends."

A League of Nations is very good, Mr. Churchill said:

"But a League of Nations is no substitute for the supremacy of the British Fleet." [100]

The Rev. Canon Barry, referring to the concentration of the British fleet in home waters, said:

"Our flag has all but disappeared from the ports and harbors which had seen it year after year waving over those squadrons whereby we patrolled the Central Sea, teaching East and West the lesson of ages, and vindicating our right to hold the gateways of Continents." [101]

When, in negotiation with the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, in 1912, Lord Haldane, referring to the expendiiture in naval construction, said:

"This was vital from our point of view, because we were an island-Power dependent for our food supplies on the power of protecting our commerce, and for this we needed the two-Power standard and a substantial preponderance in battle fleets." [102]

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[98] *The Times* (London), 25 May 1921; *United Empire*, June 1921, p. 437.

[99] July 1918. That there must be a British domination in the Mediterranean is asserted in an article in the *Fortnightly Rev.*, Nov. 1917, p. 763.

[100] *The Times* (London), 27 Nov. 1918.

[101] *The Nineteenth Century*, June 1918, p. 1104.

[102] *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, XII, pp. 593–4.

Discussing the possibility of an agreement for reduction in expenditure upon fleet construction, Sir Edward Grey said in the House of Commons (29 March 1909):

"On what basis would an arrangement have to be proposed? Not the basis of equality. It must be the basis of a superiority of the British Navy." [103]

Nothing but the overwhelming financial power of the United States of America, and its announced determination to construct the largest navy in the world, could have induced the United Kingdom to forego her sea-supremacy.

The United States. National and natural egoism is to be found in every country. The *Seven Seas Magazine* — the organ of the Navy League of the United States — for example, produced the following (November 1915):

"The imperialism of the American is a duty and credit to humanity. He is the highest type of imperial master. He makes beautiful the land he touches; beautiful with moral and physical cleanliness. . . . There should be no doubt that even with all possible moral refinement, it is the absolute right of a nation to live to its full intensity, to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by any proper means such as armed conquest, commerce, diplomacy. Such expansion, as an aim, is an inalienable right, and in the case of the United States it is a particular duty, because we are idealists and are therefore bound by establishing protectorates over the weak to protect them from unmoral Kultur." [104]

Russia. With no less patriotism, a Russian has couched his faith in his country in poetic and picturesque phraseology:

"Is it not thus, like the bold troïka which cannot be overtaken, that thou art dashing along, O Russia, my country? The roads smoke beneath thee, the bridges thunder; all is left, all will be left behind thee. The spectator stops short, astounded as at a marvel of God. Is this the lightning which has descended from heaven? he asks. What does this awe-inspiring movement betoken? And what uncanny power is possessed by these horses, so strange to the world? Ah, horses, horses, Russian horses! What horses you are! Doth the whirlwind sit upon your manes? Doth your sensitive ear prick with every tingle in your veins? But lo! you have heard a familiar song from on high; simultaneously in friendly wise you have bent your brazen breasts to the task; and hardly letting your hoofs touch the earth, you advance in one tightly stretched line flying through the air. Yes, on the troïka flies, inspired by God! O Russia, whither art thou dashing? Reply! But she replies not; the horses' bells break into a wondrous sound; the shattered air becomes a tempest, and the thunder growls; Russia flies past everything else on

[103] Quoted in *Round Table*, March 1915, p. 374.

[104] Quoted by Walter E. Weyl: *American World Policies*, pp. 153–4.

earth; other peoples, kingdoms, and empires gaze askance as they stand aside to make way for her." [105]

Other Nations. Greece looks back on her glory-days, and has recently made heroic endeavor to reconstitute the Empire of Constantine Palæologus, while Italy, with no less pride, recalls the Cæsar-periods, and prates about her "mission."

"For thirty years," Signor Crispi has recently said, "Mazzini himself preached that we had a 'mission of universal civilization' to carry out, a mission upon which we had entered by the force of our arms in the days of Rome's greatness, which the example set by free communes had continued to preach in mediaeval times, and which our learning and our arts had carried far afield at the time of the Renaissance." [106]

IMPERIALISM

All Guilty. To a charge of imperialism, as to a charge of effort after chief influence in the world, all nations which have attained maturity must plead guilty. For imperialism signifies expansion (although falling short of an ambition for world-domination), and expansion outside the original limits of a state is as natural as prior consolidation within it. Methods are various. Looking, said Seeley, at the colonial part of the British Empire alone:

"we see a natural growth, a mere extension of the English race into other lands, which for the most part were so thinly peopled that our settlers took possession of them without conquest. If there is nothing highly glorious in such an expansion, there is at the same time nothing forced or unnatural about it." [107]

That is one method of expansion. Another was illustrated by Seeley when he said:

"This fact then, that, both in America and in Asia, France and England stood in direct competition for a prize of absolutely incalculable value, explains the fact that France and England fought a second Hundred Years' War." [108]

And a third method of expansion may be termed dollar-imperialism, for it operates through loans, concessions, and various other economic exploitations.

German Imperialism. German expansion was as natural as British. In 1874 (27 October), Lord Lytton, Secretary of the British Embassy at Paris, wrote to Lord Lyons as follows:

"Odo's [Lord Odo Russell's] impression (communicated to you) that Bismarck does not want colonies rather surprises me. It seems to

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[105] Gogol: *Dead Souls:* quoted from English translation in Dickinson, *The Choice Before Us*, p. 98.

[106] *The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*, II, p. 1.

[107] *The Expansion of England*, p. 296.

[108] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

me a perfectly natural and quite inevitable ambition on the part of a Power so strong as Germany not to remain an inland state a moment longer than it can help, but to get to the sea, and to extend its seaboard in all possible directions. Is there any case on record of an inland state suddenly attaining to the military supremacy of Europe without endeavoring by means of its military strength and prestige to develop its maritime power? . . . Anyhow, there seems to be now a pretty general instinct throughout Europe, and even in America, that a policy of maritime and colonial development must be the natural result of Germany's present position; and such instincts, being those of self-preservation, are generally, I think, what Dizzy calls 'unerring' ones." [109]

As Dr. J. Holland Rose has said:

"Is it surprising that she" (Germany) "feels land-hunger? Endowed with a keen sense of national pride, she was certain to experience some such feeling; and we, who have expanded partly by force of arms, partly by a natural overflow of population, shall be foolishly blind if we do not try to understand the enemy's point of view."

"After the formation of the German Empire under the headship of Prussia, the polyglot Hapsburg dominions could expand only towards the Balkans. Hence the principle of growth, which pushes the Germans towards the North Sea and into new lands, also urges Austria towards the Ægean. We must recognize that, in both cases, an impulse natural to a vigorous people is driving on these movements." [110]

Since the War. The naïve belief of President Wilson and many others that, with the defeat of Germany, militarism and imperialism would disappear from the world had, as they now realize, no foundation. The disillusionment of Mr. Wilson had in it much that was tragic, and his despairing cries, as he realized the truth, pathetically reveal the deep sincerity of his vanishing conviction. Struggling against the treaties by which, during the war, the *entente* Allies had made wrongful dispositions of territories and peoples, and urging that right, as he regarded it, should be done, the President, at the end of his note of 10 February 1920, wrote as follows:

"If substantial agreement on what is just and reasonable is not to determine international issues; if the country possessing the most endurance in pressing its demands, rather than the country armed with a just cause, is to gain the support of the Powers; if forcible seizure of coveted areas is to be permitted and condoned, and is to receive ultimate justification by creating a situation so difficult that decision favorable to the aggressor is deemed a practical necessity; if deliberately incited ambition is, under the name of national sentiment, to be rewarded at the expense of the small and the weak; if, in a word, the old order of things which brought so many evils on the world is still to prevail, then the time is

[109] Newton: *Lord Lyons*, II, pp. 60–1.

[110] *The Origins of the War*, pp. 48, 118.

not yet come when this Government can enter a concert of Powers, the very existence of which must depend upon a new spirit and a new order." [111]

During his endeavor to secure ratification of the peace treaty, Mr. Wilson declared in a letter to Senator Hitchcock (8 March 1920) that Article X of the treaty:

"represents the renunciation by Great Britain and Japan, which before the war had begun to find so many interests in common in the Pacific, by France, by Italy, by all the great fighting Powers of the world, of the old pretensions of political conquest and territorial aggrandizement." [112]

Article X was, in truth, a part of the treaty which ratified the conquests and territorial aggrandizements, upon enormous scale, of the preceding four and a half years of war, and which preceded the various other treaties (notably that of Sèvres) dealing with the huge conquests and territorial acquisitions in still other parts of the world.

Somewhat inconsistently, in a later part of the same letter, Mr. Wilson said:

"Militaristic ambitions and imperialistic policies are by no means dead, even in counsels of the nations whom we most trust and with whom we most desire to be associated in the tasks of peace. Throughout the sessions of the conference in Paris, it was evident that a militaristic party, under a most influential leadership, was seeking to gain ascendancy in the counsels of France. They were defeated then, but are in control now. The chief arguments advanced in Paris in support of the Italian claims on the Adriatic were strategic arguments; that is to say, military arguments, which had at their back the thought of naval supremacy in that sea. For my own part, I am as intolerant of imperialistic designs on the part of other nations as I am of such designs on the part of Germany."

To Italian statesmen, Mr. Wilson's "vision of a new day" took the form of wide territorial annexations.

CONCLUSIONS

From what has been said, the following conclusions may safely be drawn:

1. That Germany sought to dominate the world is a very ridiculous assertion.

2. That Nietzsche, Treitschke, or Bernhardi advocated world-domination is untrue.

3. That Germany desired to be able to exercise the chief influence in world affairs is as true as that the United Kingdom has occupied that position for the last hundred years.

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[111] *N. Y. Times*, 27 Feb. 1920. [112] *Current History*, XII, p. 28.

4. Germany's desire for a strong navy was based upon the same reasons as those which actuated the United Kingdom, namely (1) protection of coasts, (2) protection of commerce, (3) protection of colonies, and (4) diplomatic influence.

5. Of imperialism, all virile nations have been guilty. The victors in the recent war, and their friends, made the most of their opportunities. Previous to her defeat, Germany was no exception to the general rule.

6. The prose and poetry of all nations boastfully assert superiorities, and reveal imperialistic proclivities. German authors were and are as foolish as the others.

CHAPTER XVI

GERMANY AND MILITARISM

"CRUSH MILITARISM"

IN enumerating the objects of the war, Mr. Asquith, in a now classic sentence, declared that the United Kingdom would not sheathe her sword:

"until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed."

M. Trepoff is reported to have said to the Russian Duma:

"The war must continue until German militarism is destroyed."

M. Briand used similar language. Dr. Prince said that:

"The people of England are literally inspired, as by a religion, to make no peace until Prussian militarism is destroyed."[1]

Sir Edward Grey, in a letter to *The Times* of 9 May 1914, said:

"It is against German militarism that we must fight."

What is Militarism? If from the many definitions of militarism are eliminated those which, to the general mind, are untainted with sinister significance, and if we endeavor to state what it is that, among the objectionable connotations of the word,[2] is meant, we shall say that militarism is an attitude of approval of war as an elevating, ennobling occupation, as the purifying salt in the otherwise nauseous human compound; that, usually, the approval rises to a desire for national glory as the product of military success, welcoming quarrel in order that war's beneficent influence may have full operation; and that the approval and the desire have, as result, the endowment of the military profession with a rank and worthiness higher and more meritorious than attaches to

[1] These extracts are quoted by Henry Dwight Sedgwick, American historian and essayist, in an article in *Current History*, V, p. 931.

[2] Major-General Sir George Aston has unwittingly declared various British governments to have been "militarists" by defining the word as: "Those who use military forces aggressively, either against other States, or against members of their own State upon whom they wish to enforce their views" (*Nineteenth Century*, Oct. 1919, p. 637). The definition was framed to fit Germany. Sir George overlooked the Boer war, as well as Ireland.

avocations of civil character — a preëminence which found its expression in the idea (not altogether displaced) that the church and the army were the only honorable careers. Men who can refer to the recent years of slaughter and misery as "Days of Glory"[3] are actuated by the militaristic conception.

Five Concepts. Distinguish between five concepts which are frequently confused:

1. *Militarism* as defined above.

2. *Jingoism*, a horrid but expressive word, meaning a truculent, intolerant, domineering, fight-desiring frame of mind: War may be an evil, but it is better than "a dishonorable peace." The other nation is impertinent, audacious, aggressive, and must be given a lesson. The Jingo is the opposite of the Pacifist, and, not asserting the ennobling effect of the war, falls short of being a Militarist.

3. *Imperialism* connotes territorial expansion. Representatives of these three classes — the Militarist, the Jingo, and the Imperialist — are distinguishable by their motives. The first favors war for its own sake; the second favors it as gratifying to his own arrogant, swaggering nature; while the third regards war as perhaps an unfortunate but as, nevertheless, a justifiable pre-requisite of the expansion to which his particular nation is pre-destined "for the benefit of the world."

4. *World-domination* is sublimated imperialism. Nobody advocates it. Nobody really believes it to be a possible possession of any Power.

5. *War-preparation* may be the result of the preponderating influence of militaristic, jingoistic or imperialistic feeling, but it may also be undertaken wisely as a necessary safeguard against threatened aggression. What may be the character of the preparation in any particular case is always a subject of dispute, for it depends very largely upon estimates of danger which the Militarist and Jingo exaggerate, which the Pacifist underrates, and which nobody can accurately gauge. Your view, moreover, of what is necessary and what is improperly designed is apt to depend, to large extent, upon whether you are speaking of your own country which, as you say, is unaggressive and peaceful, or of some other country which, as you imagine, is planning your subversion. Observe, for example, that, while thinking of England, Mr. Frederick Scott Oliver could write of the military profession in this way:

"The school of political thought which remained predominant throughout the great industrial epoch (1832–1886) bitterly resented the assumption made by certain classes, that the profession of arms was more honorable in its nature than commerce and other peaceful pursuits. The destruction of this supposed fallacy produced a great literature, and even a considerable amount of poetry."

"But the much-resented claim to a superiority in the matter of honor is well founded, and no amount of philosophising or political economis-

[3] The title of a book by Frederick Villiers.

ing will ever shake it. Clearly it is more honorable for a man to risk his life, and what is infinitely more important — his reputation and his whole future career — in defence of his country, than it is merely to build up a competency or a fortune." [4]

How the writer's view changes when he thinks of Germany, may be seen on another page of the same book:

"More especially is it difficult for the military caste to resist the influence of the priesthood when, as in Germany of recent years, they have insisted upon giving the warrior the most important niche in their temple, and on burning incense before him day and night." [5]

Let us endeavor to be impartial as well as analytical.

THE CRUSHING OF MILITARISM

It is improbable that Sir Edward Grey, or any other rational being, imagined that militarism, as an attitude of mind, could be "crushed" by war. For militarists have always been aware of the horrors and disappointments of war; and it is war, with all its accompaniments, that they glorify, and declare to be beneficent. Thus Mr. Oliver, himself a militarist, has testified as follows:

"We are constantly being told by high authorities that the moral objective of the present war is 'to put down militarism,' and 'abolish it' off the face of the earth. There are few of us who do not wish that this aim may be crowned with success; but militarism is a tough weed to kill, and something more than the mere mowing of it down by some outside scythesman will be necessary, one imagines, in order to get rid of it." [6]

"Tough," Mr. Oliver says, because, in his opinion:

"with all its vices and extravagances," it "is rooted in instincts which are neither depraved nor ignoble." [7]

Defeat will not destroy such a state of mind as (for example) that of Mr. Oliver. Defeat of a virile nation will intensify rather than obliterate its militaristic feeling.

The Clergy. If British statesmen thought that militarism could be crushed and extinguished, they might well have commenced at home — and upon the clergy. For if there be one revelation of the war more depressing than another, it is the fact that, among these men, in proportion to their numbers, may be found more militarists, than among the members of other groups of the civil populations. Look, for example, at the language of the Bishop of London shortly after the outbreak of hostilities:

"It is a glorious thing to be alive to-day. The present is one of the

[4] *Ordeal by Battle* (1915), pp. 403, 5. And see p. 409.
[5] P. 139.
[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 146–7.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

great days of God that only come once in about two hundred years." [8] Or look at the language of the Bishop of Carlisle, who, referring to British freedom from European war between 1815 and 1914, asked:

"Has it been a good peace or bad? Are we as a nation better for it? To what high and noble uses have we put this gift of a hundred years of peace?"

and then proceeded to debit peace with all the social evils:

"Money has been made at an appalling rate. So also have slums. Success and sweating have both gone ahead like wild fire: success enriched by sweating, and sweating increased by success. Political economy has had little companionship with morals: and competition has been almost a stranger to mercy," etc., etc.

The Bishop finished his paragraph with the words:

"The nineteenth century would almost lead to the conclusion that a worldly peace is among the most deadly foes of peace divine."

As one of his horrible examples, the Bishop pointed to the United States, saying:

"In the fifty years of prosperous peace which have elapsed since the Civil war and the death of Lincoln, dollar dignity has been quite as prominent as moral sovereignty."

And he appears to attribute the recent war to the fact that:

"Rich nations are more prone to war than poor nations. . . . This has been the case with Germany. Fifty years of peace, and its attendant success, have drugged her moral sense."

From all this, the Bishop hopes that war will deliver us:

"Such are some of the perils with which peace, political and prosperous peace — the peace of physical security and protected sloth and bodily ease — has been menacing the modern world; and from which happily there are hopeful signs that this world-wide war, despite all its wickedness, may achieve our deliverance." [9]

The character of the age in which Martin Luther lived furnished some excuse for his assertion that war:

"is a business divine in itself, and as needful to the world as eating and drinking."

Not the same apology can be found for British bishops in the twentieth century. In Canada, too, the apostles of Christ are, too often, the belauders of war. A Toronto clergyman, bothered by the conflict between his Sunday and week-day principles, denounced and, at the same time, preached militarism:

"I am against this pacifism. I am against militarism with all my soul. But I think the best thing in the world is a good fight." [10]

Military Men. We must not be surprised if among British military

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[8] Reported by "Windermere" in the Montreal *Star*, 28 Oct. 1914.

[9] *The Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1917, pp. 256–9.

[10] Rev. Charles A. Eaton: *Canadian Defence*, June 1916, p. 14.

men we find many whose militarism it would be difficult to crush. Bernhardi's opinions were quoted during the war many hundreds of times. Very rarely, on the other hand, were references made to the fact that Lord Roberts — a man infinitely better known in the United Kingdom than was Bernhardi in Germany, a man referred to by Professor Gilbert Murray as:

"a great and chivalrous soldier, admired and loved by his fellow-countrymen," [11]

held and preached the same opinions. Read the following from his pen:

"History repeats itself. The present is the past entered through another gate, and war is as inevitable as death. It is not, and never was an accident. In every instance, from the beginning of time, it is a well-deserved punishment, worked up to and earned. It will come again with the swing of the pendulum. It is salutary, necessary, and is the only national tonic that can be prescribed. . . . Peace begets over-civilization, and over-civilization degeneracy. Then comes war. If a country has any health left in its constitution, it revives, gathers itself together, makes the most tremendous sacrifices, puts forth an effort of strength of which no man thought it capable, and rises like the phœnix." [12]

Professor Murray, regretting that Lord Roberts should have uttered such sentiments, excuses him in this way:

"My defence must be the rather speculative one, that I do not believe he really accepted the doctrines that he seemed to preach." [13]

Professor Murray offers no such charitable excuse for Bernhardi, or, indeed, for Colonel Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, one of the best known and most highly respected of British officers. On the contrary, he quotes two sentences, one from Bernhardi and the other from Maude:

"War gives a biologically just decision, since its decisions arise from the very nature of things."

"War is the divinely appointed means by which the environment may be readjusted, till 'ethically fittest' and 'best' become synonymous"; and asks his readers to guess:

"Which of these two is German? Which is the more remote from good sense? which the more characteristic in its mixture of piety and muddle-headedness?" [14]

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[11] *Faith, War and Policy*, p. 121.

[12] Taken from an essay read by Lord Roberts before a New York club, and reported in the New York *Tribune*. *Cf.* G. Lowes Dickinson: *The Choice Before Us*, p. 74; *Common Sense*, 2 Dec. 1916; The *Journal* (Ottawa), 14 Oct. 1916; *Canadian Defense*, 16 Dec. 1916.

[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 121.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 122. The first is Bernhardi; and the second, Maude, in *War and the World's Life*.

The Professor's general reply to these and other instances of highly-placed militarists in the United Kingdom is as follows:

"What, then, is the answer to my friend's challenge? I confess myself still unshaken by it. We must admit that these militarists, these enthusiastic spurners of international law, these eloquent would-be torturers of civil populations, these rejectors and despisers of arbitration and peace, do exist among us; they exist among us, but, thank Heaven and our own common sense, they do not control our Government." [15]

Reference to British military officers may fittingly be closed with the following from Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O.:

"The world of 1914 has been purified by fire. To-day this world is a better world than it ever was before, for it has vanquished the greatest of all evils — the spiritual enchainment of liberty. Certainly it is a poorer world, yet 'Blessed be ye poor,' for poverty means struggle, and struggle means self-sacrifice, and self-sacrifice means progress." [16]

Professor Cramb. The German Professors had their English counterpart in Professor J. A. Cramb (Queen's College, London), who said:

"War, therefore, I would define as a phase in the life-effort of the State towards completer self-realisation, a phase of the eternal *nisus*, the perpetual omnipresent strife of all being towards self-fulfilment. Destruction is not its aim, but the intensification of the life, whether of the conquering or of the conquered State. War is thus a manifestation of the world-spirit in the form the most sublime and awful that can enthrall the contemplation of man." [17]

Referring to Treitschke, Professor Cramb said:

"To him, the army is simply the natural expression of the vital forces of the nation; and just as those vital forces of the nation increase, so shall the German army and the German navy increase. A nation's military efficiency is the exact coefficient of a nation's idealism. That is Treitschke's solution of the matter. His answer to all our talk about the limitation of armaments is: Germany shall increase to the utmost of her power, irrespective of any proposals made to her by England, or by Russia, or by any other State upon this earth. And I confess it is a magnificent and a manly answer, an answer worthy of a man whose spirit of sincerity, of regard for the reality of things, is as great as Carlyle's. The teaching of Treitschke's disciple, General von Bernhardi, is the same." [18]

Mr. Harold F. Wyatt. Mr. Wyatt, at the instance of the Royal

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[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 123. It is not often that the Professor so far forgets himself as to class British militarists as "spurners," "torturers," and "rejecters and despisers."

[16] *The Reformation of War*, quoted in *Manchester Guardian*, 16 March 1923.

[17] *Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain*, p. 121.

[18] *Germany and England* (1914), pp. 64–5.

Colonial Institute, travelled through the Dominions, preaching "preparedness," and may be taken as holding views not distasteful to his patrons. In *The Nineteenth Century* for April 1911, he published, under the caption, *God's Test by War*, an article which the Editor, immediately after the outbreak of the recent war, republished,[19] deeming it "appropriate to the present moment" because of its "many truths." The following are some extracts:

"Thus, then, efficiency in war, or rather efficiency for war, is God's test of a nation's soul. By that test it stands, or by that test it falls. This is the ethical content of competition. This is the determining factor of human history. This is the justification of war."

"Ruthless, inexorable, the law of the survival of the fittest trampled on the corrupt. Of that law, war is the supreme instrument; and of war, in the long passage of the centuries, the deciding factor is the soul."

"Victory in war is the method by which, in the economy of God's Providence, the sound nation supersedes the unsound, because in our time, such victory is the direct offspring of a higher efficiency, and the higher efficiency is the logical outcome of the higher morale."

"Hence it follows that if the dream of short-sighted and superficial sentimentalists could be fulfilled — that is to say, if war could suddenly be rendered henceforth impossible upon earth (which is at present impracticable) — the machinery by which national corruption is punished and national virtue rewarded would be ungeared. The higher would cease to supersede the lower, and the course of human evolution would suffer arrest."

"The paradox, therefore, is true, that in this globe of ours (as probably in all other worlds throughout space which life inhabits) death is the condition of the increase of life. But of death, war is the scythe. Throughout the periods of biological time, war has been the road to food, and since man was developed, war has been the condition of human advance. . . . Death and war, those grim twin brethren, ride the rush of this world's tide and put the bit in the mouth of man."

"If this argument possesses validity, then the deduction follows that while human nature remains what it is at present, war must retain its place beside death as a vital and essential part of the economy of God. The Lord of Hosts has made righteousness the path to victory. In the crash of conflict, in the horrors of battlefields piled with the dead, the dying, and the wounded, a vast ethical intention has still prevailed."

"The truth is that armaments are the reflection of the national soul. The immense naval and military strength of Germany is the reflex of moral and social conditions better than our own. The excess of her birth-rate over ours (and still more over that of France) is in itself the proof of that superiority. For the growth of her population involved, not the production of degenerates, but of a sound and vigorous

[19] Sep. 1914.

race. Patriotism, public spirit, frugality and industry are the essential moral factors which render possible the vast armed force which Germany wields. And in all these factors it must be admitted, with whatever shame and sorrow, that she surpasses England."

"Yet the cry of weakness is sporadic only and alters no world facts. War remains the means by which, as between nations or races, the universal law that the higher shall supersede the lower continues to work. From Great Britain and from the United States, whence the military spirit is passing away, this bleat of feebleness is now proceeding. But it is not heard among the two most energetic and efficient peoples now upon earth. It is not heard in Germany, and it is not heard in Japan. The wolf who has lost his teeth does not wish to fight, but the wolves whose jaws are still strong do not share his pious desire."

"The real Court, the only Court, in which this case can and will be tried is the Court of God, which is war." [20]

Prior to the war, Mr. Wyatt in this way glorified warlike preparations and insisted upon the survival value of war. Immediately after the war, in an addendum to his republished articles, he made modifications of his preaching, and, detaching survival value from excessive militarism associated it with democracy. He said:

"Yet, as of all virtues there is a possible excess, so in this instance it may be that the Germans have carried warlike preparations to a point at which it has inflicted injury on the national character. . . . Evidently there is no survival value in a spirit of violent aggression."

"Democracy is coming to its own in modern war. For in such war intelligence in the soldier is the secret of success, and the despotic system of Prussia crushes intelligence in the individual private. The German infantry, we are told, fight bravely only when in masses under command. Hence those close formations which lead to defeat. Here there is direct connection between a political system and a military weakness. Here is survival value attaching to the spirit of democracy and withdrawn from the spirit of despotism." [21]

All of which illustrates, in curious and instructive fashion, the danger of elevating a spirit of local patriotism into a principle of universal application. Militarism in the United Kingdom is of God, and in Germany of the Devil. Very clearly, if British statesmen were determined to "crush militarism," there was plenty of work for them in the British isles.

British and German Militarism. To Professor Murray, assertion that English militarists did not — "thank Heaven and our own common sense" — control the government, whereas German militarists did, there are three replies: First, the militarists, as defined above, never controlled either the German or the British government. Secondly, assum-

[20] Pp. 491, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 500, 1.
[21] P. 509.

ing (probably correctly) that the Professor intended to refer to military officers rather than to militarists, while it is true that these men have not in recent years controlled the British government, it is also true that upon occasion imperialists (still more dangerous) have had their way in the conduct of foreign affairs. Professor Seeley, for example, tells us: "that the main struggle of England from the time of Louis XIV to the time of Napoleon was for the possession of the New World, and that it is for want of perceiving this that most of us find that century of English history uninteresting." [22]

"I said that the expansion of England in the New World and in Asia is the formula which sums up for England the history of the eighteenth century. I point out now that the great triple war of the middle of that century is neither more nor less than the great decisive duel between England and France for the possession of the New World." [23]

"This fact then that, both in America and in Asia, France and England stood in direct competition for a prize of absolutely incalculable value, explains the fact that France and England fought a second Hundred Years' War." [24]

The Boer war of 1899–1902 (now defended by nobody) was the work of three great British imperialists — Chamberlain, Rhodes, and Milner. Thirdly, the assertion that in recent years military officers controlled the German government has no foundation in fact. Were it true, Germany would have been at war with France in 1886–7, during the Boulanger régime — particularly in connection with the Schnaebele incident; and again, in 1905–6 and 1911, at the time of the Morocco incidents; and on various other occasions during the Balkan wars of 1912–13. If Professor Murray intended to make special reference to the war of 1914–18, his apology must be that he wrote under war-influence, and prior to the publication of material which has made concurrence in his view impossible.

It may well be assumed that, at various periods between 1871 and 1914, German military officers urged war. That they failed was because they did not "control the government." During the two Morocco incidents, for example although they were backed by many strident voices, the Kaiser and his government were able to withstand both the influence and the clamor. And during the Balkan wars, although the circumstances were, for Germany, much more propitious than in 1914, and military men and jingoes of all shades were active, the political authorities not only maintained peace but labored diligently to that end. Mr. Oliver has truly said:

"Looking back at the Balkan struggle in the light of subsequent events,

[22] *The Expansion of England*, pp. 13–14.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

it appears to us now a great deal less remarkable for what it actually produced than for what it failed to produce. It failed to set Europe in a blaze, and yet it afforded far better opportunities for doing this than the Serajevo murders in June 1914." [25]

The good offices of the German government during this extremely exciting and dangerous period were frankly acknowledged by the man who had the best reason to appreciate them — Sir Edward Grey. He said in his momentous speech of 3 August 1914:

"Throughout the Balkan wars by general admission, we worked for peace. This co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis." [26]

Lord Haldane had said a few months previously (15 January) at Hoxton:

"It was with pleasure that he thought of the great power for good of the two statesmen in Europe, Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg and Sir Edward Grey. These two had worked for all they were worth, and we had seen the fruits of it during a period of great anxiety and crisis, when probably without that group system we might have had a conflagration in Europe." [27]

It was the King of Roumania, at whose capital the treaty of Bucarest (1913) was arranged, who telegraphed to the Kaiser: "Thanks to you, the peace will remain definitive." [28]

In view of all this, Professor Murray would have difficulty in maintaining that, normally, German militarists "controlled the government." He might profitably peruse the first five documents in the French Yellow Book issued shortly after the commencement of war; the Kautsky documents; *My Memoirs*, by von Tirpitz, &c., &c. In a well-analyzed, if not perfectly accurate, report upon conditions in Germany in July 1913, prepared by the French Foreign Office, it is said that:

"German public opinion is divided into two currents on the question of the possibility and proximity of war. . . . People sometimes speak of a military party in Germany. The expression is inaccurate, even if it is intended to convey the idea that Germany is the country whose military power is supreme, as it is said of France that it is the country where the civil power is supreme. There exists a state of mind which is more worthy of attention than this historical fact, because it constitutes a danger more evident and more recent. There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidised for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the

[25] *Ordeal by Battle*, p. 274.

[26] See also Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 101. The same admission is to be found in the strongly anti-German booklet, *Why We are at War*, by six "Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History," p. 40. *Cf.* Goschen to Grey, 28 July 1914: Br. Blue Bk., 1914, No. 71.

[27] Quoted by Neilson: *How Diplomats Make War*, p. 224.

[28] Baron Beyens: *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, p. 261.

intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed. Those in favor of war are divided into several categories." Specification of the categories follows. On the other hand:

"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war should be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufactures of guns and armour plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain." [29]

Against the suggestion that the actions of the German government immediately prior to the outbreak of the war of 1914 were dictated by Germany's military chiefs, it is sufficient to quote the following from von Tirpitz:

"As, however, the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister for War, the Chief of the Naval Staff, and myself were kept away from Berlin during the succeeding days, the whole business was monopolized by the Chancellor, who, having no experience himself of the great European world, was unable to estimate correctly the value of his colleagues in the Foreign Office. The Chancellor at any rate did not write to me for advice." [30]

Geographical Considerations. That there were more militarists in Germany than in the United Kingdom is probably true, but that was not because Germans are Germans, but because of their geographical situation. If the British people had lived in Central Europe instead of upon two islands, they would not have become dominant upon the seas. They would, I believe, have achieved corresponding position on land; and that would not have been accomplished without the development of militaristic spirit. Prussia was essentially a military state in the days of Frederick the Great. Frederick dead, his spirit and system relapsed. That they revived, may justly be attributed to the French victories under Napoleon. That they recurred under Bismarck, was due, to a large extent, to a natural desire for release from the predominance of Austria. And it is not probable that under similar circumstances the British people would have exhibited the submissive docility of the Chinese. That British security lies in command of the water, and that German security lies in strength upon the land, sufficiently explains the difference in their attitude. It explains also why one rails at the militarism of the other, and is replied to by counter-objection to ocean-domination.

If militarists were somewhat plentiful in Germany while rare in the United States, the explanation again is geography and environment. Suppose that to the north of the United States there were one hundred

[29] Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 5. Longer extracts may be seen in cap. XVII, pp. 565–9.

[30] *Op. cit.*, I, p. 243; and see p. 246.

and seventy million partially educated Slavs, governed by ever-changing autocrats, and with a history of imperialistic expansion comparable to that of the United Kingdom. Suppose that to the south were forty million French — rich, cultured, brave — nursing resentment for the forcible annexation of Texas and California. Suppose that Cuba was the richest nation in the world; that she possessed one fifth of the earth's surface; that she dominated the seas, including the Atlantic and Mexican Gulf coasts.[31] And suppose that, instead of being bounded on east and west by vast oceans, there were on one side some Scandinavian nations, including an angry Denmark, and, on the other, Italian and Balkan states awaiting a favorable moment to disintegrate the only American ally. If that were the environment of the United States, is it probable that among her people there would have been fewer men of militaristic type than in Germany?

Russian and Japanese Militarism. It is a curious fact that in our war to "crush militarism," we have had as allies the two pre-eminently militaristic (using the word now in the less rigid sense) Powers — Russia and Japan. No other European country (except France of the past) has a militaristic record equal to that of Russia. Sometimes, as in the case of Peter, her autocrats were themselves militarists, and sometimes, as in the case of the last Czar, they were weaklings under militaristic influence. The Russian mobilization which induced the German ultimatum of 31 July 1914 was ordered by the Minister for War and the Chief of the Military Staff, in the face, probably, of specific orders to the contrary from the Czar. The story is told in a subsequent chapter.[32]

Militarism in Japan may be said to be almost a religion. The feudal system has indeed been superseded, and the Samurai have ceased to be a separate class; but the militaristic spirit persists in its full intensity, and the *bushido* of the Samurai has become a national ethic. Imperialism, backed by militarism, has given Japan a dominating influence upon the eastern sections of the neighboring continent at the expense of Koreans, Manchus, and Chinese.

HAS MILITARISM BEEN CRUSHED?

If we are to gauge war-success in the crushing of militarism by computation of the number of militarists (using the word in the defined sense) then and now, it is difficult to ascertain what the effect of the war has been. In Germany, a number of them have been killed, but the punitive provisions of the peace treaty have probably not only produced a new and larger supply, but have converted many previous pacifists to an opinion which they formerly despised. In France, the

[31] Above sentences are adapted from George W. Crile: *A Mechanistic View of War and Peace*, p. 69; and *The New Republic* of 4 August 1917.

[32] Cap. XXVII.

victory has almost certainly revived the national penchant for *la gloire*. One cannot doubt that the recent outburst in France of enthusiastic apotheosis of Joan of Arc and Napoleon was largely a product of the Foch success in the recent war.[33]

The futility of an endeavor to crush the militaristic spirit is known to every reader of history. Is it not certain, for instance, that to the victories of France under Napoleon (to go no farther back) may rightly be attributed the revival of militarism in Prussia? Is it not certain that the Prussian victory of 1871 added enormously to the fighting temper of the French? And is it not certain that the effect upon the Germans of their recent overthrow will be a repetition of the reaction after Jena in 1807?

During the war, we were told that the only way to "crush German militarism" was to prove to the German people that it did not pay. "Turn out the militaristic Kaiser and his militaristic entourage, and Europe will disarm and her peoples dwell in peace" — so we were told. We have succeeded in the turning out. Germany is a republic. But the situation is worse than before. After the Franco-Prussian war of 1871, Bismarck found security against French revenge by means of his alliances. France, unable satisfactorily to follow his example,[34] is finding that the only way to ensure herself against German revenge is the eternal maintenance of overwhelming military force ready for instant action. Repression of German national spirit and of German resentment against the peace terms is as impossible as were unsuccessful Bismarck's efforts to induce France to forget Alsace and Lorraine. Hatred is, at the moment of writing (November 1923), being fanned into fury by the French occupation of the valley of the Ruhr. To Germans, as to other virile peoples, defeat is inspiration and incitement. The war has not changed human nature. Militarism will never be crushed by war. And our four years' effort, if devoted to that purpose, was a gigantic mistake.

[33] *Cf. Current History*, XIV, pp. 574, 685.

[34] She has done what she could. She has entered into military alliance with Belgium, and is cultivating relations with Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and other states.

CHAPTER XVII

GERMANY AND PREPARATION

PRELIMINARY

Prevalent Opinion. As evidence of the purpose of Germany to dominate the world, it is frequently asserted: (1) that she made diligent and elaborate preparation for the execution of her purpose; (2) that she did so secretly; (3) that, at "the chosen moment," she precipitated war; and (4) that the other great Powers pursued merely peace-ensuing policies. From among the many hundreds of such assertions, the following may be selected:

Mr. Robert Lansing, United States Secretary of State, has said:

"In the light of events, we could read the past and see that for a quarter of a century the absorbing ambition of the military oligarchy which was the master of the German Empire, was for world dominion. Every agency in the fields of commerce, industry, science, and diplomacy had been directed by the German Government to this supreme end." [1]

In a speech at Sacket Harbor (9 July 1917), Mr. Lansing said:

"It was the policy of those who plotted and made ready for the time to accomplish the desire of the German rulers, to lull into false security the great nations which they intended to subdue, so that when the storm broke they would be unprepared. How well they succeeded, you know." [2]

In the same vein, Mr. Frederick Scott Oliver has said that the war: "is waged against an enemy who by the treacherous thoroughness of his peace-time preparations, appears to our eyes to have violated good faith as between nations, as in the conduct of the campaign he has disregarded the obligations of our common humanity." [3]

Sir Edward Grey, on 22 March 1915, said:

"We now know that the German Government had prepared for war as only people who plan can prepare." [4]

And Mr. Lloyd George, speaking at the Queen's Hall, London, on 4 August 1917, said:

"What are we fighting for? To defeat the most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations; carefully, skilfully, insidiously, clandestinely plotted in every detail with ruthless, cynical determination." [5]

Methods of Investigation. There are two methods which may be pursued in the investigation of the truth of these charges: First, there is the purely mathematical — each Power, in each year, spent so much money, trained so many men, constructed so many ships; comparison of the figures; and general deductions. The second method makes the mathematical subordinate to the varying complexities of political considerations: the figures are essential; but, without knowledge of the circumstances which produced them, unsatisfactory and possibly misleading.

The Main Points. The main factors in the situation, from this second point of view, are not in dispute:

1. France had not ceased to regret the loss in 1870–1 of Alsace and Lorraine, and to look forward to the day of their restoration.

[1] "War Information Series, No. 6. Published by the Committee of Public Information."

[2] Reported in *N. Y. Times*. And see pp. 12 and 452.

[3] *Ordeal by Battle*, p. 420. The sentence conflicts with the language on p. 140.

[4] Quoted by Morel: *Truth and the War*, p. 92.

[5] Quoted by Mr. Woodsworth in Canadian House of Commons, 15 February 1923.

2. Various attempts at creation of an alliance between the United Kingdom and Germany (1875–80; 1895; 1898; 1899; and 1901) failed.

3. The United Kingdom, urged thereto by British apprehension with reference to German rivalry in various respects — more particularly (1) the construction of warships; (2) the military menace in western Europe; and (3) the military and economic menace in the Near and Middle East — turned toward France and Russia. Preservation, development, and consolidation of *entente* relations with France from 1904, and with both from 1907, formed the pivot of British foreign policy.

4. Without asserting the existence of *entente* policy of "encircling" Germany with enemies — without, that is, making use of a word often repudiated — there can be no doubt that, from a period shortly after the accession of Edward VII, advantageous war-alignment of as many European Powers as possible became the principal purpose for which *entente* relations were being cultivated. That was perfectly legitimate. Denial of it would be foolish.

5. Germany dreaded the union of the United Kingdom with France and Russia, and, for that reason, made repeated efforts toward the establishment of friendship with the United Kingdom. The German rivalries above referred to — especially in the construction of war-ships — and the assumed necessity for maintenance of the Entente, rendered all attempts at *rapprochement* futile. German protestations could not remove the German menace.

6. Although Italy and Roumania were associated with Germany and Austria-Hungary in war-alliance, they were untrustworthy, and, when war came, played the part anticipated.

7. Finally, the Balkan wars of 1912–13 prejudiced Germany's position (1) by the reduction of the fighting power of Turkey, (2) by the enhancement of the power of Serbia, and (3) by the increased danger to the stability of Germany's only dependable ally — Austria-Hungary.

All but one of these points are developed in other chapters: the first in chapter XVIII; the second and fifth in chapter V; the third in chapters V, XIX, XX, and XXI; the sixth in chapters VII and IX; and the seventh in chapter III. A few words here on the fourth:

Encirclement. Germany's fear of isolation commenced with the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907. In that and other incidents, she saw the development of what she termed the "encircling" policy — the policy attributed to King Edward VII, but quite as much the policy of France also.[6] That it existed has often been denied, but any dispute turns upon the meaning of the word.[7] There is no doubt that the

[6] Indeed, in Berlin the initiation of the policy was by some persons attributed to Delcassé: Report of Russian Ambassador at Berlin, 27 Feb. 1913: *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 36.

[7] The Russian Ambassador at London, in his report of 8 Feb. 1912, said:

United Kingdom and France entered upon *entente* relations in 1904; that the United Kingdom and Russia did the like in 1907; that Italy — always an uncertain German ally — made war-treaty arrangements with France in 1902, and was carefully courted by both the United Kingdom and France; that efforts were made — at least, Germany believed that efforts were being made to detach her only substantial ally — Austria-Hungary; and that anti-Germany and anti-Austria leagues were formed under the ægis of Russia. Indeed, the *entente* Powers themselves recognized that Germany's policy was to some extent based upon her dread of isolation. For example, on 2 April 1909; shortly after settlement of the Balkan crisis of that year, the Russian Chargé at Berlin reported:

"The fear of isolation begins to wane. Germany is beginning to emerge from the difficult position in which she considered herself placed after the Conference of Algeciras." [8]

On one occasion, when referring to the association of the United Kingdom with France and Russia, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg (as Isvolsky declared, 2 July 1909):

"sought to explain the attitude of Germany by saying that she faced a new grouping of the Powers in Europe, and must therefore knit her ties with Austria-Hungary still closer." [9]

In his recent book, von Bethmann-Hollweg has said:

"That King Edward, or, to express it more correctly, the official British policy behind him, had planned any military enterprise against us, is in my opinion not the case. But to deny that King Edward aspired to and attained our encirclement is mere playing with words. The fact of the matter was that the communications between the two Cabinets were confined essentially to the despatch of such formal business as was required by the mutual relations of two States not at war with one another. Further, that Germany found herself opposed by a combine of England, Russia and France in all controversial questions of World policy.[10] Finally, that this combine not only raised every obstacle to

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"The 'Iron Ring,' which has become proverbial, is based upon a fallacy. So far as I am aware, the Russian Government has not attempted to interfere with the legitimate interests of Germany, when she has not attempted to oppose ours. On the other hand, Sir Edward Grey, publicly as well as to me personally, has constantly denied that he wished to isolate Germany. He has repeated to me that every attempt to destroy the Triple Alliance would be a mistake. In his opinion the isolation of Germany would signify an actual danger to the cause of peace" (Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 618). As comment upon this let it be noted that for ten years prior to the date of the report, France had been in secret war-alliance with a member of the Triple Alliance — Italy. Sir Edward Grey had, almost certainly, been confidentially informed of that fact.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 492. And see p. 493.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 496. And see p. 499.

[10] In connection with Morocco, Persia, and the Bagdad Railway, for example, Germany repeatedly felt that she had to deal not with one Power, but with two, and sometimes three.

the realization of German ambitions, but also labored systematically and successfully to seduce Italy from the Triple Alliance. You may call that 'encirclement,' 'balance of power,' or what you will; but the object aimed at and eventually attained was no other than the welding together of a serried and supreme combination of States for obstructing Germany, by diplomatic means at least, in the free development of its growing powers." [11]

On 18 March 1910, the Russian Chargé at Berlin made report upon the subject as follows:

"The reason for this [12] is to be sought in that feeding of suspicion which Germany of late has been harboring concerning our foreign policy; for the Germans seem ever and again to fear the efforts of the enemies of Germany to isolate her. The ratifications of a long series of international conventions to which Germany was not a party, as well as the fear of a conflict with England, which has increased since the Russian *rapprochement* with England, have called forth this distrust on the part of Germany. This became specially manifest after the meeting of Racconigi,[13] as they seem to be of the opinion in Germany that we wish to separate her from one of her allies [Italy].

"There is no doubt that our negotiations with Austria awaken the same feeling of suspicion. Our efforts to draw the other Powers into these negotiations, in order thus to keep Austria in some wise from engaging in any more of Aehrenthal's adventures, are regarded in Germany as an attempt, inspired by England, to involve Austria into a formal convention, and to loosen her ties with Germany so as to deprive Germany of her second ally. This thought has found clear expression in articles of the 'Vossische Zeitung' and of the 'Germania,' in which the British Ambassador at Vienna is charged with leaving no stone unturned to break asunder the German-Austrian alliance.

"The visits of the Balkan sovereigns to St. Petersburg and Constantinople likewise cause disquiet. In the marked reserve of the Bulgarian and Serbian Ministers, they discern hostility towards Austria, and they fear the formation of a Balkan block with Turkish connivance." [14]

Very remarkable is the despairing wail which the Kaiser penned (30 July 1914) upon a despatch from the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, as he felt himself facing the fate which he believed had been prepared for him:

"England, Russia, and France have agreed — taking as a basis our *casus fœderis* with Austria — using the Austro-Serbian conflict as a pretext, to wage a war of destruction against us. Hence Grey's cynical

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[11] *Reflections on the World War*, pp. 11–12.

[12] German exhibition of dislike of Russian negotiations with Austria.

[13] The meeting of the Czar and the King of Italy in October 1909. It is referred to in cap. VII.

[14] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 500.

observation to Lichnowsky, that 'so long as the war remained confined to Austria and Russia, England would stand aside, but only if we and France became involved he would be forced to become active against us,' *i.e.*, either we are basely to betray our ally and abandon her to Russia and thus break up the Triple Alliance, or, remaining faithful to our ally, are to be set upon by the Triple Entente together and chastised, by which their envy will finally have the satisfaction of completely ruining all of us. This, in a nutshell, is the true, naked situation, which, slowly and surely set in motion and continued by Edward VII, has been systematically developed by disclaimed conversations of England with Paris and St. Petersburg, and finally brought to its culmination and set in motion by George V. At the same time the stupidity and clumsiness of our ally is made a trap for us. The celebrated 'encircling' of Germany thus finally became an accomplished fact, in spite of all the endeavors of our politicians and diplomats to prevent it. The net is suddenly drawn over our heads, and, with a mocking laugh, England reaps the most brilliant success of her assiduously conducted, purely anti-German world-policy. Against this we have proved powerless, while, as a result of our fidelity to our ally, Austria, she has us isolated, wriggling in the net, and draws the noose for our political and economic destruction. A splendid achievement, which compels admiration even from one who is ruined by it! Edward VII, after his death, is stronger than I who am alive." [15]

On the same day, the Kaiser wrote upon a copy of an article in *The Morning Post* the following annotation:

"The whole affair is plainly arranged between England, France, and Russia for the annihilation of Germany, lastly through the conversations with Poincaré in Paris and Petersburg, and the Austro-Serbian strife is only an excuse to fall upon us! God help us in this fight for our existence, brought about by falsehood, lies, and poisonous envy." [16]

For her attitude toward Germany, the United Kingdom cannot be blamed. National security, as she thought, made it necessary. Even if, by possibility, her interests (1) in Belgium and Holland, (2) in Constantinople, and (3) in India could have been safeguarded otherwise than by military association with France and Russia, the "challenge" to her naval supremacy rendered measures for national safety indispensable.

Italy, Roumania, and Austria-Hungary. Germany, moreover, was far from well assured of the fidelity of her allies. That Italy and Roumania, although in war-alliance with the Central Powers for more than thirty years, were not regarded as certain supporters in case of hostilities, has been made clear in previous chapters.[17] When war came, they, after periods of prudential bargaining, joined the *entente* Powers.

[15] Kautsky, *The Guilt* &c., pp. 176–7; Kautsky Docs., No. 401.
[16] Kautsky Docs., No. 402.
[17] Caps. VII and IX.

For the fidelity of Austria-Hungary, there was the sanction that her existence, as against her predatory neighbors, depended upon the strength of her northern ally. But Germany could not be perfectly assured of her co-operation in case of a war unconnected with the Balkans. Germany believed (as well she might) that efforts had been made by the British King to induce Francis Joseph to withdraw from the Dual Alliance,[18] and she was aware that that Emperor was not altogether pleased with the nature of German response to his various appeals.[19] Germany, moreover, found that Austria-Hungary was an ever-increasing source of annoyance, and, for that reason, of apprehension. She was, as von Bethmann-Hollweg (the German Chancellor) said, "very difficult to manage." [20]

"Austrians," von Tschirschky (German Ambassador at Vienna) said, "will always be Austrians. A compound of vanity and frivolity is neither easily nor quickly overcome. I know them well." [21]

Germany recognized that the interests of the two countries were by no means identical, and she had reason to feel that her recognized need of an ally exposed her to exploitations by that ally. For example, the German Chancellor, von Bülow, strongly disapproved of Austro-Hungarian methods in connection with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 — methods which nearly provoked war. Conversing upon the subject with Sir Charles Hardinge, British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (as Sir Charles reported):

"he did not spare Aehrenthal; condemned his methods; and complained of the difficult situation of Germany, called upon to support an ally whose policy Germany was not always able to approve." [22]

Again, on the eve of the breaking out of the Balkan war of 1912, Sazonoff (Russian Foreign Minister), when reporting to the Czar the result of his journeyings abroad, said:

"At Berlin, I was enabled to establish the fact that, on the whole, Germany is but little concerned at the war of the Balkan States, but, following the example of France, Germany dreads being implicated in a European war as a consequence of her treaty obligations, and in case war in the Balkans should be inevitable, she is ready to do anything to localize such a war. From this viewpoint, Poincaré's proposal to depute Russia and Austria to announce the will of Europe at Sofia, Belgrade, Cettinje, and Athens was sympathetically received at Berlin, all the more

[18] At the meeting at Ischl on 12 Aug. 1908, during the early stage of the Balkan crisis of 1908–9. See *ante*, cap. V, p. 166; *Contemporary Rev.*, Jan. 1922, p. 64; and *Quarterly Rev.*, Jan. 1923, pp. 3–4.

[19] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 671.

[20] In Prussian Council of 30 July 1914: Kautsky Docs., No. 456. *Cf.* Fr. Yell. Bk., *Balkan Affairs*, I, Nos. 54, 124; II, No. 438; III, No. 128.

[21] 26 July 1914: Kautsky Docs., No. 326.

[22] As reported by the Russian Chargé at London, 16 Feb. 1909: Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 490.

so because there evidently exists at the present moment some doubt as to the inclination of the Vienna Cabinet to listen to the advice given by its northern Ally, and the Germans, therefore, prefer not to put their influence at Vienna to the test, being afraid they will no longer meet with the former obedient attention there. It seems to me that this state of affairs is, to a certain degree, explained by the fact that Austria is not averse to accentuating her independence of Germany, profiting, as she does, by Germany being obliged to adhere to the alliance with Austria and being afraid of standing isolated among all the Great Powers." [23]

A report of the Russian Ambassador at Berlin of 14 March 1913 contained the following:

"An additional reason why the German Government must feel anxiety about strengthening its military power, must, in my opinion, also be sought for in the ever-increasing suspicion here of Austria-Hungary, who can hardly feel quite satisfied with the support given her by Berlin in her selfish policy. This view is shared by my French colleague, who likewise inclines to the belief that the relations between Berlin and Vienna are each day growing cooler, one might even say, more strained." [24]

Austria-Hungary, moreover, was failing in relative strength, and was described by the German Assistant Foreign Secretary as having become: "as formerly was Turkey, the sick man of Europe, that the Russians, the Italians, the Roumanians, the Serbians, and the Montenegrins expected to partition." [25]

Von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, writing just before the war, said:

"If localization of the conflict cannot be secured, and if Russia attacks Austria, the *casus fœderis* arises, and we cannot sacrifice Austria. We would then find ourselves in an isolation which could not be regarded with pride. I do not wish a preventive war, but if combat is offered to us, we cannot draw back." [26]

The difficulties of German association with Austria-Hungary were well illustrated, as we shall see [27] during the negotiations which immediately preceded the outbreak of the war. Had Austria-Hungary adopted the attitude pressed upon her by Germany with reference to the Serbian reply (25 July 1914) to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, war (for the time at least) might have been avoided. Even after Germany had declared war on Russia, repeated telegrams were necessary before Austria-Hungary could be induced to take the same step;[28] and she disregarded

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[23] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 671.

[25] Kautsky Docs., vol. IV, p. 139. Mr. Lloyd George, on one occasion, referred to Austria-Hungary as the "ramshackle Empire."

[26] Kautsky Docs., No. 72.

[27] Cap. XXVII.

[28] Kautsky Docs., Nos. 870–879.

altogether Berlin's urgings that she should declare war against France and the United Kingdom.[29]

Effect on Germany. Under these circumstances — France purposing revenge; existence of the Triple Entente, and its consolidation as the pivot of British foreign policy; attempted expansion of it; persistent German efforts to establish relations of friendship with the United Kingdom; foredoomed failure of them, save on condition of permanent naval inferiority;[30] uncertain allies; rapidly recurring international crises; almost annual escapes from war — under these circumstances, there can be no reason for astonishment that Germany made extensive preparations for the day upon which settlement of some episode, by diplomatic endeavor, would prove to be impossible. But while it is true that Germany prepared, the following propositions are equally true.

1. Germany's geographical and political situation made adequate preparation necessary.

2. There was no secrecy as to the amount of money which Germany was spending upon preparation. All the world was aware of it. Every nation knew what every other was doing.

3. Between 1900 and 1914, all the great European Powers lived in constant dread of the outbreak of war.

4. France, Russia, and the United Kingdom were as diligent as was Germany in their preparation for the anticipated war.

GERMANY'S PERIL

The observations in the preceding chapter as to the relation of Germany's geographical situation to the militarism with which she has been charged[31] are equally applicable to the subject of Germany's preparation for war. It may now be added that, prior to the war, the reason for that preparation was well understood, and by many persons frankly admitted. Bismarck had put the matter clearly and quite fairly when he said:

"Germany is a new empire, and it must be protected from possible assault by one, or two, or both Powers, one to the east, the other to the west of us. You must remember that the next war between France and Germany will mean extinction for one. We lie between two lines of fire: France is our bitter enemy, and Russia I do not trust. Peace may be far more dishonorable than war, and for war we must be prepared."[32]

Mr. Lloyd George, on at least two occasions, recognized the reasonableness of this view. On 28 July 1908, he said:

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[29] France declared against her on the 10th Aug., and the United Kingdom followed on the 12th.

[30] See *ante*, cap. V, pp. 167, 168, 169, 170, 171–4.

[31] *Ante*, pp. 489–90.

[32] Article "Conversations with Prince Bismarck," by Sir William Blake: *North American Rev.*, Sep. 1914, p. 395.

"Look at the position of Germany. Her army is to her what our navy is to us — her sole defence as against invasion. She has not got a two-Power standard. She may have a stronger army than France, than Russia, than Italy, than Austria, but she is between two great Powers who, in combination, could pour in a vastly greater number of troops than she has. Don't forget that, when you wonder why Germany is frightened at alliances and understandings, and some sort of mysterious workings which appear in the Press, and hints in the *Times* and *Daily Mail*. . . . Here is Germany in the middle of Europe, with France and Russia on either side, and with a combination of their armies greater than hers. Suppose we had here a possible combination which would lay us open to invasion — suppose Germany and France, or Germany and Russia, or Germany and Austria, had fleets which, in combination, would be stronger than ours, would not we be frightened? Would we not arm? Of course we should." [33]

Upon another occasion, only seven months prior to the outbreak of the recent war, Mr. Lloyd George said:

"The Germany Army is vital, not merely in the existence of the German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation itself, surrounded as Germany is by other nations, each of which possesses armies about as powerful as her own. We forget that, while we insist upon a 60 per cent. superiority (so far as our naval strength is concerned) over Germany being essential to guarantee the integrity of our own shores, Germany herself has nothing like that superiority over France alone, and she has, of course, in addition, to reckon with Russia on her eastern frontier. Germany has nothing which approximates to a two-Power standard. She has, therefore, become alarmed by recent events, and is spending huge sums of money on the expansion of her military resources." [34]

Historians take the same view. For example, *The Cambridge Modern History* has the following:

"Even so, the new position of Germany is not without its difficulties. At every step forward, she is confronted by the political and economic opposition of alliances and *ententes*, and fully realizes that, despite the Triple Alliance, it is upon her own strength that she must rely first of all in any emergency. This state of things requires that she should strain every nerve. . . . In view of her geographical and military position, set in the centre of the international constellation of Powers, and impelled by the inward necessity for further development, this country is subjected to a stronger tension of conflicting forces than any other Power, and therefore needs to put forth her strength the more effectively

[33] Quoted by Morel: *Truth and the War*, pp. 95–6. And see G. H. Perris: *Our Foreign Policy*, cap. vii; *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.*, III, 389.

[34] *Daily Chronicle*, 1 Jan. 1914. Quoted by Morel: *Truth and the War*, p. 91.

if she is to hold her own. It is only the fullest exercise of her strength which has sufficed since the days of the Saxon and Hohenstauffen Emperors to vindicate the existence of the Germans as a nation. Long centuries of weakness and dismemberment have taught them that, without this determined display of force, the heart of Europe will become an object of attack and spoliation for their neighbors. In the new empire, Emperor, princes, and people, all parties, and all ranks, are agreed that these lessons of the centuries, taught by the heights and depths of the nation's history, shall not have been in vain." [35]

To somewhat similar effect, Dr. J. Holland Rose, in a book published after the war had commenced, said:

"We who live behind the rampart of the sea know but little (save in times of panic) of the fear which besets a state which has no natural frontiers. . . . Germany accomplished a wonderful work in unifying her people (or, rather, Bismarck and his compeers did it for her); but, even so, she has not escaped from the disadvantages of her situation; by land she is easily assailable on three sides." [36]

In *The Times*, in 1911, its Military Correspondent wrote:

"The possibility of a war on two fronts is the nightmare of German strategists, and, considering the pace at which Russia has been building up her field armies since 1905, the nightmare is not likely to be soon conjured away." [37]

French writers, prior to the war, acknowledged Germany's reasons for apprehension. M. Marcel Sembat, for example, has made vivid representation of the Slav peril:

"The German obsession of Russia does not correspond at all with the hostility, born of their defeat, which many Frenchmen entertain for Germany. It originates from bitterness of yesterday, and anxiety for to-morrow. . . . The German has grown up under the overshadowing threat of a formidable avalanche suspended over his head; an avalanche always ready to become detached, to roll down upon him; an avalanche of immense savagery, of barbarous and brutal multitudes threatening to cover his soil, to swallow up his civilisation and his society."

"If I fail to understand the Russia which haunts Germany I shall be incapable of understanding the effect which the Russo-French alliance produces upon the mind of the Germans."

"And, after all, does not the Tsar possess within his dominions all the barbarians of Turkestan and Central Asia? Conquered? What nonsense! The day when *European* Russians, too Liberal-minded or too Socialistic, cause the Tsar inconvenience, will he hesitate to lead against them his *sotnias* of Cossacks and Turkomans? That day it will be Asia,

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[35] XII, pp. 172–3.

[36] J. Holland Rose, *The Political History of Germany*. Quoted by Morel: *Truth and the War*, p. 97.

[37] Quoted by Morel: *Truth and the War*, p. 141.

the barbarous Orient, which will be at the doors of Europe and on the threshold of Germany. The Franco-Russian Alliance, and the Triple *Entente*, appear, therefore, to the German, as a compact between two civilised peoples and barbarism." [38]

Colonel Arthur Boucher, whose books, *France Victorious in the War of Tomorrow*, *The Offensive against Germany*, and *Germany in Peril*, have enjoyed considerable vogue, wrote in the last of them, immediately prior to the war:

"Germany is threatened to-day on all her frontiers, and finds herself in such a position that she can only ensure her future and face all her foes by seeking first of all to eliminate us from their number by concentrating, from the beginning, all her forces against us."

"To be in a position to resist attacks which menace her on all sides Germany is compelled to develop her military powers to the supreme degree. . . . It was to guard against the Russian danger that Germany made her (Military) law of 1913."

"Thus, we see, when the time comes, and it may come soon, when Slavism desires to make an end of Germanism, the friendship of Russia can serve us if we are fully decided to fulfill all our duties towards her. Germany does not doubt that France, remaining immutably attached to her treaties, would support her ally with all her strength, choosing, however, the most favorable moment for her intervention."

"If Russia attacks Germany, France becomes mistress of the situation. It will be sufficient for France to draw her sword at the opportune moment to make it impossible for Germany to defend the provinces she took from us."

"From whatever aspect Germany's position is studied it will be realised that her future is of the darkest, and that she has placed herself in the most perilous situation. Now of all the factors which contribute towards compromising the destinies of this great Power, the chief factor is certainly the hostility of France. To what might Germany not aspire if she were assured merely of our neutrality." [39]

Sir Thomas Barclay, who was an active and effective promoter of *entente* relations between the United Kingdom and France, writing in the spring of 1914, said:

"Wedged in between France and Russia, with England dominating all her issues to the outer world, her frontiers open to all the political winds that blow, Germany has a geographical position which forces her statesmen to listen with an anxious ear to any movements, projects, or combinations of her neighbors." [40]

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[38] Sembat: "*Faitès un roi, sinon faites la paix.*" Quoted by Morel: *Truth and the War*, pp. 102–3.

[39] *Germany in Peril* (1915). Quoted by Morel: *Truth and the War*, pp. 99–100.

[40] *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences* (1876–1906), p. 256.

Admiral of the Fleet Lord Wester-Wemyss, writing after the war, has said:

"To Germany, without natural frontiers, and therefore always open to invasion from east and west, a strong army is a primary condition of national existence, and her so-called militarism is not due, as is so often advanced, to the Hohenzollerns, but rather are the Hohenzollerns the product of her military needs." [41]

The point was apparent even to the six "Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History," who, under the influence of the outbreak of hostilities, framed an unscholarly indictment of Germany. They admitted that:

"Geographical pressure on all sides has made Prussia feel herself in a state of chronic strangulation; and a man who feels strangled will struggle ruthlessly for breath." [42]

When introducing the army estimates in 1913, von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, said:

"Germany was like no other country . . . wedged in between the Slav world and the French. Germany could never compete with Russia, whose Emperor could always call out more men than Germany. In any war, Germany would stake her confidence upon the courage and the spirit of the people, but it was necessary to give figures to show what extraordinary military efforts Germany's neighbors were making. In Russia there was a most marvellous economic development of the giant Empire, with its inexhaustible natural resources, and an Army reorganization such as Russia had never known, as regarded the excellence of the material, the organization, and the speed of conversion from peace to war strength." [43]

Germany's situation, we may then confidently say, was amply sufficient to account for her war-preparation.[44] Attribution to her of a purpose to dominate the world, when the prospect of maintaining her own integrity as against her surrounding enemies was regarded as problematical, is fantastic and foolish.[45] French and Russian expenditure upon preparation greatly exceeded (as we shall see) German and Austro-Hungarian.

GERMAN SECRECY

Equally absurd is the statement of Mr. Lansing that the German rulers sought:

"to lull into false security the great nations which they intended to subdue;" [46]

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[41] *Nineteenth Century*, March 1922, p. 412.

[42] *Why We are at War*, p. 114.

[43] Quoted by Morel: *Truth and the War*, p. 143. The increased provision for the army had been rendered necessary, the Chancellor said, because "the Panslavist movement . . . has received a powerful stimulus from the victories of the Slav States in the Balkans . . . and we are compelled to take this into account when we think about the future": *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, p. [309. [45] See cap. XV.

[44] The subject was alluded to in the next preceding chapter. [46] *Ante*, p. 493.

and the reference by Mr. Oliver to "the treacherous thoroughness of his [Germany's] peace-time preparations."[47] Mr. Lansing had in the departments of his government accurate statements of the amounts expended every year by every important government in the world. He knew that private persons could get the figures in the Year Books. And he knew that every increase in Germany's expenditure was voted by the Reichstag after explanation of the reasons for it by the Imperial Chancellor, whose speeches were fully reported. Summaries of them appeared in English and American newspapers.

GENERAL APPREHENSION OF WAR

To what has been said, must now be added that between 1898 and 1904 statesmen of all countries were rightly apprehensive of war. As Lord Haldane apologetically pleaded, he had to make peace-speeches (All diplomats had to do that), but, as Sir J. A. R. Marriott, the very competent historian, said in 1917:

"For years past Europe has been, admittedly, in a state of unstable equilibrium. Great armies have been crouching, ready, at the given signal, to spring at each other's throats."[48]

Look at a mere list of the more significant of the events of these few years:

1. In 1898, the Fashoda dispute between the United Kingdom and France.

2. In 1899–1902, the war between the United Kingdom and the South African Republics, and, with it, the danger of continental intervention.

3. In 1900, the German government introduced a navy bill which had as its preamble:

"Germany requires a fleet of such strength that a war with the mightiest naval Power would involve risks jeopardising the supremacy of that Power."[49]

4. In 1898, 1899, and 1901, the United Kingdom, having determined, in view of various complications, to abandon her policy of "splendid isolation," engaged in negotiations for an alliance with Germany.

5. In 1902, the war-treaty between France and Italy.

6. In 1902, the United Kingdom agreed, by treaty, to protect Japan against the intervention of a third Power, in case of war between Japan and any other Power — Russia being the Power aimed at.

7. In 1904, because of war-apprehension, the United Kingdom and France settled all outstanding disputes, and entered upon *entente* relations aimed at Germany. Siam had caused disquiet in 1903.

8. In 1904–5, the Russo-Japanese war, into which the United Kingdom was nearly precipitated.

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[47] *Ante*, p. 493.

[48] *Nineteenth Century*, April 1917, p. 717.

[49] J. Ellis Barker: *The Foundations of Germany*, p. 177.

9. In 1905–6, France and Germany were on the verge of war in connection with the first of the Morocco disputes — the United Kingdom siding with France.

10. During that period, the military and naval staffs of the United Kingdom and France engaged in "conversations," with a view to agreement upon co-operation in case of war with Germany.

11. In 1906, Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin in a fruitless endeavor to establish better relations.

12. In 1907, the United Kingdom settled all international questions with Russia; and thus was inaugurated the Triple Entente. All the Great Powers were now in two vast opposing camps. Italy was in both of them.

13. In 1908, the Young Turk revolution, and the Casablanca incident.

14. In 1908–9, Europe on the verge of war in connection with the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

15. In 1909, the United Kingdom became almost hysterical over "the German naval scare" — an incident which evidenced in the most convincing manner the panicky apprehension of war.

16. In 1911, the second Morocco incident, with the Lloyd George warning to Germany, and the narrow escape from general war.

17. In 1911, and continuously till the outbreak of the 1914–18 war, "conversations" between the Chiefs of the Military Staffs of the United Kingdom and France, by way of preparation for war with Germany.

18. In 1911–12, the Turco-Italian war, with protests from Austria-Hungary, and, at one period, probable intervention.

19. In 1912 (February), Lord Haldane's second fruitless visit to Berlin.

20. In 1912 (July), the naval convention between France and Russia.

21. In 1912 (November), the war-agreement between the United Kingdom and France.

22. In 1912–13, the first Balkan war — Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy antagonistically watching its progress, and eventually quarrelling over the Slav occupation of points on the Adriatic.[50]

23. In 1913, the second Balkan war — among the confederates over the distribution of the Turkish assets.

24. In 1913, by the treaty of Bucarest, a new map of the Balkans — a map of which a well-informed diplomatist (writing prior to the recent war) said that it had been "no help to the peace of Europe";[51] a map against which Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary were certain to protest.

25. Between 1904 and 1914, annual consultations between the Chiefs of the Military Staffs of Russia and France in preparation for war with Germany.

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[50] Important documents may be seen in Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 403–435. *Cf. Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 362, 369, 370.

[51] *Nationalism and War in the Near East*, by a Diplomatist, p. 369.

26. Between 1905 and 1914, the Bagdad-railway and Persia questions.

27. In 1913–14, the Liman von Sanders quarrel between Russia and Germany.

28. In 1914, the Russo-German press campaigns[52] had hardly subsided before the cannon of July announced the opening of European hostilities.

Not half the story, of course, is told in a mere catalogue,[53] but expansion of it must be deferred until the appropriate pages are reached. Baron Beyens (Belgian Ambassador at Berlin prior to the outbreak of war) has well said:

"After the settlement of the South Africa question, events unexpectedly occurred almost without interruption from year to year, which, in large measure, contributed toward the actual conflagration. One might say with certainty that they hastened and precipitated the explosion. One with another they connected themselves by a thread sometimes barely visible, but always continuous, and they developed in two very different theatres, Morocco and the European Orient." [54]

Referring to the period in British history immediately prior to 1910, Mr. Arthur D. Innes, in his *England and the British Empire*, said:

"Jingoism had turned its eyes to Germany where the corresponding disease of Junkerism was rampant. A section of the press in each country was persistently doing its best to foster feelings of suspicion and animosity toward the other. The German was encouraged to believe that British statesmen were engaged in Machiavellian designs for the isolation of Germany; the British public was encouraged to believe that Germany was on the point of wiping the British fleet off the seas and invading England with irresistible armies; and in each country there was a very common belief that war soon or later was inevitable." [55]

Lord Haldane, who was Secretary of State for War, has told us that between the beginning of 1906 and:

"the middle of 1913 the indications were that it was far from unlikely that war might in the result be averted. That was the view of some, both here and on the Continent, who were most competent to judge, men who had real opportunities for close observation from day to day. It is a view which is not in material conflict with anything we have since learned." [56]

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[52] A short account may be seen in cap. II.

[53] Innumerable passages in the Foreign Office documents of all the Powers attest the existence of general and persistent apprehension of war. The following pages of the latest of the publications — *Un Livre Noir*, vol. II — may be referred to: 20, 21, 24, 29, 51, 65–66, 74, 137, 356–7, 547, 548, 552 (dates prior to the Balkan wars of 1912–13); 170, 197, 363–4, 391, 394 (dates subsequent to the treaty of Bucarest). These timidities produced constantly recurring unfounded suspicions of treachery, instances of which may be seen in the same volume at pp. 99, 178, 359, 501, 520, 522, 566.

[54] *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, pp. 211–12.

[55] IV, p. 550.

[56] *Before the War*, p. 11.

And Lord Bryce has recently said:

"It was nervousness and tremulousness which led the greater European States to increase from year to year their naval and military armaments till, in 1914, there were some who seemed to wish for war in the hope that the decision it was to bring would put an end to costly preparations for it. The price has been paid and the result desired has not been attained." [57]

Mr. G. B. Gooch, the English historian, relates his impressions after reading the Russian Foreign Office Documents (1907–14) published by Siebert and Schreiner [58] as follows:

"We live in an atmosphere of suspicions and flirtations, pressure and counter-pressure, incidents and explanations, and the thought of war is never far away. Every statesman in Europe, it is clear, regarded a conflagration as highly probable, if not as inevitable, and the main task of diplomacy was manœuvring for position in the expected conflict." [59]

To these excerpts, many of similar import might easily be added. For the present, it is sufficient to observe that no statesman could have been content to remain tranquil and inactive under the pressure of such circumstances — such a series of closely connected war-provoking occurrences.

COMPARATIVE PREPARATION

That Germany was not more diligent in her war-preparation than were the other Powers is not difficult of proof.

Army Expenditure. Omitting, for the present, the United Kingdom and Italy, the army budgets of the other four opposed states, during the decade which preceded the war,[60] were as follows:[61]

France		£347,348,259
Russia		495,144,622
		£842,492,881
Germany	£448,025,543	
Austria-Hungary	234,668,407	£682,693,950
Excess by France and Russia for 10 years		£159,798,931
Average excess per year		£15,979,893

[57] Address at Williams College: *N. Y. Times*, 10 Aug. 1921.

[58] *Entente Diplomacy and the World.*

[59] *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1921, p. 62.

[60] The figures for the previous year are interesting. They may be seen in F. W. Hirst: *The Political Economy of War*, cap. IV.

[61] The figures do not include capital expenditures of France and Germany in 1913, as referred to upon later pages.

This disproportion had been increasing as the years advanced. For the last five years of the decade it was as follows:

France		£196,817,797
Russia		279,659,470
		£476,477,267
Germany	£252,378,319	
Austria-Hungary	128,705,624	£381,083,943
Excess by France and Russia for 5 years		£95,393,324
Average excess per year		£19,078,665

The excess of the last of the years was still greater:

France and Russia	£114,270,338
Germany and Austria-Hungary	92,865,354
Excess by France and Russia	£21,404,984 [62]

These figures form some answer to the assertion that Germany set the pace. For the excess-expenditure of France and Russia over Germany and Austria was in ever-increasing ratio. During the ten years prior to the war, it averaged, in round figures, sixteen million pounds per annum. During the five years prior to the war, nineteen millions. And in the last of the years, twenty-one and a half millions. If to these figures are added the expenditure of the United Kingdom on the side of France and Russia, and that of Italy on the side of the Central Powers, the excess would be largely increased. And the Italian expenditure might very well be omitted, for in that extremely useful book, Pribram: *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, 1879–1914*, it is said:

"The crucial test of the Triple Alliance began with the moment in which the first serious differences between Germany and England made their appearance. As far back as 1896, Italy, as the present investigation shows, had notified the Central Powers that she could not participate in a war in which England and France should figure as the joint adversaries of the states included in the Triple Alliance. The fact

[62] The figures are taken from the budgets of the respective Powers as they appear in the *Almanach de Gotha* carried into the *International Peace Year Book*, 1918, a sum of £8,000,000 being added to the Austro-Hungarian figures in respect of the separate expenditures of Austria and Hungary. The figures agree with those quoted by Mr. E. D. Morel in *Truth and the War*, pp. 92–4; and by Frederick Bausman: *Let France Explain*, p. 165.

that Germany, and likewise Austria-Hungary under the influence of Germany, refused to take cognizance of this declaration, which was incompatible with the contents of the treaty, did not alter the fact that Italy from that time on moved away from her allies and entered upon a course which gradually led her into the camp of their enemies." [63] Moreover, as we now know, Italy, on 1 November 1902, entered into a secret war-agreement with France by which it was provided that if either of the Powers "should be the object of a direct or indirect aggression," the other Power would observe strict neutrality. The subject is more fully discussed in a previous chapter.[64]

Soldiery. Colonel Seely, in the British House of Commons on 4 June 1913, when replying to a request for information as to the "additions" made "during the last two years to the peace strength" of various Powers, said (in part):

"On the assumption that the proposed increases are all approved, the information is approximately as follows:

Russia	
Additions made	75,000
Present peace establishment	1,284,000
(Future not yet ascertained)	
Austria-Hungary	
Additions made	58,505
Present peace establishment	473,643
(Future not yet ascertained)	
France	
Additions proposed	183,715
Future peace establishment	741,572
Germany	
Additions made	38,372
Additions proposed	136,000
Future peace establishment	821,964"
Added together, the peace strength of Russia and France therefore was	2,025,572
And the peace strength of Germany and Austria-Hungary was	1,295,607
The excess of Russia and France was	729,945

[63] I, pp. 10–11. And see *ante*, cap. VII.

[64] *Ante*, pp. 231–2.

Count Montgelas [65] gave the peace strengths in 1914 as follows:

		Winter	*Summer*
Russia		1,845,000	1,445,000
France		794,000	794,000
		2,639,000	2,239,000
Germany	761,000		
Austria-Hungary	478,000	1,239,000	1,239,000
Excess of Russia and France		1,400,000	1,000,000

That the Russian strength is not here exaggerated is shown by an article in the St. Petersburg *Birshewija Viedomosti* of 13 June 1914 — an article inspired by General Sukhomlinoff, the Russian Minister for War:

"The reforms of the Russian Military Department, with a view to the formation of strong Russian armies, surpass everything that has been known. The contingent of recruits for this year, according to the last ukase, has been raised from 450,000 to 580,000 men, and the term of service has been prolonged by six months. Thanks to this measure, there are each winter in Russia four contingents of recruits under arms, that is to say, an army of 2,300,000 men. Great and powerful Russia alone can indulge herself in this luxury. Germany has about 880,000, Austria about 500,000, and Italy about 400,000 men. It is natural, therefore, that Russia expects of France 770,000 men, which is possible only with the introduction of the three years' service." [66]

Referring to war-strength, Mr. Winston Churchill (when First Lord of the Admiralty), in a memorandum of 13 August 1911, estimated as follows:

"The decisive military operations will be those between France and Germany. The German army is at least equal in quality to the French, and mobilizes 2,000,000 against 1,700,000." [67]

In his recent book, *The World Crisis*, Mr. Churchill has said:

"Although, according to the best information, the French pre-war Army when fully mobilized was only three-fourths as strong as the German pre-war Army, the French mobilization from the ninth to the thirteenth day yielded a superior strength on the fighting front." [68]

The French General Buat has said:

"One can say, then, that without taking any account of the Belgian

[65] Published in *Foreign Affairs*, July 1921, p. 6. The Count was one of the persons appointed by the German Government (after the exit of the Kaiser) to publish the documents compiled by Karl Kautsky (author of *The Guilt of William Hohenzollern*) for the German Foreign Office.

[66] *Ante*, p. 72. [67] *The World Crisis*, I, p. 58. [68] Vol. I, p. 57.

Army or the four British divisions, France alone was at the beginning at least equal if not superior to her formidable adversary in the number of the principal units." [69]

In the *Remarques de la Délégation Allemande au Sujet de la Commission des Gouvernements Alliés et Associés sur les Responsibilités des Auteurs de la Guerre*, presented at the peace conference, was the following:

"Figures which cannot be doubted prove that, apart from the Landsturm and formations of like quality, Germany and Austria-Hungary were able to put in line somewhat less than 6,000,000 of combatants out of 116,000,000 inhabitants; Russia and France, on the other hand, easily 9,000,000 out of a population of 210,000,000 inhabitants. There was indeed crushing superiority, but it was not on the side of Germany." [70]

Those persons who still believe that Germany was looking forward to world-domination through perfect confidence in her military superiority ought to read Ludendorff: *Problems of the General Staff*; von Eggling: *The Russian Mobilization and the Outbreak of the War*; von Kuhlmann: *The German General Staff in Preparation and Conduct of the War*. If it be objected that these books were issued after the war, von Moltke's *Memorandum* on the military situation in December 1912 antedates hostilities. It may be seen in Ludendorff's book.[71]

Naval Expenditure. The naval expenditure of France and Russia, during the decade prior to the war, was larger than that of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The figures are as follows:

France		£161,721,387
Russia		144,246,513
		305,967,900
Germany	£185,205,164	
Austria-Hungary	50,692,814	235,897,978
Excess of France and Russia for 10 years		70,069,922 [72]
During the same period the British naval expenditure was		£351,916,576 [73]

[69] Bausman, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[70] P. 2.

[71] I, p. 57. The principal portions of it are quoted in Bausman, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–5.

[72] The above figures are from *British Parliamentary Paper* No. 274. They agree with those referred to by Mr. Morel in *Truth and the War*, p. 157.

[73] After making deduction of £40,000,000 "under Pensions, Coastguard, Reserves, and Steamship subsidies, for which no corresponding provision exists in the votes of Foreign Powers, except France and Italy" (House of Commons return, August 1914). Quoted from Morel, *op. cit.*, p. 160, note.

Russian Expenditure. The increase in Russian military and naval expenditure, especially during the ten years immediately preceding the war, was (in the language of a German but an anti-German writer) "truly startling." He represented the figures for 1904–13 as follows:

	Army	*Navy*
1904	£40,200,000	£12,200,000
1907	42,800,000	9,500,000
1910	52,500,000	9,800,000
1913	62,700,000	24,900,000 [74]

Continental Expenditure in 1913. Truly startling is this, also, that (as Mr. Asquith has said):

"It is estimated that in the single year 1913 the Continental states added £50,000,000 to their military expenditure." [75]

Everybody was making peace certain by preparing for war — so each of them said, and cursed the others for doing the like.

BRITISH PREPARATION

To the British public, nothing appears to be more incontrovertible than that their government was unprepared for the war of 1914, and that the lack of preparation was due to an indisposition on the part of the government to face the well-known facts relating to German preparation and motive. Did not the war itself demonstrate the inadequacy of the provision made for it? Did not Lord Roberts proclaim unceasingly what was about to happen, and urge the government to greater activity? It is a strong *prima facie* case, but very easily displaced.

When Mr. (now Viscount) Haldane went to the War-office in 1905, he found that little had been done since the days of the Boer war (in 1902) to remedy the defects in army organization which in that year had produced such disastrous results. As he has told us, when he and his colleagues in the new government entered upon their duties:

"not only was there no divisional organization, but hardly a brigade could have been sent to the Continent without being recast. For there used to be a peace organization that was different from the organization that was required for war, and to convert the former into the latter meant a delay that would have been deadly. Swift mobilization, like that of the Germans even in 1870, was in these older days impracticable." [76]

Haldane and Roberts. Haldane had not been in office more than a week before he became aware that war, in connection with the first

[74] Article by Mr. J. Ellis Barker in *Fortnightly Review*, April 1914, p. 619.

[75] *The Genesis of the War*, cap. XVIII. Mr. Winston Churchill in his recent book *The World Crisis* agrees with this estimate: I, p. 184.

[76] *Before the War*, p. 157.

Morocco incident, might break out at any moment, and that Sir Edward Grey, the new Foreign Minister, deemed it necessary to enter into war-relations, by means of military "conversations," with both France and Belgium. From that time until the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, the skies were, as we have seen,[77] only at intervals fairly clear. Apprehension of war was the normal condition.

Haldane and Roberts were both apprehensive, but they differed fundamentally as to the rôle which the United Kingdom would play if war ensued, and, therefore, as to what ought, meanwhile, to be done. Haldane was aware that in case of war between France and Germany, the United Kingdom had determined to support France, not only by retaining command of the sea, but by sending a military contingent to the continent. Roberts knew nothing of that. Fearing an invasion of the British Isles, he urged preparation for home defense — universal military service, everybody ready to repel a German attack.[78] Haldane, on the other hand, wanted an Expeditionary Force, as he called it — a relatively small but highly trained army which could be placed on the fighting line in Flanders within a fortnight.[79] The two men were proposing different schemes for different purposes. Haldane was handicapped by inability to divulge the real reason for his proposal. Roberts, unrestrained, pictured the power of Germany and received popular acclaim.[80]

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[77] *Ante*, pp. 505–8.

[78] After commencement of the war, Lord Milner, Chairman of the National Service League, issued a statement upon which *The Times* commented as follows (20 August 1915): "In changed circumstances, the League has changed its policy. It now advocates not merely National Service for home defence, but universal and compulsory military service for the duration of the war."

[79] Not the only mistake of the six "Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History," in their booklet "Why We are at War," is the assertion that the British "Expeditionary Force . . . had been planned for the defence of India and the Colonies" (p. 48).

[80] Lord Roberts' speeches, and the supporting articles in the newspapers and magazines, undoubtedly had an inflammatory effect in both the United Kingdom and Germany. But in reply to charges of that import, Lord Roberts replied: "My Lords and gentlemen, in mentioning Germany in this connection, I want to make it perfectly clear that I do so in no spirit of hostility, with no wish to stir up any feeling of resentment or enmity against a great people bent upon working out their own salvation. I have not the slightest sympathy with the Press controversies carried on in both countries, which have done so much to embitter the feeling between what are really two branches of the same race. . . . At the same time, there is Germany, a great homogeneous State, with a people of 66,000,000, which is consciously aiming at becoming a World-Power with 'a place in the sun,' where its vigorous progeny may develop a German life, actuated by German thoughts and ideals" (*Message to the Nation*, p. 35). Lord Roberts saw "danger of collision with Germany," and his purpose in these speeches was to arouse his countrymen to an appreciation of the danger. The newspaper men might have offered similar plea. And so far as they were acting honestly, it is difficult to condemn them. The inflammatory effect is not, unfortunately, counteracted by honesty of motive.

After the inception of hostilities, members of the government could speak more freely, and Lord Haldane, in a letter to *The Times* (16 December 1918), in reply to some attacks, explained at length the reasons for the adoption of the policy which he had pursued. Lord Roberts' proposal of universal service ("directed merely to home defence") was, he said, under existing circumstances, impracticable; the "conversations" with the French General Staff had made the necessities of the anticipated situation clear; conscription was impossible; there was no time for experimentation; a highly trained force might be needed at any time, and it must be organized as rapidly as possible. Haldane added:

"At all events, it was, on purely military grounds, out of the question to run the risks attending such an attempt between 1906 and 1914. The General Staff had advised to this effect, reluctantly, I think, but very firmly. They thought of a pounce on us by Germany when we were changing horses while crossing the stream."

It was in 1906, he said that (Italics now added):

"the plans were first made for organizing the Expeditionary Force. It was, indeed, hoped earnestly that the existing peace would remain unbroken. But it was held as of high importance to insure against a conceivable conflagration. The fleet was enlarged and the Navy Estimates were raised from 36 millions, at which figure they then stood, to 51, the figure to which they were brought by Mr. McKenna and Mr. Churchill. If there were to be a war with Germany in which we stood alone, our security against invasion was decided by the Committee of Imperial Defence to be ample. This conclusion was come to after much consideration, and after investigating specific points brought before it in much detail by Lord Roberts and his advisers personally. But the paradox remained that if France also were attacked along with us, instead of France being left alone, we might be in a less favourable situation. For if a successful invasion of that country should give Germany the Channel ports of France as naval bases, she might, by the use of submarines and long-range guns, seriously imperil the control of the Channel by our Navy, and, as a consequence, our position as an island. Against this danger there was only one way of providing. If we had a large Navy, France had a large Army. That Army was not quite sufficient to guard against attack along the eastern frontier of France by the still larger Army of Germany. *But careful calculation made by the French General Staff and our own showed that the addition of a comparatively small, but very highly trained and organized, Expeditionary Army from Great Britain* to co-operate by defending the northern portion of the French frontier in conjunction with the French Armies *would be sufficient*, having regard to the co-operation, which was certain, of the Armies of Russia in engaging the German Armies in the East. To the margin which Great Britain might possibly be thus asked to provide, *an addition of about 60 per cent. was made* for greater security in the

plan as carried out later. We were thus to put in as our contribution, in the event of a war which we intended to avert by every step in our power, the greatest navy to command the seas that the world had ever seen, and six divisions in addition to a cavalry force, being the Army required to make up the requisite margin of military strength. The Expeditionary Force fashioned for this purpose was of a kind different from anything which this country had ever possessed before, as it was organized for extremely rapid mobilization and concentration, to be at least as swift as that of the army of Germany; and, as a means to this end, its formations in time of peace were revolutionized by being given a divisional organization, and by being made in time of peace exactly what they would have to be in time of war. Its commanders were also designated at once, so that they might in peace time train the units they would command should war unhappily break out. Besides this, all the accessories of these divisions were brought up to scientifically calculated war strength."

At one of the election meetings in September 1918, Mr. Asquith was asked:

"Why did you refuse support for Lord Roberts' scheme?"

The reply was:

"Lord Roberts' scheme would have had no effect whatever in increasing our efficiency for war. It was intended for invasion, and we were never in danger of that." [81]

Further particulars as to the military "conversations," and references to the various collaborating preparations of the Entente Allies, may be seen upon subsequent pages of the present chapter.

The War Book. For several years before the war, a

"Sub-Committee for the Co-ordination of Departmental Action at the Outbreak of War,"

composed of the principal permanent officials of the various British Departments of State, had been at work, and had produced "The War Book":

"definitely assigning to each department, and not merely the War Office and the Admiralty, but the Home Office, the Board of Trade, with its local association with the railways and shipping, the Local Government Board and other Departments of the State, its responsibility for action under every head of policy." [82]

The Fleet. That the British fleet was ready for its work, is well known. Lord Sydenham has said:

"On August 4th, the navy was in a position of relative strength never realized at the beginning of any of the great wars of the past, and stood ready for immediate action as it did not even after the rupture of 1803 of the brief peace of Amiens. And the reason was that the intelligence

[81] *The Daily Telegraph* report.

[82] Archibald Hurd in *The Fortnightly Rev.*, Dec. 1918, p. 858.

of our people at home and overseas had been awakened to a sense of their primary imperial need, by an educative process in which the Navy League played a notable part. Thus we possessed a marked initial advantage to which another was added. A great mobilization of the Fleet had taken place in July, and the crews had not been dispersed. . . . Never in all history had there been a manifestation of sea-power on so gigantic a scale." [83]

A good account of the British naval preparation between 1904 and 1914 may be seen in an article by Archibald Hurd in *The Fortnightly Review* of August 1919, pp. 201–14. Mr. Winston S. Churchill, who became First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911, tells us in his recent book that:

" Although my education had been mainly military, I had followed closely every detail of the naval controversies of the previous five years in the Cabinet, in Parliament, and latterly in the Committee of Imperial Defence; and I had certain main ideas of what I was going to do and what, indeed, I was sent to the Admiralty to do. I intended to prepare for an attack by Germany as if it might come next day. I intended to raise the Fleet to the highest possible strength and secure that all that strength was immediately ready." [84]

Mr. Churchill may fairly claim that, in very large measure, he accomplished his task.

The Result. The successful result of the British preparations became dramatically apparent when put to the war-test. Twelve days after the declaration of war, it was announced that the entire Expeditionary Force of:

" 160,000 men had been safely landed in France, without a single casualty. Five days later its concentration had been completed, and it had occupied the position assigned to it on the line from Condé to Mons."

" Events showed that Viscount French, the Commander-in-Chief of this Army, had spoken with full knowledge and accuracy when he had declared that Lord Haldane, during his term of office, had ' inaugurated and made a military fighting machine and a system of national defence such as this country never had before.' If ever an army took the field ' complete to the last button,' with splendid arrangements for the commissariat, the medical services, and supplies generally, that army was the Expeditionary Force thrown across the Channel like a thunderbolt, to the complete derangement of Germany's plans." [85]

What that means may be understood by recalling the fact that, as the Hon. John Fortescue, the historian of the British Army has reminded us, prior to 1914, the United Kingdom:

" never in the whole course of her existence put 50,000 of her own

[83] *The Navy*, April 1915, pp. 101–2.
[84] *The World Crisis*, I, pp. 75–6.
[85] *Fortnightly Rev.*, April 1916, pp. 654, 655.

children in the line of any battlefield, and very rarely as many even as 30,000." [86]

Replying to the charge that the British government was unprepared for war, Mr. Asquith made proper distinction:

"We are told, sometimes by way of reproach and sometimes by way of commendation, that we were unprepared for the war. Unprepared to take the offensive in a war of aggression we certainly were. Unprepared we were also to take a leading part in a European land campaign in competition with the gigantic armies of the Continental Powers. But we were not unprepared either for our defence, or for rendering help to any ally." [87]

The best military talent of the United Kingdom and of France had agreed as to the scope of the preparations necessary for an encounter with Germany; a certain part of the work had been assigned to the United Kingdom; and that work was thoroughly well done. Mr. Archibald Hurd, the most prolific of the war-publicists, might well ask:

"In the knowledge of these measures, naval, military, and administrative, and in the light of the victory which we have achieved, can it be declared that we were unprepared for war and have muddled through?"

To the possible answer that the British force sustained an early reverse, Mr. Hurd replied:

"All that may be admitted. Does it not point, however, rather to an under-appreciation of the enemy's military power by the military authorities of England and France than to a want of adequate preparation by this country? At least this is certain, that the help which we gave to France was larger and of greater efficiency than our Ally had expected to receive. The Expeditionary Force was mobilized at once — five times as great a force as we had ever before mobilized in a similar period — and it was transported across the Channel with a swiftness and a competency unparalleled in amphibious warfare." [88]

Mr. Hurd might have added that if temporary check in the fighting proves lack of preparation, much more convincing must be permanent defeat; and, upon that line of reasoning, it was Germany which was unprepared; Paris did not fall in six weeks, nor in four years. British and French officers, on the other hand, did not foresee, and could not have foreseen, the political collapse of Russia. But for that misfortune, the arrangements were amply adequate. If any reader should still harbor doubt as to the amplitude and effectiveness of British preparation for war, a perusal of Mr. Hurd's article, and of chapters XIV–XVII of Mr. Asquith's *The Genesis of the War*, will dissipate it.

[86] Quoted by Archibald Hurd: *Fortnightly Rev.*, Dec. 1918, p. 853.
[87] *The Times* (London), 28 Sep. 1918.
[88] *The Fortnightly Rev.*, Dec. 1918, pp. 858–9.

FRENCH PREPARATION

Reference has already been made to the French expenditure upon military preparation during the ten years prior to the war,[89] and to the "conversations" (1906–14) between the General Staffs of France and the United Kingdom.[90] A few other points must be noted.

Poincaré. Poincaré is a man of courageous character. Isvolsky, the very capable Russian Ambassador at Paris, described him as "a very powerful personality";[91] "an extraordinarily strong character";[92] "a passionate character," who "goes in a straight line";[93] a man of "brutally direct temperament,"[94] who, "while often displaying useless rudeness, and irrationally breaking windows, has never given me reason to doubt his veracity";[95] a man whose "sensitive *amour propre*" must be "taken into account";[96] "an ardent and convinced partisan of a close union between France and Russia";[97] a man who would never fail Russia in case of war with Germany.[98] In January 1912, Poincaré succeeded Caillaux as Prime Minister and de Selves as Foreign Minister, neither of whom had any liking for war-adventures. In view of the situation in the Balkans, he (Poincaré) visited St. Petersburg (July 1912), where he signed a naval convention with Russia.[99] Afterwards he moved the place for concentration of French warships in the Mediterranean to Bizerta; ordered the third squadron from Brest to Toulon; gave Russia renewed assurance that if she were attacked by Germany, France would go to her aid; and sent Delcassé (strongly antipathetic to Germany) as Ambassador to St. Petersburg.[100] Between the date of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand (28 June 1914) and of the delivery to Serbia of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum (23 July), Poincaré, now President of the French Republic (accompanied by Viviani, the Foreign Minister), was again in St. Petersburg. He was not the sort of man who would neglect preparations for war.

Three Years' Service. Probably as the result of an understanding arrived at during his first visit to St. Petersburg, Poincaré proceeded in 1912, to increase the military strength of his country. In parliament,

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[89] *Ante*, pp. 508–12.
[90] *Ante*, pp. 115–6.
[91] *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 203.
[92] *Ibid.*, II, p. 248.
[93] *Ibid.*, I, p. 281.
[94] *Ibid.*, p. 251.
[95] *Ibid.*, p. 266.
[96] *Ibid.*, p. 216.
[97] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 360, 393.
[98] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 326, 349; II, pp. 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 125, 209, 248, 345, 360, 396–7, 570.
[99] *Ante*, cap. IV, pp. 98–9.
[100] These points are dealt with on subsequent pages of this chapter, pp. 548–53.

a bill was introduced for the purpose of adding to the *cadres* of the infantry in such a way as to provide the reserves with officers and non-commissioned officers from the regular army, in the event of mobilization.[101] On 4 December 1912, Poincaré (as recorded in the British *Annual Register*):

"had an interview with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber, presided over by M. L. Barthou; and the explanations he then gave had been cordially welcomed. He had declared himself determined to secure respect for the economic and political interests of France, not only in the Balkan Peninsula but in the remainder of the Turkish Empire, in Syria, for example."[102]

In January of the next year, Poincaré became president of France, and was succeeded in the premiership by M. Briand, who announced (24 January), as part of his policy:

"the maintenance of the alliances of France and of her friendships, strengthening these by the sacrifices necessitated by the increase of the army and navy."[103]

On 4 March, the Supreme Council met:

"M. Poincaré presided, and M. Briand, the War Minister (M. Etienne), and the chief commanders of the army were present. The Council decided that, in the interest of the national defence, it was absolutely necessary to increase the effectives, and, after having examined the various methods of meeting the need — voluntary enlistment, utilization of civilian workmen, so as to place in the combatant ranks all the employees in military establishments, service of twenty-seven or of thirty months — it declared unanimously in favor of a three years' term, strictly and rigorously equal for all with no exemptions. The question could not be put more clearly or more impressively. The whole nation took sides passionately for or against the change."[104]

Late in March, Briand resigned and was succeeded by M. Barthou, who, besides pressing a bill providing for three-year service to its passage in July, retained with the colors (by simple decree) recruits who were approaching the end of their period of service.[105] The amount estimated by the Budget Commission as necessary for the inauguration of the new system (that is, for additional barracks, armament, equipment, horses, &c.) was the sum of $88,000,000 — an amount which was spread over the budgets of 1913 and 1914.[106]

Leaving his parliament during the fierce struggles over the three years' service bill, Poincaré visited the fleet at Toulon, and then went to

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[101] *Ann. Reg.*, 1912, p. [305.
[102] *Ibid.*, p. [307.
[103] *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, p. [279.
[104] *Ibid.*, p. [281. *Cf. Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 33–6, 42–5.
[105] *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, p. [285.
[106] *Ibid.*, p. [286.

London (24–27 June), where he met with a "magnificent reception" — as he himself described it.[107] In October, a visit to Spain resulted in the publication of a Note which was regarded (according to the British *Annual Register*):

"as proving that Spain proposed to place herself in international relations on the side of the Triple Entente." [108]

No definite arrangement was made.

Naval Preparation. The quarrel with Germany with reference to Morocco in 1905 was probably the principal cause of the commencement in France of the construction of a navy which, in time, it was hoped, could compete with that of the probable enemy. Between 1899 and 1906, France had done little in the way of construction.

"The estimates of 1906 provided for the construction of six battleships, which were commenced, four in 1907, and two in 1908. Thus M. Thomson completely reversed the economic policy of M. Pelletan, the Radical, and prepared the way for a general naval revival in France. . . . The same week that Mr. McKenna announced that the four contingent battleships would be laid down, Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère became Minister of Marine in France, and began to frame his new proposals. The new programme for 1910 was to be increased by 38,000,000 francs, and there were to be Supplementary Estimates for three new battleships, and in the same autumn the dockyards, private shipyards and armament firms began their preparations. In February, the Cabinet approved the draft Bill for twenty-eight battleships and armored cruisers to compose the fighting fleet, and ten cruisers for distant service, to be ready by 1922." [109]

Chauvinism. One of the reasons assigned by the German Chancellor, in his speech of 7 April 1913, for his proposed addition to the strength of the German army was the existence of "a chauvinistic literature" in France. "By illusion," he said, "France had already won a future war with Germany." [110] That the assertion was not without foundation is satisfactorily established by the reports of Russian and Belgian Ambassadors — reports which are of special value because, Russia being the open ally of France and Belgium having secret military arrangements with France, their representatives had special opportunities for gauging the trend of French opinion. On 14 March 1912, Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador, reported as follows:

"In the course of these last days, I have, on more than one occasion, had to note in the despatches and letters which I addressed to your Excellency the expression of national sentiment, and, in particular, the strong interest manifested in the military affairs of the country, which

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[107] *Ibid.*, p. [151.
[108] *Ibid.*, p. [291.
[109] Newbold: *How Europe Armed for War*, p. 79.
[110] A summary of the speech may be seen in *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, pp. [308–10.

may be observed in the lower strata of the French people under the influence of the recent external crisis.[111] This movement is clearly confirmed, among other ways, by the brilliant success secured by the national subscription recently announced, on the initiative of the newspaper *Le Matin*, for the acquisition of aeroplanes for the necessities of the French army, which has produced in less than two weeks more than a million and a half of francs. The purpose of the subscription is to conserve to France, at all cost, its priority over Germany relating to military aviation, and that independently of the material resources which could be supplied toward this end by the treasury. There is without doubt reason to attribute to the new Minister for War, M. Millerand, a large share in the arousing of public interest touching the army." [112]

Six weeks prior to the date of the Chancellor's speech, the Russian Ambassador at London reported (25 February 1913) as follows:

"The situation, as I regard it, seems to be that all the Powers are sincerely working to maintain peace. But of all of them, it is France who would accept war the most philosophically.[113] As has been said, 'France stands erect once more.' Rightly or wrongly, she has complete confidence in her army; the old ferment of animosity has again shown itself, and France could very well consider that the circumstances to-day are more favorable than they will ever be later." [114]

Almost simultaneously (27 February), the Russian Ambassador at Paris reported as follows:

"Speaking of the relations between France and Germany, M. Poincaré has, among other things, told me that, considering the present exaltation of French national sentiment, neither he nor his ministers would

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[111] The Morocco affair of 1911.

[112] *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 212.

[113] The diplomatic correspondence makes indisputable that Poincaré was "sincerely working to maintain peace." See the Fr. Yell. Bk.: *Balkan Affairs*, I and II. The Ambassador was probably right in saying that France "would accept war the most philosophically." See *ante*, pp. 109–10. As an example of the literature of the period, an article which appeared in the *Nouvelle Revue*, one of the most prominent of the Paris publications, may be cited: "We intend to have war. After forty years of a heavily armed peace, we can at last utter this opinion without the serious readers of a French review shaking in their shoes. . . . France is ready to strike out and to conquer as she was not ready forty years ago, and she will not be in four or five years to come, owing to the annual divergent numbers of the birthrate in each country. . . . We, the attacking party, will have arranged with England that their fleet . . . will have followed . . . the remains of the whole German navy into German waters." Quoted by Mr. Buxton in the British House of Commons, July 1912: Neilson, *How Diplomats Make War*, p. 206.

[114] *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 306. *Cf.*, however, the report to the Czar by Sazonoff after his visit to Paris in Sept. 1912, prior to the outbreak of the Balkan wars (*ibid.*, p. 356); and the report of Kokovtsef (President of the Russian Council) of 19 Nov. 1913, after the termination of the wars (*ibid.*, pp. 393–4). Von Bethmann-Hollweg's estimate of the chauvinistic influence of Poincaré may be seen in his *Reflections on the World War*, pp. 39–43.

tolerate repetition of the Agadir incident, nor consent to such a compromise as had then taken place. He expressed this idea in absolutely clear fashion to the Ambassador of Germany in a straightforward conversation, and received from Baron Schoen this reply, that Germany understands perfectly." [115]

The reports of Baron Guillaume (the Belgian representative at Paris) are very illuminating. On 3 March 1913, he reported:

"The German Ambassador said to me on Saturday: 'The political situation is much improved in the last forty-eight hours; the tension is generally relaxed; one may hope for a return to peace in the near future. But what does not improve is the state of public opinion in France and Germany with regard to the relations between the two countries. We are persuaded in Germany that a spirit of chauvinism being revived, we have to fear an attack by the Republic. In France, they express the same fear with regard to us. The consequence of these misunderstandings is to ruin us both. I do not know where we are going on this perilous route. Will not a man appear of sufficient goodwill and prestige to recall every one to reason? All this is the more ridiculous because, during the crisis we are traversing, the two Governments have given proof of the most pacific sentiments, and have continually relied upon one another to prevent conflicts.'"

"Baron Schoen," Guillaume added, "is perfectly right. I am not in a position to examine German opinion, but I note every day how public opinion in France becomes more suspicious and chauvinistic. One meets people who assure one that a war with Germany in the near future is certain and inevitable. People regret it, but make up their minds to it. . . . They demand, almost by acclamation, an immediate vote for every means of increasing the defensive power of France. The most reasonable men assert that it is necessary to arm to the teeth to frighten the enemy and prevent war." [116]

On 16 April, Guillaume reported that M. Pichon (French Foreign Minister) had said to him:

"Among us, too, there is a spirit of chauvinism which is increasing, which I deplore, and against which we ought to react. Half the theatres in Paris now play chauvinistic and nationalistic pieces." [117]

On 17 April Guillaume reported the "increasingly bellicose and imprudent tone prevalent in Paris." [118] On 12 June, he said:

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[115] *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 32.

[116] Dickinson: *The European Anarchy*, pp. 28–9. The reports of the Belgian Ambassadors at Paris, London, and Berlin, from which the above and later quotations have been taken, were published by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, and were reprinted under the title "*Belgische Aktenstücke*" (Ernst Siegfried Mittler & Sons, Berlin). The translations are those of Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson and Mr. E. D. Morel.

[117] Dickinson, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[118] Morel: "*Pre-War Diplomacy*," p. 30.

"It is, therefore, practically certain that French legislation will adopt a measure that the country is unlikely to be able to bear for long. The obligations of the new law will be so heavy for the population, the expenses it will involve will be so exorbitant that the country will soon protest, and France will be confronted with this dilemma: either an abdication which she could not bear, or speedy war. The responsibility of those who have dragged the nation into this situation will be heavy. . . . The propaganda in favor of the *Three Years' Law*, which was bound to lead to a revival of Chauvinism, has been admirably prepared and staged. It paved the way for M. Poincaré's election to the Presidency. It is being pursued to-day without caring for the dangers to which it gives rise. Uneasiness is general in the country." [119]

On 16 January 1914, Guillaume reported:

"I have already had the honor of informing you that it is Messrs. Poincaré, Delcassé, Millerand and their friends who have invented and pursued the nationalist, boastful and jingoistic policy, whose revival we have witnessed. It is a danger for Europe — and for Belgium. I see in it the greatest peril which threatens the peace of Europe to-day. Not that I am entitled to suppose that the Government of the Republic is disposed to trouble the peace of Europe deliberately — I think rather the contrary — but because the attitude which the Barthou party has taken up is, in my judgment, the determining cause of the increase of military tendencies in Germany. The bellicose follies of the Turks and the Three Years' Law appear to me to constitute the only dangers to be feared from the point of view of European peace. I feel able to indicate the perils which the present military legislation of France has created. France, weakened by the decrease in her nativity, cannot long support the three years' system of military service. The effect is too considerable, financially, and as regards personal burdens. France cannot sustain such an effort, and what will she do to escape from the position in which she will have placed herself?" [120]

On 8 May 1914 (within three months of the outbreak of war) Guillaume reported:

"It is incontestable that during the past few months the French nation has become more Chauvinistic and more confident in itself. The same men, instructed and competent, who, two years ago, showed lively anxiety at the mere mention of possible difficulties between France and Germany, have changed their tone. They now say they are certain of victory. They dwell largely on the progress, which is truly very real, accomplished in the army of the Republic, and contend that they could at least hold the German army in check sufficiently long to enable Russia to mobilize, to concentrate her troops, and to fling

[119] Quoted by Morel: *Truth and the War*, pp. 153–4.

[120] Morel: *Truth and the War*, p. 154; Dickinson: *The European Anarchy*, pp. 29–30.

herself upon her Western neighbor. One of the most dangerous elements in the situation is the re-enactment in France of the Three Years' Law. It was imposed light-heartedly by the militarist party, and the country cannot sustain it. Two years from now it will either have to be abrogated or war must ensue." [121]

And on 9 June 1914 (within two months of the war), he reported:

"The Press campaign of the last few days in favor of the *Three Years' Law* has been one of extreme violence. Every possible means has been adopted to influence public opinion, and it has even been sought to involve the personality of General Joffre. We have witnessed, too, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg taking, contrary to all usage, a somewhat dangerous initiative for the future of France. Is it true that the St. Petersburg Cabinet imposed the adoption of the *Three Years' Law* upon this country and is pressing to-day with all its weight to secure the maintenance of that law? I have not succeeded in obtaining light upon this delicate point, but it would be the graver, seeing that those who direct the destinies of the Empire of the Tsars cannot be ignorant of the fact that the effort which is thus demanded of the French nation is excessive and cannot long be sustained. Is the attitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg based, then, upon the conviction that events are so near that the tool it proposes to place in the hands of its ally can be used?" [122]

These reports, coming from the representatives of countries friendly to France, make clear, as Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson has said:

"that France, supported by the other members of the Triple Entente, could appear, and did appear, as much a menace to Germany as Germany appeared a menace to France; that in France, as in other countries, there was jingoism as well as pacifism; and that the inability of French public opinion to acquiesce in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine was an active factor in the unrest of Europe." [123]

Indeed, reference (for the purpose in hand) to ambassadorial reports is hardly necessary, for Poincaré, while endeavoring to minimize the importance of the reports of Baron Guillaume, himself says:

"The announcement of the increase in the German army, the apprehension caused by the Balkan crisis, the difficulties that had been raised in connection with the application of the Moroccan treaty, the recollection of the alarms caused by the Tangier, Casablanca, and Agadir incidents — all this naturally gave new life to the patriotic sentiment in France." [124]

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[121] Morel: *Truth and the War*, pp. 154–5.
[122] *Ibid.*, p. 155. And see Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–5.
[123] *Op. cit.*, p. 30.
[124] Poincaré, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

BELGIAN PREPARATION

Upon subsequent pages will be noted the military conversations between the British Military Attaché at Brussels and the Belgian Generals, Ducarne and Jungbluth, at which arrangements for co-operation in case of war with Germany were discussed. At this place we note merely that, early in December 1912, an army bill was introduced into parliament; was approved by the Central Commission of the Belgian Chamber of Deputies on 10 January 1913; and was passed by the Chamber on 30 May by vote of 104 to 62. It passed the Senate on 20 June.

"It entails general service, in place of recruiting only one son per family; the men called up will be no less than 49 per cent. of the annual contingent, the exemptions including seamen, eldest sons of families of six, etc. For the infantry the period of service with the colors is fifteen months, and special provisions relate to the recruiting reserve and reserve *cadres*. It involves the creation of eight new regiments and a new divisional staff.

"The Government estimates the effective forces available in time of peace at 54,641 men for 1913–14, 56,080 for 1914–15, 57,034 for 1915–16, instead of 35,000 as at present. In 1926 the total armed strength will be 340,000 men; 180,000 for the field army and 160,000 for the defence of Antwerp, Liège and Namur. . . .

"These figures are important, for although the treaties of 1839 retain their validity and the guarantee of Belgian neutrality remains unchanged, all the Powers concerned may successively be drawn into a conflict, and none might then be in a position to adopt the course taken by Great Britain in 1870 (A. R., 1870, pp. 106–7). The Belgian Government has therefore laid down and developed its military policy on such lines that it can defend its territory effectively, and no belligerent can use it as a base or as a line of communication.

"The Act necessitates a supplementary annual expense of 20,000,000 to 21,000,000 francs (800,000*l*). To meet this the Government proposed new taxes on trading companies, Stock Exchange transactions, motor-cars and cinematographs. The existing taxes on companies' profits and mines disappear, and are replaced by a tax of 4 per cent. on dividends from shares and debenture interest. Foreign securities are subject to stamp duty of 1 per cent. on the nominal capital. These taxes are expected to produce 1,800,000*l* a year." [125]

RUSSIAN PREPARATION

The military expenditure of Russia during the decade preceding the war has already been referred to.[126] Upon subsequent pages[127] will be noted the conversations in September 1912 between M. Sazonoff

[125] *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, pp. [359–360. [126] *Ante*, pp. 508–13. [127] Pp. 531–2.

and Sir Edward Grey in London,[128] and between Sir Edward Grey and Poincaré (involving Russian arrangements) in April 1914 in Paris.[129] A few additional points will now be dealt with.

1. In Russia, as in France, the contingent of recruits which in the usual course would have been released for service, were (July 1913) retained with the colors.[130] This was because of the Balkan complications.

2. By change in the army law (1913), men who had been born in 1892 were required to report for service in 1913 instead of 1914.[131] The military budget, providing for the increased expenditure, was passed by the Duma, in secret session, in July.[132]

3. In February 1913, M. Delcassé, who as French Foreign Minister had wanted war with Germany in 1905, was sent as French Ambassador to St. Petersburg.

4. Russia's preparation for war was political as well as military. She succeeded in separating — not nominally but actually — Roumania from the Quadruple Alliance.[133] On 3 April 1914, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna reported:

"Now, however, under existing political conditions, Austria is entirely isolated in the Balkans, and every attempt on her part to alter the *status quo* would meet with decided resistance on the part of the League — Roumania, Serbia, and Greece." [134]

5. During the early part of 1914, Russia was endeavoring to link Montenegro with Serbia, and, meanwhile, she (Russia) agreed to send military officers to assist in the development of the Montenegrin army.[135] The negotiations created alarm in Austria-Hungary, and on 5 March 1914, her Ambassador at St. Petersburg said to the Russian Foreign Minister:

"If such a union should take place, Austria would not remain a passive spectator. The interests of the monarchy in the Adriatic do not allow of any displacement of the balance of power. The Adriatic has the same significance to Austria-Hungary as the Black Sea to Russia." [136]

6. The proceedings of the Russian Council of 21 February 1914, and the character of the associated memoirs which Sazonoff and Basili presented to the Czar (referred to in a previous chapter [137]) remove any doubt as to Russian preparation for European war, and the purpose which, in Russian interest, such a war was intended to subserve.

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[128] *Post*, pp. 531–2.
[129] *Post*, pp. 532–6.
[130] Morel, *Pre-War Diplomacy*, p. 27; *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, p. [337.
[131] Morel, *Pre-War Diplomacy*, p. 27.
[132] *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, p. [337.
[133] See cap. IX.
[134] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 443.
[135] *Ibid.*, pp. 440–50.
[136] *Ibid.*, p. 446. And see pp. 447–8.
[137] Cap. II, pp. 55–8.

ANGLO-FRENCH WAR-ARRANGEMENTS

For the expected war with the Central Powers, the *entente* Allies prepared not only by accumulating men and armaments but by consultations and agreements. These must now be sketched. Material for full relation is not yet available.

Morocco Episodes, 1905–6 and 1911. Quarrel between France and Germany over Morocco was brought to climax by the landing of the Kaiser at Tangier in April 1905. Germany required that the dispute should be submitted to an international conference. France at first refused. Mr. Roosevelt, the President of the United States, intervened at the request of the Kaiser, and succeeded in inducing France to change her attitude. A conference was agreed to. It sat from January to April 1906 and arranged terms of settlement. In both of the periods, namely, prior to the agreement for the conference and during its sittings, the United Kingdom warmly supported France; gave her assurances of armed support; and, had the necessity arisen, would have taken arms in her defence. During the second of the Morocco incidents (1911), the British government made perfectly clear that in case of war the United Kingdom would support France as against Germany.[138]

Military Conversations, 1906–14. Not only did Sir Edward Grey give assurances of support to France in connection with the two Morocco incidents, but, almost immediately after assuming office, he authorized the institution of "conversations" between the British and French military Staffs — "conversations" which meant arrangements of the most detailed character for co-operation in case of war with Germany; "conversations" which continued, with little interruption, from January 1906 down to the outbreak of the 1914 war. Sir Edward Grey, in his memorable speech of 3 August 1914, made partial revelation of what had been going on, but it was not until after the war had commenced that the public had any idea of the detailed completeness of the arrangements. At a dinner in London, April 1919, to Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, a letter from Marshal Foch, containing the following, was read:

"Long before the war, General Wilson and I worked together to prepare for the struggle against the German peril, which we both foresaw. It is due to the success of his mobilization arrangements, and his careful and detailed plans for transporting troops, that the British army was able to arrive quickly on the field of battle, as soon as the government had come to a decision." [139]

Captain Peter E. Wright (late Assistant Secretary, Supreme War Council) tells us that:

"Sir Henry had predicted and prepared for this war all his life.

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[138] See *post*, cap. XX.

[139] *N. Y. Times*, 9 April 1919.

He had been over this ground on which it was to be fought time after time on his bicycle, and, for example, had chosen the billets our headquarters were to occupy in one place during the Mons retreat long before the war." [140]

Viscount French, in a contribution to the *Daily Telegraph* (24 May 1919) said:

"The British and French General Staffs had for some years been in close secret consultation with one another on the subject (*i.e.*, the point of concentration for the British forces on their arrival in France). The German menace necessitated some preliminary understanding in the event of a sudden attack. The area of concentration for the British forces had been fixed on the left flank of the French, and the actual detraining stations of the various units were all laid down in terrain lying between Maubeuge and Le Cateau. The headquarters of the Army were fixed at the latter place. It is now within the knowledge of all that the General Staffs of Great Britain and France had for a long time held conferences, and that a complete mutual understanding as to combined action in certain eventualities existed." The Viscount added that:

"it was somewhere about 1908 that the certainty of a war was forced upon my mind."

The British-French conversations resulted in the signing of military and naval conventions,[141] and an understanding that, at the outbreak of war with Germany, (1) France would be protected from the German navy by a predominant British fleet; (2) a British military force, sufficient for the protection of the left flank of the French army, was to be ready for immediate action; and (3) the force necessary for that purpose was estimated at 100,000 men. Speaking in the House of Lords (13 July 1917), Viscount Haldane said:

"The French General Staff advised the Government that if we could put 100,000 men within ten days on the eastern frontier of France we should have made such contribution to the military forces of France as would probably enable her to withstand any attack that could be made upon her while our enormous fleet was operating at sea. At the outbreak of war, we sent 160,000 men to France in 12 days." [142]

In a letter to *The Times*, the Viscount said:

"I could make some comment on other figures offered by Lord Midleton. But it is perhaps sufficient to remind him of what is now hardly doubtful — that the Expeditionary Force was at least by 100 per cent. more powerful than any force which would have been sent abroad in the same time under the old system." [143]

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[140] *At the Supreme War Council*, pp. 37–8.
[141] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 719–22.
[142] *The Times* (London), 14 July 1917.
[143] 16 July 1917.

Arrangements of 1912 — Letters of 22 November. Hardly had the probability of war over the second of the Morocco incidents passed (1911) than preparations by Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, for war against Turkey commenced,[141] with the consequent danger of a European conflagration. Rapid diplomatic interchanges between members of the *entente* Powers ensued, and these were supplemented by important visits and interviews. The French Prime Minister, Poincaré, went to St. Petersburg (August 1912), where he consummated the Franco-Russian naval convention; the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, went to London (September); Prince Liven, the Chief of the Russian Naval Staff, went to Paris; Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador, Paul Cambon, exchanged letters in London; the United Kingdom concentrated her big ships in the North Sea, while the French transferred some of hers from Brest to Toulon, and others from Toulon to Bizerta.

The *Annual Register* of the same year (1912) contained the following:

"Misgivings, however, as to national defence were raised by the announcement (Sept. 10) that practically the whole of the French Navy would henceforth be concentrated in the Mediterranean, a step which, though quite explicable strategically, was explained by the Paris *Temps* as part of an arrangement whereby France, in the event of a great war, could hold the Mediterranean against the fleets of Italy and Austria-Hungary; Russia the Baltic (though her new fleet was as yet unbuilt), while Great Britain took charge of the Channel and the North Sea. The naval alarmists apprehended that the Mediterranean would again be abandoned; and Liberal critics interpreted the step as foreshadowing the conversion of the Triple *Entente* into a naval alliance, and so precluding an improvement in Anglo-German relations. This, it was said, was the doing of the Foreign Office without the knowledge of Parliament."[145]

Arrangements of 1914 — Sir Edward Grey in Paris. On 21 April 1914, King George V and Sir Edward Grey visited Paris, and committed themselves deeply to both France and Russia. What took place is related on subsequent pages.

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[141] Treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria, 13 March 1912; and treaty between Greece and Bulgaria, 29 May 1912. War began 12 Oct.

[145] *Ann. Reg.*, 1912, p. [209. Bethmann-Hollweg says that the changes in the disposition of the fleets were agreed to in September 1912: *op. cit.*, p. 61. Poincaré fixes the same date: *The Origins of the War*, p. 72. Mr. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt noted on 31 May the meeting at Malta of Asquith, Churchill, Kitchener, and added: "It was on this occasion that our people came to the decision of getting the French Navy to police the Mediterranean, while the English Navy should keep the North Sea and English Channel for the French in the event of a war with Germany, thus enabling them to make a definite promise to the French Government of help by land in a war with Germany": *My Diaries*, II, pp. 405–6.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN ARRANGEMENTS

Arrangements in 1912 — Sazonoff in London. Shortly prior to the outbreak of the first of the Balkan wars (12 October 1912), Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, anxious as to the British attitude, visited London. He was well pleased with his reception. Reporting to the Czar after his return to St. Petersburg, he said that he had been invited to Balmoral (the King's residence in Scotland), and there (23–28 September) had a series of conversations with Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Bonar Law (leader of the Opposition), who were also guests.

"Taking advantage," he said, "of these favorable circumstances, I deemed it useful to inform myself, among other things, during one of my conversations with Ed. Grey, as to what we might expect of England in case of a conflict with Germany, and I consider as being very significant the words which I was able to hear on this subject from the responsible chief directing the foreign policy in England, as well as, later, from the mouth of King George himself. Your Imperial Majesty is aware that M. Poincaré, during his visit to St. Petersburg, last summer, expressed to me his desire to ascertain clearly to what extent we could depend upon the co-operation of the English fleet in case of such a war. After having communicated confidentially to Grey the tenor of our naval convention with France, and after having remarked to him that, by reason of the treaty concluded, the French fleet will be employed in safeguarding our interests in the southern theatre of the war by preventing the Austrian fleet from breaking through into the Black Sea, I asked the Secretary of State whether England could, on her part, render us the same service in the North Sea by diverting the German squadrons from our Baltic coasts. Without hesitation, Grey declared that if the circumstances foreseen arose, England would put forth every effort to deal a most telling blow to the naval power of Germany. The question of military operations has already been discussed before the respective authorities, but from these deliberations has developed that, admitting that the English fleet might be able to enter the Baltic with ease, its stay there would be in considerable danger, because, in view of the possibility of Germany laying hands on Denmark and of closing the exit of the Baltic, the English fleet might find itself caught as in a trap. That is why England will probably confine her operations to the North Sea. *Apropos* of this, Grey voluntarily confirmed to me what I already knew from Poincaré: the existence of an arrangement between France and England, by virtue of which, in case of a war with Germany, England has incurred the obligation of lending to France her assistance not only on sea but also on land by means of landing troops on the continent.

"Touching the same question, the King in one of the conversations which he had with me, expressed himself in a manner even more

decisive than his Minister, and having, with manifest irritation, mentioned the fact that Germany was endeavoring to place herself in equality with Great Britain as regards naval forces, His Majesty exclaimed that in case of conflict this would have fatal consequences, not only for the German fleet, but also for the maritime commerce of Germany. 'We shall sink every single German ship we shall get hold of.' These last words seemed to express not only the personal sentiments of His Majesty, but also the popular feeling in England with regard to Germany." [146]

While thus freely indicating his own views, Sir Edward hesitated to pledge his government. Shortly afterwards, during the progress of the Balkan hostilities, when differences between Serbia and Russia on the one hand and Austria-Hungary on the other had become acute, the Russian Ambassador at London reported (14 November 1912) that Sir Edward had promised:

"diplomatic support . . . but [said] that, for the moment, a direct question as to the opening of hostilities would place him in a different position."

"Nicolson" (the British Under Secretary of State for War) "told Cambon" (the French Ambassador), "with every reservation, that, if the Triple Alliance were fighting against the Entente, England would, he thought, take part in the war." [147]

A few days afterwards (20 November), the Russian Ambassador, reporting another conversation with Sir Edward Grey, said:

"He had told me enough to prove to us that, under certain special conditions, England would enter the war. For this, in my opinion, two conditions are necessary: in the first place, the active intervention of France must make this war a general one; secondly, it is absolutely necessary that the responsibility for the aggression fall upon our opponents." [148]

It was immaterial that the United Kingdom might have no direct interest in the subject matter of the quarrel.

Arrangements in 1914 — Sir Edward Grey in Paris. The Balkan wars (1912–13) closed without breeding wider war, but the tension remained. The treaty of Bucarest had effected a postponement only. At the end of 1913 and commencement of 1914, occurred the Liman von Sanders affair.[149] Then came the probability of the renewal of war between Greece and Turkey; and, having good reason for apprehension as to the future, Sazonoff (the Russian Foreign Minister) proposed (12 February 1914) a meeting of representatives of the three *entente* Powers

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[146] *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 346–8. *Cf. Ann. Reg.*, 1912, p. [213.

[147] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 399–400.

[148] *Ibid.*, p. 405.

[149] *Ante*, pp. 60–9.

in order to "establish the community of their views." [150] The suggestion having been accepted by Sir Edward Grey, and a visit to Paris by King George V and Sir Edward having been arranged, Sazonoff telegraphed to the Russian Ambassador there (2 April) proposing:

"a further reinforcement and development of the so-called Triple-Entente, and, if possible, its transformation into a new Triple-Alliance." [151]

Reporting, in reply, on 9 April, the Russian Ambassador at Paris said that the Foreign Minister would speak to Grey at the approaching conference:

"He believes that it will prove very easy to bring forth convincing arguments in favor of this thought, for it is obvious that, France having military and naval conventions with Russia and England, the system ought to be co-ordinated and completed by a corresponding accord between Russia and England." [152]

About the same time, the Czar had a conversation with Buchanan (the British Ambassador); the Ambassador recounted it to Paléologue (the French Ambassador); and Paléologue telegraphed (18 April) to Paris as follows:

"I have learned from a private and reliable source [153] that the last conversation of the Emperor with the Minister of Foreign Affairs before his departure for the Crimea revolved entirely upon the question of the Anglo-Russian alliance. Dealing with the more or less imminent risks of a conflict between Russia and Germany, His Majesty referred to the eventuality of a renewal of hostilities between Greece and Turkey. In such case, the Ottoman government will close the Straits. Russia could not tolerate a measure so prejudicial to her commerce and her prestige. 'To re-open the Straits,' declared His Majesty, 'I should employ force.' But would not, then, Germany range herself on the side of Turkey? It is in a possible intervention by Germany that the Emperor Nicholas perceives the principal danger of new complications menacing the East. And it is for the purpose of preventing Turkey obtaining the assistance of Germany, and above all in order to assure (a word here not decipherable) that he hopes so strongly for the prompt conclusion of an accord with England. I venture to recall to Your Excellency that the Emperor Nicholas declared to me that he would be grateful if M. the President would explain, in his conversations with King George, the reasons which, according to him, require a

[150] Siebert & Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 712–3. *Cf. Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 249–50, 255–9, 312–13.

[151] Siebert & Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 714.

[152] *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 256–7.

[153] The document now bears a note in the handwriting of the Czar as follows: "This must be Sir Buchanan, who has communicated to Paléologue my conversation with him." The telegram was intercepted by the Russian government, and thus came before the Czar (*Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 258, note).

tightening of the Anglo-Russian relations. Will not M. the President deem it useful to inform the Emperor personally of the result of his conversations? I know that M. Sazonoff would be equally regardful of everything which you would be good enough to convey to him of your conversations with Sir Edward Grey." [154]

An interesting account of the ensuing visit to Paris of King George and Sir Edward Grey (21–24 April 1914) appears in the report of Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador there (29 April) as follows:

"The exchange of ideas between the French and English statesmen was devoted principally to the relations between France and England; in approaching this subject, the two parties were unanimous in recognizing that the accord existing between the two Powers required modification only with reference to the matter of form that it might be complete, and that, in continuing to apply regularly and loyally the principles of 'the *entente cordiale*' to all present political questions, England and France would every day strengthen and develop the bonds already existing between them; it was recognized also that France and England associated Russia in their policy. Also, as you have no doubt remarked, this thought is very clearly expressed in the communiqué which was sent to the press after the conference and which was published here and in London. M. Doumergue told me that this communiqué, edited by Cambon, had been examined and approved in all its details, not only by himself, but also by Sir Edward Grey; the latter entirely approved the mention in it of Russia and that it indicated that the three Powers had for object not only the maintenance of 'peace,' but also the stability of 'the equilibrium.'

"After having deliberated on the different political questions of the moment, M. Doumergue passed to the question of the relations between Russia and England and communicated to Sir Edward Grey our wishes in the form in which they had been conveyed to him; he presented, above all, the two following arguments in favor of a more intimate accord between Russia and England; 1st, the efforts which Germany was making to induce us to abandon the 'Triple Entente,' under the pretext that it is only a weak and uncertain political combination, and, 2d, a naval convention concluded between us and England would liberate a part of the English fleet, which would then be able to act with greater energy, not only in the North Sea and the Baltic, but also in the Mediterranean. M. Doumergue remarked, among other things, to Sir Edward Grey, that, in two years we would have in the Baltic Sea an important fleet composed of dreadnoughts. Sir Edward Grey replied to M. Doumergue that he personally approved of all that had just been said by his interlocutor, and that he would be ready to conclude with Russia an accord analogous to those which existed between

[154] *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 258.

England and France; at the same time he did not conceal from M. Doumergue that there were in England, not only among the members of the Government party, but also among the members of the Cabinet itself, some elements predisposed against Russia and little inclined to closer rapprochement with her. He expressed, however, the hope of being able to induce Mr. Asquith and the other members of the Government to share his point of view, and he proposed the following *modus procedendi:* the two Cabinets, that of London and that of Paris, would, by common agreement, commence by communicating to the Cabinet of Petersburg all the conventions existing between England and France, namely; 1st, the military and naval conventions between the two Staffs, which, as you know, have, so to speak, a facultative character, and 2d, the political convention, which has assumed the form of letters exchanged between Sir Edward Grey and the French Ambassador at London; it is said in one of these letters that when, by reason of events, England and France should decide upon active operations, they 'would take account of' the said conventions. The two Cabinets would, at the same time, ask us as to our manner of viewing the subject, which would afford us the opportunity of broaching, in our turn, the question of an analogous Russo-English convention. In Sir Edward Grey's view, we could conclude with England only a naval convention, for all the English land forces have already been assigned to their destination and evidently could not co-operate with the Russian army. Sir Edward Grey added that, immediately on his return to England, he would submit this plan to Mr. Asquith and his other colleagues. M. Doumergue asked him if it would not be preferable to combine all these conventions between Russia, France, and England, in a single triple accord. Sir Edward Grey replied that personally he did not think this suggestion impracticable, but that it could be taken up only at a later period in connection with the detailed examination of the proposed accord between Russia and England. MM. Doumergue, Cambon, and de Margerie, who had been present at this conference, declared that they had been struck by the firmness and precision of Sir Edward Grey's words, saying that he was ready for a more intimate union with Russia. They are persuaded that if he spoke with reserve of the probable attitude of Mr. Asquith and the other members of the Cabinet with regard to the accord, that was only a matter of form, and that if he had not been sure in advance of their agreement, he would have abstained from making such concrete suggestions." [155]

The notable points in this document are: (1) It was recognized that the accord between the United Kingdom and France "required modification only with reference to the matter of form." (2) "That the three Powers had for object, not only the maintenance of 'peace,' but

[155] *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 259–61. Another translation of this document appears in Morel, *Pre-War Diplomacy*, pp. 35–7.

also the stability of 'the equilibrium.'" (3) Sir Edward Grey "would be ready to conclude with Russia an accord analogous to those which existed between England and France." (4) The United Kingdom could make "only a naval convention" with Russia — "for all the English land forces have already been assigned to their destination and evidently could not co-operate with the Russian army." (5) The French gentlemen "declared that they had been struck by the firmness and precision of Sir Edward Grey's words, saying that he was ready for a more intimate union with Russia." (6) Some clever management of Sir Edward's colleagues might be necessary.

Profoundly impressed, as he said, with the reception of the King and himself in Paris, Grey, on his return to London, asked the Russian Ambassador there to call upon him (12 May):

"On this occasion" (the Ambassador reported), "Grey spoke with a warmth which is not usual with him, and which proved that he had made his deductions from firmly-grounded judgment. The intention by which he was governed in asking me to come and see him, in order to make such a communication to me, is entirely clear. He wished to announce to me the beginning of a phase of a still closer rapprochement to France. This intention became still more obvious to me upon his remarking to me, without any preliminaries, that I was doubtless informed about the conversation which he had had with Doumergue on the subject of Russia."

To the suggestion of an alliance, Grey replied that he did not consider an alliance possible:

"As you see, we have no alliance to-day even with France."[156]

Four days afterwards (16th), the Ambassador again reported:

"According to Sir Edward's views, the course of the proceedings might be as follows: After authorization by his Government, Cambon would inform me of the exchange of notes, whilst, at the same time, Sir Edward on his part would communicate the same to me in order that I may inform the Russian Government. Just as the agreements entered into with France by Great Britain provide in the event of a *casus belli* first of all for the co-operation of the armies, so, according to Sir Edward Grey, the nature of things demands that the eventual agreements with Russia should relate to the navy. The negotiations would have to be carried on between the Russian and English staffs of Admiralty. The negotiations with France took place at the time in London, and the French military and naval attachés in London travelled to Paris in order to obtain the instructions which occasion rendered necessary. Finally, Prince Louis of Battenberg went to Paris quite unofficially in order to co-ordinate the agreements. Cambon was of the opinion that after the correspondence had been communicated it would

[156] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 716–7; *Un Livre Noir*, II (under date of 9 May), pp. 318–20.

be necessary to determine the further proceedings. He told me that, according to the opinion of Sir Edward Grey, the negotiations might be conducted precisely as in the case of France, i.e., that our naval attaché in London would be empowered to enter into negotiations with the British Admiralty staff, after he had been given instructions in St. Petersburg, for even repeated journeys on the part of the naval attaché would in no wise arouse public attention, whereas the arrival of prominent Russian naval officers in London would surely become known and might lead to undesirable comments." [157]

Two days afterwards (18th), the same Ambassador reported that Grey had informed Asquith of the interchanges at Paris, and added:

"Without binding the Cabinet to the present, Asquith had answered that he saw no insurmountable difficulties against carrying out the plan proposed at Paris. Since then Asquith has repeated this to Cambon himself. The latter has been able to establish the fact that the Prime Minister is very favorably disposed to plans of that kind. These refer, consequently, to eventual military conventions between Russia and England analogous to those which exist between France and England. The latter would be communicated to us in confidence, whereupon the Russian Government would have to make analogous proposals to the British Government, which, according to the nature of things would refer more to the navy than to the army."

After referring to the "extraordinarily hearty" reception accorded to the British King and Queen in Paris, the Ambassador added:

"I doubt whether a more powerful guarantee for common military operations could be found in the event of war than this spirit of the Entente, as it reveals itself at present, reinforced by the existent military conventions. If we review the various phases of the Entente, it cannot be denied that England has never hesitated, in threatening moments, to place herself on the side of France; the same holds good for Russia on every occasion on which English and Russian interests were simultaneously affected, and this, despite the difficulty of reconciling the policies of both countries in questions which arise day after day, and despite those reasons, which it would lead too far to discuss here, but which explain clearly why the *entente* between Russia and England has not taken root so deeply as that between France and England." [158]

[157] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 718; *Un Livre Noir*, II (under date of 15 May), pp. 320–1.

[158] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 719–20. Two years previously, Poincaré had held the same view as to supersession of the *entente* by an alliance. On 6 June 1912, the Russian Ambassador at Paris reported that: "According to his conviction, there was no need for France or England to desire any alteration in the present relations. Recent events had proved that, according to the present European situation, the community of interests of France and England, and the understanding based thereon, was so great and indisputable, that, in case of any serious complications, the common policy of both nations could thereby be safeguarded" (*Ibid.*, p. 643). That the German government was of the same opinion

The next day, Sazonoff reported to the Czar that:

"The Government of Great Britain has decided to charge the Chief of Staff of the English Navy with entering into *pourparlers* with the military agents of the Russian and French navies, with the object of elaborating the technical conditions of eventual co-operation of the naval forces of England, Russia, and France." [159]

Four days later (23 May), the Russian Ambassador again wrote:

"Sir Edward yesterday requested that Cambon and I call upon him. As my French colleague had already informed me, the Secretary of State confirmed to me the fact that the English Minister's Council had approved of the answer which he gave to Doumergue in Paris in his own name,[160] after the French Minister had spoken of the relations between Russia and England, and had indicated how useful, under certain contingencies, previous military conventions between the governments would prove. The first step to be considered was to communicate to the Russian Government on the part of France and England the two confidential and secret documents which had been exchanged between the French and British Governments in the year 1912.[161] Sir Edward laid special stress upon the point that the text of these documents showed that no alliance was concluded between the two Powers. They fulfilled the purpose rather of putting the substance of military agreements in the proper light — agreements which had been entered into between the army and navy authorities for the eventuality that it should become necessary for the British and French naval and land forces to co-operate actively. Sir Edward emphasized the fact that without some such previous agreement, an immediate co-operation, even with the best of wills and in spite of the close political *entente* between both governments, would encounter serious technical difficulties. . . . Hereupon Sir Edward Grey gave me a copy of the document which he had handed to the French Ambassador on November

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appears from a report of the next day (7 June 1912) from the Russian Ambassador at Berlin: "The question of transforming the friendly agreement between England and France into an alliance arouses great interest in Germany, and great anxiety in political circles here. Although the press loudly asserts that this question has no significance for Germany, since events during late years have proved that in case of a conflict between Germany and France, England would place herself on the side of the latter anyway, no matter whether she was bound to France by an alliance or by an agreement, the contrary is, nevertheless, established by the passion with which this question is discussed and by the space which it occupies in all newspapers. Not the fact of the conclusion of an alliance between England and France makes itself felt, but rather the circumstance that the Germans have been finally convinced that England is now turning away from the possibility of a rapprochement with Germany — a rapprochement which Germany in truth passionately desired" (*Ibid.*, p. 644).

[159] *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 266–7. And see pp. 324–5.

[160] *Cf. ibid.*, p. 323.

[161] *Ante*, p. 118.

22, 1912, and Cambon, on his part, gave me, upon the authority of his Government, a copy of the reply which he had directed to Sir Edward Grey on the following day. In response to my question, Sir Edward Grey declared that the most expedient thing to do would be to authorize our naval attaché in London to place himself in communication with the British Staff of Admiralty. The First Lord of the Admiralty, as well as the British Ministers, were instructed as to our plan. The British Staff of Admiralty is in possession of the conventions regarding the navy which were worked out in common by France and England. As to the remaining agreements, France, who was allied with us, might use them as she deemed necessary." [162]

Five days afterwards (28 May — just a month prior to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand), Sazonoff wrote to the Ambassador at London as follows:

"The readiness of the British Government to begin, without delay, negotiations regarding the conclusion of an agreement between Russia and England, which would concern joint operations of our naval forces in the event of a common military action, has been received on our part with a feeling of the greatest satisfaction. Quite apart from the fact that such an agreement is desirable from a special military standpoint, we attach great importance to it in a general political sense. In the conclusion of such an agreement, we see an important step towards bringing England into closer union with the Franco-Russian alliance, and an effective means of reinforcing the recognition of the common interests of England and Russia, which we are convinced, will favorably influence all the questions which affect British and Russian interests. I have called the attention of our Ministry of the Navy, in particular of our Naval Agent in London, most specially to the great political significance of the impending negotiations which the latter will have to carry on with the English Staff of Admiralty. The proposal made by the British Government, respecting the form in which the convention is to be concluded, is recognized by us as in every way suited to the purpose, and Captain Volkoff has been instructed to enter into negotiations with the British Government." [163]

Sazonoff enclosed with this despatch a copy of a resolution adopted at a meeting in the office of the Chief of the Staff of Admiralty (26 May) indicating the principles to be observed in the framing of a convention with the United Kingdom.[164] Thereupon the Russian Naval Attaché in London — Volkoff — went to St. Petersburg, and, after his return to London, the Russian Ambassador reported as follows (11 June):

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[162] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 721. The date of the document is given in *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 321, as 19 May. Probably the telegram given on pp 323–4 as of 20 May preceded the one above quoted.

[163] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 724–5. [164] *Ibid.*, pp. 725–7.

"I notified Grey yesterday that Captain Volkoff had returned from St. Petersburg, and had been instructed to enter into negotiations with the Admiralty. Grey replied that he would at once acquaint the First Lord of the Admiralty of this." [165]

Disclosures through the newspapers (the result of official indiscretion) now caused Grey a good deal of embarrassment.

"He regretted this the more," he said to the Russian Ambassador (11 June), "since he will be obliged to reply to a question relative to this which will be put to him in the House of Commons."

The Ambassador supplied comfort by the assurance (as he reported) that:

"the *Novoe Vremia* had published a *démenti*. Grey was not aware of this, and was very well satisfied. He asked me to send him the text. He then told me in general outlines the answer which he thought of returning in parliament, and which would cover our negotiations, as well as those which had taken place with France." [166]

Grey's *démenti* in the House, the same day, narrowly escaped falsehood,[167] and was not credited in Berlin,[168] although diplomatically acknowledged.[169] In order, if possible, to ascertain the truth, Herr Albert Ballin was sent to London, von Jagow (German Foreign Minister) describing in a letter to him (15 July), the situation as follows:

"There are actually negotiations taking place between London and Petersburg for a naval agreement in which — this in the greatest secrecy — Russia is striving for a wide-reaching military and naval co-operation. These negotiations have not yet come to a result in spite of Russian pressure, partly because Grey has become somewhat hesitant on account of the *Tageblatt's* indiscretion and on account of the open opposition in a part of the Liberal Party in England. But the Russians appear to be pressing hard, and who knows what they may offer as an equivalent in return? In the end, Grey will certainly not oppose its conclusion, unless he meets with opposition within his own party or in the Cabinet. . . . The importance which the matter has for us, I need not go into further. We could scarcely consider any longer any further drawing closer to England. It seems to me, therefore, very important to make once more an effort to wreck the affair. Perhaps if the Liberal Party became alarmed, or if a member of the Cabinet made decided objections, Grey would hesitate before definitive conclusion. My idea was whether you, through your numerous relations with influential Englishmen — have you not such relations with Lord Haldane? — could sound a warning beyond the Channel." [170]

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[165] *Ibid.*, p. 728. *Cf.* pp. 732–3.
[166] *Ibid.*, pp. 728–9. *Cf.* p. 733.
[167] *Un Livre Noir*, II, No. 327; *Remarques &c.*, p. 110.
[168] Kautsky Docs., No. 6; Bethmann-Hollweg, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
[169] Kautsky Docs., Nos. 5, 20, 30.
[170] Kautsky Docs., No. 56.

Shortly afterwards (23 July), Ballin dined with Grey and Haldane, but elicited nothing. He was told:

"that such a naval accord did not exist, and that it was not in the intentions of England to conclude such a convention." [171]

Here the revelations end, but enough has appeared to enable us to see why, when purporting to read in the House of Commons, on 3 August 1914, the letter which, on 22 November 1912, he gave to the French Ambassador,[172] Sir Edward Grey omitted its last sentence.[173] He did not desire to provoke inquiries which might lead to the discovery that there existed a "military and naval convention" between the United Kingdom and France which had been "worked out by the General and Naval Staffs"; [174] and that this convention was in several parts. The convention has never been published.

ANGLO-BELGIAN ARRANGEMENTS

Arrangements of 1906. Having arrived (January 1906) at a general understanding with France (as above stated), the British government opened military "conversations" with Belgium. War between France and Germany was, at the moment, in the balance, and depended upon the success or failure of the Algeciras conference (then sitting) in connection with the first of the Morocco incidents.[175] From a report of General Ducarne, Chief of the Belgian General Staff, to the Belgian Minister of War, dated 10 April 1906 (discovered by the Germans when in Brussels), and containing an account of a series of interviews with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston (British Military Attaché at Brussels), we learn that upon the first occasion (middle of January):

"Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston told me of the preoccupation of the British General Staff concerning the general political situation and the existing possibilities of war. Should Belgium be attacked, it was proposed to send about 100,000 men." [176]

That was, as we have seen, the number required by France. He continued as follows:

"The disembarkation of the British troops would take place on the French coast, in the neighborhood of Dunkirk and Calais, in such a manner that the operation might be carried out in the quickest possible

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[171] *Ibid.*, No. 254.

[172] *Ante*, pp. 117–8.

[173] *Ante*, p. 118.

[174] Bogitshevich speaks of an Anglo-Russian Marine Convention of May 1911: *Causes of the War*, p. 23.

[175] The Algeciras settlement was signed on 6 April 1906.

[176] Oakes and Mowat: *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century*, p. 152. The report may also be seen in the *Belgian Grey Book*, 1914, App. No. 4. A fac-simile reproduction of the manuscript of the Ducarne report may be seen in Fuehr: *The Neutrality of Belgium*, between pages 220 and 221.

way. Landing at Antwerp would take much longer, as larger transports would be required, and, moreover, the risk would be greater."

Barnardiston (the report continues):

"emphasized the following points: (1) our conversation was absolutely confidential; (2) it was in no way binding on his Government; (3) his Minister, the British General Staff, he, and myself were the only persons then aware of the matter; (4) he did not know whether his Sovereign had been consulted."

At a subsequent meeting, Barnardiston:

"gave me a detailed statement of the strength of the British forces; we might rely on it that, in twelve or thirteen days, two army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of mounted infantry would be landed."

Referring to a third interview, the report continues:

"As the plans of the British General Staff advanced, the details of the problem were worked out with greater precision. The Colonel assures me that half the British Army could be landed in eight days, and the remainder at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth day, except the mounted infantry, on which we could not count till later."

"At another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I examined the question of combined operations in the event of a German attack directed against Antwerp, and on the hypothesis of our country being crossed in order to reach the French Ardennes. Later on, the colonel signified his concurrence in the scheme I had laid before him, and assured me of the assent of General Grierson, Chief of the British General Staff.

"Other questions of secondary importance were likewise disposed of, particularly those respecting intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, illustrations of uniforms, English translations of extracts from certain Belgian regulations, the regulation of customs dues chargeable on the British supplies, hospital accommodations for the wounded of the allied army, &c. . . . In the course of the last meetings which I had with the British attaché he communicated to me the daily embarkation table of the troops to be landed at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg."

In the course of the conversations:

"Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, on his side, informed me that he had at present little confidence in the support or intervention of Holland. He likewise confided to me that his Government intended to move the British base of supplies from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as the North Sea had been cleared of all German warships." [177]

[177] *Belg. Grey Book*, 1914, App. No. 4; Oakes and Mowat, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–6. The reference to Antwerp receives additional significance from the fact that upon the day after the British declaration of war, Sir Edward Grey gave to Belgium assurance that "the British fleet will ensure the free passage of the Scheldt for the

Upon the margin of the report, in Ducarne's writing, were the words:

"The entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany."

In an added note, under date "End of September 1906," was the following:

"When I met General Grierson at Compiègne at the manœuvres of 1906, he assured me that the reorganization of the British army would result not only in ensuring the landing of 150,000 men, but in enabling them to take the field in a shorter period than had been previously estimated."

Although no definite agreement was entered into by the two officers, the arrangements were so far advanced that Barnardiston expressed a desire for an understanding upon "the question of the chief command" of what he referred to as "the allied forces." Upon that point nothing was settled — as far as we know.

Arrangements of 1912. A further Anglo-Belgian conversation (23 April 1912), this time between Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, the new British military attaché at Brussels, and General Jungbluth, is recorded in another document discovered by the German army at Brussels:

"Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the General that Great Britain had available for dispatch to the Continent an army composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry, in all 160,000 men. She had also all that she needed for home defence. Everything was ready. The British Government, at the time of the recent events,[178] would have immediately landed troops on our territory, even if we had not asked for help. The general protested that our consent would be necessary for this. The military attaché answered that he knew that, but that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our territory, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event. As to the place of landing, the military attaché was not explicit. He said that the coast was rather long, but the general knows that Mr. Bridges made daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostend during the Easter holidays. The general added that, after all, we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from going through." [179]

British, French, and Belgian Comments. The German newspapers having published (October 1914) General Ducarne's report of his interview with Barnardiston in 1906,[180] Sir Edward Grey immediately (14 October) issued a circular despatch in which he said:

provisioning of Antwerp" (*Belg. Grey Book*, 1914, No. 49). The Scheldt at its mouth flows through Dutch territory. By treaty it was open to commerce. But Holland claimed a right to prevent its use for war purposes. Belgium was not inclined to dispute the claim, and the British fleet was never called into operation for the purpose suggested.

[178] The Franco-German dispute over Morocco. See cap. XXII.

[179] *Belg. Grey Book*, 1914, App. No. 4 (2); Oakes & Mowat, *op. cit.*, pp. 156–7.

[180] *Belg. Grey Book*, 1914, App. No. 4.

"In view of the solemn guarantee given by Great Britain to protect the neutrality of Belgium against violation from any side, some academic discussions may, through the instrumentality of Colonel Barnardiston, have taken place between General Grierson and the Belgian military authorities as to what assistance the British army might be able to afford to Belgium should one of her neighbors violate that neutrality. Some notes with reference to the subject may exist in the Archives of Belgium. It should be noted that the date mentioned, namely 1906, was the year following that in which Germany had, as in 1911, adopted a threatening attitude towards France with regard to Morocco, and, in view of the apprehensions existing of an attack on France through Belgium, it was natural that possible eventualities should be discussed." [181]

The later Belgian document, containing the conversation between Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges and General Jungbluth, in which the former said that during the 1911 crisis:

"as we [Belgians] were not in a position to prevent the Germans passing through our territory, Great Britain would have landed troops in any event"

— even without Belgian consent — was not published until 25 November 1914. To it the Belgian Foreign Minister replied by a circular despatch (4 December 1914) deprecating the attachment of great importance to the opinion of a Military Attaché which was not concurred in by the Foreign Office.[182] In the following January, Sir Edward Grey published a note [183] declaring that a statement recently made by the German Chancellor, that:

"England had determined to debark troops in Belgium without the assent of the Belgian Government"

was false; and as to what the British government would have done, he referred to his former statement (7 April 1913 [184]). M. Poincaré's view, as reported by the Belgian Ambassador at Paris (22 February 1913), was as follows:

"M. Poincaré has assured me that France would never take the initiative in violating our neutrality, but that if the German armies should enter Belgium and we should not be strong enough to drive them back, the Government of the Republic would consider themselves justified in taking whatever steps they thought expedient to defend French territory; either upon their own frontier or, if the General Staff thought it more expedient to advance to meet the Imperial armies." [185]

Under war-stress, every country would do the like.

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[181] *Ibid.*, App. No. 3. The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs also issued circular despatches: *Belg. Grey Book*, 1915, Nos. 98, 99, 102, 103, 106.

[182] *Belg. Grey Book*, 1915, No. 99.

[183] *Belg. Grey Book*, 1915, No. 102; *The Times* (London), 27 Jan. 1915. The reply of the Belgian government is in *Belg. Grey Book*, 1915, No. 103.

[184] *Belg. Grey Book*, 1914, App. No. 1; *Belg. Grey Book*, 1915, No. 100, Enc.

[185] *Belg. Grey Book*, 1915, No. 1.

Arrangements 1912–14. From 1912 on, special care seems to have been applied by the British War Office to the development of plans for a campaign in Belgium. The following is taken from *The North German Gazette* of 2 December 1914:[186]

"Further proofs have been found that England, in co-operation with Belgium, had prepared the war against Germany already during peace time to the utmost, not only in a diplomatic but also in a military way. Recently, our troops seized some secret military guide-books about Belgium, edited by the British General Army Staff, entitled: 'Belgium Road and River Reports, prepared by the General Staff, War Office.'

"We are in possession of four volumes of this handbook, of which volume 1 was printed in 1912, volume 2 in 1913, volume 3 (in two parts) and volume 4 in 1914.

"They show the following imprint: '*Confidential. This book is the property of the British Government and is to be used for the personal information of . . ., who himself is responsible for the safe keeping of the book. The contents are to be revealed to authorized persons only.*'

"The handbook contains evidence of military investigations in the minutest and most exact descriptions of the territory. The introduction reads as follows: 'These reports can give only the condition of the roads at the time in which they were investigated. It will always be advisable to investigate them again before they are used, in order to make sure that they are not closed on account of repairs, pipe laying,' etc.

"Thus, for instance, in volume 1, page 130 and following, the great highroad, Nieuport-Dixmude-Ypres-Menin-Tourcoing-Tournai, is described and accompanied by maps, with special regard to quality of the roads, the surrounding country, tactic considerations, observation posts and water conditions. In this discussion, all the villages along the highroad are enumerated and described. Thus we find their exact distance from one another, detailed descriptions of the road net, with reference to elevators, bridges, crossings, telephone and telegraph stations, railway stations, including length of platforms and landing places, branch lines, oil tanks, etc. It is always mentioned whether the population speaks partly or altogether French.

"As an illustration we may cite the tactical remarks about Dixmude on page 151:

"'It will be difficult to take Dixmude from the north or from the south. The best position for defence against attacks from the south would be the railway embankment in the west as far as the street, to the east a number of small fields. As far as 1,500 yards west of the street the field is favorable for firing; farther to the east the view is obstructed by trees. Two battalions would be sufficient for occupation. The hostile artillery probably would be situated near Hoogmolen and

[186] As translated in Fuehr: *The Neutrality of Belgium*, pp. 221–4.

Vertkant; otherwise there is nothing of tactical importance, nor is there anything which might retard marching. Point of observation, the mill of Reencheek permitting of a free panoramic view; also the Koelberg, seven and one-half miles distant from Ypres, with outlook toward the east and south.'

"It may be mentioned that the church towers are usually mentioned as good observation points.

"In a similar detailed manner the entire course of the Scheldt, with all tributaries, villages, landings, opportunities for crossing, widths and depths, bridges, supply of boats, etc., is described.

"Thus the handbook forms an excellent guide for the army leader, the officer of the general staff, and for officers second in command. To the book are added:

"First — A schedule containing information about communities and villages for purposes of billeting; furthermore, instructions regarding transportation and all other items which may be needed by the local commander.

"Second — A number of important hints to aviators for that part of Belgium which is situated south of the line Charleroi-Namur-Liège as well as for the surroundings of Brussels.

"This very carefully and comprehensively drawn memorandum is supplemented by a map showing the landing places. It bears the inscription 'Secret' and is dated July 1914.

"These military geographical handbooks cannot be supposed to have been written shortly before or during the war. That would, aside from putting them in print, have been impossible. The material for the work has, on the contrary, as may be seen from remarks in the different parts, been collected since 1909. The first volume was printed in 1912.

"The manuals therefore prove a minute preparation carried on during the last five years for an English campaign in neutral Belgium. They are nothing else but secret regulations of military service for an English army fighting in Belgium. The English general staff, therefore, since long time, prepared themselves for this event and foresaw the same so surely that they undertook the painstaking work of compiling these military handbooks.

"Without ready and far-reaching assistance on the part of the Belgian government and military authorities such a work would not have been possible. These strategical and tactical reports, going into the minutest details, as mentioned above, or such exact data concerning railroads and transportation service, rolling stock, locks and bridges, could not have been obtained in any other way. The schedules about the billeting capacity, which deal with Belgium as if it were English territory, could only be derived from the Belgian government. Without doubt official Belgian material has been used. It has been made suit-

able for English purposes, or, at many places simply translated into English!

"Very extensively, indeed, England and Belgium had prepared themselves together during times of peace for military co-operation. Belgium in political as well as in military matters was nothing but a vassal state of England. The indignation which England today is putting up before the world because of Germany's so-called breach of neutrality is made altogether meaningless and unjust by those documents.

"When on account of our operations at the coast, the English and French press remarked sneeringly that we were not sufficiently instructed about the dangers of the inundation district in the so-called 'Polderland' they were right in so far as before the beginning of the war we did not know Belgian territorial conditions any better than may be learned from sources obtainable in the book market.

"The English reconnoitering reports and the excellent maps, therefore, were very valuable booty for us. We were able to make immediate use of this remarkable material and thus could fight England with her own weapons. This should be the best indication of the importance of our enemies' painstaking labor."

The following is taken from *The North German Gazette* of 15 December 1914:[187]

"New and convincing evidence with reference to the Anglo-Belgian complicity has been found. Some time ago there was detained in Brussels the British Secretary of Legation, Grant-Watson, who had remained in the British Legation after the office had been transferred to Antwerp and later on to Havre. This Grant-Watson has been caught in the act of disposing of a number of documents which he at the time of his detention had taken with him from the Legation.

"An investigation of these documents showed that they were of the most intimate kind, containing exact information of the years 1913 and 1914, about the Belgian mobilization plans and about the defense of Antwerp. Among them were also found circular decrees directed to the higher Belgian commands, with fac-simile signatures of the Belgian Minister of War and the Belgian General Staff. Furthermore, a report of a session of the 'commission for the provisions base at Antwerp' of May 27, 1913, was found.

"The fact that these documents had been at the British Legation sufficiently proves that the Belgian Government in military matters had no secrets from the British Government and that these two governments had a continuous and most intimate understanding in military matters."

German preparation for an advance through Belgium and Luxemburg was well known. The nature of recent railway construction left little room for doubt upon that point.[188] Indeed, the impracticability

[187] As translated in Fuehr: *The Neutrality of Belgium*, p. 225.

[188] Per Sir Edward Grey, 14 Oct. 1914 (*Belg. Grey Book*, 1914, App. No. 3;

of successful invasion through the narrow opening between Luxemburg and Switzerland, past the French forts which guarded the entrance, was, in itself, for military experts, sufficient evidence of Germany's intention. It was for that reason, and not, as far as we know, with a view to a French invasion of Germany through Belgium, that the British government made arrangements with Belgium.

FRANCO-RUSSIAN ARRANGEMENTS

Arrangements of 1912. Prior to January 1912, while M. Caillaux was Prime Minister and M. de Selves was Minister for Foreign Affairs, Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, had found it useless to talk to France about international matters,[189] but with the substitution, in that month, of M. Poincaré for both these men, the situation underwent notable alterations.[190] The new minister wanted, for example, to understand the Balkan situation, and, for that purpose, to be informed as to the nature of the conversations between Russia and Austria-Hungary. He questioned Isvolsky, who wrote to Sazonoff (29 January):

"I write to you all this quite frankly, for it appears to me that it is for us a matter of extreme importance that we should take into account the principles expressed by M. Poincaré when assuming power, and act accordingly. The present President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs is a very considerable personality, and his cabinet seems to be the strongest combination which has been formed during quite a series of years." [191]

In another despatch of the same month (15 February), Isvolsky said:

"New international complications in the spring are here expected in military circles, and the War Department continues to prepare actively for military operations in the near future." [192]

Naval Convention, 1912. Ensuing communications led to the arrival in Paris of Prince Liven, Chief of the Russian Naval Staff, and to the negotiation of a formal naval convention between the two countries." [193] On 18 July, Isvolsky reported as follows:

"Prince Liven said to me that, in his opinion, the exchange of views which had just taken place has produced for us very advantageous results; notably the Chief of the General Staff of the French Marine had thoroughly understood the necessity, in the joint interest of the two allied countries, for facilitating our task of naval hegemony in the

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and see *ibid.*, 1915, No. 102); per Lord Haldane, 14 Nov. 1914 (*Belg. Grey Book*, 1914, App. No. 6); and see *Nineteenth Century*, June 1918, p. 1126; Nov. 1918, p. 819.

[189] Isvolsky to Sazonoff, 23 Nov. 1911: *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 164–8.

[190] *Ante*, p. 519.

[191] *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 203.

[192] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

[193] See *ante*, cap. IV, pp. 98–9.

Black Sea by the exercise of appropriate pressure on the fleets of our eventual enemies; that is to say, principally of Austria-Hungary, and perhaps of Germany and Italy. For this purpose, France declared herself ready during the time of peace to transfer the concentration of her Mediterranean naval forces farther to the east, namely to Bizerta. This decision, which is clearly expressed in the *procès-verbale*, is considered by Prince Liven as a great success for us, all the more that it does not carry with it any obligation on our part." [194]

Poincaré in Russia, 1912. In projecting a visit to St. Petersburg in August 1912, Poincaré was motived principally by three considerations: (1) desire for more complete information as to the Balkan situation; (2) desire for interchanges more intimate than usual through Ambassadors; and (3) desire to complete the proposed naval convention between the two countries.[195] When shown, in St. Petersburg, the text of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance as against Turkey, Poincaré at once said: "that it was, as a matter of fact, a war-agreement;" [196] and: "when I returned to France," he records, "I was unable to conceal from the Cabinet the serious anxiety it has caused me." [197]

He was right. War-preparations in the Balkans were being hurried. On the last day of the next month, mobilization by the Balkan allies was decreed. It is said (and not without some foundation) that Sazonoff, during Poincaré's visit, had urged the necessity for additions to the strength of the French army.[198] Sazonoff had, at the least, excited apprehensions which prompted the extension of the period of French military service from two years to three.[199] Shortly afterwards, Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the Czar, attended the army manœuvres in France, announcing that he had come to bear to the army of France the greetings of the Russian army [200] — had come, more probably, to make easier the proposed addition to the strength of the French army.

French Assurance to Russia, 1912. That Poincaré had been impressed with the necessity for pre-war preparations is clearly indicated in a despatch from Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, of 12 September 1912:

"M. Poincaré declared to me that the French Government was examining in the most serious fashion the question of international eventualities which were likely to occur; he recognizes fully that such or such events, for example the destruction of Bulgaria by Turkey, or

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[194] *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 297.

[195] *Ibid.*, II, pp. 338, 534.

[196] Poincaré, *op. cit.*, pp. 115, 117. The Russian Ambassador at Sofia was of the same opinion: *ibid.*

[197] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

[198] The subject is discussed by Morel: *Truth and the War*, pp. 150–6.

[199] *Ante*, pp. 519–20.

[200] *Ann. Reg.*, 1912, p. [303.

the attack on Serbia by Austria-Hungary, might oblige Russia to emerge from her passive rôle and to have recourse to diplomatic action and afterwards to military intervention against Turkey or Austria. Conformably with the declarations which we have received from the French Government, the most sincere and energetic *diplomatic* support under such circumstances is assured us by France. But under such circumstances, the Government of the Republic would not be in a position to obtain from parliament or public opinion the necessary sanction for military measures of any kind. But if the conflict with Austria produced armed intervention by Germany, the French Government recognized in advance that that would be a *casus fœderis*, and it would not hesitate for a minute to fulfill the duties toward Russia which rested upon it. 'France,' added M. Poincaré, 'is undoubtedly disposed toward peace and neither seeks nor desires war, but intervention by Germany against Russia would immediately modify that disposition,' and he is convinced that in such case parliament and public opinion would readily approve the decision of the Government to render armed support to Russia." [201]

Movements of French Fleets. Before going to St. Petersburg, Poincaré, with a view to aiding Russia in an effort to command the Black Sea, had (as above noted) agreed to transfer the concentration point of the Mediterranean fleet from Toulon to Bizerta. That was done; and Poincaré, after return from his visit, transferred the third squadron from Brest to Toulon:

"This decision," Poincaré said to Isvolsky, "has been taken in common agreement with England and constitutes a later development and a complement of the conventions concluded sometime ago between the General Staffs of the French and English fleets." [202]

On 20 November 1912, Isvolsky reported to Sazonoff that, in a conversation with Signor Tittoni (the Italian Ambassador at Paris), Poincaré had said that if:

"Russia should find herself at war with Austria and Germany, she could count fully on the armed support of France." [203]

Military and Naval Conversations 1905–1913. During the ten years prior to the great war, the Chiefs of the Military Staffs of France and Russia met annually for the purpose of consultation as to preparations for war with Germany. The minutes of the seventh, eighth, and ninth conferences (1911, 1912, and 1913) have been published.[204] They are interesting, especially for those who believe that Germany sprang hostilities upon an unprepared France. Quotation of a few items from

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[201] *Un Livre Noir*, I, pp. 325–6; *Remarques &c.*, p. 70.
[202] Isvolsky to Sazonoff, 12 Sep. 1912: *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 326.
[203] *Ibid.*, p. 349; Morel: *Pre-War Diplomacy*, p. 20.
[204] *Un Livre Noir*, II, pp. 419–437.

the minutes of 1911 will suffice for present purposes. The French Chief of Staff said:

"From what is known of the German mobilization and concentration, one may conclude that the first great encounters will probably take place in Lorraine, Luxemburg, and Belgium from the fifteenth to the eighteenth day."

Continuing his exposition:

"He shows that the French army concentrates as rapidly as the German army, and that, on the twelfth day, it is in a position to take the offensive against Germany, with the help of the British army on its left flank. . . . In a word, it is essential that Germany shall be attacked at the same time on the west and on the east. . . . In 1900, the Russian General Staff, in conformity with this point of view, undertook to attack on the eighteenth day with the first *échelon* sufficient to engage victoriously five or six German army corps supported by a certain number of reserve divisions. . . . It seems that the new disposition of Russian troops in peace time involves certain difficulties from the point of view of prompt intervention at the commencement of the campaign. Indeed, in 1910, the passage of the frontier was indicated as taking place only towards the twentieth day."

"The Russian Chief of Staff — General Gilinsky — said that the reorganization of the Russian army:

" followed the campaign in Manchuria, but this transformation only really began in 1908, that is to say, four years ago. A great number of improvements are in the way of being carried out; but, using the greatest diligence, the Russian army will be complete in heavy artillery only in 1913, in mitrailleurs only in 1914, and in new infantry munitions only in 1916."

After a reference to recent improvements in Austrian preparations, the Chief added:

"In these circumstances, Russia will not be in a position before two years at least to sustain a war against Germany with a certainty of success. She would certainly be in a position to ward off blows, but perhaps less able to give decisive blows."

"General Gilinsky specially declares that the mobilized troops of the active army will have completed their concentration on the frontier on the fifteenth day, with the exception of the last trains and convoys, and that efforts will be made to take the offensive on that day, without awaiting the final elements referred to, which will be complete only on the twentieth day." [205]

In 1912 and thenceforward, the conferences between the military chiefs were supplemented by similar conferences between the naval chiefs.[206]

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[205] *Ibid.*, pp. 420–3.

[206] Isvolsky to Sazonoff, 18 Jan. 1912: *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 296.

Delcassé at St. Petersburg, 1913. It was no doubt because of the international tension caused by the second of the Morocco incidents (1911), so quickly followed by the outbreak of the first Italo-Turkish war and the first of the Balkan wars (8 October 1912), and the consequent necessity for developing the spirit of war-preparation, that Poincaré sent as Ambassador to St. Petersburg, M. Delcassé the man who in 1905 had resigned his office as Foreign Minister rather than forego war with Germany. The significance of the appointment was obvious. Reporting the fact to his Foreign Office, Baron Guillaume, the Belgian representative at Paris, said (21 February 1913) that it had burst upon the city "like a bombshell." [207] Baron Beyens (Belgian Ambassador at Berlin) noted that:

"The skillful hand of M. Delcassé, sent as Ambassador to St. Petersburg during the events of 1912, had drawn tighter the bond of the alliance." [208]

The report of the Russian Ambassador at Berlin (27 February 1913) contained the following:

"The nomination of M. Delcassé to the post of Ambassador at Saint Petersburg has produced here an extremely unfavorable impression. This energetic statesman, who was so long Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic, has acquired the reputation of being a determined enemy of Germany, and it is to him that is attributed the initiation of the so-called 'Einkreisungpolitik,' that is to say the formation around Germany of a circle that would be hostile to him." [209]

The report of the Russian Ambassador at Paris (13 March 1913) contained the following:

"According to the advice of our military attaché, he [Delcassé] has been especially entrusted with the mission of convincing our War Department of the necessity for multiplying the number of strategic railways with the object of accelerating the concentration of our army on the western frontier. In this field, M. Delcassé is so competent and so acquainted with the views of the French Chief of the General Staff that he is able to discuss the said question with our military authorities in a perfectly free fashion; he is, moreover, armed with the powers necessary for proposing to Russia all the financial means which might be acquired for this object under the form of corresponding railway loans." [210]

Arrangements of 1914 — Poincaré in Russia. The important conversations at Paris in April 1914, during the visit of King George and Sir Edward Grey, have been noted on previous pages.[211] Three months afterwards — that is, immediately prior to the recent war — Poincaré (President of the Republic) was again in St. Petersburg (23–25 July),

[207] Morel: *Truth and the War*, p. 153.
[208] *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, p. 20.
[209] *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 36.
[210] *Ibid.*, p. 49.
[211] Pp. 532–6.

this time accompanied by M. Viviani (French Premier and Foreign Minister). The assassination of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary (28 June) had made further consultation advisable. Some reference to the ensuing conversations may be seen in a subsequent chapter.[212]

GERMAN PREPARATION

The Oxford Faculty. Explaining, from a British point of view, "Why we are at war," and stating, as they understood it, "Great Britain's Case," six "Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History" commenced their treatment of the European rivalry in armaments with a reference to Germany's:

"unenviable prominence in the 'race of armaments' which all thinking men have condemned as an insupportable tax upon Western civilization, and which has aggravated all the evils that it was intended to avert." [213]

Very curiously, the writers then proceeded to lay a large part of the blame upon France, and to offer extenuation for the actions of Germany:

"The beginning of the evil was perhaps due to France; but, if so, it was to a France which viewed with just alarm the enormous strides in population and wealth made by Germany since 1871. The 'Boulanger Law' of 1886 raised the peace footing of the French army above 500,000 men, at a time when that of Germany was 427,000, and that of Russia 550,000. Bismarck replied by the comparatively moderate measure of adding 41,000 to the German peace establishment for seven years; and it is significant of the difference between then and now that he only carried his Bill after a dissolution of one Reichstag and a forcible appeal to its successor.

"France must have soon repented of the indiscretion to which she had been tempted by a military adventurer. With a population comparatively small and rapidly approaching the stationary phase, it was impossible that she could long maintain such a race. In 1893, Count Caprivi's law, carried like that of Bismarck after a stiff struggle with the Reichstag, raised the peace establishment to 479,000 men. Count Caprivi, at the same time, reduced the period of compulsory service from three years to two; but while this reform lightened the burden on the individual conscript, it meant a great increase in the number of those who passed through military training, and an enormous increase of the war strength.[214] The Franco-Russian Entente of 1896 [215] was a

[212] Cap. XXVII.

[213] *Why We are at War*, p. 41.

[214] That is rather curious. The professors themselves note (p. 45) that when France wanted to increase her military strength in 1913, she *lengthened* the period of service from two years to three.

[215] The Franco-Russian alliance was arranged in 1891–4.

sign that France began to feel herself beaten in the race for supremacy and reduced to the defensive. In 1899 the German peace strength was raised to 495,000 for the next six years; in 1905 to 505,000. On the second of these occasions the German Government justified its policy by pointing out that the French war strength was still superior to that of Germany; and would become still stronger if France should change the period of service from three years to two. The German law was announced in 1904; it had the natural effect. The French Senate not only passed the new law early in 1905, but also swept away the changes which the Lower House had introduced to lighten the burden of annual training upon territorial reserves. France found her justification in the Moroccan episode of the previous year.

"This was not unreasonable; but since that date France has been heavily punished for a step which might be taken to indicate that *Revanche* was still a feature of her foreign policy. Since 1886 her utmost efforts have only succeeded in raising her peace establishment to 545,000 (including a body of 28,000 colonial troops stationed in France), and her total war strength to 4,000,000. In the same period the peace establishment of Germany was raised to over 800,000, and her total war strength of fully trained men to something like 5,400,000. It is obvious from these figures that a policy of isolation has long ceased to be possible to France; and that an alliance with Russia has been her only possible method of counterbalancing the numerical superiority of the German army, which is certainly not less well equipped or organized than that of France." [216]

The writers then refer to the German Army Acts of 1905 and 1911, passed because of the Franco-Russian alliance, and add:

"National defence was of course alleged as the prime consideration; and if these preparations were really required by growing danger on the two main frontiers of Germany, no German could do otherwise than approve the policy, no foreign Power could feel itself legitimately aggrieved." [217]

In view of these admissions, it is unnecessary to comment upon any of the German Army Bills down to and inclusive of the Bill of 1911, when, at the end of the usual quinquennial period, an addition of 10,000 men to the peace footing was made. Admittedly, until 1912 or two years prior to the great war, Germany was not responsible for the "race of armaments." What then happened?

German Army Bill, 1912. In the British *Annual Register* for 1912 is the following:

"The new Army and Navy Bills were introduced in the Reichstag on April 15. The Army Bill provided for the addition of two new

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[216] Pp. 41–3.
[217] P. 43.

Army Corps, one on the western and one on the eastern frontier, and an increase of the total peace strength from 515,321 to 544,211, corresponding in percentage with the increase of the population of the German Empire as shown by the census of 1910. The cost of this increase was estimated at 22,025,000*l*, up to the year 1917." [218] Following closely, as it did, upon the increase of 1911, this bill is not inaptly referred to by the Oxford writers as "sensational," [219] but the necessity for it, from a German point of view, is easily understood. During seven months of the previous year (April to November), relations with France in connection with the second of the Morocco incidents had been severely strained, and the United Kingdom, through Mr. Lloyd George, had indicated a hostile attitude.[220] Italy and Turkey, two of Germany's potential supporters, were at war with each other. Complications were arising between Italy and Austria-Hungary — two of Germany's allies: [221] and Russia was forming her Balkan League — Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro — aimed at Turkey and Austria-Hungary.[222] The Prussian War Minister, in a speech supporting the bill (April), frankly stated that it had been rendered necessary by the experiences of 1911. The experiences fully justified the action. And it is noteworthy that, at the time, the German proposals were regarded in France as not unreasonable. On 27 February 1913, the Russian Ambassador at Paris reported as follows:

"From all that has occurred at this moment, one cannot help concluding that the German Government, now as in the Agadir period, has given the strongest impulse to national and military sentiment in France. It is fitting to remark also that the French press, while unanimous in requiring insistently an immediate response from France to the military measures of Germany, maintains the calmest of tones with regard to this country, recognized its right of augmenting its effectiveness, and does not accuse it of aggressive intentions toward France. Among persons in authority, the idea is expressed that Germany will be forced to reckon with the military and political weakness of the Triple-Alliance, since a considerable part of the Austrian army has been diverted from our frontiers for removal toward the Balkan States." [223]

German Army Bill, 1913. Events subsequent to the passage of the 1912 army bill deepened European anxiety as to the probability of general war, and very materially decreased Germany's security. Prior to the date of the publication of the army bill of 1913 (28 March [224])

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[218] P. [322.
[219] P. 44.
[220] See cap. XXII.
[221] See cap. VII.
[222] See cap. VIII.
[223] *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 35.
[224] *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, p. [307.

Turkey had been beaten, but had not finally acknowledged the fact (peace treaty 30 May); relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary in connection with Serbian and Montenegrin frontages on the Adriatic had become severely strained; and war between the members of the Balkan League had appeared to be probable (It soon commenced). Under these circumstances, the German Chancellor introduced, on 7 April, the new bill, and supported it in a speech which was summarized in the British *Annual Register* as follows:

"In introducing the new Army and Taxation Bills on April 7, the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, stated that the increase of the Army proposed was, 'according to the unanimous judgment of the military authorities, necessary in order to secure the future of Germany.' The Army took about 280,000 recruits a year, but the reserve of able-bodied young men was so large that they could take some 60,000 a year more. They could no longer afford the luxury of going without tens of thousands of trained men whom they could have, but at present did not take. There would in all probability be no European war in which Germany would not be involved, and then they would have to fight for their existence. No great Power desired war, but no man could know whether war might not at any moment break out, and a state of tension had for months existed between Austria-Hungary and Russia, which was only prevented from developing into war by the moderation and the sense of responsibility of the Powers. 'Europe will feel grateful to the English Minister of Foreign Affairs for the extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation with which he conducted the discussions of the Ambassadors in London and which constantly enabled him to bridge over differences. Germany shares all the more sincerely in this gratitude, because she knows herself to be at one with the aims of English policy, and, standing loyally by her allies, has labored in the same sense.' Referring to the 'extraordinary vitality' of the Christian States of the Balkans as displayed in the war, the Chancellor proceeded to point out that 'if it should ever come to a European conflagration in which the Slavs would be ranged on one side and the Germans on the other, this newly developed vitality of the Slavs on the Balkan would be a disadvantage to Germany, as they would hold the balance of forces in that quarter which had hitherto been occupied by Turkey, and it is therefore the duty of Germany to provide against such a contingency, though it could not be said that a collision between Slavs and Germans is inevitable.' With Russia, her great Slav neighbor, Germany enjoyed 'the most friendly relations,' and racial antagonisms 'will not by themselves lead to a war between us and Russia; we, at any rate, shall never stir up such a war, and I do not believe that those who at present hold power in Russia will ever do it: but the Panslavist movement . . . has received a powerful stimulus from the victories of the Slav States in the Balkans . . . and we are compelled to take this into

account when we think about the future.' As compared with twenty-five years earlier, he considered that the chances of the Governments of great Powers forming a centre of warlike aspirations had decreased rather than increased. 'Nobody could conceive the dimensions of a world-conflagration and the misery and trouble it would bring upon the nations. All previous wars would probably be as child's play, and no responsible statesman would be disposed lightly to set the match to the powder.' On the other hand, the power of public opinion had increased, and the driving-force of the noisiest elements of it tended in excited times to consist not of majorities but of minorities. Thus in France, though he did not believe that the French people as a whole were pressing to war, many of the quieter and thinking people believed that the French Army was at least equal, if not superior, to the German, and based hopes on the alliance with Russia and perhaps also on the *entente* with England; a Chauvinist literature had arisen, which boasted of the superiority of the French Army and saw visions of Germany overrun by masses of Russian infantry and cavalry. 'By illusion, France had already won in a future war with Germany.' France had for a long time called up every man to her Army, and now she was reverting to three years' service. In Russia, too, there was a most marvellous economic development of the giant Empire, with its inexhaustible natural resources and an Army reorganization such as she never had before. Both Powers desired to be as strong as possible, and Germany would be challenging Providence if she said that, although she ought to be stronger, it would cost too much, and she would remain as she was. So it had been in France in 1870, and in Turkey in 1912. 'The German Army Bill was presented not because Germany wanted war, but because she wanted peace, and because if war came she wanted to win." [225]

The effect of this law was to add 63,000 new recruits per annum,[226] at an initial expenditure of £52,000,000 to £53,000,000 [227] and an increased annual expenditure of £9,000,000 to £9,500,000. That was a very material addition to German strength, but, once more, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, on the eve of the publication of the bill, reported that it was not there regarded as unreasonable. He said (13 March 1913):

"The most influential organs of the French press have adopted the point of view that Germany was absolutely in the right in deciding that it was necessary for her to augment her military forces, and that a decision of this kind by no means indicates the intention of attacking France."

The Ambassador noted the German allegation:

[225] *Ibid.*, pp. [308–10.

[226] Russia was, at the same time, adding 130,000: *ante*, p. 511.

[227] This was provided for by a levy on property.

"that the new armaments come as result of the general political situation of Europe and, indirectly, through the changes which have been effected in the Balkan Peninsula." [228]

The British press condemned the new bill, but the Foreign Office took a more reasonable view. On 24 February 1913, Count de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in London, reported as follows:

"The English Press naturally wants to throw upon Germany the responsibility for the new tension which results from its proposals, and which may bring to Europe fresh occasions of unrest. Many journals consider that the French Government, in declaring itself ready to impose three years' service, and in nominating M. Delcassé to St. Petersburg, has adopted the only attitude worthy of the great Republic in presence of a German provocation. At the Foreign Office, I found a more just and calm appreciation of the position. They see in the reinforcement of the German armies less a provocation than the admission of a military situation weakened by events which it is necessary to strengthen. The Government of Berlin sees itself obliged to recognize that it cannot count, as before, on the support of all the forces of its Austrian ally, since the appearance in south-east Europe of a new Power, that of the Balkan allies, established on the very flank of the Dual Empire. Far from being able to count, in case of need, on the full support of the Government of Vienna, it is probable that Germany will have to support Vienna herself. In the case of a European war, she would have to make head against her enemies on two frontiers, the Russian and the French, and diminish perhaps her own forces to aid the Austrian army. In these conditions, they do not find it surprising that the German Empire should have felt it necessary to increase the number of its Army Corps. They add at the Foreign Office that the Government at Berlin had frankly explained to the Cabinet of Paris the precise motives of its action." [229]

Much the same view was held by the Russian and French Ambassadors at Berlin. The former, reporting on 14 March 1913, said:

"The spectre, or rather the emergency, of a possible Austro-Russian conflict has produced a strong movement for increasing Russia's military preparedness. Even if the Austro-Hungarian army still deserves the same confidence as before, yet the strength and power of her possible enemies have been materially augmented. In view of all this, the German Government has become convinced that it would be an unpardonable omission on its part not to bring into play all the military

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[228] *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 44.

[229] G. Lowes Dickinson: *The European Anarchy*, pp. 92–3; Morel: *Diplomacy Revealed*, p. 246. Quite appreciating the significance of "new political conditions," Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister, made lengthy report to the Czar with reference to "the problem of our own attitude" toward them: *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 363. See *ante*, cap. II, pp. 54–5.

strength available. Since Germany, in this matter, follows the example of France, it is felt here that the German Government's proposed military reforms are devoid of every aggressive character. . . . The necessity of filling up the vacancies in the army was explained by the Secretary of State by the fact that the present numerical strength of the French army is but a trifle less than that of the German army, and by the fact that the unfavorable geographical position of Germany compels her to defend both western and eastern frontiers.

"An additional reason why the German Government must feel anxiety about strengthening its military power must, in my opinion, also be sought for in the ever-increasing suspicion here of Austria-Hungary, who can hardly feel quite satisfied with the support given her by Berlin in her selfish policy. This view is shared by my French colleague, who likewise inclines to the belief that the relations between Berlin and Vienna are each day growing cooler, one might even say, more strained." [230]

The comment of the "Six Members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History" upon the Army Bill of 1913 is unintentionally favorable to Germany. After stating that in his supporting speech, the Chancellor made:

"reference to the new law for a return to three years' service which France was introducing to improve the efficiency of her peace establishment," the writers add: "But it was obvious that Russia was the main preoccupation." [231]

And, admitting the Russian preponderance in resources and preparation, they said:

"The revenue in Russia in 1913 was over £324,000,000; she has budgeted for £78,000,000 of military expenditure in 1914, of which some £15,000,000 is emergency expenditure. The total revenue of the German Empire in 1913 was £184,000,000; she has budgeted for a military expenditure in 1914 of £60,000,000. To adopt the usual German tests of comparison, Russia has a population of 173 millions to be defended on three land-frontiers, while Germany has a population of 65 millions to be defended on only two. The military efforts of Russia, therefore, have been on a scale relatively smaller than those of Germany." [232]

Whether Germany ought to have been satisfied with a position of military inferiority, merely because one (only) of her opponents was spending in preparation less per head of population, but in aggregate very much more, is not a difficult question to answer. Predominance in man-power, the Professors appear to think, gives title to predominance

[230] Siebert & Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 670–1. German relations with Austria-Hungary have been referred to *ante*, pp. 80–6.

[231] P. 45.

[232] P. 47.

in military efficiency. The smaller nation may be excused for having declined to admit the validity of the deduction.

Germany's apprehension of the rapidly increasing power of Russia was referred to in several of the reports of the Russian Ambassador in Berlin. On 12 March 1914, for example, he said:

"No wonder that in view of such considerations, the Germans are straining every nerve to be ready for war with us, and no wonder that they try to intimidate us, so as to avert the suspicion that Germany is afraid of Russia. Nevertheless, it is my conviction that between all the lines printed about Russo-German relations in the German newspapers of late one may always read fear of Russia." [233]

Simultaneous Preparation. It will be observed that the increases of 1913 in the French, Belgian, German and Russian armies were approximately simultaneous. In France, the Briand ministry, on 24 January 1913, announced, as part of its policy, an increase in both army and navy; and on 4 March, the Supreme War Council declared the necessity for extending the period of universal service from two years to three — with no exemptions. Change of ministry and delay by the War Department postponed the passage of the necessary bill until early in August.[234] In Belgium, the new Army Bill was introduced early in December 1912; was approved by the Central Commission of the Chamber on 10 January 1913; and passed both Houses by 20 June. In Germany, the new Army Bill was published on 28 March 1913, and was introduced in the Reichstag on 7 April.[235] In Russia, the budget was passed on 8 July. And the reasons for the respective actions of the Powers were identical — apprehension of war. Everybody was preparing.

German War-Navy — The Chancellor's Statement. Provision for a German war-navy, upon a serious scale, commenced under Admiral von Tirpitz in 1897, with an increased expenditure of only about a million dollars, but with a promised enhancement by 1904 of about seven and a half millions. The arrangement was soon superseded. In the session of 1899, announcement was made of an intention:

"to double the number of battleships and of the great ships employed on foreign service, while at the same time doing away with the squadron for coast defence." [236]

Explaining the reason for the proposal, von Bülow said:

"The proposed increase of the Navy has become necessary owing to the change in the international situation, and in the position of Ger-

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[233] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 711.

[234] *Ann. Reg.*, 1913, pp. [279, [281, [289.

[235] *Ibid.*, p. [308. *Cf.* Poincaré, *op. cit.*, p. 137, where the dates of the German submission to the Reichstag and the French submission to the Chamber are reversed.

[236] Stated by the Chancellor: *Ann. Reg.*, 1899, p. [279.

many with regard to transoceanic questions. The German Government had always pursued a tranquil middle course, equally removed from neglect of German interests and from extravagance. Events had begun to jostle each other in a manner which could not have been foreseen two years ago. . . . Scarcely a year and a half ago the Spanish-American war gave a new impetus to the movement of events, and has led to great results and far-reaching changes — ancient empires have been shaken; new countries are made to ferment by new kinds of leaven; and no one can say, no one can predict, what the consequences will be of the war which has set South Africa in flames during the last few weeks.[237] The forecast of Lord Salisbury — 'the strong States must become stronger and the weak States weaker' — had been confirmed by everything that had occurred since the remark had been made. Do we again stand before a fresh partition such as occurred 100 years ago? I would fain hope not, but in any case we cannot permit that any Power should say to us on occasion, 'What is to be done? The world is already divided.' We do not wish to interfere with any other country, but we do not wish that any other Power should interfere with us, should violate our rights, or push us aside either in political or commercial questions. It is time that, in view of the great change in the international situation, and in consideration of the great change which has taken place in the prospects of the future, we should make up our minds as to the attitude which we ought to adopt with regard to the changes which are in preparation all around us, and which perhaps may determine the distribution of power on our planet for an indefinite period. Germany cannot stand aside while other nations divide the world among them. The rapid increase of our population, the growth of our industry, the capacity of our merchants, — in brief, the keen vitality of the German people — have drawn us into the international market and bound our interests up with those of the whole world. If Englishmen speak of a *Greater Britain* and Frenchmen of a *Nouvelle France*, if Russia opens up Asia for herself, then we, too, have a right to a *Greater Germany*. . . . In the hitherto isolated cases, in which we have had to come to an agreement upon colonial questions with France, we have always been able to arrive at a friendly settlement without any difficulty. From Russia we have met with friendly treatment in these matters, and we gladly reciprocate. The good relations existing between us and the United States have recently been emphasized by President McKinley with a warmth of expression which gives us the sincerest satisfaction, and which we do not doubt that country will be prepared to confirm by deeds. As regards England, we

[237] The reference is to the war between the United Kingdom and the Boer States. Detention at sea, by the British navy, of the German vessels *Bundesrath* and *Herzog* tended to impress the German people with the necessity for addition to their naval strength.

are entirely prepared to live in peace and friendship with that Power on the basis of complete reciprocity and mutual consideration. But it is exactly because our internationai position is a favorable one that we must utilize it to make ourselves secure for the future. In the old diplomacy, one sphere of friction lasted a generation; nowadays new questions are constantly cropping up. We must be strong enough to be secure against surprises, not only on land but also at sea. We must build ourselves a fleet strong enough to exclude all possibility of an *attack* being made upon us. I underline the word 'attack' because there can be no question of an attack proceeding from us in view of the absolutely peaceful character of our policy. . . . German foreign policy — and this is not addressed to the Reichstag alone — is neither covetous, nor restless, nor fantastic. But to secure Kiao-Chau, Samoa, and the Carolines was no such simple matter. . . . The German pepole may be quite at its ease. Confiding in the rising star of the German nation, German policy will not let itself be beaten by any one. But what we must do is always to reckon with the conditions of the case. The older states with maritime interests require to have naval bases because of the necessities of coaling. We, too, must look about for coaling stations, though not to the extent attributed to our intentions by unfriendly foreign critics. Like other people, we have to cut our coat according to our cloth. But we are bound to recognize that the sphere of our maritime interests has developed far more rapidly than the naval resources which are required for their maintenance.

"History has been made with singular rapidity in the period immediately following our last Navy Act. In quick succession we have had the War between America and Spain, the troubles in Samoa, and, last of all, the war in South Africa, which has seriously affected our interests. . . . What has happened in these last two years has demonstrated how patriotic of the Reichstag it was to pass the last Navy Bill, and at the same time how indispensable the further development of that measure has become. A policy which diverged from the lines I have sketched would cease to be a business-like policy, and that is the only policy for us.

"Yet with all our transoceanic interest, we must not forget that our centre of gravity is in Europe, we must not forget that our position rests upon the unshaken Triple Alliance, and upon our friendly relations with Russia. The best pledge that our transoceanic policy will always be moderate lies in the necessity of keeping our strength in Europe always collected and ready.

"This must not, however, prevent us from carefully and conscientiously doing all we can for our maritime interests. Why do all other States strengthen their Navies? Italy devotes her energies to this task. The French Government cannot do enough to meet the desires of the representatives of the people for fresh demands for the Navy. Russia

has doubled the estimates for her fleets. America and Japan are making enormous exertions in the same direction. England endeavors without ceasing to make her gigantic fleet still greater. Without a great Navy, we cannot maintain our position in the world alongside of these States.

"In the coming century the German nation will be either the hammer or the anvil. Our general policy is peaceful and honest. It is exclusively a German policy. The question whether and when we might be compelled, in defence of our interests throughout the world, to abandon our reserve, depends upon the general course of events. It depends upon circumstances which no one can foresee or determine" [238]

In 1900 was introduced the promised bill, accompanied with an *exposé des motifs* in which was the following:

"To protect the Empire's sea trade and colonies, in view of present circumstances only one method can avail — Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that even the adversary possessed of the greatest sea power will attack it only with grave risk to himself. For our purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest Naval Power: for as a rule a great Naval Power will not be able to direct his whole striking force upon us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong German fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet." [239]

By way of arousing German sentiment to the support of the burdens imposed by the bill, the Kaiser, in his speeches made use of language which was both resented and ridiculed in the British press — for example:

"As my grandfather worked for the reconstitution of this army, so I will work without allowing myself to be checked to reconstitute this navy." [240]

"The German people, with its princes and its Emperor, was preparing to forge itself an arm with which the black, white and red flag would to all eternity at home and abroad maintain the dignity of the Empire." [241]

"Our future lies upon the water." [242]

"The trident belongs to our hands."

"Sea power is world power."

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[238] *Ann. Reg.*, 1899, pp. [279–282.

[239] Asquith, *op. cit.*, cap. X. *Cf.* J. Ellis Barker in *The Foundations of Germany*, p. 177.

[240] Speech, 1 Jan. 1900. See Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

[241] Speech on the return of Prince Henry (brother of the Kaiser) from China. See *Ann. Reg.*, 1900, p. [284.

[242] Speech, June 1901. See Dawson, *op. cit.*, II, p. 299.

"The Admiral of the Atlantic salutes the Admiral of the Pacific." [243]

"I will never rest until I have raised my Navy to a position similar to that occupied by my Army." [244]

From a German standpoint, Chancellor von Bülow recognized that the Kaiser's influence was very properly applied to the support of the bill. In his book, he has said:

"Ever since the end of the 'eighties in the nineteenth century the building of a fleet sufficient to defend our oversea interests had been a vital question for the German nation. It is greatly to the credit of the Emperor William II that he recognized this, and devoted all the power of the throne and all the strength of his own personality to the attainment of this end. . . . Parliamentary opposition, which at that time was considerable, could only be overcome if steady pressure were brought to bear on Parliament by public opinion. In view of the anxious and discouraged state of feeling that obtained in Germany during the ten years following Prince Bismarck's retirement, it was only possible to rouse public opinion by harping on the string of nationalism, and waking the people to consciousness." [245]

Contemplated enlargement of the German fleet was delayed by the launching of the British *Dreadnought* (10 February 1906), a new type suggested by the Russo-Japanese war. During two years — summer 1905 to summer of 1907 — not a single keel was laid down in Germany.[246] Further additions to the fleet were provided for by the laws of 1908 and 1912, with the effect that (if both the British and the German programmes were carried out) the battleships would be [247] as follows:

	Ready for Service	*Total on Mobilization*
Germany	25	38
Great Britain	49	57 (rising to 65)

To British people, Germany's emergence upon the sea was an impudent challenge: Britain it was who "ruled the waves." But, curiously enough, the French army chiefs did not altogether relish a diminution in German expenditure on warships. As Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, reported (29 February 1912), they:

"fear that if an agreement be reached between England and Germany, regarding the cessation, or at least a diminishing of the rivalry in naval armaments, the German Government would then be able to dispose of redoubled means of increasing its army — which would necessarily call forth counter-measures on the part of France and Russia." [248]

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[243] Dawson, *op. cit.*, II, p. 364.

[244] *The War Lord*, p. 48; Dawson, *op. cit.*, II, p. 364.

[245] *Imperial Germany*, pp. 19–20.

[246] Asquith, *op. cit.*, cap. X.

[247] *Ibid.*

[248] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, p. 634; *Un Livre Noir*, I, p. 201.

Navy-rivalry was the most important of the Anglo-Saxon rivalries, and constituted one of the roots of the war between the two countries.[249]

GERMANY IN 1913

Nowhere can one get a better analysis, if not a perfectly correct view of the state of public opinion in Germany in 1913 than in the reports of Jules Cambon (the very able French Ambassador at Berlin) and his assistants of 17 March, 6 May, and 22 November 1913, and the covering report to M. Pichon (French Minister of Foreign Affairs) of 30 July, 1913. They may be summarized as follows:

1. The Conference of Algeciras of 1906 has:

"removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an Entente between France, Great Britain, and Russia."

2. Evidently, the agreement between France and Great Britain by which, in case of war, 100,000 British soldiers were to be landed in France, had become known to the German Military staff.

3. Germany had been disappointed and humiliated by the surrender of her interests in Morocco under the treaty with France of 4 November 1911. The French ambassadorial report of 1912 had stated:

"We are discovering every day how deep and lasting are the feelings of injured pride and revenge provoked against us by the events of last year. The treaty of the 4th November 1911 has proved a complete disillusion. The feeling is the same in all parties. All Germans, even the Socialists, bear us a grudge for having taken away their share in Morocco. . . . People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again." [250]

4. Germany resented the heavy addition to the military strength of France (early in 1913) by the extension of the period of service from two to three years:

"For some time now it has been quite a common thing to meet people who declare that the military plans of France are extraordinary and unjustified. In a drawing room, a member of the Reichstag who is not a fanatic, speaking of the three years' service in France, went so far as to say, 'It is a provocation; we will not allow it.' More moderate persons, military and civil, glibly voice the opinion that France with her forty million inhabitants has no right to compete in this way with Germany." [251]

5. "France — a new France — undreamed of prior to the summer of 1911 is considered to be a warlike country, and to want war." [252]

6. The attitude of the German Emperor had changed:

"the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace. The person [253]

[249] See *post*, cap. XIX.
[250] Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 1, Enc. 1.
[251] Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 1, Enc. 1.
[252] *Ibid.*, No. 5.
[253] The King of the Belgians.

addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II, whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer, in his eyes, the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. William II has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later."

"If I [Jules Cambon] may be allowed to draw a conclusion, I would submit that it would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that the Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase which he likes to use, 'we must keep our powder dry.'" [254]

7. The change in attitude was due to several causes:

(1) The imminence of war in 1912–13:

"The crisis which we have just gone through has been very serious. Here the danger of war has been considered imminent. I have proof of the anxiety of the German Government by a number of facts which it is important that your Excellency should know." [255]

(2) The strengthening of the Franco-Russian Entente by the adhesion of the United Kingdom in connection with the Morocco incidents.

(3) "German public opinion" considered France as longing for war.

8. In the words of Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck:

"French people are quite wrong in thinking that we harbor evil designs and want war. But we cannot forget that, in 1870, popular opinion forced the French Government to make a foolish attack on us before they were ready. Who can assure us that public opinion, which in France is so easily inflamed, will not force the Government to declare war? It is against this danger that we wish to protect ourselves." [256]

9. "It must be emphasized again that the Government is doing everything to increase patriotic sentiment by celebrating with *éclat* all the various anniversaries of 1813." [257]

10. It is a mistake to "speak of a military party in Germany." There is "a war party," and there are the unorganized "forces making for peace."

"Those in favor of war are divided into several categories; each of these derives from its social caste, its class, its intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates, special arguments which create a general

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[254] Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 6.
[255] *Ibid.*, No. 3.
[256] *Ibid.*, No. 1, Enc. 2.
[257] *Ibid.*, No. 1, Enc. 1

attitude of mind and increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike desire." [258]

The "war party" is composed of:

(1) Those who consider war "inevitable."

(2) Those who consider war necessary for "economic reasons" or for "social reasons."

(3) Those who are:

"uneasy for the safety of the Empire, and believing that time is on the side of France, think that events should be brought to an immediate head."

(4) Those who are:

"bellicose from 'Bismarckism' as it may be termed. They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussion with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force. From their still recent past, they derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the events of recent years."

(5) "Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary France; others finally from a feeling of rancour. These are the people who heap up pretexts for war."

(6) "The country squires represented in the Reichstag by the Conservative party want at all costs to escape the death duties, which are bound to come if peace continues. . . . Finally, this social class which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realized with dread the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection threaten its material interests, but in addition, the number of its political representatives decreases with each legislative period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162 belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of this number 27 alone belong to the Right; 14 to the Centre; 7 to the Left; and one sits among the Socialists."

(7) "The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy at the democratization of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members in the Reichstag; in 1874, 155; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45."

(8) "Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity — all these regard war as good business."

(9) "Amongst the 'Bismarckians' must be reckoned officials of all kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free Conservatives or Imperial Party."

[258] *Ibid.*, No. 5.

(10) "The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so they say, is a crushing burden on the nations, it checks improvement in the lot of the masses, and assists the growth of socialism. France by clinging obstinately to her desire for revenge opposes disarmament. Once for all, she must be reduced, for a century, to a state of impotence; that is the best and speediest way of solving the social problem.

"Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other apologists for German *Kultur* wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wished to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession."

(11) "We have come finally to those whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancour and resentment. These are the most dangerous. They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion."

(12) "Must war then be considered as inevitable? It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the *Entente Cordiale* and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist, and will make themselves felt. The British fleet imposes a wholesome terror."

On the other hand, peace sentiment was represented by

(1) "The bulk of the workmen, artisans and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct."

(2) "Those members of the nobility detached from military interests and engaged in business, such as the *grands seigneurs* of Silesia and a few other personages very influential at Court, who are sufficiently enlightened to realize the disastrous political and social consequences of war, even if successful."

(3) "Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are chiefly supported by foreign capital."

(4) "Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and Schleswig-Holstein — conquered, but not assimilated and sullenly hostile to Prussian policy. There about 7,000,000 of these annexed Germans."

(5) "Finally, the Governments and the governing classes in the large southern states — Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, and the Grand Duchy of Baden — are divided by these two opinions: — an unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they have derived great economic advantages, a successful war would only profit

Prussia and Prussianisation, against which they have difficulty in defending their political independence and administrative autonomy."

(6) "These classes of people either consciously or instinctively prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenceless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling."

(7) "Finally, it must be observed that these supporters of peace believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other solution for the present situation. In certain contracts, especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however, that the will of the Emperor on the one side, France's difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a guarantee of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free play to those who favor war." [259]

"THE CHOSEN MOMENT"

There still remains for treatment the frequently repeated statement that Germany, having made diligent preparation for war, launched it at the moment which best suited her purpose — at "the selected moment," or, as Sir Edward Grey phrased it in his speech before the Foreign Press Association on 23 October 1916, at "the chosen moment." [260] The charge is easily answered.

1. Publication of the Foreign Office records of Germany and Austria-Hungary makes perfectly clear not only that Germany did not select 1914 for a European war, but that she was strongly opposed to its outbreak. Unquestionably, she agreed to the Austro-Hungarian pressure upon Serbia, and urged expedition in its prosecution; for, in her view, punishment of Serbia was necessary for the maintenance, unimpaired, of the integrity of the Dual Monarchy, and, consequently, for Germany's own military security. But it is equally unquestionable that when Serbia, in her reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands, made extensive submission, and when it became apparent that a local war would immediately take on European proportions, Germany endeavored to effect accommodation of the difficulty. The subject is fully dealt with in a subsequent chapter.[261]

2. Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the German navy, has been particularly pointed at as a chief of the militarist class who dominated the German government and precipitated the war. Had not he been waiting for the completion of the Kiel canal, and, now that it could pass his big warships, was not he eager for hostilities? He

[259] Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 5.
[260] *Current History*, V, p. 455.
[261] Cap. XXVII.

was not. He was building a formidable navy, but it was still far from competent for war with the United Kingdom, and few people were more disappointed by its outbreak than Tirpitz. How do we know that? Note the following:

(1) Tirpitz has devoted a good many pages of his book, *My Memoirs*, to a defence of his policy, and to complaints of the diplomatic proceedings which precipitated the war. He wanted further years for preparation.[262] In the events which immediately preceded the outbreak, Tirpitz had no share. He says:

"As, however, the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister for War, the Chief of the Naval Staff, and myself were kept away from Berlin during the succeeding days, the whole business was monopolized by the Chancellor, who, having no experience himself of the great European world, was unable to estimate correctly the value of his colleagues in the Foreign Office. The Chancellor at any rate did not write to me for advice." [263]

(2) Baron Beyens, at the outbreak of the war Belgian Ambassador at Berlin, wrote in his book, *L'Allemagne avant la Guerre*, as follows:

"Hostilities broke out sooner than he (von Tirpitz) had foreseen or desired, and when he was not yet ready for the attack. A few years more, and Tirpitz would doubtless have surprised his adversary with a war different from what he expected — a war in the air, a treacherous and submarine war, which would have compensated for numerical inferiority." [264]

(3) That was well understood in the United Kingdom, where the failure of the Tirpitz policy of delay was regarded as a matter for congratulation. In *The Navy* for April 1915, for example, was the following:

"We know from the terms of the Navy Law of 1912 that there was a scheme on hand to bring into being a self-contained fleet for foreign service which would have surpassed in numbers and strength any corresponding force maintained in distant waters by other nations, not excluding the British Empire. Happily for us, this grandiose plan had not matured when the war broke out. Had it done so, the task of sweeping the seas and keeping open the trade routes would have been a stupendous one, and, to do it thoroughly, we should have had to reduce our strength in home waters to a dangerous minimum. A few years hence, Germany would have had 30,000-ton battle cruisers on the China Station; in the Mediterranean; and at other strategical points; together with a great army of fast, lightly-armed vessels, each of which would have been a potential *Emden*." [265]

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[262] I, pp. 165, 190, 236, 238, 241–287.
[263] *Ibid.*, p. 243. And see p. 246.
[264] P. 129.
[265] P. 104.

RESPONSIBILITY

We have now passed in review the general character of the military preparations for war which were being made by the four greatest European Powers. Readers who desire more detailed information will find it in Mr. Newbold's book, *How Europe Armed for War*. Everywhere the existence of danger was realized; everywhere the dread of defeat was leading to excessive expenditure and to intimate exchanges of strategic plans between the military staffs.

Who was to blame? Reply is not easy. Germany feared Russia and France, and had no confidence in Italy and Roumania. On the other hand, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom feared Germany. France still harbored designs upon Alsace-Lorraine. Russia and Germany were engaged in natural rivalry for predominance at Constantinople. The interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary sharply conflicted in the Balkans. The United Kingdom, for reasons elsewhere explained, had attached herself to France and Russia. War had been but narrowly escaped in 1899–1902, 1904, 1905–6, 1908–9, 1911, 1912–13. Each nation declined to play the part of the foolish virgins.

It was probably because of a feeling of unpreparedness on the part of France that the Morocco crisis of 1911 was successfully passed. In that year, Paul Cambón was the very able French representative in England, and, on 21 September 1911, the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at London reported that Cambon had said:

"France is convinced that the war will be forced upon her. But both France and her allies are of the opinion that the war — even at the expense of greater sacrifices — must be postponed to a later time, that is to say until the year 1914–15. The necessity of this postponement is required less by France's material preparedness for war, which is complete, than by the organization of the upper command, which is not yet finished. The delay is wanted also by Russia. England alone will derive no advantage from this arrangement, because the superiority of her fleet over that of Germany decreases each year. Out of consideration for the preparedness of her allies, France urges that an understanding be reached with Germany for the present." [266]

Much can be urged in support of the view of von Bethmann-Hollweg:

"The controversy as to which party gave the first impulse to a programme of general armament, and to a perversion of the policy of alliances will probably never be fought to a finish. Immeasurable distrust, imperialistic ideals, and a patriotism restricted to material national instincts, respectively worked each other up without its ever being possible to say that any particular nation had contributed most to the general tendency of the world." [267]

[266] Bogitshevich, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

[267] *Reflections on the World War*, p. 169.

Could existing differences in 1914 have been amicably arranged? No. Occasions for outbreak of war might, by possibility, from time to time have been adjusted. But war alone could settle or make an appearance of settling disputes involving territorial re-arrangements — could reconcile France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, or Roumania to the *status quo*. War at some period being inevitable, war-preparation was unavoidable.

And yet to what cataclysmic end must such preparations always lead! The very burden of them makes release by war acceptable. Diplomats had agreed that the French three-year service law created financial obligations that could not long be borne; and Sir Edward Grey, one of the clearest-headed of international experts, foretold disaster. He said:

"If this tremendous expenditure on armaments goes on, it must, in the long run, break down civilization. You are having this great burden of force piled up in times of peace, and if it goes on increasing by leaps and bounds as it has done in the last generation, in time it will become intolerable. There are those who think it will lead to war, precisely because it is becoming intolerable. I think it is much more likely the burden will be dissipated by internal revolution — not by nations fighting against each other, but by revolt of masses of men against taxation. . . . The great nations of the world are in bondage to their armies and navies at the present moment — increasing bondage." [268]

Sir Edward was too sanguine. Preparation did lead to war. The internal revolutions have followed. But the burden has not yet been "dissipated," or even put in the way of dissipation. On the contrary, it is more grievous than before.

[268] Morel: *Truth and the War*, p. 164.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ALSACE-LORRAINE ROOT

ALSACE-LORRAINE AND THE WAR

M. Gabriel Hanotaux, one time French Foreign Minister, has well said that:

"The war of 1914 is closely connected with the war of 1870. In consecrating, by the treaty of Frankfort, the dismemberment of France, Bismarck (who often protested that he did not do it altogether willingly) left, in the bleeding wound in the side of that noble country the germ of future ills." [1]

Mr. Sydney Brooks has expressed his view as to the effect of the forced cession of Alsace-Lorraine upon European politics, and particularly upon the recent war, in the following language:

"The question of Alsace-Lorraine is usually and justly spoken of in terms of politics and sentiment. And these undoubtedly are the aspects that have made it for forty years the true pivot of all European affairs. The incurable antagonisms which resulted from Germany's determination to hold Alsace-Lorraine and from the silent but passionate longing of France to regain her lost provinces have been the root cause of all the alliances, all the diplomatic adventures, all the groupings and re-groupings of the Powers, and especially of the monstrous growth of armaments, that have made up the sorry tale of Europe during the past four decades. So far as the measureless cataclysm in which the whole world is now engulfed can be traced back to any single source, that source is Alsace-Lorraine. Europe had no chance of a sane and stable peace so long as the greatest nation in Europe could neither forget nor forgive the brutal injury of which she had been the victim. France is not fighting to-day for conquest but for justice and restitution. What the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine may mean to her commercially and materially, she neither knows nor cares. The impulse that fires and sustains her people is the resolve to right the wrong of 1870, and to reunite to *la patrie* the cherished and essential parts that were wrenched from it. And that resolve will either be realized to the full, or France is crushed and the Allies lose the war." [2]

[1] *Histoire Illustrée de la Guerre de 1914*, p. 7.

[2] *North American Rev.*, Nov. 1917, p. 695. *Cf.* André Tardieu: *The Truth about the Treaty*, pp. 10, 234–7. Mr. G. B. Gooch has said: "From that disastrous error in judgment dates the division of Europe into two armed camps, the

Mr. Asquith, in October 1917, after saying that Germany "filched from France less than fifty years ago" Alsace-Lorraine, "the symbol of French humiliation," continued as follows:

"It is, as I pointed out the other day, this act of crude and short-sighted spoliation which was the root and source of the unrest, of the unstable equilibrium, of the competition in armaments, which have afflicted Europe during the lifetime of two generations, and have culminated in the most terrible war in history." [3]

Mr. Lloyd George, in a public address at Westminster (5 January 1918), said:

"We must stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, without any regard for the wishes of the population, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the German Empire. This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half a century. There can be no better illustration of the folly and wickedness of using a transient military success to violate national right." [4]

The eighth of President Wilson's celebrated Fourteen Points was as follows:

"All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all."

M. Ribot, the French Prime Minister, speaking in the Chamber of Deputies regarding a government motion, said (5 June 1917):

"What does this resolution say? It states that we do not follow a policy of conquest or of enslavement. We have groaned for 45 years under this policy, which is not ours, and the revenge of to-day is not the revenge of oppression, but the revenge of the ideas of justice, of liberty, and of equilibrium, of which the whole of France have been the defenders." [5]

M. Poincaré (President of the French Republic 1913–1920, and afterwards Prime Minister) in his recent book said:

"There had undoubtedly been for forty-five years a persistent mis-

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victors seeking allies to guarantee their new possessions, the vanquished seeking associates to reverse the verdict of Sedan" (*Contemporary Rev.*, March 1921, p. 187). Just in time for reference in this foot-note comes to hand the excellent booklet *Franco-German Relations 1871–1914* by Mr. Gooch.

[3] London *Times*, 12 Oct. 1917. Mr. Asquith had said at Leeds on 26 September (*Times*, 27 Sept. 1917): "That act of highhanded and shortsighted violence, which Europe ought to have protested, is the primary, though not of course the only cause of the race in armaments which went on at an ever-accelerated pace between the Great Powers for forty years before this war broke out."

[4] *The Times*, 7 Jan. 1918.

[5] *The Times*, 6 June 1917.

understanding between Germany and France. The one did not understand that the other had decided not to become her 'brilliant second.' Austria had forgotten Sadowa. Why did not France — conquered, offended, despoiled of two provinces — also joyously agree to accept the hegemony of the conqueror? For her to be pacific, tranquil, resigned, was not enough; Germany wanted something more than loyalty, courtesy, and consideration; she wanted to wrest from France, with tender embracements, the definite acceptance of the Treaty of Frankfort, and then bind us, complacent and passive, to her own destinies." [6]

"The one thing which all our Governments in succession, ever since 1871, refused to do was to renounce their own private sentiments, to repudiate the two lost French provinces, to be guilty of a cowardly betrayal. France was too proud and too fair to disguise her regrets in any kind of deceptive formulæ, or to qualify with mental reservations a political *entente* with Germany." [7]

"She was conscious that she had always kept to herself the feelings of sadness and regret left behind by her defeat of 1870 and the loss of her provinces." [8]

After referring to the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1908), Poincaré added:

"There were thus existing, both in the west and east of Europe, two great injustices, two visible attacks on human conscience, two continuous scandals, which vitiated continental organization and weakened the supports of European peace." [9]

During his years of diplomatic intercourse with von Bethmann-Hollweg (the German Chancellor) M. Jules Cambon (the French Ambassador at Berlin) found that the maintenance of silence as to French feeling was not always possible. On the contrary, the Chancellor tells us that Cambon was:

"also bound in honor to recognize that neither 1870 nor Alsace-Lorraine were forgotten, and that longing for reparation of the injuries then suffered constituted an element in French policy dominating all more ephemeral events and calculated to cause the most momentous developments whenever the situation became in any way difficult." [10]

To the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, Cambon declared (10 February 1909) that the recent Franco-German agreement with reference to the Morocoo dispute was a "façade" agreement, and that:

"Paris was of like opinion, because the Morocco question, important as it might have become, was still, at bottom, only of secondary — of colonial — importance, whereas the true reasons for the impossibility

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[6] *The Origins of the War*, p. 16.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 255.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 96.
[10] *Reflections*, p. 11.

of establishing a real understanding between France and Germany lay far too deep to be removed by means of diplomatic documents." [11]

On more than one occasion, von Bethmann-Hollweg expressed his regret that such amicable exchanges of view as from time to time occurred between Germany and Russia, and Germany and the United Kingdom, were not possible as between Germany and France.[12] Poincaré resented approaches of that sort. On 28 October 1912, Isvolsky, the Russian Ambassador at Paris, reported as follows:

"Poincaré said to me that his public declarations with reference to the fidelity of France to her alliance had, among other objects, that of persuading the Berlin Cabinet of the inutility of its attempts to draw the French Government into a new groupment of the Powers." [13]

More than three years prior to the recent war, Nekludoff, in reporting from the Russian embassy in Paris (14 December 1910) said:

"The France of the present day really wishes peace; her governments principally fear war; but the wound dealt in 1870 to French ambition will not heal for a long time, and if finally France should enter on hostilities, the immense majority of the nation would be carried away by an explosion of the most ardent patriotism." [14]

He was right. After referring to the earlier effects of the Franco-Russian alliance as having induced colonial rivalry with the United Kingdom, Nekludoff added:

"But the idea of 'revanche' became stronger and more determined than during the time of Gambetta and Jules Ferry, whose prudent opportunism seemed to be already an out-of-date system, not corresponding with the reconstituted French forces." [15]

When announcing the outbreak of the war of 1914 to the French Senators and Deputies, President Poincaré said:

"For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace, have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation." [16]

In the same vein, M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, said:

"Germany can reproach us with nothing. Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which Germany dealt us, we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice." [17]

The diplomatic world was well aware in 1870 that the attitude of France would be one of awaiting an opportunity. In the *Quarterly Review* of October of that year, Lord Salisbury declared that:

"Europe will look on while France is watching Prussia with affected

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[11] Siebert and Schreiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 488–9.
[12] *Un Livre Noir*, II, p. 362.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 564.
[14] *Ibid.*, I, p. 5.
[15] *Ibid.*, I, p. 7.
[16] Fr. Yell. Bk., 1914, No. 158.
[17] *Ibid.*

amity but with unsleeping hatred, waiting till her enemy makes some false step or falls into trouble from war, or revolution, or misgovernment; sacrificing all other objects of policy to the one hope of retaliating in some moment of weakness upon the conqueror who has despoiled her." [18]

British statesmen remained of that opinion during the forty-three years of interval between the wars. As von Bethmann-Hollweg has said:

"England was well aware that the eyes of France were steadfastly fixed upon Alsace-Lorraine, and could hear the deep notes of the *revanche motif* sounding even through the harmonies of Russo-French fraternization." [19]

It was, therefore, quite in accordance with Anglo-French understanding that on 15 November 1917, in answer to a question in the House of Commons as to:

"when the British Government agreed to support the French Government in making the restitution of Alsace and Lorraine an essential item in our war aims?"

Lord Robert Cecil replied that the restitution "was a well-understood war aim from the moment we entered the war." [20]

FRENCH AND PRUSSIAN ATTITUDES, 1870

If it be true, as it undoubtedly is, that the possession of Alsace-Lorraine has been:

"the root of all the alliances, all the diplomatic adventures, all the groupings and re-groupings of the Powers, and especially of the monstrous growth of armaments." [21]

it follows that responsibility for the recent war, in its European expansion, depends, to a very large extent, upon responsibility for the war

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[18] Reproduced in the *Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury*, by Lady Gwendolen Cecil, II, p. 36.

[19] *Reflections*, p. 13.

[20] This and other statements did not pass without adverse comment in England. One gentleman, for example, who had (as he said) "addressed many and successful recruiting meetings," complained as follows: "We were told that we drew the sword to vindicate the faith of a treaty, flagrantly violated in the invasion of Belgium, and to prevent in our own interests the annexation by Germany of the Channel littoral of France, and the French Colonies. The war was stated to be one of defence against wanton and wicked military aggression, and it was on that ground that thousands of the youth of the country were urged to join the colors, and nobly responded to that appeal. It now appears that we are out for conquest, not for ourselves but for other people. Alsace-Lorraine is to be annexed to France; Trieste and the Southern Tyrol to Italy; and to-day I see that the latter Power demands also Dalmatia 'for strategic reasons' while Roumania is to get a large slice of Austrian territory in the shape of Transylvania. We are also invited to concern ourselves with that hotbed of troubles, the Balkan Peninsula" (*Common Sense*, 19 Jan. 1918).

[21] *Ante*, p. 574.

of 1870–1. Understanding of that episode, therefore, is of essential importance. As aids to its study, the following observations and quotations are submitted:[22]

Sadowa. By the Prussian victory over Austria at Sadowa (1866), "all the calculations of Napoleon III were upset."[23] He had looked forward to a protracted war, and to French intervention with a view to French profit. The astonishing rapidity of the Prussian success had left him only the self-assumed rôle of mediator, and even in that part he was left little to do. Indeed, his principal occupation was unequal negotiation with Bismarck for some territorial "compensation" for France because of the aggrandizement of Prussia. He wanted expansion to the left bank of the Rhine, or over Belgium, or Luxemburg, or both. He got nothing, and France saw herself in danger of descent from the hegemony of Europe. As Sorel has said:

"In France, the *amour-propre* was wounded by the military successes of Prussia, the national sentiment disturbed by the expansions of that State. People felt that political prestige and the preponderance in Europe had escaped from them with the monopoly of brilliant victories. For the country, this was a grave enfeeblement and a danger for the future; for the Empire, it was a disaster and a question of dynasty. . . . Sadowa became for the supporters of the Empire the most cruel of irritations."[24]

For a time, Napoleon persisted in his fruitless diplomatic endeavors, while:

"by turns careless and passionate, the nation slumbered, dreaming of the '*revanche* of Sadowa.'"[25]

"The victory of Prussia came to be regarded by the Imperialist party as a humiliation which it was essential to avenge."[26]

Referring to the incident out of which the war of 1870 arose — the succession to the Spanish throne — Lord Lyons, the very capable British Ambassador at Paris, said in July of that year:

"The wound inflicted by Sadowa on French pride had never been completely healed — nevertheless, time had begun to produce the effect of reconciling men's minds to what was done and could not be helped, and irritation was subsiding. Now this unhappy affair has revived all the old animosity; the Government and the people have alike made it a point

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[22] Exhaustive discussion of the subject could not be attempted in a single chapter. A French commission has for several years been engaged in publishing the documents bearing upon *Les Origines Diplomatiques de la Guerre de 1870–1.* The series commences with a report of 24 Dec. 1863. Vol. XIII has been published, bringing the documents down to 31 Dec. 1866. Further volumes are yet to appear.

[23] Sorel: *Histoire Diplomatique de la Guerre Franco-Allemande*, I, p. 19.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[26] *Cambridge Modern History*, XI, p. 576. See also Monroe Smith: *Bismarck*, pp. 43–9.

of honor to prevent the accession of the Prince, and they have gone too far to recede." [27]

Prague. During the peace-mediation between Prussia and Austria (1866), Napoleon procured Bismarck's assent to the principle of self-determination by the people of the Duchy of Schleswig — a popular vote was to settle whether it should become part of Prussia, or part of Denmark; and a clause to that effect was inserted in the peace treaty of Prague. The referendum was not held;[28] Prussia remained in possession; the omission gave to her an unmerited expansion; and France (although not a party to the treaty) felt that she had been duped. "Reparations" for Sadowa and Prague became, for her, a patriotic obsession, even as, after 1871, became the return of Alsace-Lorraine.

Emperor, Ministers, and People. If the Emperor Napoleon was not consistently in favor of war with Prussia in 1870, it was only because he was anxiously apprehensive as to its outcome.[29] Keenly aware of the fact that his European diplomacies had miscarried;[30] that withdrawal from Mexico at the demand of the United States had damaged his prestige; and that, on the other hand, Bismarck's imperialisms had been astonishingly successful,[31] he felt that security for himself and his dynasty would be much helped by a successful appeal to arms,[32] but he knew also that failure meant abdication. The Empress:

"fanatically anxious for the overthrow of a great Protestant Power, passionately eager for the military glory which alone could insure the crown to her son," [33] pressed for war. Of the members of the Cabinet, Gra-

[27] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 10.

[28] The clause of the treaty was abrogated by arrangement with Austria, but not until Oct. 1878: Oakes & Mowat: *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century*, p. 252, note; *Ann. Reg.*, 1879, p. 22. After a lapse of fifty years, the people of North Schleswig have now voted for incorporation with Denmark.

[29] Austria-Hungary, with whom the Emperor was in negotiation, had declared that she would not be ready until the spring of 1871: J. Holland Rose, *The Development of the European Nations*, pp. 35–7.

[30] The celebrated draft Benedetti treaty is in Br. Blue Bk., C–189.

[31] Morley: *Life of Gladstone*, II, p. 319; *Fortnightly Rev.*, Oct. 1917, pp. 512–13.

[32] Malleson: *The Refounding of the German Empire*, p. 214; J. Holland Rose: *The Development of the European Nations*, p. 29.

[33] C. A. Fyffe: *History of Modern Europe*, III, p. 420. And see Fitzmaurice, *Lord Granville*, II, p. 52. In the opinion of Pierre de la Gorce, "It was she [the Empress] who, on the French side, was the principal artisan of the war" (*Histoire du Second Empire*, VI, p. 294. Sorel said of her: "The Empress Eugenie, at the time frivolous, heroic, and passionate, like most of the women of her race, conceived the Empire as a beautiful historical romance; deceived by her imagination and the flatteries of her courtiers, trembling for the future of her son, she thought to renew by victory his title to the throne of Napoleon. . . . She had influence, and that influence was bad" (*op. cit.*, I, pp. 75–6). Comte Fleury, in his *Memoirs of the Empress Eugenie*, contends (II, cap. 7) that neither the Emperor nor the Empress was in favor of war, but points to no very earnest effort to avert it. Readers of the present chapter will be able to form their own opinions.

mont, the Foreign Minister,[34] and Leboeuf, the Minister for War,[35] were anxious for war. The Prime Minister, Ollivier, weakly favored peace, but was without authority. After it appeared that Gramont's action had made war inevitable, he (Ollivier) determined (he has told us) that, rather than resign, he would endeavor "to attenuate the effect of the *démarche*," [36] considering that his resignation would be followed by the accession to power of a reactionary ministry — to the greater prejudice of his country.[37] He did little, and the stronger men had their way. The French people and press — so far at least as these were represented in Paris — were, from the initiation of the crisis (the Spanish-throne episode) clamorous for war. In parliament, the Right, the Legitimists, and the Orleanists insisted upon it. And eventually, the Emperor could, with some truth, say:

"that it is the whole nation which has, by its irresistible impulse, dictated our decision." [38]

Prussian Attitude. Of King William and Queen Augusta, Bismarck has left the following sketch:

"He was seventy-three years old, a lover of peace, and disinclined to risk the laurels of 1866 in a fresh struggle; but when he was free from the feminine influence, the sense of honor of the heir of Frederick the Great, and of a Prussian officer, always remained paramount. Against the opposition of his consort, due to her natural feminine timidity and lack of national feeling, the King's power of resistance was weakened by his knightly regard for the lady and his kingly consideration for a Queen, and especially for his own Queen. I have been told that Queen Augusta implored her husband with tears, before his departure from Ems to Berlin, to bear in mind Jena and Tilsit and avert war. I consider the statement authentic, even to the tears." [39]

The Chancellor, Bismarck; the Minister of War, von Roon; and the Chief of Staff, von Moltke, were as anxious for war as were Gramont and Lebœuf. Bismarck (as he tells us) regarded:

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[34] In the opinion of Messrs. Ward and Wilkinson, Gramont was "a vehement adversary of the advance of Prussia in Germany," and "regarded a Prussian war as inevitable" (Germany, II, p. 415). Fyffe says (*op. cit.*, III, p. 414) that "there is no doubt that, from the beginning to the end, the Duke of Gramont, with short intermissions, pressed with insane ardor for war." He had desired that France should intervene in the war between Prussia and Austria in 1866. In his book, he speaks of "the fatal day when that memorable abstention of 1866 prevailed in the councils of the crown which was the foundation of great Prussia and the source of all her power" (*La France et la Prusse avant la Guerre*, p. 142. *Cf.* de la Gorce, *op cit.*, VI, pp. 216–7, 224, 241).

[35] Ward and Wilkinson referred to him as "the bellicose Lebœuf" (*op. cit.*, II, p. 416).

[36] Ollivier: *L'Empire Liberal*, XIV, p. 270.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 274; Fyffe, *op. cit.*, III, p. 421; Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, p. 139.

[38] Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 12, Enc. An analysis of the British Blue Book may be seen in *Ann. Reg.*, 1871, pp. 248–54.

[39] *Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, p. 95.

"the outbreak of the war between France and Germany" as something "which was evidently coming sooner or later."[40]

"That a war with France," he said, "would succeed that with Austria, lay in the logic of history, even had we been able to allow the Emperor Napoleon the petty expenses which he looked for from us as a reward for his neutrality."[41]

Bismarck held his French diplomatic opponents in contempt. He described the Emperor as *une grande incapacité méconnue*, and he declared that Gramont was the greatest blockhead (*dummkopf*) in Europe.[42] The story of 1870 confirms the estimates. The Prussian official press maintained an attitude of indifference until two days before the French declaration of war. The unofficial newspapers interchanged railings with the French.[43]

THE SPANISH THRONE

Prince Leopold. The Spanish people, dissatisfied with their sovereign, Isabella II, deposed her (30 September 1868), and the military leaders, under General Prim, initiated search for a successor. After various failures, Prince Leopold, a member of the Roman Catholic Sigmaringen branch of the House of Hohenzollern, was thought of (spring 1869), but it was not until June 1870 that a tentative offer of the throne was made to him[44] and conditionally accepted. That the scheme originated with Bismarck has often been alleged, but never proved. Sorel did not believe it.[45] Ollivier did, but had no proof — "since the truth," he said, "would have been too ugly to reveal."[46] In a telegram of 3 July 1870, Mercier, the French Ambassador at Madrid, relates that he said to Prim:

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[40] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 41. And see pp. 56, 57. Bismarck was by no means alone in his forecast. Edgar Sanderson, in a passage recently quoted by Archibald Hurd (*Fortnightly Rev.*, Feb. 1917, p. 244), said: "The attitude and conduct of Louis Napoleon and his Government towards Prussia became restless, irritating, and intrusive; and though war was for a time averted in a dispute about Luxemburg, it was certain that a struggle for continental supremacy was not far distant": *Outlines of the World's History*.

[42] Professor Munroe Smith: *Bismarck*, p. 53.

[43] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 335.

[44] *Cf.* Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 52–6.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 54. Gramont has it that the suggestion of Leopold's accession to the throne had been abandoned in 1869; that General Prim, unknown to his colleagues, revived the idea and wrote to Bismarck; that the letter remained unanswered for three months; that Bismarck then replied "that the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern was in itself an excellent thing, which ought not to be abandoned and which, at a given moment, might be opportune;" and that thereupon Prim proceeded to its accomplishment: *Op. cit.*, pp. 19–21. *Cf.* de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 209.

[46] *Op. cit.*, XIV, p. 521.

"Oh! I have seen very well for a long time that Bismarck was seeking to intermeddle in your affairs, and you will admit that if he did not believe that he had much to gain there, he would not have risked playing so big a game."

Prim replied:

"You deceive yourself. The overtures came from here. I have never talked politics either with M. Bernhardi, or with M. de Canitz."[47] Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, relating an interview with the King of Prussia, reported (9 July 1870) that the King had said that the negotiations had taken place between the Spanish government and Leopold, and that the Prussian government not only remained outside them, but was ignorant of them, although he (the King) had communicated to Bismarck his relation to them. Benedetti added:

"As Sovereign and King of Prussia, His Majesty had taken no part in this affair, and the cabinet of Berlin was not responsible for an arrangement of which it was entirely ignorant.[48]

Lord Fitzmaurice, in his *Life of Lord Granville*, indicates that the idea of Leopold's candidature originated in Spain.[49] The Prince at first declined the proposal. His father, Prince Antoine, writing to his other son, King Charles of Roumania (20 March 1870), said as follows:

"I have been in Berlin for a fortnight on most important family matters. No less is in question than the acceptance or refusal of the Spanish Crown for Leopold, which has officially been offered to him by the Spanish Government under the seal of secrecy, it being a European secret of State.

"The question occupies people here very much. Bismarck desires acceptance for dynastic and political reasons, but the King only if Leopold accepts willingly. On March 15th, there was here a very interesting and important Council (Beratung), presided over by the King. There were present the Crown Prince, Leopold and I, Bismarck, Roon, Moltke, Schleinitz, Thile and Delbrück. The unanimous resolution was in favour of acceptance because this was a Prussian patriotic duty. Leopold has declined for many reasons after a great struggle. However, as Spain desires before all a Roman Catholic Hohenzollern prince, I have proposed your brother Fritz instead of Leopold."[50]

Bismarck has denied the truth of this statement:

"The Memoirs of his Majesty the King of Roumania are not accurately informed as regards details of the ministerial co-operation in the question. The ministerial council in the palace which he mentions did not take place. Prince Anthony was living as the King's guest in

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[47] Gramont, *op. cit.*, p. 365; Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 14–15.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 371, 5, 6.

[49] Vol. II, pp. 30–1. *Cf.* de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 193–209.

[50] *Fortnightly Rev.*, Oct. 1917, p. 517. The negotiations are detailed by Ward and Wilkinson: *Germany*, II, pp. 420–9. And see Fyffe, *op. cit.*, III, p. 413.

the palace, and had invited him and some of the ministers to dinner. I scarcely think that the Spanish question was discussed at table." [51]
Whether the matter came before a Council or not, there is little doubt that Bismarck very strongly urged acceptance of the offer. King Charles entered in his diary on 2 March:

"Count Bismarck pleads with great warmth that Prince Leopold should accept the Spanish Crown. He demonstrates, in a memoir of his to King William of Prussia, the great importance for Germany of having a Hohenzollern Prince on the Spanish Throne; that it would be politically invaluable to have in France's rear a country friendly to Germany." [52]

The assent of the King of Prussia — not as King, but as head of the House of Hohenzollern — was necessary, and, as Sorel relates:

"The King limited himself, 28 June 1870, to declaring to him (Leopold) that he did not believe it his duty to put any obstacle in his way. He intervened only in the quality of chief of the family: he did not call his council together, and he consulted nobody." [53]

Leopold finally consented to submission of his name as a candidate for the throne, and on the second of July the Spanish government decided to recommend the selection to the Cortes which was to be summoned for the 20th of the same month.[54] The next day the French Government became aware of these facts.

French Objection. French objection to the establishment of a Hohenzollern on the throne was, as the present writer thinks, not unreasonable. It was the sort of objection which had led to the war of the Spanish Succession. German influence had (1866) been strengthened by the accession of Leopold's brother to the Roumanian throne. The same result, probably, would have followed the elevation of Leopold in Spain. Dynastic arrangements have always been regarded as extremely important factors in European politics. At the same time, it may be observed that:

"although Prince Leopold bore the name of Hohenzollern, the connection with the ruler of Prussia dated very far back, whilst he was more recently related through the Beauharnais family with Napoleon III. On the other hand, it must be admitted, the friendship of the Sigmaringen branch with the ruling family of Prussia was intimate; the prince's father had been the first prime minister to King William; and it was he, it is believed, who first suggested to the King the appointment of Bismarck to the post of prime minister." [55]

[51] *Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, p. 89.

[52] *Fortnightly Rev.*, Oct. 1917, p. 516.

[53] Benedetti's report of 9 July 1870, referred to by Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, p. 76. *Cf.* Gramont, *op. cit.*, pp. 371, 5, 6; de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 210.

[54] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, Nos. 1, 24.

[55] Malleson, *op. cit.*, p. 211. See upon this point Bismarck, *op. cit.*, II, p. 89; *Fortnightly Rev.*, Oct. 1917, p. 510; Fyffe, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 412–3; de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 191, 201.

France and Spain. French objection should, one would think, have been addressed to Spain, but to that government not a word of protest was offered between the 3d of July (when Leopold's acceptance became known) and the outbreak of war. General Prim has testified as follows:

"During the days which followed the announcement of this candidature, up to the time when the attitude of France was known, no one endeavored to make the least observation to me, neither was any made in France to the Spanish Ambassador, nor in Madrid to the French Ambassador." [56]

Ollivier declares that Prim was wrong, but offers very little in support of his assertion. He appears, moreover, to excuse the absence of remonstrance by saying that Prim's activities indicated that:

"our representations would not be accepted, that they would not consent to a discussion with us, and that we were in the presence of an irrevocable decision." [57]

And he read in the Corps Législatif, on the 15th July, as part of the government's declaration announcing the breach with Prussia:

"In these negotiations, we have asked nothing of Spain, of whom we wished neither to awaken the susceptibilities nor to wound the independence." [58]

Gramont, in his book, indicated as the reason for not delivering a protest to Spain, that:

"It would not be advisable for the French government to place itself in opposition to a national manifestation of the Spanish people." [59]

Conclusive evidence upon the point is furnished by the report of Mr. A. H. Layard, the British Ambassador at Madrid (25 July 1870):

"As the Duc de Gramont, in his circular to the Diplomatic Agents of the Empire, dated the 21st of this month, states that, so far back as the month of March of last year (1869), the French Ambassador at Berlin was requested to inform Count Bismarck of the views which the Emperor's Government would take of the election of a Hohenzollern Prince to the Spanish Throne — an idea which the Duc de Gramont declares was not a new one; that Count Benedetti, in several interviews which he had on this topic with the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, and the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, did not leave them in ignorance that France would never admit that a Prussian Prince should reign beyond the Pyrenees; and that M. de Thile had given his word of honor that the Prince of Hohenzollern was not and could not seriously become a candidate for the Spanish Crown — I have endeavored to ascertain whether any communication to this effect,

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[56] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 30.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 397. *Cf.* the curious suggestion of de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 199. And see p. 218.

[59] *Op. cit.*, 27–8; Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, p. 62.

or which might have warned the Spanish Government of the serious consequences of proposing a Prince of the House of Hohenzollern as a candidate for the Throne, had at any time been made by the French Ambassador at Madrid, or through the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, or indirectly through any other channel to the Government of the Regent. I have received the most distinct and positive assurances from the three Ministers who have been at the head of the Foreign Office since the Revolution, — Señor Silvela, Señor Martos, and Señor Sagasta, — that no such communication was ever made to them directly or indirectly, and that they had no reason to believe that the election of Prince Leopold would have caused so violent an outbreak of feeling against Prussia and Spain in France. The only hint which Señor Sagasta appears to have received was the one given to him by Señor Olozaga, that the Emperor would not, in that diplomatist's opinion, view with favor the election of a German Prince to the Throne of Spain on account of his probable leaning to Prussia, as I reported to Lord Clarendon in my despatch of the 11th May last." [60]

Gramont was, of course, well aware that it was to Spain that remonstrance should be directed, and it was upon Spain that he asked the United Kingdom to exercise her influence. The British Ambassador reported that Gramont said to him (7 July):

"It was, however, in Spain that the assistance of Her Majesty's Government might be most effectually given to France. The Regent might surely be convinced that it was his duty to separate himself from a policy which would plunge Spain into civil war, and put an end to peace in Europe. Could he wish that Spain's re-appearance on the political scene of Europe should be the signal for ruin and bloodshed? Would he wish his name to go down to posterity as the author of all these evils? Let him be strongly urged to prevent the early assembling of the Cortes. In this way the election would be prevented, and all might be well again." [61]

Lord Granville quite agreed with this view,[62] and acted accordingly. Italy was of the same opinion, and instructed her Ambassador at Madrid: "to urge upon the Spanish Ministers, to the utmost of his power, to avoid bringing on a rupture with France, and to come to some arrangement by which the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern may be withdrawn." [63]

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[60] Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 45.

[61] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 11.

[62] See his despatch to Lord Loftus, 6 July 1870 (*ibid.*, No. 5); and his two despatches to Mr. Layard, 7 July (*ibid.*, Nos. 7, 8). *Cf.* de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 234.

[63] Layard to Lord Granville, 11 July 1870: Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 38; and see No. 47. "The knot of the question was at Madrid." *Cf.* de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 235.

Austria-Hungary, assuming that France had made representations at Madrid, expressed the hope:

"that the Spanish nation and Government would give due weight to the appeal of the French Government to their wisdom and friendship." [64]

But no representations were made. To Spain no remonstrance was addressed. If, from Gramont's actions, one were to surmise why he refrained from presenting his objection to Spain, the thought would be that, looking forward to a desired war with Prussia, he wished to avoid cause for anxiety from across the Pyrenees.

France and Prussia. Gramont's tenderness with regard to Spain was balanced by the roughness of his advance upon Prussia. In a telegram to the French Ambassador at Berlin, he said:

"We will not consider this candidature as serious, and believe that the Spanish nation will reject it. But we cannot without some surprise see a Prussian prince seeking to seat himself on the Spanish throne. We should like to believe that the Berlin government is a stranger to this intrigue; in the contrary case, its conduct would suggest to us some reflections of an order too delicate for me to indicate in a telegram. I do not hesitate, however, to say to you that the impression is bad, and I invite you to explain yourself in this sense." [65]

The reply from Berlin (4 July) was:

"that the Prussian government knew absolutely nothing of this affair, and that for it, it does not exist." [66]

That attitude was maintained until the end.

The French Chamber. As on many other occasions, the Press in Paris immediately commenced to inflame public opinion; [67] and Cochery, a member of the Corps Législatif, gave notice of an interpellation:

"on the eventual candidature of a prince of the royal family of Prussia to the throne of Spain." [68]

Upon the effect of this action, Sorel comments as follows:

"This interpellation responded to the preoccupations of public opinion, but it was a grave fault; it had disastrous consequences. In carrying the affair to the tribune for harangues, M. Cochery and his friends cut short all diplomatic intervention in Europe. . . . Unfortunately the French ministry partook of the passions bursting around it; it had not the courage to combat them." [69]

Complaining of the action of the Cabinet, Sorel said:

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[64] Lord Granville to Lord Bloomfield, 19 July 1870: Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 101. *Cf.* de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 236.

[65] De la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 218; Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 62–3; Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 31–2.

[66] Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, p. 63. *Cf.* Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 32.

[67] Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 64, 67, 69.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[69] In his book, Gramont said that "the interpellation responded . . . to the preoccupation of public opinion": *op. cit.*, p. 36.

"The duty of true diplomats, of intelligent Frenchmen, was to calm minds; that was an indispensable precaution, if they did not seek war, and if they wished to negotiate. But, far from restraining these sentiments, the Cabinet associated itself with them."

"Now it soon became clear, at least for the government, that peace was compromised even before a negotiation had commenced."[70]

London and Vienna were counselling moderation:

"But at the moment when these despatches were written in London and Vienna, the French government summoned Prussia to surrender, and precipitated the rupture which Austria and England were endeavoring to prevent."[71]

Gramont's Declaration. The summons was in the form of a declaration by Gramont in the Chamber on 6 July, as follows:

"We have not ceased to show our sympathy for the Spanish nation, and to avoid all that might have had the appearance of intermeddling in any way in the internal affairs of a noble and great nation in the full exercise of her sovereignty. We have not departed from regarding the various candidates for the throne with the strictest neutrality, and have never manifested for any one of them either preference or aversion. We persist in that course. But we do not think that respect for the rights of a neighboring people compels us to suffer that a Foreign Power, in placing one of its Princes on the throne of Charles V, should disturb to our disadvantage the present balance of power in Europe, and should endanger the interests and honor of France. This eventuality, we firmly hope, will not be realized. To prevent it, we count at once on the wisdom of the German people, and the friendship of the Spanish people. If it should be otherwise, strong in your support, gentlemen, and in that of the nation, we should know how to discharge our duty without hesitation and without weakness."[72]

Ollivier, the Prime Minister, followed the reading of the declaration by a speech in which he said:

"The Government desires peace, and desires it with passion. It desires it with passion, but with honor."[73]

The declaration had been formulated at a council of the ministers presided over by the Emperor.[74] In Ollivier's view, it was, in reality, "an ultimatum."[75] He, nevertheless, had agreed to it. Sorel's comment on it was as follows:

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[70] Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 68, 70.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[72] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 6; Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 109–10. And see Lord Granville's speech in the House of Lords, 11 July 1870.

[73] Gramont, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[74] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 10; Ward and Wilkinson: *Germany*, II, p. 430; de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 226–7; Henri Welschinger: *La Guerre de 1870*, I, pp. 52–3.

[75] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 110. After the session of the Chamber, Ollivier

"Crushing in form, absolute in conclusions, the declaration of the 6th July put King William in the position of either submitting to a diplomatic affront, or of declaring war. It was an ultimatum. . . ." [76]
In the view of de la Gorce:

"The manifesto, by the sharpness of its terms, seemed first act of war rather than invitation to negotiate." [77]
The Emperor afterwards stated his opinion of it as follows:

"I felt then, and my mind has never changed on this point, that the ministry made a grave mistake in pronouncing in the tribune a sort of challenge. . . ." [78]
Gramont himself acknowledged that the declaration was couched in "language firmer than usual," and was "a categorical exposition" of the duties of Prussia. He placed his justification upon the fact that the Prussian government had denied association with, or responsibility for, the situation,[79] and upon "the impossibility of contending with public opinion." [80] That he intended his language to be provocative, is made clear by what he said on the previous day (5th) to Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador, who reported it as follows:

"To this, continued M. de Gramont, France will not resign herself, and when I say that we shall not resign ourselves to it, I mean that we shall not permit it, and that we shall use our whole strength to prevent it. M. de Gramont then informed me that he had declared categorically to Baron de Werther, the Prussian Ambassador, that France would not tolerate the establishment of the Prince de Hohenzollern, or any other Prussian Prince, on the Throne of Spain." [81]

Appreciating the purport of such language, Lord Granville, the British Foreign Secretary, in his reply to Lord Lyons, said (6 July) that he had declared to the French Ambassador in London:
"that it was a matter of regret to me that such strong language as that reported by your Excellency to have been addressed to Baron Werther had been used; but I added that it was not so much a moment for the general discussion, but rather to see what could be done that could tend to a favorable issue of the affair." [82]

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telegraphed to the Emperor: "The declaration was received in the Chamber with emotion and immense applause. The Left itself, with the exception of a few, declared that it would support the Government. The movement, at the first moment, has surpassed the object. It was said that it was a declaration of war": Welschinger, *op. cit.*, I, p. 150.

[76] *Op. cit.*, p. 78. Jules Favre declared in the Chamber that Gramont's "declaration was an offence to Prussia," and the newspapers repeated the assertion. It was the keynote of the comments of several of the more prominent sheets: Count Fleury, *Memoirs of the Empress Eugénie*, II, p. 226. See also pp. 234, 236, 251.

[77] *Op. cit.*, VI, p. 228.

[78] Fleury, *op. cit.*, II, p. 252.

[79] *Op. cit.*, p. 39. *Cf.* Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 41, Enc.

[80] Lyons to Granville, 7 July 1870: Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 11.

[81] *Ibid.*, No. 2.

[82] *Ibid.*, No. 4.

The effect upon Bismarck of Gramont's declaration in the Corps Législatif may be judged from his comment upon it.

". . . this utterance was itself an official international threat, with the hand on the sword hilt. The phrase *La Prusse cane* (Prussia climbs down) served in the press to illustrate the range of the parliamentary proceedings of July 6 and 7; which, in my feeling, rendered all compliance incompatible with our sense of national honor." [83]

The declaration had created an extremely difficult situation.

Military Preparation. Making no demand upon Spain; having no expectation of Prussian submission; and anxious for war, Gramont, two days after his declaration in the Chamber, said (as the British Ambassador reported):

" that he was still without any answer from Prussia, and that this silence rendered it impossible for the French Government to abstain any longer from making military preparations. Some steps in this direction had been already taken, and to-morrow the military authorities must begin in earnest. The movements of troops would be settled at the Council to be held at St. Cloud in the morning. On my manifesting some surprise and regret at the rapid pace at which the French Government seemed to be proceeding, M. de Gramont insisted that it was impossible for them to delay any longer." [84]

Replying to the Ambassador's report of this conversation, Lord Granville said (9 July):

" Her Majesty's Government have continued to regret the tenor of the observations successively made in the French Chambers and in the French press, which tend to excite rather than to allay the angry feelings which have been aroused in France, and may only too probably call forth similar feelings in Germany and in Spain; and their regret has been increased by the intimation now given to you by the Duc de Gramont that military preparations would forthwith be made in France." [85]

When the British Ambassador presented these considerations to Gramont, the reply was, as the Ambassador reported (10 July):

" that in this matter the French Ministers were following, not leading the nation. Public opinion would not admit of their doing less than they had done. As regarded military preparations, common prudence required that they should not be behindhand. In the midst of a profound calm, when the French Cabinet and Chamber were employed in reducing their military budget, Prussia exploded upon them this mine which she had prepared in secret. It was necessary that France should be at least as forward as Prussia in military preparations. . . . The French Government would, M. de Gramont went on to say, defer for a

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[83] *Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, p. 92.

[84] Lyons to Granville, 8 July 1870: Br. Blue Bk., C.-167, No. 15.

[85] *Ibid.*, No. 17.

short time longer (for twenty-four hours, for instance) those great ostensible preparations for war (such as calling out the reserves) which would inflame public feeling in France. All essential preparations must, however, be carried out unremittingly. The French Ministers would be unwise if they run any risk of allowing Prussia to gain time by dilatory pretexts." [86]

BENEDETTI AT EMS

Benedetti's Instructions. Receiving no satisfaction from Berlin, Gramont sent Benedetti to Ems, where the King of Prussia was taking the waters, and instructed him (Friday, 7 July) as follows:

"If the head of the Hohenzollern family has been up to the present indifferent about this affair, we ask him not to be so for the future, and we pray him to intervene, if not by his orders, at least by his counsels, to Prince Leopold." [87]

Such were the official instructions. The private were as follows:

"I am sending to you young Bourqueney with a cipher, in order that you may be able to inform me as quickly as possible as to the result of your *démarche* with the King. We know, by the avowal of the prince himself, that he has arranged the entire affair with the Prussian government, and we are unable to accept the evasive reply with which M. de Thile seeks to escape from the dilemma in which he has been placed. It is absolutely necessary that you obtain a categorical reply, followed by its natural consequences. The following is the only thing which could satisfy us and avert war: 'The government of the King does not approve the acceptance of the Prince of Hohenzollern, and gives him the order to withdraw from this determination taken without his permission.' It will then remain to let me know whether the Prince, obedient to this injunction, renounces officially and publicly his candidature. We are much pressed for time, because, in the case of an unsatisfactory response, it would be necessary to forestall them, and on Saturday to commence the movement of troops in order to enter upon the campaign in fifteen days. . . . I insist above all upon the necessity of not permitting the gaining of time by evasive replies; it is necessary to know if we are to have peace, or if a finality of non-compliance will oblige us to undertake war. If you obtain from the King [assurance] that he revokes the acceptance of the Prince of Hohenzollern, that will be an immense success, and a great service. The King, on his part, will have assured the peace of Europe. Otherwise, it is war. As for the Prince, his reign in Spain will not last a month; but the war provoked by this intrigue of M. de Bismarck, how long will it last, and what will be the consequences? So then, no evasions and no delays: that you may be able to succeed is my most ardent wish."

In a postscript, Gramont added:

[86] *Ibid.*, No. 25.

[87] Benedetti: *Ma Mission en Prusse*, p. 317.

"Be on your guard against an answer which would consist in saying that the King leaves the Prince of Hohenzollern to his fate, and disinterests himself from all that may happen; that he will remain neutral in presence of all the eventualities which might be the consequence of his individual resolutions. We cannot accept this response as satisfactory, for the government of the King could not dissociate itself by mere words from a situation which he has helped to create. If we are to accept the assurance of his disinterestedness, it is necessary that he modify it, that he amend it." [88]

In other words, withdrawal of Leopold's candidature would not be sufficient to avert war. The King was required (1) to say that he did not approve Leopold's acceptance; (2) to declare that the acceptance had taken place without his permission; and (3) to order Leopold to withdraw. There can be little doubt that Benedetti's compliance with these instructions would have produced immediate rupture. Their truculent form sufficiently indicates their purpose. Disobeying his orders, Benedetti proceeded with moderation, and, in reporting, said:

"You will approve, I hope, of my not having been more exigent with the King, and of my not having acted with excessive brusqueness. Doubtless you will be of the opinion that it is necessary to show a due measure of moderation on our side." [89]

The "moderation" provoked Gramont's censure, and made much more difficult the accomplishment of his purpose — as we shall see.

9, 10, 11 JULY

Benedetti and the King. Presenting his message to the King (9 July, 3 P.M.) with such circumspection as he thought advisable, Benedetti received the reply that no order or counsel to Prince Leopold could be given. The King said, however, that communication had been entered into with Leopold and his father, and that reply was expected shortly.[90] "... he has added," Benedetti reported, "that if they were disposed to withdraw their acceptance he would approve that resolution." [91]

From that position the King never receded. He would approve. He would neither order nor counsel.

Gramont to Benedetti. Benedetti's reply to Gramont was, as we have seen, of placatory character, but Gramont was little disposed to moderate his tone, and the next day (10 July, 1.20 P.M.), telegraphed as follows:

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[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 319–21; Gramont, *op. cit.*, 61–5.

[89] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

[90] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 325–8. See also Benedetti's letters of same date: *Ibid.*, pp. 328–40. Ward and Wilkinson's references to the Ems incident are in their *Germany*, II, pp. 433–41.

[91] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

"It is necessary that you employ all your efforts in order to obtain a decisive reply; we cannot wait, under penalty of being forestalled by Prussia in our preparations. The day cannot pass without our commencing." [92]

In a letter to Benedetti of the same date, Gramont said:

"I tell you plainly public opinion is ablaze and will leave us behind. We must begin; we wait only for your despatch to call up 300,000 men who are awaiting the summons. Write, telegraph something definite. If the King will not counsel the Prince of Hohenzollern to resign, well, it is immediate war, and in a few days we are on the Rhine. The King is henceforth responsible. After the admission that he has authorized the acceptance, it is necessary that he forbid it, or at least that he counsel and obtain the renunciation." [93]

The comment of Henri Welschinger (of the French Institute) upon this message is as follows:

"When one re-reads this despatch after the events which followed it, events which happened forty years ago and seem as of yesterday, one is literally stupefied by the blindness of this minister and his colleagues, 'In a few days we are on the Rhine!' Alas! in a few days, in spite of the heroism of our troops, we were going to retreat on the Moselle." [94]

Benedetti and the King. In the evening of the same day, the King met Benedetti, and stopped to tell him that as yet no reply had been received from Prince Leopold.[95]

Ollivier. Ollivier's impressions on receipt of Benedetti's report were, as he himself has recorded, as follows:

"Our impression was that the King was trifling with us. Feeling ourselves among liars, fearing each instant to be surprised by a new perfidy, haunted by that date of the 20th July always before our eyes as a spectre, we were unable to believe a word of any of the contrivers of the pitfall which we were trying to avoid." [96]

Gramont to Benedetti. Early in the morning of the next day (the 11th, 1 A.M.), Gramont telegraphed Benedetti:

"You cannot imagine to what height public opinion has risen. It flows over us from all sides, and we are counting the hours. It is absolutely necessary to insist that a reply from the King, negative or affirmative, be obtained. It must be got for us for to-morrow, the day after will be too late." [97]

Later in the day (6.50 P.M.) Gramont again telegraphed Benedetti:

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[92] *Ibid.*, p. 342.
[93] *Ibid.*, p. 347.
[94] *La Guerre de 1870*, I, p. 66.
[95] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 344–5.
[96] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 189.
[97] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

"I have received your first report of the 9th, and your private letter. At the point at which we have arrived, we must not leave you in ignorance that your language no longer corresponds, in point of firmness, with the position taken by the Government of the Emperor. It is necessary to-day to accentuate it more strongly. . . . We require that the King forbid the Prince of Hohenzollern to persist in his candidature, and if we do not receive a decisive reply to-morrow, we shall consider silence or ambiguity as a refusal to do that which we demand." [98]

Comte Fleury, the author of *Memoirs of the Empress Eugénie*, affirms that the Emperor was not shown this telegram, "the tone" of which he afterwards described as "exceedingly haughty." [99]

Benedetti and the King. Urged by Gramont's telegram, Benedetti requested another audience with the King, and, during an hour (morning of the 11th) pressed him, "by all the arguments imaginable" [100] to make concession without waiting to hear from Prince Antoine or Prince Leopold, declaring that it was "absolutely urgent" that time should not be lost. In telegraphing the conversation, Benedetti said:

"Not concealing the impression which my words produced upon his mind, the King replied to me that, when he was asking nothing more than a short delay in order to assure himself of the intentions of the two princes of Hohenzollern, our insistence was calculated to make him think that we had the design of provoking a conflict." [101] Peace, said the King, "will not be disturbed if in Paris they wish to wait until I am in a position to contribute usefully toward it, by leaving me the time that is necessary for me."

"In remarking to the King that all these details were certainly not of a nature to subdue the public effervescence in France if they were known there, and that I could see in them only another motive for putting an end to this unfortunate incident by his personal intervention, I made a last effort to obtain the assent of His Majesty to my proposition." [102]

In a simultaneous despatch to Gramont, Benedetti said:

"His Majesty has allowed me to infer, and through his entourage has given me to understand, as M. de Werther will tell you, that the Prince ought to renounce spontaneously the crown which has been offered to him, and that the King will not hesitate to approve his resolution." [103]

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[98] *Ibid.*, p. 361; Gramont, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–9. And see Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 202.

[99] II, pp. 218–9.

[100] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

[101] Gramont repudiated this suggestion, and authorized Benedetti to accord the desired delay, hoping that it would not extend beyond a day: Telegram of 12th, 2 P.M.: Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 364.

[102] *Ibid.*, pp. 355–6.

[103] *Ibid.*, 358. See Benedetti's telegrams, *Ma Mission en Prusse*, pp. 349, 360; and his despatch, *ibid.*, p. 362.

It will be observed that this is the second time that the King had expressed his willingness to "approve" a withdrawal. In a telegram of the 12th (8.30 A.M.), Benedetti said that in his conversation with the King he (Benedetti) had held firmer language and shown himself more pressing than previously.[104]

The Chamber. At Paris, as Ollivier relates, the government was "fighting with the intractable opposition of the Chamber." [105] Having stated that the government had nothing to announce further than (quite untruly) that:

"all the Cabinets we have addressed appear to admit the legitimacy of our grievances;" [106]

and questions having been raised as to the nature of the demands made upon Prussia, Gramont rose to reply; but:

"a veritable tempest from the Right would not permit him to offer a word." [107]

"The Right declared loudly that the Hohenzollern affair ought to be considered as merely an incident, that even if the solution were favorable, it would be necessary not to allow the matter to drop; to raise the question of the treaty of Prague; and resolutely to place Prussia between the acceptance of a Congress and war. This language was held similarly by Gambetta, Montpayroux on the Left, Jérome David and Pinard on the side of the Right; and all announced openly the intention to attack the Cabinet if it stopped after the termination of the Hohenzollern affair." [108]

Referring to the state of opinion in Paris on the 10th, Gramont has said:

"While we were pursuing this result in every possible way, public opinion became every day more inflamed and threatened to overwhelm us . . . and it became evident that the Chambers and the country would reject as insufficient any solution which did not carry with it, in a certain measure, the participation of the King in the withdrawal of the Prince." [109]

Referring to the 11th, Gramont has said:

"However, public opinion became more inflamed, as anyone might see; the Chamber, whose unquiet and agitated spirit reflected faithfully the impatience of the public, imperiously exacted a communication from the government." [110]

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[104] *Ibid.*, pp. 361–2.

[105] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 198.

[106] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 29, Enc. The British government promptly denied the statement: *ibid.*, No. 34; and No. 61, Enc. 3.

[107] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 199. See Fleury, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 239, 251.

[108] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 201.

[109] Gramont, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–1.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

12 JULY — LEOPOLD'S WITHDRAWAL

The Withdrawal. As might have been, and probably was, expected, Prim, in view of the attitude assumed by France (which he had not anticipated), was quite willing to drop his proposal with reference to Prince Leopold. Gramont so advised Benedetti on the 10th at 1.20 P.M.[111] Indeed, Prim sent General Dominguez to Sigmaringen in order to persuade Leopold to withdraw. Thither, on similar mission, went also Colonel Strantz on behalf of the Prussian King[112] and Strat on behalf of Olozaga, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris.[113] As a result of their representations, Antoine telegraphed to Marshal Prim (12th, A.M.) withdrawing the candidature of Leopold,[114] and sent a duplicate of the message to Olozaga at Paris.[115] Olozaga carried his copy to Gramont, and, at the same time, announced that Spain disengaged herself from the incident.[116] That was bad news for Gramont. Having commenced with a foolish defiance to Prussia, he found, on the one hand, that, without any action on the part of Prussia, all ground of quarrel had been removed, and, on the other, that he was quite unable, even if he had so wished, to appease the Chamber and the public, whose anger he had aroused. Quite frankly, he communicated his difficulty to the British Ambassador, who reported the conversation to Lord Granville as follows:

"On the one hand, public opinion was so much excited in France, that it was doubtful whether the Ministry would not be overthrown if it went down to the Chamber to-morrow, and announced that it regarded the affair as finished without having obtained some more complete satisfaction from Prussia. On the other hand, the renunciation of the Crown by Prince Leopold put an end to the original cause of the dispute." [117]

After the trouble was all over, Gramont wrote in his book:

"Every guarantee, all satisfaction escaped us. It was evidently necessary to find some new expedient." [118]

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[111] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 342. And see p. 348.

[112] De la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 254.

[113] Strat was Roumanian Chargé at Paris, and had reason to apprehend that French antipathy to Leopold might be extended to his (Leopold's) brother, the King of Roumania (*ibid.*, pp. 253–4). Ollivier says that the Emperor informed him that Olozaga acted without the knowledge of Marshal Prim, but authorized by the Emperor (*op. cit.* XIV, p. 239). In some respects Strat appears to have been commissioned by King William himself: Welschinger, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 68, 72.

[114] De la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 255.

[115] *Ibid.*, pp. 256–7.

[116] Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 130. The form of the withdrawal, signed by Leopold himself, and the ensuing action by the Spanish government, may be seen in Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 93.

[117] *Ibid.*, No. 30; *Ann. Reg.*, 1870, p. 201.

[118] *Op. cit.*, p. 114. Quoted by Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, p. 130.

The expedient which he adopted will appear in a few minutes. Meanwhile, let us note the effect of the withdrawal upon other persons.

Ollivier. Ollivier's view was as follows:

"If then no new incident came up matters would be arranged in this way: The King, during the day of the 13th, would have communicated to Benedetti the renunciation which he was expecting. He would add that he approved it, and authorized our Ambassador to transmit to our government this double assurance. In that way would have been obtained the two conditions presented by Gramont: abandonment of the candidature, and the manifest participation of the King in the abandonment. Our victory of the 12th would have been complete on the 13th, and Bismarck would have been definitely beaten." [119]

"The affair was surely ended if we did not commit some imprudence, and I was so happy that, for a moment, I could not believe it to be true." [120]

Referring to Gramont, Ollivier says:

"He did not receive the news with the same joy as I. I had seen only the disappearance of the candidature, thinking little of the manner in which it had disappeared; he confined himself above all to the form, and, in the direct notification made by Prince Antoine to Prim, he saw the juggling of indirect participation by the King. From that moment, the complete accord between us was at an end; he continued to attach a major importance to the participation of the King, which had become secondary in my eyes." [121]

Without consulting anybody, and without sufficient consideration as to what the effect might be, Ollivier carried a copy of the Antoine telegram to the Chamber and passed it among the members, indicating that by it the government had obtained all that it wanted.[122]

Bismarck's Attitude. Bismarck was as displeased as was Gramont. He saw that the withdrawal would be regarded as a humiliating submission to a French demand. His attitude has been described by Ollivier as follows:

"In a flash, he saw all the lamentable (for him) consequences of the event. He was deceived, beaten, humiliated, abandoned by his King, by his candidate; he was about to become the laughing-stock of Germany and of Europe; his edifice of trickery was crumbling over his head." [123]

But Bismarck was determined that there should be no appearance of diplomatic defeat. He still believed in peace (he said), but he declined to be responsible for:

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[119] *Op. cit.*, XIV, p. 225.
[120] *Ibid.*, p. 230.
[121] *Ibid.*, pp. 243–4.
[122] Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 126–8; de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 257.
[123] *Op. cit.*, vol. XIV, pp. 218–19.

"the attitude by which the peace had been purchased." "I saw by that time that war was a necessity which we could no longer avoid with honor . . . we had got our slap in the face from France, and had been reduced by our complaisance to look like seekers of a quarrel if we entered upon war, the only way by which we could wipe away the stain. My position was now untenable, solely because, during his course at the baths, the King, under pressure of threats, had given audience to the French Ambassador for four consecutive days, and had exposed his royal person to insolent treatment from this foreign agent, without ministerial assistance." [124]

12 JULY — VARIOUS PLANS

Napoleon and Gramont believed that a withdrawal, unaccompanied by any action on the part of the King beyond mere approval, would be unacceptable alike to the Chamber and the public. Some "new expedient" had to be found. As Sorel has said:

"The King of Prussia sought to disengage himself, the Duke thought only of means to replace him in the case." [125]

Four schemes were suggested.

The Emperor's Plan. The Emperor proposed, in a note to Ollivier, a rather mendacious way out of the difficulty:

"If the news is announced to the Chamber, one ought at least to make the best of it and give the impression that it is upon the injunction of the King of Prussia that the candidature has been withdrawn. I have not yet seen Gramont. The country will be disappointed. But what can be done?" [126]

Ollivier went to the Emperor; asked if the withdrawal had been really the work of the King; was told that it had not; and said:

"In that case, it would be very risky to boast, even indirectly, of the intervention of the King of Prussia. The satisfaction which we might give public opinion, by that erroneous assurance, would not be of long duration; Bismarck would counter it by a brutal denial, and the affair, which seemed to be ended, would recommence." [127]

That proposal was abandoned.

Gramont's First Plan. Telegram to Benedetti, 1.40 P.M. Immediately after hearing of the telegram announcing the withdrawal, Gramont telegraphed to Benedetti (12th, 1.40 P.M.) as follows:

"Employ your skill . . . to procure that the renunciation of the Prince is announced, communicated, or transmitted by the King of Prussia or his Government. That is, for us, of the greatest importance.

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[124] *Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, p. 94.
[125] *Op. cit.*, p. 130.
[126] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 236.
[127] *Ibid.*, p. 239.

The participation of the King must, at all costs, be consented to by him or result from the facts in a manifest manner." [128]

It will be observed that the requirement of this telegram (It may be referred to as the *modifying telegram*) falls far short of that of Gramont's next preceding message — that of the 11th at 6.50 P.M. A demand "that the King forbid the Prince of Hohenzollern to persist in his candidature" is reduced to a demand that the King's participation in the withdrawal must "result from the facts in a manifest manner." Benedetti did what he could, but failed. In the evening of the same day, but not in reply to Gramont's message, he telegraphed:

"The King has just said to me that he had received a telegraphic despatch which advised him that the reply of the Prince of Hohenzollern would certainly reach him to-morrow morning. He added that he will send for me as soon as it is placed in his hands." [129]

Gramont's Second Plan. Gramont's second plan was to extract from Werther (the Prussian Ambassador), during conversation with him, some useful, if only verbal, admission of the King's participation. Ollivier relates that:

"He tried to obtain from him the admission that the King had not been a stranger to the withdrawal. The situation would in that way be righted; he would be able, without contradiction, to make the announcement of which the Emperor felt the necessity. But Werther did not fall into the trap; he argued, in a tone which admitted of no doubt, 'that the renunciation certainly emanated from the sole initiative of Prince Leopold.'" [130]

Gramont's Third Plan. Foiled in this attempt, Gramont endeavored, with the help of Ollivier (who had arrived during the conversation) in another way to involve the King: Gramont said to Werther (as the latter related):

"that, in our conduct toward France, we had not employed friendly procedure, as, to his knowledge, had been recognized by all the great Powers." [131]

And Gramont suggested that the King of Prussia should sign a letter in the following form:

"In authorizing Prince Leopold to accept the crown of Spain, the King did not intend to harm either the interests or the dignity of the French nation. His Majesty associates himself with the renunciation of the Prince, and expresses his desire that all causes of misunderstanding between his government and that of the Emperor may henceforth disappear." [132]

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[128] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 365; Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 242–3. Benedetti gives the hour as 2.15 P.M.

[129] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 365.

[130] *Op. cit.*, XIV, p. 244.

[131] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

[132] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 245–6.

Opinions may differ as to whether such a document would have been considered, as it has been variously described, a "letter of excuse," an "apology," [133] or a mere *lettre d'amitié;* but as the express purpose for which it was wanted was that French anger might be appeased by a diplomatic victory, there can be little doubt that it would have been useless unless it could have been construed as a Prussian retreat. During the conversation, Gramont said to Werther that:

"King William would render to our two countries, and to the whole world, an incomparable service if, by the spontaneity of an amicable advance, he would re-establish the cordiality of the relations which he himself had upset. In strengthening our ministerial position, he would give us the means of continuing our pacific work." [134]

The "ministerial position" could not, of course, be strengthened without the display of some striking success. And if Ollivier and Gramont regarded the proposed letter as *une lettre d'amitié*, there need be no surprise that the Prussian King saw in it something of an apology, and that the Berlin newspapers so characterized it. In his report of the conversation to the King, Werther said:

"Such were the words, intended to be given publicity for the appeasement of the country, which the letter was to contain." [135]

Replying, during the conversation, to Werther's expression of distaste for being the medium of presentation to the King of such a request, Ollivier and Gramont (as Werther related):

"Both said to me that if I did not believe myself able to undertake it, they would be obliged to charge Count Benedetti with the raising of the question." "The two ministers, in making it appear that, in regard to their ministerial situation, they had need of an arrangement of this kind to calm the excitement, added that such a letter would authorize them to act as defenders against attacks which could not fail to rise against his Majesty the King." [136]

In a circular despatch, Gramont afterwards (24 July) denied that he had asked for:

"a letter of excuse, as the Berlin journals have pretended in their semi-official commentaries." [137]

But Gramont did not deny that he had threatened to put the matter into the hands of Benedetti for diplomatic action, and that the "strengthening our ministerial position" was the purpose for which he wanted the letter. The only effect of the request was, as might have

[133] Bismarck spoke of it as "an apologetic letter to the Emperor Napoleon, the publication of which might pacify the excited feelings in France": Bismarck to Bernstorff; communicated to the British government 18 July 1870: Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 8, Enc. No. 1. *Cf.* No. 31, Enc.

[134] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 249–50.

[135] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 443.

[136] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

[137] *Ibid.*, p. 445; Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 41, Enc.

been expected, to arouse the King's resentment. Writing to his Queen, he said:

"Did one ever see such insolence? It is necessary, then, that I appear before the world as a repentant sinner in an affair that I never set in motion, conducted, and led, by Prim, and they have left him out of the game. Unfortunately, Werther did not at once leave the room after such a pretension, and send his interlocutors to Minister Bismarck. They even went so far as to say that they would charge Benedetti with this affair. Unfortunately, it is necessary to conclude regarding these inexplicable procedings, that they are resolved, cost what it may, to provoke us; and that the Emperor, in spite of himself, will allow himself to be led by these inexperienced practitioners." [138]

Gramont's Fourth Plan. Foiled in these various attempts to escape from the difficult position in which he had placed himself, Gramont adopted a fourth plan — a plan by which (when supplemented by misrepresentation) he succeeded in satisfying the Chamber, at the expense of producing war. It will be dealt with in a later paragraph.

12 JULY — DEMAND OF FUTURE GUARANTEE

Duvernois Interpellation. The war-party in the French Chamber were by no means discomfited by the telegram announcing the withdrawal. They ridiculed it as "the despatch of Father Antoine," and, through Clement Duvernois, they presented the following interpellation:

"We demand to interpellate the Cabinet as to the guarantees for which it has stipulated, or intends to stipulate, in order to avoid the return of successive complications with Prussia." [139]

That was the origin of the absolutely new demand, shortly afterwards made by Gramont. Of the temper of the Chamber, the *Gazette de France* said:

"The war current seemed to overwhelm it. In the conference room of the Corps Législatif, a Vendean deputy said loudly that if the ministry contents itself with the renunciation by Prince Antoine in the name of his son, the Extreme-Right will not. Altogether, the majority seems bent on war; it might be that the ministry would be overturned if it stopped now." [140]

Referring to the same subject, Ollivier says that the Right considered that the candidature was a secondary consideration, and that quarrel with Prussia was necessary:

"The Right, not hoping to terminate my resistance, tore me to pieces furiously. I was accused of lack of courage, of patriotism, and of foresight." [141]

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[138] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 303.
[139] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 235–6. See Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, p. 128.
[140] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 236.
[141] *Ibid.*, p. 256.

He then quotes from various newspapers to the same effect, and comments:

"This outburst of anger did not move me." [142]

Gramont's Fourth Plan — Future Guarantee. Immediately after his conversation with Werther (above referred to), Gramont went to the Emperor and reported his lack of success. Thereupon, in the absence of any other member of the Council, they agreed that the matter should not be allowed to terminate — withdrawal of Leopold's candidature, with mere "approval" of the King, would not satisfy the public or the Chamber.[143] And they determined to make the demand which had been suggested in the Duvernois interpellation, namely, a demand upon the King for what may be called a future guarantee [144] — "an assurance that he will not authorize anew this candidature." But their resolution was evidently based upon their view of the necessity of pandering to the clamor which they had raised — upon their view that "some new expedient" must be found — rather than upon their conception of the unrelated propriety of the step. Gramont admitted as much when, in his book, he said:

"It is not possible to accept the withdrawal of Prince Antoine without stipulating guarantees. It was necessary, I repeat, to associate oneself, in a certain measure, with the national sentiment, if one still wished to retain a chance of being able to hold it back from a recourse to arms." [145]

Gramont to Benedetti — 7 P.M. Accordingly (at 7 P.M.), Gramont sent the following telegraphic instruction to Benedetti:

"We have received, from the hands of the Spanish Ambassador, Prince Antoine's renunciation, in the name of his son Leopold, of his candidature to the throne of Spain. In order that this renunciation of Prince Antoine may produce all its effect, it appears necessary that the King of Prussia associate himself with it, and give us the assurance that he will not authorize anew this candidature. Be good enough to wait immediately upon the King in order to demand from him this declaration, which he cannot refuse if he is not really animated by some *arrière-pensée*. Notwithstanding the renunciation, which is now known, the excitement is such that we do not know whether we shall be able to dominate it." [146]

Ollivier's Disapproval. Informed of this telegram in an interview with Gramont during the evening, Ollivier expressed strong disapproval

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[142] *Ibid.*, p. 258.

[143] "This was not sufficient for Napoleon who, in the state of French opinion, dared not close the incident without inflicting a public diplomatic defeat upon Prussia" (*The Cambridge Modern History*, XI, p. 578) — a defeat in what Ollivier termed *la bataille diplomatique* (*op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 81).

[144] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 254–5.

[145] Gramont, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

[146] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 254–5; Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 369.

of it. He recognized that the King could not be expected to give the guarantee demanded. In his book he wrote:

"The acquiescence of the King in the new demand would have produced deplorable consequences for him. If, to the renunciation which, in spite of denials, was attributed to him, he had added an engagement of any kind, a German clamor would have arisen against his humiliation. It was precisely the perfidy of the Right to have raised an exigency which it was impossible that our opponent could remove; the demand for the guarantee could be interpreted only as a desire to bring about war." [147]

On another page, Ollivier wrote:

"This inconsiderate despatch annulled the wise despatch of 1h. 40.[148] It no longer contented itself with the participation of the King in the present case; it demanded an engagement with reference to problematic occurrences of the future, and threw us back into the hazards from which, without it, we were sure to have escaped happily. What necessity was there to precipitate himself in that way? . . . This demand of a guarantee was, as we have seen by the interpellation of Duvernois which had preceded it, his conception." [149]

In the debate in the Corps Législatif three days subsequently, Thiers attacked the demand for future guarantee as a mistake, and Ollivier defended it (as we shall see) as reasonable. In his book, he made a distinction. The demand was:

"defensible in pure logic, but unjustifiable in the circumstances in which it occurred. All the argumentation of Thiers on this subject is irrefutable; he was right in calling the demand for a guarantee a mistake. Although this mistake may not have been that of the Cabinet, I could not disclaim responsibility for it, since, not having resigned, we were all bound by it. I had even been obliged to cover by an official word that which I was blaming in my own mind; I had done this through sliding over it without insisting upon it, and such is entirely the reason that to-day the very sensible reproaches of Thiers cling to me." [150]

Ollivier Blames the Emperor. As between the Emperor and Gramont, Ollivier places the responsibility of the telegram on the former, who, he says, succumbed to the prevailing excitement, while Gramont acted under orders. Ollivier says:

"Meanwhile the Emperor is impressed by the unusually loud cheering attending his passage, which is evidently a war incitement. At Saint-Cloud he falls into surroundings even more excited." [151]

"But at that point, Napoleon III himself, to whom was owing this

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[147] P. 261.
[148] *Ante*, p. 598.
[149] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 255.
[150] *Ibid.*, p. 444.
[151] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

peace victory, sustained an effacement of will, and, under the pressure of the Court and the Right, without taking time to reflect, without consulting his Ministers, reopened the affair and ordered Gramont to address to the King a demand for guarantees for the future." [152]

Referring to Gramont, Ollivier says:

"On his part, it was only obedience, and not bellicose premeditation; on the part of the Emperor, I feel sure, it was only a yielding to weakness, not determination for war." [153]

Ollivier, probably, misplaced the blame. Gramont was the strong man, if a *Dummkopf*. Napoleon was the timid *incapacité méconnue*,[154] who, in the absence of cabinet approval and in the presence of an objecting member of it (objection must be implied if Gramont is to be acquitted), would not have assumed to order a proceeding which would almost certainly produce war. It was Gramont, as we have seen, who deemed it "necessary to find some new expedient." [155] Perhaps some share in responsibility must be assigned to the Empress.[156]

The Emperor's Note. During the interview (above referred to) between Ollivier and Gramont, a note arrived from the Emperor (10 P.M.) as follows:

"It is necessary then that Benedetti insist, as he has been ordered, on having a categorical reply by which the King engages for the future not to permit Prince Leopold, who is not engaged, to follow the example of his brother [157] and set out some fine day for Spain." [158]

The note was a nervous suggestion to Gramont of a historical analogy by which the action agreed upon might be supported. Probably it may be explained by the fact that David and Cassagnac had, meanwhile, frightened the Emperor with arguments as to the ridiculous position in which he would be left by accepting a "derisive satisfaction"; had shown him the discontent of the army, the disaffection of the people, the hostility of the opposition; and had threatened him with a furious speech from Gambetta. Ollivier has said:

"Internal pressure of Saint-Cloud had led to the telegram of seven o'clock; external pressure of the visitors of the evening dictated the letter to Gramont." [159]

Gramont to Benedetti — 11.45 P.M. Before retiring for the night, Gramont passed on the Emperor's suggestion to Benedetti (11.45 P.M.):

"In order that we may be sure that the son will not disavow his father, or that he will not arrive in Spain, as his brother did in Rou-

[152] *Ibid.*, p. 545.
[153] *Ibid.*, pp. 262–3.
[154] *Ante*, p. 582.
[155] See also de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 265.
[156] *Cf. ibid.*, p. 266.
[157] Prince Charles had become King of Roumania.
[158] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 267–8. *Cf.* Gramont, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–7.
[159] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 268.

mania, it is indispensable that the King be good enough to say to us that he will not permit the Prince to recall the renunciation communicated by Prince Antoine." [160]

The Three Gramont Telegrams of 12 July. There were therefore three telegrams to Benedetti on the 12th July: (1) The modifying telegram of 1.40 P.M., indicating that the King's participation in the withdrawal might be indirect and implicit. (2) The telegram of 7 P.M., with the new demand for a future guarantee. (3) The telegram of 11.45 P.M., repeating the demand and adding the Emperor's suggestion. Benedetti's action will be dealt with on subsequent pages.

Public Opinion. Of the state of public opinion on the 12th, Gramont has said:

"It would be superfluous to picture here the state of mind at the moment when the despatch from Prince Antoine circulated among the public. The events are still too close to us to make it necessary to describe the fever of indignation which inflamed, one after the other, all the organs of the press, and which expressed itself in the mass of the people by an agitation almost disquieting." [161]

"There was but one cry, but one sentiment in the chambers and in the country: 'Guarantees are necessary for the future. We cannot rest exposed to new surprises; guarantees are indispensable for the security and the repose of the future.'" [162]

"There was no longer a single journal, whatever its party and its opinions, which considered the isolated act of Prince Leopold sufficient, and newspapers the most reserved, the most pacific, counselled the government, as extreme limit, to content itself with an official disavowal from the Berlin cabinet, or with a declaration confirming the definitive character of the renunciation." [163]

13TH JULY — MINISTERIAL STATEMENT

Council Meeting — 9 A.M. The situation caused by the demand for a future guarantee gave rise to prolonged discussion at the Council meeting of 9 A.M. on the next day.[164] At first, the Emperor concurred in the proposal of Labœuf, the Minister for War, for the calling out of the reserves, but afterwards he agreed to postpone that action. According to Ollivier (but, probably, as we shall see, not according to the fact), the view of the majority of the Council was that the following question should be answered in the affirmative:

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[160] Gramont, *op. cit.*, p. 138; Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 270; Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 138–9. Benedetti gives the hour of the telegram as 1.45 A.M.: *op. cit.*, p. 373.

[161] Gramont, *op. cit.*, pp. 128–9.

[162] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[163] *Ibid.*, pp. 148–9.

[164] It was to this meeting that Lord Lyons sent the substance of Lord Granville's telegram of earlier in the same morning.

"If, as was probable, Prince Leopold did not disavow [the action of] his father; if the King approved it, as he had promised to do; if Spain resigned itself to abandon its candidate; should we declare ourselves satisfied, even if the King should refuse to give us the guarantee for the future?"[165]

The discussion resulted in the preparation of the following declaration for presentment to the Chamber:

"The Ambassador of Spain officially announced yesterday the renunciation by the Prince of Hohenzollern of his candidature to the throne of Spain. The negotiations which we are pursuing, and which have never had any other object than the question of Spain,[166] are not yet concluded. It is impossible, then, for us to speak of them, and to submit today to the Chamber and to the country a general recital of the affair."[167]

These few lines contained two mis-statements: (1) That the Spanish Ambassador had made an official announcement, was not true. Ollivier admits the charge. He has written:

"That is the only untruth which we permitted ourselves in that crisis; it was inspired in us by the desire to increase the chances for peace in giving consistency to the disputed act of Prince Antoine."[168] (2) Nor was the statement that Leopold had renounced his candidature quite true. His father had assumed to do it, but, as afterwards appeared, Leopold dissented and was, with difficulty, persuaded into submission.[169] The statement that the negotiations had "never had any other object," moreover, was misleading.

But although these statements were inaccurate, the effect of publicly declaring them to be true fulfilled two of the three conditions upon which (as above quoted from Ollivier) a refusal of the future guarantee would be deemed to be immaterial.[170] And for the third — that the King would approve Leopold's withdrawal — the government had already, on two occasions, received the King's assurance.[171] As soon, therefore, as the King should intimate his refusal to give the future guarantee, the affair would be at an end — that is, according to Ollivier.

Ministerial Declaration in the Corps Législatif. Having read the declaration (as agreed to in Council) in the Chamber, Gramont was asked from whom the renunciation had emanated — from Leopold himself, or from Antoine, the father? He answered:

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[165] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 287. And see *ibid.*, pp. 289, 545, 546. *Cf.* Ollivier: *Thiers devant l'histoire*, p. 7.

[166] The words "than the question of Spain" do not appear in Ollivier's version of the document.

[167] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 289; de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 276.

[168] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 289. And see p. 300.

[169] *Ibid.*, pp. 209–12, 300.

[170] Ollivier indicates that satisfaction of these two conditions was regarded as certain.

[171] *Ante*, pp. 592, 594.

"I have been informed by the Spanish Ambassador that Prince Leopold has renounced his candidature to the Crown." [172]

That was not true; and to the further statement that rumor had it that the renunciation came from Antoine, Gramont retorted:

"I have not concerned myself with the rumors that circulate in the corridors." [173]

Then Duvernois asked when he would have an opportunity of developing his interpellation. The 15th was agreed to.[174]

Gramont and Lyons. Shortly afterwards (still the 13th), Lord Lyons (the British Ambassador) called upon Gramont to intimate regret that the statement to the Chamber had not been an announcement that the difficulty had been settled. Ollivier in his book laments that Gramont refrained from informing Lyons of the resolution which he (Ollivier) says had been arrived at by the Council, namely, its readiness, upon conditions, to abandon the demand for a future guarantee.[175] Not having heard of such a resolution, or else assuming sole responsibility for disregarding it, Gramont endeavored to convince Lyons that the demand was reasonable, and compliance with it indispensable. To avoid misunderstanding, he wrote and handed to the Ambassador the following:

"We ask the King of Prussia to prevent the Prince of Hohenzollern receding from his resolution. If he does that, the whole incident is terminated." [176]

Lyons urged that nobody would believe that France seriously could apprehend a renewal of the candidature, but Gramont declared:

"If the King refuses to formulate that prohibition, France can only assume hostile designs on his part, and would take measures accordingly." [177]

Ollivier in his book says:

"That resembled an ultimatum, and the Council had decided that it would not have an ultimatum." [178]

But Ollivier's testimony upon that point cannot be accepted — as we shall see.[179] Replying to Lyons' report of the conversation, Lord Granville said (14 July):

"I have already informed your Excellency, and I now repeat, that, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, a demand on Prussia for an engagement covering the future cannot be justly made by France." [180]

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[172] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 294.
[173] *Ibid.*
[174] *Ibid.*, p. 296.
[175] *Ibid.*, pp. 299, 300.
[176] *Ibid.*, p. 300.
[177] *Ibid.*, p. 301.
[178] *Ibid.*
[179] *Post*, p. 615–7.
[180] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 44.

Effect of Declaration. The effect of the ill-advised pronouncement in the Chamber was as might have been expected. Ollivier says:

"From the sitting of the Chamber until late in the night, the 13th, in the absence of definite news from Ems and Berlin, the mental excitement became momentarily more violent in Paris. Our response to the interpellation raised an almost general reprobation." [181]

13 JULY — "THE HAUGHTY RUPTURE"

One of the grounds upon which the French have placed their justification for entering upon the war is that indicated by Ollivier in one of his speeches in the Chamber:

"We have continued to negotiate. How have they responded to our moderation? By the haughty rupture of the negotiations, which, on our part were pursued with perfect straightforwardness." [182]

In his circular despatch of 21 July 1870, Gramont gave international circulation to the charge, by referring to the language of the King at Ems as "at first hesitating, then decided and haughty." [183] Was there a *rupture hautaine?* For answer, we must look at the messages in which Benedetti reported the facts to Gramont. There were four telegrams and one despatch.

Benedetti's First Telegram. Early in the morning of the 13th, after having received Gramont's telegram of 7 P.M. of the previous day,[184] but before receiving that of 11.45 P.M.,[185] Benedetti met the King on the promenade, and, as he reported, "approached" him "to execute your orders" [186] — namely, to obtain a general guarantee for the future. Remembering that he had been censured for lack of "firmness," [187] Benedetti appears to have been unduly persistent in the presentation to the King of what he himself conceived to be an unreasonable demand. Reporting to Gramont (13 July at 10.30 A.M.), he said:

"I remarked to him that the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern approved by the King, was our guarantee for the present, but that we thought that it was indispensable, in order to assure the future and definitely to give confidence to all interests, that the King, to this end, should be so good as to permit me to announce to you, in his name, that if the Prince of Hohenzollern should again think of his project, His Majesty should interpose his authority and prevent it. The King has absolutely refused to authorize me to send you such a declaration. I vigorously persisted, but without succeeding in modifying the deter-

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[181] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 337.
[182] *Ibid.*, p. 427.
[183] *Op. cit.*, p. 409.
[184] *Ante*, p. 602.
[185] *Ante*, pp. 604–5.
[186] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 377.
[187] *Ante*, p. 594.

mination of His Majesty. The King terminated our interview by saying that he could not, nor did he wish to undertake such an engagement, and that he would in this eventuality, as in all others, reserve to himself the faculty of consulting the circumstances." [188]

It will be observed that Benedetti understood that the King had already approved of Leopold's withdrawal. That "guarantee for the present" was satisfactory. Guarantee for the future was the new demand.

Benedetti's Second Telegram. During the interview with Benedetti, the King had indicated to him that he would be sent for as soon as communication from Leopold was received. When, therefore, Benedetti received (10.30 A.M.) Gramont's third telegram of the previous day, he replied (11 A.M.), by his second telegram, that he would give it attention when summoned by the King.[189]

Benedetti's Third Telegram. The King, instead of summoning Benedetti, sent Prince Radziwill (the Adjutant in attendance) with a message, which Benedetti reported in his third telegram — 3.45 P.M. It reached Gramont at 11 P.M.:

"The King has received reply from the Prince of Hohenzollern; it is from Prince Antoine, and he announces to His Majesty that Prince Leopold, his son, has withdrawn from his candidature for the crown of Spain. The King has authorized me to inform the Government of the Emperor that he approves this resolution. The King charged one of his Aides de Camp with the communication of this to me, and I reproduce the exact terms of it. His Majesty not having made any announcement to me on the subject of the assurance which we desire for the future, I have solicited a last audience in order to submit again, and develop, the observations which I presented to him this morning. I have strong reason to suppose that I shall not obtain any concession in that respect." [190]

It will be observed that Prince Leopold has now, for himself, withdrawn his candidature; that the King has approved the withdrawal; and therefore, that all three of the conditions which, according to Ollivier, the Council had stipulated as being sufficient to satisfy them,[191] existed. It may be noted also (for future reference) that the famous "Ems telegram" to Bismarck was despatched at 5.50 P.M., or about two hours after Benedetti had sent off the last above quoted telegram.

Benedetti's Fourth Telegram. In his fourth telegram (7 P.M.), Benedetti reported as follows:

"To my request for a new audience, the King has made reply that he would not consent to renew with me the discussion relative to the

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[188] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 372.
[189] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 374.
[190] *Ibid.*, p. 375.
[191] *Ante*, pp. 605–6.

assurance which, according to our opinion, should be given to us for the future. His Majesty declared that, as to that subject, he would refer me to the considerations which he had explained to me this morning, of which I gave you the substance in my first telegram of this day, and which I have developed in a report that you will receive tomorrow morning. His Majesty consented, as his envoy has again told me, in the name of His Majesty, to give his approbation, full and unreserved, to the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern; he cannot do more. I will attend to your orders before leaving Ems." [192]

Benedetti's Despatch. In a lengthy despatch, Benedetti, besides reiterating the contents of his telegrams, said that the conversation with the King had taken place on the public promenade; that he had "approached" the King [193] for that purpose; that the King had not ceased to accord an "apparently gracious reception . . . to my requests"; [194] but that he was firmly determined not to give the guarantee.

Why the Adjutant. At the interview between the King and Benedetti, a second meeting had been contemplated. Why did the King substitute a message by his Adjutant? The answer is threefold: (1) Because there was no necessity for a further interview. The fact of Leopold's own withdrawal (Antoine had previously withdrawn in Leopold's name) could be communicated as well by the Adjutant as personally. (2) Because the King did not wish to give Benedetti an opportunity to renew a demand which already had been somewhat too strongly urged and which had been definitely refused. (3) And because, principally, after the morning interview, the King had read the Werther report telling of the request for a letter from him in which he was to appear as "a repentant sinner." [195]

Gramont to Benedetti — 8.30 or 9.45 P.M.[196] Benedetti's first telegram, announcing the unqualified refusal of the King to give the future guarantee, necessitated determination in Paris as to future action. Gramont settled the point by instructing Benedetti as follows:

"As I have informed you, public sentiment is excited to such an extent that it was with great difficulty we were able to obtain until Friday for the giving of our explanations.

"Make a last effort with the King. Tell him that we confine our-

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[192] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 376.

[193] Ollivier untruly says: "The Ambassador had too much politeness to approach the King; it was the King who advanced toward him": *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 280.

[194] *Ante*, p. 601. *Cf.* de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 277–8: Welschinger, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 77–81, 83, 87.

[196] Ollivier puts the hour of the telegram at 8.30, Benedetti at 9.45. Gramont (*op. cit.*, p. 182) states it to be 8.00, and records 9.45 as the time stamped by the Paris telegraphic bureau.

selves to asking him to forbid the Prince of Hohenzollern to retract his renunciation — that he say to you, 'I will forbid it to him,' and that he authorize you to write to me, or that he charge his minister or his ambassador so to inform me; that will satisfy us. If, in short, the King has no mental reservations, it is for him only a secondary question; but for us it is very important. The simple word of the King would constitute a sufficient guarantee for the future. . . . In any case, leave Ems and come to Paris with the reply, affirmative or negative. It is necessary that I should see you before noon on Friday. If necessary, take a special train. Still continue to telegraph to me all that you have to make known to me. Perhaps you might, in receiving from the King the news of the renunciation of the Prince of Hohenzollern, say to him: 'Sire, Your Majesty is the guarantor of the Prince of Hohenzollern, because you do not forget that, as a Power, we have no relations with the Prince, and that, consequently, before the country, our official guarantee is the word of the King." [197]

Gramont probably sent this telegram on his own responsibility. He was insisting, it will be observed, upon his demand for the future guarantee.

Not feeling that he could again address the King, Benedetti communicated, the next day, with one of the Prussian Ministers (just arrived at Ems) who, after consulting the King, replied "that he had nothing to communicate to me." [198] That was the end of the interview, with the exception of Benedetti's short *au revoir* conversation with the King at the railway station on the same evening.

The King on the Refusal. As above mentioned, one reason for the King's disinclination for a second interview was that Benedetti had, in the first, been somewhat too insistent. The King's account of the conversation was as follows:

"Count Benedetti stopped me on the promenade to ask me finally, in a very pressing manner, to authorize him to telegraph immediately that I engaged not to give my consent in the future if the Hohenzollerns again set up their candidature. I refused in a sufficiently serious manner, as one ought not, and cannot, assume such perpetual engagements." [199]

In a letter to the Queen, the King characterized Benedetti's conduct as "almost impertinent." [200]

In his official report of the occasion, the Adjutant in attendance upon the King declared that Benedetti, after the King had refused to give the future guarantee, said to him (the Adjutant) that:

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[197] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 384–5; Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 344–5; Gramont, *op. cit.*, pp. 182, 189, 190.

[198] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 385–6.

[199] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 306–7.

[200] *Ibid.*, p. 283, note.

"he must persist in his request for another conversation with His Majesty, as he was expressly instructed to do so in the last despatch from M. de Gramont, and even if it were only to hear the same words from His Majesty again; the more so as there were fresh arguments in this last despatch which he wished to submit to His Majesty. Hereupon His Majesty caused answer to be given to the Count through me, for the third time, after dinner, about half-past 5 o'clock, that His Majesty must positively decline to enter into further discussions in regard to this last point (a binding assurance for the future). What he had said in the morning was His Majesty's last word on this matter, and he could do no more than refer to it." [201]

Benedetti on the Refusal. Benedetti (as he said) saw no reason to complain of the King's refusal:

"again to renew with me the discussion relative to the assurance . . . for the future." [202]

On the contrary, in his report to Gramont he said:

"I even foresee that, dating from this moment, it will be less easy for me to approach him, and I doubt not that, in confiding to one of his officers the duty of acquainting me with the resolution of the Prince of Hohenzollern, he had wished to avoid giving me occasion for it." [203]

Referring to the Werther report and its effect upon the King, he said:

"Not less was the King impressed with it in the most deplorable way; and, instead of sending for me, to make to me the communication, as he had indicated his intention, he charged Prince Radziwill with the duty of making it. I had not, moreover, been informed of the conversation which the Duc de Gramont and M. Emile Ollivier had had with the Prussian Ambassador, and since then have not been able to combat the unfortunate influence which the report of that diplomat has exercised over the mind of the King. It is, indeed, from that moment that all has been compromised." [204]

That Benedetti did not feel aggrieved, is shown, too, by the fact that, hearing on the next day (the 14th) that the King was about to leave Ems, he, "in order not to fail in any point of etiquette," [205] expressed to the King the desire "to take leave." [206] The King received him in the reserved room at the station; and there, in allusion to previous conversations (as Benedetti reported), he:

"confined himself to telling me that he had nothing further to communicate, and that negotiations which might yet have to be pursued would be continued by his Government." [207]

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[201] Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 8, Enc. 4. *Cf.* Benedetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 439–40.
[202] *Ante*, pp. 609–10.
[203] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 381.
[204] *Ibid.*, p. 383.
[205] *Ibid.*, p. 386; Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 388.
[206] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 386; Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 388.
[207] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

Ollivier on the Refusal. In Ollivier's opinion, Benedetti had been too persistent and the King had acted properly.

"Persuaded, as he was, that he would not obtain any concession, Benedetti should have understood that one does not disturb a King in order to hear him repeat what he has already said in peremptory terms, and that any insistence would lack tact and might bring upon him disagreeable rebuffs. Without doubt, Gramont had sent him the instruction to insist, but the Minister could not know the exact state of the King's mind, and certainly he would not have reiterated that order if he had been on the spot. The consequences of the unwise importunity on the part of our Ambassador were immediate." [208]

Referring to the conversation between the King and Benedetti, Ollivier says:

"One understands what must have been passing in the King's mind. Having decided to terminate the affair peaceably, to risk even a rupture with his confidential Minister, and to expose himself to the criticism of German national opinion, he received, as response to this honest effort, a futile exigence, to which, in spite of all his goodwill, it was impossible to yield without humiliation. He showed a self-possession truly royal. Very firmly, but without failing in any of the forms of his habitual courtesy, he made the Ambassador understand his surprise at this unexpected exigence, and explained to him why he repelled it." [209]

After the King's refusal (Ollivier continues):

"Benedetti insists, presses the King to reason by hypothesis and to admit the renunciation as having been made. Entering into a distinction for which he had no authority, he adjured him to consent to it as head of the family, if not as sovereign." [210]

After another reasoned refusal by the King (Ollivier continues):

"Benedetti returned to the charge a third time. . . . This time the King becomes impatient and finds the insistence out of place. Without ceasing to be polite, he says in a more severe tone: 'Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, I have just given you my reply, and since I have nothing to add to it, permit me to withdraw.'" [211]

Ollivier acquits the Adjutant, too, of any lack of courtesy. In one of his speeches in the Chamber, he said that the circumstance:

"appeared to us the more significant in that the Aide de Camp, who announced to M. Benedetti the refusal of audience, failed in none of the points of courtesy." [212]

Gramont on the Refusal. Gramont was of much the same opinion. In his book he said:

"The refusal to receive the Ambassador contrasted, it is true, with

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[208] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 306.
[209] *Ibid.*, p. 281.
[210] *Ibid.*
[211] *Ibid.*, p. 282.
[212] *Ibid.*, p. 425.

the habitual courtesy of the King, but inasmuch as, after all, it was not accompanied by any offensive act, and appeared to be inspired solely by the desire not to renew a discussion thenceforth without object, we were far from finding in it the character of a premeditated offence." [213]

"However, it is useful to point out here the very marked difference which constantly manifested itself between the conduct of the King and that of his Prime Minister. Throughout the whole of the negotiations, and even to the final period, that is to say at his departure from Ems, the King, by his language, by his attitude, rather sought to safeguard peace than to kindle the flames of war." [214]

Conclusion. If there be added to all these views the opinion of the ministerial council itself, namely, that the conduct of the King had been "irreproachable," [215] there can be no escape from the conclusion that in describing the King's treatment of Benedetti as "the haughty rupture," Ollivier was purposely misleading the Chamber, and, through it, the public and the world.

13 JULY — EVENING — PARIS

The King's "Approval." The sentence in Benedetti's third telegram (arrived 11 P.M.):

"The King has authorized me to inform the Government of the Emperor that he approves this resolution." [216]

— that is the withdrawal of Leopold — gave cause for new discussion in Paris. Referring to it, Gramont sent the following note to Ollivier:

"I am going to St. Cloud.[217] Again some news. He (the King) has communicated and approved the Hohenzollern letter, that is little." [218]

Ollivier replied immediately:

"I do not find that the *approved* is little, especially in connection with the despatch which Olozaga has communicated to you." [219]

On returning from St. Cloud, Gramont sent another note to Ollivier:

"My dear friend, I have returned from Saint-Cloud. The indecision is great. Then the doubt because of the *approbation* by the King. The Spanish despatch might perhaps incline toward peace. The Emperor has charged me to beg of you to inform all our colleagues that he expects them to dine with him to-morrow at seven o'clock, in order to hold a Council in the evening." [220]

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[213] *Op. cit.*, p. 195.
[214] *Ibid.*, p. 290. See also pp. 292–3.
[215] *Post*, p. 623.
[216] *Ante*, p. 609; Gramont, *op. cit.*, pp. 182, 191.
[217] The Emperor resided there.
[218] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 350.
[219] *Ibid.* The reference is to the telegram from Strat on the previous day.
[220] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 351.

Ollivier's comment in his book is as follows:

"King William had replied with a clearness which left nothing to be desired; he had communicated to us by Benedetti the renunciation, declaring that he approved it; Olozaga notified us of unreserved adherence; unless it be bad faith, one is obliged to agree that this double acceptance by Prussia and Spain implied a more than sufficient guarantee for the future. We had attained the end that we set for ourselves. There was only one way now of bringing on war: it was to pass from the affair already settled according to our wish, and to raise the question of our general grievances against Prussia: I was resolved not to consent to it." [221]

According to Ollivier, therefore, all cause for war had disappeared. If there was to be war, it would be, he thought, necessarily based upon previously existing grievances; and he would not be a party to the substitution. What happened, we shall see.

INSISTENCE UPON THE DEMAND FOR GUARANTEE

The foregoing facts and others still to be referred to prove conclusively the invalidity of Ollivier's assertion that the Council in the morning of the 13th determined to dispense with the demand for a future guarantee provided (1) that Leopold did not disavow the action of his father in withdrawing the candidature; (2) that the King "approved" of the withdrawal; and (3) that Spain accepted the withdrawal. Observe the following:

1. The conditions had all been fulfilled, and yet the demand was pressed.

2. If the Council had decided as alleged, Benedetti would have been advised of it. And although it was too late to prevent presentation to the King of the demand as at first formulated,[222] it was not too late to interrupt his persistence throughout the day. If Benedetti had been notified of the Council's decision, and if, upon receiving the notification, he had made intimation of it to the King, the negotiations would have reached a satisfactory conclusion.

3. It is inconceivable that Gramont would have flouted the decision of the Council by telling Lord Lyons that if the King refused to give the future guarantee:

"France can only assume hostile designs on his part, and would take measures accordingly." [223]

4. And it is also inconceivable that after Gramont had been advised from Ems of the King's refusal, he should have instructed Benedetti (8.30 or 9.45 P.M.) to press the matter still further.[224]

[221] *Ibid.*, pp. 351–2.
[222] By Gramont's telegram of 7 p.m.: *ante*, p. 602.
[223] *Ante*, p. 607.
[224] *Ante*, pp. 610–11.

5. The extract from Ollivier's book, last above quoted,[225] is based not upon the cancellation of the demand, but upon its continued existence. He urges, not that compliance has been dispensed with, but that there had been sufficient fulfillment.

6. If Gramont's action was inconsistent with the decision of the Council, he has escaped with very little criticism. Ollivier, while objecting to Gramont's statement to Lord Lyons, offers no comment upon either the absence of proper notification to Benedetti, or the instructions to him to persist.

7. The Council, at its afternoon meeting on the 14th (the day after it is alleged to have agreed to waive the demand, upon conditions), determined to announce its satisfaction with everything, except the absence of the future guarantee; and proposed to procure that at the hands of an international conference.[226]

8. In the ministerial declaration, read in both the Chamber and the Senate on the 15th, the facts of the demand for a future guarantee and of the King's refusal to give it, were stated; and not only was there no indication that the Council had waived the demand, but the assertion was made that "our request was moderate,"[227] and that "this refusal appeared to us unjustifiable."[228]

9. During the debate in the Chamber on the 15th, Ollivier, himself, insisted upon the reasonableness of the demand:

"Is it the excess of our demands that is attacked? Could any one conceive of more moderate? If others had sought to preserve good relations as much we have, would it have been very difficult, after the days of anxious waiting, to have given us the assurance that we should not have to fear any change of mind."[229]

10. The Committee of the Senate, after hearing Gramont's statement, reported that:

"All the grievances described by the declaration of the government appeared to it at once well founded and legitimate."[230]

11. In the address of the Senate to the Emperor, the refusal to give the future guarantee was posited as the sufficient ground for declaring war:

"Had not we the right to demand of that Power guarantees against the possible return of such attempts? These guarantees are refused; the dignity of France is disregarded. Your Majesty draws the sword; the country is with you, trembling with indignation and pride."[231]

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[225] P. 615.

[226] *Post*, p. 625.

[227] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 399.

[228] *Post*, p. 634. Ollivier modified "unjustifiable" into "regrettable": *ibid.*, p. 400.

[229] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 431.

[230] *Ibid.*, p. 479.

[231] *Ibid.*, p. 481.

12. In the government's announcement to the Senate and Chamber of the declaration of war, the only reason specified was contained in the words:

"I have invited the Chargé d'Affaires of France to notify to the Cabinet of Berlin our resolution to seek by arms the guarantees we have failed in obtaining by discussion." [232]

13. The formal declaration of war proceeded upon the refusal to give the guarantee:

"aggravated by the notification made to the Cabinets of the refusal to receive the Emperor's Ambassador and to enter into any new explanation with him." [233]

14. On the 15th, after all Ollivier's conditions had been fulfilled, the French Ambassador at London insisted that:

"It was necessary to have some guarantee for the future that the Prince would not again renew his candidature, and their representations to the King of Prussia still remained unanswered." [234]

Lord Granville's reply was that the demand, as a ground for war, could not be justified.[235]

15. The reason assigned for the French refusal to accept British mediation under the protocol of 1856 was that:

"The refusal of the King of Prussia to give the guarantee which France was obliged to ask, in order to prevent dynastic combinations dangerous to her safety and the care of her dignity, prevented her from taking any other course than that which she had adopted." [236]

16. To all this must be added that according to certain unpublished papers of M. Plichon and M. Louvet, members of the Council, four only voted to be content with the withdrawal of the candidature and the approbation of the King, while all the others voted ratification of Gramont's demand for future guarantee.[237]

These considerations make clear that, by asserting that the Council determined to waive the demand, Ollivier was endeavoring to mislead the world.

13 JULY — BERLIN

Proposed Demands. Bismarck's determination that the incident should not close peacefully was quite as strong as Gramont's. In a despatch of 13 July 1870, Lord Loftus, the British Ambassador to Berlin, reporting a conversation with him of that day, said:

"Count Bismarck further stated that unless some assurance, some declaration, were given by France to the European Powers, or in some

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[232] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 121.
[233] Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 9, Enc.
[234] Granville to Lyons: Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 56.
[235] *Ibid.*
[236] Granville to Lyons, 19 July: *Ibid.*, No. 99.
[237] De la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 272–3.

official form, that the present solution of the Spanish question was a final and satisfactory settlement of the French demands, and that no further claims were to be raised; and if, further, a withdrawal or a satisfactory explanation of the menacing language held by the Duc de Gramont were not made, the Prussian Government would be obliged to seek explanations from France. It was impossible, added his Excellency, that Prussia could tamely and quietly sit under the affront offered to the King and to the nation by the menacing language of the French Government. I could not, said his Excellency, hold communication with the French Ambassador after the language held to Prussia by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in the face of Europe."

The reference was to Gramont's declaration of the 6th in the Chamber. In the same conversation, referring to French preparations, Bismarck said that:

"If these continued, we shall be obliged to ask the French Government for explanations as to their object and meaning."

Instead of Prussia giving France the demanded guarantee, Bismarck's view was that:

"After what has occurred we must require some assurances, some guarantee, that we may not be subjected to a sudden attack; we must know that this Spanish difficulty once removed, there are no other lurking designs which may burst upon us like a thunderstorm."[238]

In some circuitous way, Gramont (as he has related) received, the next day, "an exact account of the language held by M. de Bismarck."[239] The probable effect upon Gramont will appear upon a subsequent page.[240]

The "Ems Telegram." Before hearing of the demand for a future guarantee, Bismarck, in his disappointment at the apparently peaceful termination of the Spanish throne incident, had decided to resign his office, and was actually discussing that subject at his dinner table with von Roon and von Moltke when the famous "Ems telegram" was handed to him.[241] The message completely changed the situation. It showed that war was almost certain — an inadmissible demand for a future guarantee had been pressed upon the King and categorically refused. Bismarck proceeded to make the consequence inevitable. But what he did is very generally misunderstood, and as many foolish statements have been made with regard to it — for example, charging him with "tampering with a telegram received from the King"[242] — it

[238] *Ann. Reg.*, 1870, pp. 203–4. *Cf.* Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 156–7.

[239] Sorel, *op. cit.*, I, p. 223.

[240] *Post*, p. 627.

[241] It had been despatched at 5.50 p.m.

[242] Egerton: *British Foreign Policy in Europe*, p. 294. Some writers charge Bismarck with forgery. André Tardieu, for example, in *The Truth about the Treaty* (p. 25), said: "Bismarck, on a like occasion, had forged the telegram from Ems." See also *ibid.*, p. 361. J. A. R. Marriott refutes this statement, but

will be advisable to place the message in juxtaposition with the document prepared and circulated by Bismarck. Perusal will show that the telegram was not from the King, but from Herr Abeken of the Prussian Foreign Office, who was in attendance upon him at Ems; that there was no tampering with it; that there was no alteration of it; that nothing was done to it; and that, in preparing another document for publication, Bismarck was acting in pursuance of a suggestion contained in it. Abeken's message was as follows:

"His Majesty writes to me: 'Count Benedetti spoke to me on the promenade, in order to demand from me, finally in a very importunate manner, that I should authorize him to telegraph at once that I bound myself for all future time never again to give my consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. I refused at last somewhat sternly, as it is neither right nor possible to undertake engagements of this kind *à tout jamais*. Naturally I told him that I had as yet received no news, and as he was earlier informed about Paris and Madrid than myself, he could clearly see that my government once more had no hand in the matter.' His Majesty has since received a letter from the Prince. His Majesty having told Count Benedetti that he was awaiting news from the Prince, has decided, with reference to

refers to the telegram as having been sent by the King, and, to Bismarck's document, as a converted telegram (*England since Waterloo*, p. 423). Ward and Wilkinson state correctly that the telegram was from Abeken (not from the King), but speak of Bismarck's "altering the form of the telegram" by making "certain omissions — but not of essential facts — and contractions" (*Germany*, II, p. 441). The *Encyclopædia Britannica* (11th ed., tit. *Bismarck*) has the following: "Bismarck published the telegram in which this information and the refusal of the King were conveyed, but, by omitting part of the telegram, made it appear that the request and refusal had both been conveyed in a more abrupt form than had really been the case." In such an authoritative work as Fitzmaurice's *Life of Lord Granville* (II, p. 35) is the following: "By the omission of some words and the altered position given to some others, a far graver effect was given." Ollivier speaks of "*la depêche falsifée*" (*op. cit.*, XIV, p. 565). Dr. J. Holland Rose says that Bismarck "cut down" the Abeken telegram (*The Development of the European Nations*, pp. 43–4). The *Cam. Hist. Br. For. Pol.* (III, p. 34) declares that Bismarck "took advantage of the discretionary power allowed him by the King and published the Ems telegram." The writer failed to observe (1) that the only "discretionary power" was in the telegram itself, and (2) that the discretion did not extend to the publication of the telegram, but only to the facts specified in it. Perhaps farthest removed from the truth is the statement of Theodore S. Woolsey, who said that Bismarck "used the emasculated telegram of Ems as the pretext for waging a war of conquest upon France" (*Am. Jour. Int. Law*, XIII, p. 159). Bismarck is himself largely responsible for all this misapprehension, for, in his *Reflections and Reminiscences* (II, p. 99), he speaks of "the difference in the effect of the abbreviated text of the Ems telegram as compared with that produced by the original." But he makes very clear that the document which he prepared was not to be represented as being the telegram which he received from Abeken. He was not "tampering" with the telegram. He was making use — improper use — of its contents in the preparation of a document which, by the telegram, the King had authorized him to publish.

the above demand, upon the representation of Count Eulenburg and myself, not to receive Count Benedetti again, but only to let him be informed, through an aide-de-camp, that His Majesty had now received from the Prince confirmation of the news which Benedetti had already received from Paris, and had nothing further to say to the Ambassador. His Majesty leaves it to your Excellency whether Benedetti's fresh demand and its rejection should not be at once communicated both to our ambassadors and to the press." [243]

The Alleged Tampering. It will be observed that the King authorized Bismarck to communicate to the Ambassadors and the press two facts — "Benedetti's fresh demand and its rejection." He had no permission to publish the whole telegram. That would obviously have been inappropriate as well as unauthorized. Construction of another document, limited to a correct statement of the two facts, was the proper action. Bismarck wrote as follows:

"After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern had been officially communicated to the Imperial Government of France by the Royal government of Spain, the French Ambassador at Ems further demanded of his Majesty the King that he would authorize him to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty the King bound himself for all future time never again to give his consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. His Majesty the King thereupon decided not to receive the French Ambassador again, and sent to tell him through the aide-de-camp on duty that his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador." [244]

The last sentence of this document was not only not authorized by the King, but was untruthful. For it gave the impression that the King (1) had refused to make any reply to the demand, and (2) had decided not again to receive Benedetti for any purpose; whereas the facts were that the King had received Benedetti; had given him a reply; and had decided not to receive him again only "with reference to the above demand." At the same time, it will be observed that the King's decision "not to receive the French Ambassador again" was not alleged to have been part of the communication to the Ambassador. In other words, the document stated (1) truthfully, the demand; falsely, the reply "that his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador"; and (3) falsely, the King's decision "not to receive the French ambassador again." [245]

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[243] Bismarck, *op. cit.*, II, p. 96, note. The Prussian official "Memorandum of what occurred at Ems" is in Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, o. 8, Enc. 3. The report of the King's Adjutant or Aide-de-Camp is in *ibid.*, Enc. 4.

[244] Bismarck, *op. cit.*, II, p. 99. *Cf.* Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 8, Enc. 2.

[245] Disregarding these obvious facts, Dr. J. Holland Rose holds that Bismarck's "version of the original Ems despatch did not contain a single offensive word, neither did it alter any statement": *The Development of the European Nations*, p. 45.

Bismarck and his Guests. Bismarck relates that his guests — both anxiously desirous of war — were delighted with his document, Moltke saying:

"Now it has a different ring; it sounded before like a parley; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge." [246]

Bismarck said to his friends:

"If in execution of his Majesty's order, I at once communicate this text, which contains no alteration in or addition to the telegram, not only to the newspapers, but also by telegraph to all our embassies, it will be known in Paris before midnight, and not only on account of the contents, but also on account of the manner of its distribution, will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull. Fight we must if we do not want to act the part of the vanquished without a battle. Success, however, essentially depends upon the impression which the origination of the war makes upon us and others; it is important that we should be the party attacked, and this Gallic overweening and touchiness will make us if we announce in the face of Europe, so far as we can without the speaking-trumpet of the Reichstag, that we fearlessly meet the public threats of France." [247]

Von Roon, in cheerful vein, declared that:

"Our God of old lives still, and will not let us perish with disgrace." [248]

And Moltke added:

"If I may but live to lead our armies in such a war, then the devil may come directly afterwards and fetch away the old carcass." [249]

Publication of the Document. The same evening, at ten o'clock, Bismarck's document appeared as a supplement of the *North German Gazette*. Whence it had emanated, was not indicated. Bismarck, shortly afterwards, deceitfully referred to it as a "newspaper telegram." It was, he said:

"communicated to the German Governments, and to some of our Representatives with non-German Governments, according to the wording of the newspapers, in order to inform them of the nature of the French demands, and the impossibility of complying with them, and which, moreover, contains nothing injurious to France." [250]

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[246] Bismarck, *op. cit.*, II, p. 100.

[247] *Ibid.*

[248] *Ibid.*

[249] *Ibid.*

[250] Br. Blue Bk., C.–210: Bismarck to Count Bernstorff (No. 8, Enc. 1), 18 July 1870. In a later official document (*ibid.*, No. 30, Enc. 1), Bismarck, referring to communications made by his government, said as follows: "These communications contain the well-known telegram, the only remaining ground upon which the French Ministry could base a declaration of war, and could only be used in that way by its being designated as a note sent from the Prussian to the other Governments. He would not go into the designation of what a 'note' really was; but the French Government had publicly designated a newspaper communication,

Attribution of the origin of Bismarck's document to newspaper enterprise might have passed into history as authentic but for his own book (*Reflections and Reminiscences*), from which the above quotations with reference to the real authorship are taken.

14 JULY — PARIS

Public Excitement. "Public opinion is ablaze," said Gramont on the 10th.[251] On the 12th by the temporizing declaration of the 11th, it had become (as we have seen) more and more violent[252] — and with the Emperor "the indecision is great."[253] Speaking of the morning of the 14th — that is, prior to knowledge in Paris of the publication in Berlin of the Bismarck document — Gramont said:

"It is useless to recall here what was the condition of mind and of public opinion during the morning of the 14th July. Irritation, pushed to its climax, recognized no further obstacles; and even under the walls of the palace, at the approaches to the ministerial offices, significant murmurs were heard from the people."[254]

Council Meeting, 1 P.M., at the Tuileries. The Council met at the Tuileries at 1 P.M. Gramont had been apprised of the publication of the Bismarck document,[255] but the Parisian public were not yet aware of it. Of the Emperor's approach to the Tuileries, Ollivier relates that:

"Like ourselves, he had passed through an impatient and angry crowd, from which rose strident cries, violent gestures, protestations against diplomatic delays."[256]

Gramont had difficulty in reaching the building, for, as he says:

"already the agitation of the Chamber had communicated itself to the masses, and the entrances to the ministerial offices, as well as to the

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intended merely to inform our Representatives at German and other Courts exactly the actual state of the case, and of our feeling upon it, a note. The Ministry took care not to produce this document to the Chamber, as was demanded by a few members of the Opposition; for as soon as the representatives of the people had read and appreciated this so-called document, the whole fabric upon which the declaration of war was based must have fallen to the ground, for the official document was nothing but a newspaper telegram." In the *Fortnightly Rev.* of Oct. 1917 (p. 524) is the following: "In all the official German documents this celebrated telegram is called a 'Zeitungstelegram,' as if it had been written by any ordinary journalist, and in the German 'Staatsarchiv' it is called 'a newspaper telegram from Ems.'" Bismarck was not very truthful when either exculpating or incriminating himself.

[251] *Ante*, p. 593.
[252] *Ante*, p. 608.
[253] *Ante*, p. 614.
[254] *Op. cit.*, pp. 206–7.
[255] *Ante*, p. 618.
[256] XIV, p. 357.

Corps Législatif were blocked by an impatient and angry crowd. Strident cries, violent and disorderly excitations, protestations against all idea of negotiation were sent forth and acclaimed by the crowd." [257]

At the commencement of the proceedings of the Council, Gramont threw his portfolio on the table, and, referring to the publication in Berlin of the Bismarck document, said:

"After what has just happened, a minister of Foreign Affairs who failed to decide in favor of war would not be worthy of retaining his portfolio." [258]

Gramont having been quieted, the Council proceeded to discuss the conduct of the Prussian King at Ems. Ollivier, in his book, after referring to the general relations between a sovereign and a foreign ambassador, states the conclusion arrived at by the Council as follows:

"At the same time a sovereign was not absolutely forced to receive an Ambassador who persisted in demanding that which already had been denied in peremptory terms, and he neither violates any diplomatic convention nor neglects anything which could be legitimately insisted upon when he declines, politely, through the intermediacy of one of his officers, to prolong a verbal discussion which he regards useless, since he considers it as exhausted. In consequence, we judged the conduct of the King at Ems irreproachable; he refused, in courteous terms, the conversation with Benedetti; there was neither insulter nor insulted; there was, in excess, the persistence of Benedetti in twice demanding an audience after the King had so formally notified him that he had nothing further to say." [259]

To this extremely important admission, Ollivier adds:

"But at Berlin the nature and aspect of things had totally changed. A natural refusal had become an offensive refusal. The public had been made aware of a matter that should have remained private between the Ambassador and the King, and it was divulged to them in an unusual form, sharpened as an arrow . . . Bismarck's act appeared to us a voluntary, premeditated, intolerable offence. . . . At last we were forced to admit to ourselves that resignation would be disgraceful; that what had taken place at Berlin constituted a declaration of war; that now the only question was whether we should bow our head under an outrage, or stand erect as men of honor. There could not be a doubt, and we decreed the calling out of the reserves." [260]

The obvious comments upon the above are: (1) "Irreproachable" conduct can hardly become offensive conduct by the subsequent act of

[257] *Op. cit.*, p. 211. Referring to the same period, Sorel says: "The situation had become aggravated, the impressions had changed. The agitation at Paris was great, in the vicinity of the Bourbon palace as around the Tuilleries": *Op. cit.*, p. 168.

[258] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 358.

[259] *Ibid.*, p. 360.

[260] *Op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 360–2.

a third party. (2) The conduct of the King was not a private matter between the Ambassador and the King. It was a matter of international concern. It would certainly be made known to the respective governments. And neither government could complain if the other published a full account of what had taken place. Certainly the French government felt themselves at liberty to communicate the facts (although in distorted form) to their parliament, for that is what they did. (3) The Council was right in describing Bismarck's act as a premeditated offence. But they were wrong in holding that it "constituted a declaration of war." When they came to draft their own declaration, Bismarck's act was treated as an aggravating circumstance, only.[261] It was offensive, and an occasion for diplomatic protest, but it was not in itself a sufficient ground upon which to base an abrupt declaration of war. The Council was, however, unanimously of other opinion. Ollivier relates that Leboeuf said to his fellow councillors:

"'Gentlemen, what we have just decided is very grave, but we have not voted. Before signing the summons for the reserves, I demand an individual vote.' He interrogated us himself, one after the other, commencing with me and finishing with the Emperor. Our reply was unanimous. 'Now,' said the Maréchal, 'what has just happened interests me no longer.' And he went off to his Department where he caused the orders for the summoning of the reserves to be prepared (4 h. 40)."[262]

The Council then (4 P.M.) proceeded to prepare the form of a declaration of war-policy to be made to the Chamber, and, meanwhile, as Ollivier relates:

"The Chamber being in session, effervescent, anxious, in order to calm it and to obtain information for ourselves, we sent Maurice Richard to the Palais-Bourbon."[263]

Upon his return to the Council, Richard made a report in terms similar to those in which *Le Soir* of the same day referred to his mission:

"The enthusiasm is great. If there is a Declaration to-day, the *Corps Législatif* will crumble under the applause. . . . If the Declaration is not made, it will be more than a disappointment, more than a deception, there will be an immense burst of laughter, and the Cabinet will remain overwhelmed in its silence."

Referring to M. Richard himself, the journal continued:

"Enter M. Maurice Richard; they question him. He interrogates them. Evidently, he wishes to ascertain the facts with his own eyes. If he reports exactly what he has seen, it will be to say to the Emperor that the Chamber is an immense Leyden jar."[264]

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[261] *Post*, p. 649.

[262] *Op. cit.*, XIV, p. 362. *Cf.* de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 290–1.

[263] *Op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 363.

[264] Quoted by Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 363–4.

During the sitting of the Council, a telegram arrived from Benedetti — probably his fourth of the previous day.[265] It was, Ollivier says: "merely a paraphrase of the last telegrams. Only the language which it attributed to the King while quite as negative, appeared to be less stiff. In it there was not that which would cause us to retrace our steps." [266]

"Seized with fright at our resolution," [267] however, (as Ollivier says) the Council unanimously shifted from war to peace. Gramont relates as follows:

"It was not easy, one will admit, to deliberate in this atmosphere, and yet the Council, presided over by the Emperor, deliberated during nearly six hours," with the result of having reached "a peaceful solution," and to announce to the Chamber as follows: "We believe that the principle tacitly adopted by Europe has been to prevent, without a previous arrangement, any Prince belonging to the reigning families of the great Powers from ascending a foreign throne, and we ask that the great European Powers, assembled in Congress, confirm the international jurisprudence." [268]

In other words, the ministry was to declare in parliament that:

"it considered the question as sufficiently settled for the present; and that, in order to assure the future, it believed it to be its duty to address itself to the whole of Europe, and to seek there the guarantee, in a doctrine of international right, for which it asked the collective sanction of the Powers." [269]

This resolution makes clear three important points: (1) the Council deemed that, for the present, the question was sufficiently settled; (2) a guarantee for the future, however, must be insisted upon; and (3) that guarantee should be obtained, not from Prussia but by a declaration of the Powers as to international right. The resolution being inconsistent with calling out the reserves, the Emperor sent an indefinite note to Lebœuf suggesting lack of urgency.[270] The wild absurdity of the proposal became apparent to Ollivier immediately after he had emerged from the Council Chamber.

"I experienced," he tells us, "what a man feels who, from a stifling atmosphere, has reached the open air: the cerebral phantoms disappeared, and the mind regained its consciousness of realities. The project which we had resolved upon appeared to me that which it really was, a fantastic failure of courage." [271]

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[265] *Ante*, pp. 609–10.
[266] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 364.
[267] *Ibid.*
[268] *Op. cit.*, p. 212.
[269] *Ibid.*, p. 214. *Cf.* Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 171; de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 292–3.
[270] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 366; Gramont, *op. cit.*, p. 220.
[271] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 369.

The Ladies. The Empress was indignant at the result; told the Emperor that she doubted:

"that that responds to the sentiment of the Chamber and of the country";[272]

and attacked Lebœuf with the words:

"How is this! You also approve this cowardice? If you wish to dishonor yourself, do not dishonor the Emperor."[273]

Ollivier was not more fortunate:

"On my return to the Chancellery, I assembled my family and my secretaries and read to them the declaration agreed upon. My brothers, my wife, my secretary, General Philis, all until then partisans of peace, broke out into indignant exclamations. It was one outburst of astonishment and blame."[274]

The parts played in these few exciting days by the wives of the principal actors — the French Emperor, the Prussian King, Prince Antoine, and Prince Leopold — well illustrates what Bismarck meant when he denounced the "petticoat plots" of "the royal women."[275] Sir Charles Dilke, who afterwards visited Friedrichsruhe, relates that:

"As Bismarck mellowed with his pipes, he told me that, though he was a high Tory, he had come to see the ills of absolutism, which, to work well, required the King to be an angel. 'Now,' he said, 'Kings, even when good, have women round them, who, even if queens, govern them to their personal ends.'"

Another "confession" he made to Dilke on the same point was that:

"People look on me as a monarchist. Were it all to come over again, I would be republican and democrat; the rule of kings is the rule of women; the bad women are bad, and the good are worse."[276]

Council Meeting in Evening at St. Cloud. Instead of acting upon the note sent to him, Lebœuf persuaded the Emperor to summon the Council for further consideration in the evening. Three members, conspicuously in favor of peace — Segris, Louvet, and Plichon — had not received sufficient notification and were not there.[277] The Empress was present. To Ollivier, the first arrival at St. Cloud, the Emperor said:

"After reflection, I find little satisfaction in the declaration that we made a short time ago."

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[272] *Ibid.*, p. 370.

[273] *Ibid.*, p. 371.

[274] *Ibid.*, pp. 369–70.

[275] G. Grant Robertson: *Bismarck*, p. 308.

[276] Quoted *ibid.*, p. 486.

[277] De la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 297. The presence of the Empress at the Council meeting of the evening was due solely to the afternoon understanding that the outbreak of war was to be followed by the Emperor's absence from Paris on the battlefield, and by the installation of the Empress as regent: Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 609.

Ollivier replied:

"I think the same, Sire; if we were to take it to the Chamber, mud would be thrown at our carriages, and we should be hooted."

And the Emperor added:

"You see in what a situation a government may sometimes find itself; should we be unable to assign any motive for war, we should yet be obliged to discover one in order to obey the will of the country." [278]

The women had had their way, and anxiety to discover some motive for desired action met with the usual success. Note five circumstances:

First. The public demand for war had become irresistible — at least the Emperor so considered, and the British Ambassador agreed. Telegraphing to London in the afternoon, the latter said:

"although the news of the appearance of the article in the 'North German Gazette' had not become generally known, the public excitement was so great, and so much irritation existed in the army, that it became doubtful whether the Government could withstand the cry for war, even if it were able to announce a decided diplomatic success. It was felt that when the Prussian article appeared in the Paris evening papers, it would be very difficult to restrain the anger of the people, and it was generally thought that the Government would feel bound to appease the public impatience by formally declaring its intention to resent the conduct of Prussia." [279]

Second. Gramont read to the Council a telegram from the French Ambassador at Berlin relating the effect of Bismarck's conversation (above referred to [280]), with Loftus, the British Ambassador, and stating that the calm which Berlin had theretofore maintained had given place to irritation.[281] Demands, such as Bismarck contemplated making, would have been extremely embarrassing. Attention would have been centered upon the action of the French Council, rather than upon the conduct of the Prussian King. Why had it sanctioned Gramont's challenging language of the 6th? And what reason could it offer for the extravagant demand upon the Prussian King, after the Leopold withdrawal with the approval of both the King and Spain? The answers would, obviously, have been unsatisfactory. And so the Council, Gramont tells us:

"found itself henceforth in the presence of an adversary determined to lead it, and, if necessary, to drag it, to the battlefield." [282]

The Council foolishly forestalled the "adversary."

Third. The Council was becoming increasingly aware of the dis-

[278] *Ibid.*, p. 373. Dr. J. Holland Rose has it that Ollivier was not present: *The Development of the European Nations*, p. 46.

[279] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 60. *Cf.* Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 382–3.

[280] *Ante*, pp. 617–8.

[281] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 373–4. *Cf.* de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 294–5.

[282] *Op. cit.*, p. 221. Quoted by Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

approbation of the British government — disapprobation of Gramont's declaration of 6th July; [283] of the demand for a future guarantee; [284] and of the hasty precipitation of the crisis.[285] Ollivier testifies that Lord Lyons made clear expression of British opinion,[286] and shortly after the meeting of Council, Gramont received from him a memorandum which Sorel summarizes somewhat too strongly as:

"England officially blamed France, and abandoned her forthwith to her fate." [287]

Fourth. Gramont also read to the Council a telegram (received 4.30 P.M.) from M. Guitaud, the French Minister at Berne, as follows:

"General Rœder has this day communicated to the President a telegram from Count Bismarck announcing the refusal of King William to undertake, as King of Prussia, never at any future time to give his consent to the candidature of the Hohenzollern Prince, if the question should again arise, and, following this demand, the equal refusal of the King to receive our Ambassador." [288]

Two of the objections to the Bismarck document are: (1) that it made no reference to "the refusal of King William to undertake" &c., and (2) that it indicated that the only reply to the demand for a future guarantee was a message "that his Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the Ambassador." [289] Guitaud's telegram removes the first of these objections, and changes the second into a "refusal of the King to receive our Ambassador," leaving for imagination the circumstances attending the refusal. Very evidently, the Guitaud telegram was one which would arouse enquiry rather than precipitate resentful action. It was not one which might usefully be communicated to the Chambers. As Gramont finished the reading of that telegram, he received another from M. Cadore, the French Minister at Munich (the capital of Bavaria), as follows:

"I think it my duty to transmit to you the almost textual copy of the despatch telegraphed by Count Bismarck: 'After the renunciation of the Hohenzollern Prince had been communicated officially to the French Government by the Spanish Government, the French Ambassador asked His Majesty the King, at Ems, to authorize him to telegraph to Paris that His Majesty engaged himself for all future time to refuse his consent if the Hohenzollern princes changed their determination. His Majesty refused to receive the Ambassador again, and sent to him, by an aide-de-camp, a message that he had no further communication

[283] Br. Blue Bk., C.-167, No. 11.
[284] *Ibid.*, Nos. 30, 33, 35, 36, 56, 63.
[285] *Ibid.*, Nos. 17, 60.
[286] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 367.
[287] Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 180. *Cf.* Br. Blue Bk., C.-167, No. 60.
[288] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 374.
[289] *Ante*, p. 620.

to make to him.' The despatch added that 'the King of Bavaria would without doubt be impressed by the fact that M. Benedetti had, in a provoking manner, accosted the King of Prussia on the promenade." [290] Had both of these telegrams been communicated to the Chamber, the deputies might well have seen, in the last sentence of the second, the explanation of the King's refusal "to receive our Ambassador" as stated in the first.[291] Communication of the second telegram by itself would have destroyed the assertion of "the haughty rupture." [292] We shall see what happened.

It was to the Cadore telegram that Lebœuf referred in his evidence before a committee of the Chamber in September 1871, when he said:

"At ten o'clock in the evening, the Council assembled and the discussion was opened. At eleven o'clock, it was almost decided that mobilization would be adjourned and that new plans would be made to terminate the question diplomatically. We were at that point, when a despatch was handed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This despatch was read to the Council as a body; I am not able to give the terms of it, my recollections are not sufficiently precise; but the despatch was of such a nature that it produced reaction in the Council; it was decided that the order for mobilization should be maintained." [293]

Commenting upon this statement, Ollivier said:

"It is true that during the evening a despatch was handed to Gramont from the Foreign Affairs: it was that by which Cadore announced from Munich the official communication of the Prussian Minister, of which Guitaud had already informed us from Berne. This despatch did not change specific dispositions into bellicose, it only confirmed the bellicose disposition which we had adopted, with neither variation nor dissent, from the first moment of our meeting." [294]

Fifth. Gramont in his book [295] insists that the dominating factor in the situation was the Prussian war-preparations. He says:

"I will not further dwell on the details of a situation which is now much better known than it was at the time; I will add only the last fact which completes it, and which dominates all the others by its importance. The armies of Prussia commenced actively their mobilization, and everything was proceeding on the other side of the Rhine as if war had been declared."

Preparations, he says, had been going on in various places openly for twenty-four hours; and:

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[290] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, pp. 374–5.

[291] *Ante*, p. 628.

[292] *Ante*, pp. 608–14.

[293] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 618.

[294] *Ibid.*, p. 619. According to de la Gorce (*op. cit.*, VI, pp. 296–7), all the telegrams had been discussed between Gramont and Ollivier prior to the evening meeting of the Council.

[295] *La France et la Prusse.*

"In the presence of these positive facts, the gravity and the number of which made impossible any doubt or hope, the government no longer hesitated. In reality, war had been declared. There could be no further question of avoiding it; there remained only to prepare for it in all haste. It was decided that the orders of the Minister of War should not be countermanded; that the reserves should be got ready as speedily as possible; and that, on the morrow, the Senate and the Chamber should be informed of the resolution of the government and of the circumstances which had made it necessary." [296]

Ollivier, on the contrary affirms that no news of Prussian mobilization had arrived, and that:

"Lebœuf had been badly informed; the armaments had not commenced until the 16th." [297]

Nevertheless, in the ministerial statement presented to parliament on the 15th, one of the three assigned reasons for war was that "armaments were being effected in Prussia." [298]

Council's Action. Capping the confusion in the testimony, Ollivier, by his own irreconcilable assertions, makes difficult the comprehension of what was done at the evening meeting of the Council. After the reading of the telegrams, he says:

"we were not permitted to waste our time in useless and dangerous sentimentalities; we had only to accept the situation imposed upon us." [299]

That is clear enough, but he adds:

"There was an exchange of ideas from which it followed that war could not be avoided, but it decided nothing. No definite resolution was taken, no irrevocable act was completed." [300]

Afterwards, in a dispute with M. Plichon (a member of the government), who affirmed that war had been decided upon,[301] Ollivier replied that war (Italics as in original):

"had been judged inevitable by the ministers present on the evening of the 14th, but it had been decided upon only *in principle*, which

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[296] Pp. 232–3.

[297] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 400, note. Sorel quotes from Stoffel, Military Attaché at Berlin (*Rapportes Militaires*, p. 463), and from Benedetti, to the effect that the Prussian military preparations had not commenced. Benedetti declared that "Prussia had not called out her reserves until we announced, in the sitting of 15 July, our resolution to demand by force the sureties which had been refused to us voluntarily" (*op. cit.*, p. 9; Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 176). "In this connection," says Dr. J. Holland Rose, "it is needful to state that the order for mobilising the North German troops was not given by the King of Prussia until late on July 15th, when the war votes of the French Chambers were known at Berlin": *The Development of the European Nations*, p. 48.

[298] *Post*, p. 634.

[299] *Op. cit.*, XIV, p. 380.

[300] *Ibid.*, p. 381.

[301] *Ibid.*, pp. 608–9.

meant that there had been no *exterior, official, irrevocable* manifestation of a decision which at that time remained provisional." [302]
Plichon made effective answer:

"You say to me that on the morning of the 15th the situation was open: On the part of the Chamber, yes; on the part of Europe, possibly; on the part of the Cabinet, no!" [303]

To the editor of *Le Gaulois*, who suggested to Ollivier, immediately after the adjournment of the Council, that he might resign rather than be a party to a declaration of war which he did not approve, the reply was that war had been agreed upon.

"Since," he said, "war is decided upon, it is legitimate, it is inevitable; no human force could to-day avert it. Since we are not able to prevent it, our duty is to render it popular. If we should retire, we should discourage the country, we should demoralize the army, we should put in question the right of France and the justice of her cause." [304]

The evidence being much confused, there can be little certainty as to the truth. Ollivier is unsatisfactory; Gramont is unreliable; and Lebœuf appears to have paid little attention to the arguments which were bothering his colleagues. Upon the whole, one feels that the final decision was, as Mr. Lloyd George said of the war of 1914–18: "something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly";
and that *un peu du sang froid* (as M. de la Gorce insists [305]) would have averted it. Torn by the impulses of hatred of Prussia and dread of the Parisian public on the one hand, and, on the other, by fear of a Prussian military success, the Emperor and Ollivier allowed themselves to be hurriedly precipitated into a war which neither desired and which the latter, if not both, disapproved.

"It is thus that, each impelling the other and believing himself impelled, these unfortunates were fleeing, 'with light heart,' [306] before the tempest which was pushing France to the abyss. That is the explanation; as to the facts which will decide ministers, they were first the insensate articles in the journals, then the excitements, the prayers, the menaces of the partisans of war: they besieged the ministerial offices and the antechambers of the château; they reproached the cabinet for its compromises and its negotiations; they accused it of being badly informed; they represented the German armies as marching on the frontier." [307]

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[302] *Ibid.*, p. 615.
[303] *Ibid.*, p. 616.
[304] *Ibid.*, p. 382.
[305] *Op. cit.*, VI, p. 206.
[306] Quoted from Ollivier, without his subsequent explanation.
[307] Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 173. Sorel does not in this connection refer to any effect which may have been produced by publication in Paris of the Bismarck document.

Public Excitement. As Lord Lyons had predicted, public excitement, after publication of "the Prussian article," was extreme. The police report (15 July) indicated that the boulevards had presented the appearance of a fête day:

"The same affluence, the same curiosity, the same animation; the circulation of carriages was impossible, and the omnibuses were obliged to change their itinerary. On all sides one heard cries of: *Vive la guerre! A Berlin!* As the possibility of an arrangement had produced deception, so the rupture of the negotiations was welcomed with feverish excitement. Each breathed as if freed from an oppressive uncertainty." [308]

The newspaper point of view was:

"A public affront has been offered to our Ambassador. There is not a Frenchman who will not resent the injury. All hearts are united to exact, and obtain a glorious reparation." [309]

The newspapers had been misled by the Bismarck document. The Emperor and his Ministers knew that it would be published; and they knew that it was an untrue representation of what had happened at Ems. They knew, as Ollivier relates: (1) that the King had couched his refusal in courteous terms; (2) that in the incident, there had been "neither insulter nor insulted"; (3) that the conduct of the King had, by the French Council, been adjudged "irreproachable"; and (4) that the fault was in "l'acharnement" (the undue persistence) of Benedetti himself. Yet the government permitted the assertions of the document to go uncontradicted. They did more than that: They vouched for its accuracy — as we shall see. Gramont himself tells us that he regarded the Bismarck document as:

"a fantastic recital in which Count Benedetti, on the one hand, was accused of having failed in courtesy toward the King of Prussia, and the King, on the other hand, was represented as having humiliated, by his manner and his refusal, the Ambassador of France. Nothing of this story was true. Count Benedetti had, on all occasions, observed toward the King the respect and the deference due to His Majesty, and the King had never failed either in his deportment, in his language or in his messages, in the courtesy which was habitual to him." [310]

That was not said until long after France had been made to believe that the Bismarck document contained a true recital of the facts — until long after, in that belief, France had declared war on Prussia.

15 JULY — PARIS

Ministerial Declaration. On the morning of the 15th, the Council met, in order, as Gramont relates:

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[308] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 384.

[309] *Ibid.*

[310] *Op. cit.*, p. 224.

"to formulate definitely the terms of the communication which was to be made to the Chamber." [311]

The Empress was present, and the document was agreed to. It was, as read by Gramont in parliament, as follows:

"The manner in which the country received our declaration of the 6th of July having afforded us the certainty that you approved our policy and that we could reckon on your support, we at once began negotiations with the foreign Powers in order to obtain their good offices with Prussia in order that she might admit the legitimacy of our grievances.

"In these negotiations we have asked nothing of Spain, of whom we neither wished to awaken the susceptibilities nor wound the independence. We took no action with the Prince of Hohenzollern, whom we considered as being shielded by the King; we also refused to mix up any recrimination with our discussion, or to permit that discussion to diverge from the object to which, from the commencement, we had confined it.

"Most of the Powers were full of eagerness to satisfy us, and they have admitted the justice of our demands with more or less warmth.

"The Prussian Foreign Office answered by a demurrer, pretending that it knew nothing of the matter, and that the Cabinet of Berlin had remained a stranger to it. We were, accordingly, compelled to address ourselves to the King himself, and we instructed our Ambassador to proceed to the King at Ems. While acknowledging that he had authorized the Prince of Hohenzollern to accept the candidature which had been offered him, the King of Prussia maintained that he had remained a stranger to the negotiations conducted between the Spanish Government and the Prince of Hohenzollern; that he had only intervened as head of the family, and in no way as Sovereign, and that he had neither called together nor consulted his Ministers in Council. His Majesty, however, acknowledged that he had informed Count Bismarck of the various incidents. We could not consider these answers satisfactory; we could not admit that subtle distinction between the Sovereign and the head of the family, and we insisted on the King's advising, and, if necessary, forcing Prince Leopold to renounce his candidature.

"Whilst we were in discussion with Prussia, the relinquishment of his candidature came to us from the quarter from which we did not expect it, and was communicated to us on the 12th July by the Spanish Ambassador.

"The King having wished to remain a stranger to the question, we asked him to associate himself with it, and to declare that if, by one of those changes which are always possible in a country emerging from a revolution, the Crown were to be again offered by Spain to Prince Leopold, he would no longer authorize him to accept it, so that the discus-

[311] *Op. cit.*, p. 239. Quoted by Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

sion might be considered as definitely closed. (Approval.) Our demand was moderate; the terms in which we expressed it were not less so. 'Be sure and tell the King,' we wrote to Count Benedetti on the 12th July at midnight, 'be sure and tell the King that we have no *arrière-pensée*, that we do not seek a pretext for war, and that we only ask to be able to solve honorably a difficulty which is not of our creation.'

"The King consented to approve Prince Leopold's renunciation, but he refused to declare that he would not again in the future authorize the renewal of his candidature. (Movements of surprise.) 'I have demanded of the King,' M. Benedetti writes to us at midnight on the 13th of July, 'to be so good as to permit me to announce to you, in his name, that if the Prince of Hohenzollern should again think of his project, His Majesty should interpose his authority and prevent it. The King has absolutely refused to authorize me to send you such a declaration.' (Sensation. Murmurs.) 'I have vigorously [312] persisted, but without succeeding in modifying the determination of His Majesty. The King terminated our interview by saying that he could not, nor did he wish to undertake such an engagement, and that he would in this eventuality, as in all others, reserve to himself the faculty of consulting the circumstances.' (Exclamations. Loud dissentient cries.)

"*A voice.* — Insolence cannot go further! (Hear, hear.)

"*M. Duruy.* — It is a defiance.

"*The Minister for Foreign Affairs.* — Although this refusal seemed to us unjustifiable [313] — (Marks of assent) — such was our desire of preserving to Europe the blessings of peace, that we did not break off the negotiations; and, in spite of your just impatience, fearing that a discussion should hamper them, we asked you to adjourn the explanations till to-day. (Universal marks of approbation.) We were, accordingly, profoundly surprised when we learnt yesterday that the King of Prussia had notified by an Aide-de-camp to our Ambassador that he would not receive him any more — (lively movement of indignation) —and that, in order to give to this refusal an unequivocal character, his Government had communicated it officially [314] to the Cabinets of Europe. (Explosion of murmurs.)

"*Some Senators.* — It is too much impertinence and audacity.

"*The Minister for Foreign Affairs.* — We learnt at the same time that Baron Werther had received orders to go on leave, and that armaments were being effected in Prussia. Under these circumstances, a further attempt at conciliation would be a forgetfulness of dignity and an imprudence. (Loud assent — prolonged applause.) We have neglected nothing to avoid a war; we are about to prepare to sustain one

[312] Ollivier, in his book, modified "vivement" into "vraiment."

[313] In his book, Ollivier modified "unjustifiable" into "regrettable": *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 400.

[314] Ollivier omitted the word "officially."

which is offered to us — ('Yes, yes; very good — it's true') — leaving to each a share of responsibility which belongs to them.[315]

"Yesterday we have called in our reserves, and, with your assistance, we are about immediately to take the measures necessary to secure the interests, the safety, and the honor of France. (Prolonged bravos and applause.)"[316]

After the meeting of the Council, Ollivier and Gramont had a meeting at the Foreign Office with Benedetti, who had arrived at Paris, from Ems, at 10.15 A.M. Ollivier says of the interview:

"We questioned him minutely; he informed us of nothing new as to what had passed at Ems, and confirmed, without adding to them, the circumstantial details of his despatches and reports."[317]

Comments. The obvious comments upon the declaration are as follows:

1. The King's refusal to give the required guarantee, while referred to as "unjustifiable," was not deemed to have been of such importance as to cause a rupture of the negotiations.

2. It is true that the King had refused to give Benedetti an opportunity to renew a demand which he had already pressed too strongly, and to which the King had made final reply; but it is not true that there had been a notification by the King "that he would not receive him any more." The Council had agreed that the conduct of the King had been "irreproachable,"[318] and Ollivier himself blamed Benedetti for what had happened.

3. The Prussian government had communicated to the cabinets of Europe "that he would not receive him again," but that was not the fact, as the French government well knew. Ollivier, nevertheless, could make it appear to be the fact by reading the Bismarck document. And that, during the ensuing debate, was what he did.

4. Werther's conduct had been disapproved by his government. He had not been recalled. In order that his departure might be deprived of significance, it was attributed (as Bismarck said) to:
"a leave of absence requested by the Ambassador for personal reasons," who had "transferred the business to the First Councillor of Legation, who had often represented him before, and had given me notification thereof as usual."[319]

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[315] The document as quoted by Ollivier ends here.

[316] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 75, Enc. The text of the document as given by Ollivier (*op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 397–400) is substantially the same as above, except in the three places referred to in the notes preceding this one. Ollivier omits some of the exclamations. *Cf.* Gramont, *op. cit.*, pp. 236–7.

[317] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 396.

[318] *Ante*, p. 623.

[319] See Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 61; and Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 8, Enc. 1. *Cf.* Sorel, *op. cit.*, pp. 164, 168.

Ollivier almost apologizes for the statement in the ministerial declaration by saying:

"We did not say that he had been recalled, consequently we have stated the exact truth." [320]

Exact enough, but quite misleading.

5. As to Prussian armaments, Ollivier (as we have seen [321]) frankly admits that "Lebœuf had been badly informed."

6. Eliminating the refusal of the future guarantee; Werther's "orders to go on leave"; and the Prussian armaments, there remains, as reason for war, only the alleged refusal of the King "to receive him again," which had been rendered "unequivocal" by Bismarck's actions — a non-existent action rendered unequivocal.

Other Assertions. A good illustration of the indefiniteness, even in the minds of the ministers themselves, of the reason for declaring war — of the difficulty of framing any reason other than the existence of national desire — is furnished by comparison of the ministerial declaration, just quoted, with, for example, the "motif de notre détermination" as specified by Ollivier:

"I had taken care," he wrote, "that the motive of our determination was indicated in such a manner that no person could misunderstand it, and that, insistently, at this last moment as at the first, we had obstinately refused to extend the discussion beyond the Hohenzollern candidature; that we were invoking neither the violated treaty of Prague, nor the failure to keep the promise of Luxemburg, nor the constant bad faith, nor the incessant provocation, nor the impatience to terminate and emerge from an enervating and ruinous tension, nor the necessity for redressing Sadowa; and that, even in the Hohenzollern affair, we were not in a similar way aggrieved; that we were invoking as a decisive reason neither the refusal to us of a guarantee for the future by a simple word, nor the refusal to clothe in official form an altogether private approbation, nor even the refusal to receive and hear our Ambassador. We were revolting against that refusal of audience solely because it had become a palpable outrage by divulgence of the telegram posted in the streets, addressed to the legations and to the newspapers. In other words, our declaration was only a reply to the slap of the Ems despatch — a reply that Germany herself, while awaiting it, seemed to counsel us as inevitable." [322]

It will be observed that Ollivier discards the two refusals as sufficient reasons for war — (1) the refusal of the guarantee, and (2) the refusal "to receive and hear our Ambassador"; and that he alleges as the sole reason for war that the refusal to receive the Ambassador:

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[320] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 400, note.

[321] *Ante*, p. 630.

[322] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 391–2.

"had become a palpable outrage by divulgence of the telegram posted in the streets," &c.

In other words, Ollivier drops one of the reasons assigned by the ministerial declaration (refusal to receive the Ambassador), and changes the assertion that by publication "an unequivocal character" had been given to the refusal into an assertion that the character of the refusal had, by divulgence of it, been altered — "had become a palpable outrage." The Council's statement was untrue, and Ollivier's impossible.

The Debate. Bearing these divergencies in mind, it will be instructive to observe the attitudes assumed by the ministers in the course of the debate which followed the reading of the declaration.

Thiers. Thiers, an Opposition leader, amid almost continuous interruption, insisted that no reason for war existed:

"Very well, gentlemen, is it true, yes or no, that upon the main point, that is to say the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern, your demand has been listened to, and that the matter has been set right? Is it true that you break upon a question of very honorable susceptibility? I hope so, indeed, but you break upon a question of susceptibility (*Murmurs*). Very well, gentlemen, do you wish it to be said, do you wish that all Europe should say that the main point was yielded, and that upon a question of form you have decided to pour out torrents of blood?" [323]

Ollivier. Ollivier replied to Thiers:

"we find ourselves in the presence of an affront that we cannot brook, in the presence of a menace which, were we to allow it to become a reality, would cause us to descend to the lowest rank of states." [324]

The "affront," to which he was mendaciously referring, was that the King "would not receive" the Ambassador any more. Appearing to ground the rupture upon the refusal of the King to give a guarantee for the future, Ollivier said:

"If they had accorded us some real satisfaction, we should have received that satifaction with joy; but that satisfaction has been denied us. The King of Prussia, it is necessary that history should not forget, constantly refused to intervene in order to procure or facilitate the renunciation of the Prince of Hohenzollern. When it was obtained, he affected to regard himself as a stranger to it; and when finally, wishing to obtain assurances for the future, we said to him in the most respectful form: 'Declare that this renunciation is definitive,' how has the King of Prussia conducted himself? He has refused us. Is it we, then, who have shown ourselves susceptible? Is it we who are carried away in the face of a negative reply? No, No." [325]

Returning to the refusal of the King to receive the Ambassador, Ollivier completely misled the Chamber, by saying:

[323] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 405.

[324] *Ibid.*, p. 415.

[325] *Ibid.*, pp. 415–6.

"In the midst of these negotiations, we learned that, in all Europe, the Prussian representatives announced and caused to be announced in the journals, that the King of Prussia had sent an aide-de-camp to our Ambassador to inform him that he refused to receive him. (*Cheers and applause from the Centre and the Right. — Questions from the Left.*) The honorable M. Thiers has called this sentiment susceptibility. I do not recognize in this expression the ordinary accuracy of his language. It is not of susceptibility that it was necessary to speak; it is of honor, and in France the safeguarding of honor is the first consideration." [326]

Making the deception clearer and more emphatic, Ollivier added:

"I said — because in such a matter it is always necessary to state the truth mathematically — I said that the King of Prussia had refused to receive our Ambassador, and that, in order that that decision might not appear, what it might seem to be in effect, an act of no consequence, in order that its character might not be equivocal, his Government had officially communicated that decision to the cabinets of Europe; this assuredly was not done in the case of all audiences that he refused to Ambassadors. . . . This news of the refusal to receive our Ambassador was not spoken in the ear of the ministers; they spread it all over Germany, the official journals published it in supplements. The Prussian ministers announced it to their colleagues; it was the talk of Europe." [327]

As proof of the King's refusal, he read parts of the telegrams from Berne and Munich — the latter containing the Bismarck document, which he knew to be untrue. Adhering to his assertion of the refusal, he urged that publication of it proved its offensive character (Italics as in original):

"It may happen that a King refuses to receive an Ambassador; that which is wounding is the intentional refusal, divulged in newspaper supplements, *in telegrams* addressed to all the courts in Europe (*Movements of various sorts.*) And that fact has appeared to us all the more significant in that the aide-de-camp who announced to M. Benedetti the refusal of audience did not fail in any of the forms of courtesy (*Interruptions on the left*), in such a way that our Ambassador did not at first suspect the significance that one might attach to a refusal which, imparted in a certain manner, might be disagreeable without being offensive. The offence results from the intentional publication." [328]

Ollivier might properly have complained of Bismarck's false assertion of the King's decision "not to receive the French Ambassador again." But that would not have sufficed. For Ollivier's purpose, it was necessary that the Chamber should believe that there had been an actual

[326] *Ibid.*, p. 416.
[327] *Ibid.*, pp. 418, 420.
[328] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 425–6.

refusal. And, worried by the Opposition, he exceeded his previous misrepresentations by assertion of the "haughty rupture":

"We have asked only an assurance for the future. They have repeatedly refused it to us. Have we menaced, insulted? We have continued to negotiate. How have they responded to our moderation? By the haughty rupture of pourparlers which, on our part, were carried on with the greatest loyalty." [329]

Turning upon his opponents, and touching upon the real reason for war, Ollivier said:

"Then you ignore the force of the point of honor between two nations placed for years in the situation that has been made for France and Prussia by perpetual excitations? And whence have come these excitations? Is it not from you, gentlemen of the opposition, is it not from you who, since 1866, have not ceased to represent Sadowa as an intolerable loss which must be effaced? (It is true! it is true!) Is it not you who, all these years, at least once in a session, have risen to repeat this humiliating demonstration, that France has lowered her rank, that she should prepare for the struggle which would restore it to her? (It is true! it is true!). . . . How many times has not my attention been directed to the unfortunate position of the Danes in Schleswig? How many times have not I been pressed to claim in their favor the execution of the treaty of Prague." [330]

Returning to the subject of the grounds of complaint against Prussia, Ollivier specified the two referred to in the ministerial declaration — the two which in his book he discarded: (1) the refusal to give a guarantee for the future, and (2) the King's conduct toward Benedetti. He said:

"Is it the excess of our demands that is attacked? Could one conceive of more moderate? If others had persisted as have we in conserving good relations, was it so difficult, after the days of anxious waiting, to give us the assurance that we need not fear a change of purpose? Is it finally the rupture, after the affront received in the person of the Ambassador, that you find blamable? Here I no longer reason, I feel and I affirm. No ministry, no Government, would have been able to maintain peace by accepting the situation which they wished to impose on us." [331]

Gramont. Gramont put his case better, if not more frankly, in one of his sentences:

"After all that you have heard, this fact suffices, that the Prussian Government has informed all the cabinets of Europe that he [the King] has refused to receive our Ambassador and to continue with him the discussion. It is an affront for the Emperor and for France." [332]

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[329] *Ibid.*, p. 427.
[330] *Ibid.*, pp. 427–8, 429.
[331] *Ibid.*, p. 431.
[332] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 446.

Gramont, however, did not explain that the information thus supplied was untrue — that, in fact, there had been no refusal. On the contrary, he gave the Chamber to understand that it was accurate:

"We have said that the insult offered to our dignity was the intentional publicity given at last to the refusal to receive our Ambassador, and that was, so to speak, the last drop, that caused the cup to overflow." [333]

To the British Ambassador, in the evening of the same day, Gramont was more frank. He said:

"Nor indeed had the King really treated M. Benedetti with the rough discourtesy which had been boasted of by the Prussian Government. But that Government had now chosen to declare to Germany and to Europe that France had been affronted in the person of her Ambassador. It was this boast which was the gravamen of the offence. It constituted an insult which no nation of any spirit could brook, and rendered it, much to the regret of the French Government, impossible to take into consideration the mode of settling the dispute which was recommended by Her Majesty's Government." [334]

Gramont could not very well have said to the Chamber that there had been no rudeness of any kind; and that his reason for war was that a Prussian despatch had untruthfully indicated that France had been insulted. Such a despatch would plainly have been a subject for diplomatic complaint, and not a reason for precipitate declaration of war.

Documents Concealed. Knowing that he had misled the Chamber, and knowing, too, that the Benedetti telegrams and despatches would reveal the truth, Ollivier refused to produce them. Early in the debate, Jules Favre had said:

"Where is the official despatch? Where is the report of the conference in which our Ambassador saw the national dignity slighted? We demand the production of those despatches, and particularly of those by which the Prussian government has notified foreign governments as to its intentions." [335]

Ollivier's reply was:

"We have received only confidential despatches, which diplomatic usuages do not permit to be communicated. We have extracted from them all that was useful to communicate; we will communicate nothing more." [336]

Gambetta pressed for the documents themselves. (Italics as in original):

"Well, then, I say it is not by extracts, by allusions, but by a direct *authentic* communication that you ought to inform the Chamber;

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[333] Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 70, Enc.

[334] Lyons to Granville, 15 July 1870: Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 63. *Cf.* Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

[335] De la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 305.

[336] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 417.

it is a question of honor, you say, and it is necessary that we should know in what terms they have dared to speak of France." [337]
But he could not get them. Ollivier said:
"The Government, in this affair, has, above all, the desire to make known absolutely the truth; it has nothing to dissimulate. And when, to demands for communication of despatches, it replies that it has nothing to communicate, it is because there have not been, in the true sense of the word, despatches exchanged; there have been only verbal conversations, contained in reports which, according to diplomatic usage, are not communicated. (M. Emmanuel Arago: 'It is upon these reports that you are entering upon war!') " [338]

Commenting afterwards upon the episode, Ollivier wrote:

"As all the negotiations were carried on in conversations with the King, we were debarred from printing and distributing the reports from Ems. . . . Our refusal to communicate was not then inspired by a dictatorial purpose, or by the fear of investigations; it was the result of circumstances; it was a diplomatic necessity." [339]

It is difficult to imagine that Ollivier, when asking the Chamber to vote supplies for war against Prussia, partly (at all events) because of the conduct of the King, should have felt himself bound to conceal the documents which showed what the King had done. That he did not so believe is proved by the facts (1) that he had read to the Chamber an extract from the Benedetti telegrams,[340] and (2) that he produced all of them before a committee of the Chamber — in what way we shall see.

Further Refusal. At a later stage of the debate (after report of a committee) pressing demand was made for the telegrams from the French representatives at Berne and Munich. Ollivier had pretended to give the substance of the messages to the Chamber;[341] but Gambetta and others were not satisfied, and made strong appeal for the production of the documents themselves.[342] Ollivier refused. His plea for diplomatic usage being inapplicable to telegrams from French Ambassadors, he declared that they were immaterial;[343] that, at most, they only removed the possibility that the King's refusal to receive Benedetti might not have been intentionally offensive;[344] that they had been produced before the committee;[345] and, basing himself squarely on the fact of the King's refusal to receive the Ambassador, and referring to the despatches as

[337] *Ibid.*, p. 418. *Cf.* de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 313.
[338] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 425.
[339] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 424.
[340] *Ibid.*, p. 399.
[341] *Ibid.*
[342] *Ibid.*, pp. 464–6.
[343] *Ibid.*, pp. 465–9.
[344] *Ibid.*, p. 469.
[345] *Ibid.*, p. 470.

merely evidence of the fact, otherwise sufficiently well known, he argued as follows:

"Who has spoken of a Prussian despatch? When, then, to establish the fact that an affront has been offered to France, have we invoked chancellery protocols? despatches more or less mysterious? Our language has been otherwise. We have said: Now when we are debating, there is a fact, a fact publicly known in Europe, of which not an ambassador, not a journalist, not a politician, not a person conversant with diplomatic affairs is ignorant; it is that, according to the Prussian accounts, our ambassador was not received by the King and that the King, through an aide-de-camp, refused to hear from him, for the last time, the courteous, moderate, conciliatory explanation of a courteous, moderate, conciliatory request, the justness of which is incontestable. Of what importance to us are chancellery protocols — despatches that might raise debate? On our honor as honest men, on our honor as ministers, we affirm a fact. . . . You speak to me of despatches. I speak to you of an act known throughout all Europe. Only, when one is on the point of making one of those decisions which shake the conscience, one has need of light, of light, of much light. Evidence is never sufficiently irrefragable. We have proved it. The act is incontestable, we tell ourselves; but it is perhaps unintentional, it is perhaps one of these rumors escaped from alarmed patriotism, and it would be unjust, even in moments of excitement and passion, to charge it to a Government; these are the scruples which the despatches have calmed. We have no longer doubt of offensive intention when from all corners of Europe, comes to us what? The text itself, the text itself of the instructions of M. de Bismarck." [346]

Jules Ferry interrupted: "But you have not given them to us." [347] To which Ollivier replied:

"And since indeed, Ministers of France are obliged, under the attack of an Opposition which pretends to be moderate, to prove that they did not alter, and that they did not fabricate documents. . . . (*New interruptions on the left*) we have communicated the original texts to the Commission." [348]

When, at the end of the debate, Ollivier, in private conversation, chided Gambetta for questioning the existence of the telegrams, the latter replied: "I do not contest them, but you have not read them in full." [349] Ollivier then admitted that he had not read the following part of the telegram which he had received from M. Cadore, the French Ambassador at Munich (Italics as given by Ollivier):

"The King of Bavaria would, without doubt, be impressed by this

[346] *Ibid.*, pp. 468–9.
[347] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 470.
[348] *Ibid.*
[349] *Ibid.*, p. 472.

fact that M. Benedetti *accosted* the King of Prussia on the promenade in a provocative manner." [350]

Gambetta retorted:

"Well, that is precisely what I wished to induce you to read also." [351]

Ollivier's reply was:

"I could not do it without making impossible the situation of Cadore at Munich; that which my reading would have added to the debate was not sufficiently decisive for me to believe it necessary to brave that inconvenience." [352]

There can be little question that Ollivier was more fearful of the effect of the "reading" upon his own situation than upon that of Cadore. For the Chamber might have been led by it to doubt the truth of the assertion "that an affront has been offered to France," and that the despatches proved its "offensive character." [353]

The Committee. During a short interval in the debate, Gramont produced, or rather read or partially read [354] to the Credits Committee of the Chamber, the Benedetti and other telegrams (Benedetti himself, although available, was not asked to attend); [355] and the committee, by way of indicating that the demand for a future guarantee had formed part of the original requirements, and was not (as it really was) something improvised after the original demands had been satisfied, reported: "that the first despatch to our Ambassador at Ems ended with this phrase: 'In order that the renunciation produce its effect, it is necessary that the King of Prussia associate himself with it, and give us the assurance that he will not again authorize this candidature.'" [356]

That was not true. These words were not in "the first despatch," namely, that of the 7th July.[357] They formed part of Gramont's telegram of 12 July at 7 P.M.[358] — the telegram arranged between the Emperor and Gramont after Leopold's withdrawal and in pursuance of Gramont's view that "it was evidently necessary to find some new expedient." [359] Prior to that message, there had been no demand for a guarantee.

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[350] *Ibid.*, p. 375.

[351] *Ibid.*, p. 472.

[352] *Ibid.*

[353] Gramont's interpretation of the telegram makes quite clear the reason for its concealment. In his book, he says that the telegram "represented Count Benedetti as having several times accosted the King without formality, either on the promenade or at the springs, and added that His Majesty the King of Bavaria certainly could not fail to resent deeply these repeated offences against the respect due to royal majesty" (*La France et la Prusse*, p. 232).

[354] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 450, 452.

[355] De la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 309. He was in the Chamber, listening to what he knew was not true: Welschinger, *op. cit.*, I, p. 183.

[356] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 455. Upon this point, see de la Gorce, *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 307–10; Welschinger, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 179–86.

[357] *Ante*, pp. 592–3. [358] *Ante*, p. 602. [359] *Ante*, p. 596.

Gramont has been charged, and not without reason, with having misled the committee.[360] Naturally, he would not have wished its members and the Chamber to understand (as was the fact) that, after his first demands had been, or were in course of being, satisfactorily disposed of, he had made, for the first time, a demand for a future guarantee. Very clearly, he would have wished the committee to understand the facts exactly as the committee reported them. And what he did was to erase such of the words of the despatch of the 12th as would have indicated that it could not have been "the first despatch," and to present it as having been sent five days previous to its real date. The following is the despatch of the 12th. The words italicised are eliminations. The committee reported that the remaining words appeared at the end of Gramont's despatch of the 7th.[361]

"*Nous avons reçu des mains de l'ambassadeur d'Espagne la renonciation du prince Antoine, au nom de son fils Léopold, à sa candidature au trône d'Espagne.* Pour que cette renonciation *du prince Antoine* produise *tout* son effet, il *parait* nécessaire que le roi de Prusse s'y associe et nous donne l'assurance qu'il n'autoriserait pas de nouveau cette candidature. Veuillez vous rendre immédiatement auprès du roi pour lui demander cette déclaration. . . . etc." [362]

The importance to the government of the view thus imposed upon the committee is obvious. It was noted in the *Journal Officiel* of the next day:

"As the marquis de Talhouet, reporter for the committee, has remarked with much justice, the government of the Emperor, at the time of the commencement of the incident, and from the first phase of the negotiations up to the last, has loyally followed the same, without enlarging or modifying the debate for a single instant. The first despatch addressed to our ambassador, arrived at Ems to interview the King of Prussia, terminated with this phrase:" [363]

Then follows the text as in the committee's report. Dréolle, the member of the committee who prepared the report, afterwards complained of the deception, saying:

"Gramont purposely effected suppressions in the text of the despatch, and carried it back to the 7th; so it is upon this antedated and altered

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[360] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 458–60.

[361] *Ante*, p. 643.

[362] "*We have received from the hands of the Spanish Ambassador Prince Antoine's renunciation, in the name of his son Leopold, of his candidature to the throne of Spain.* In order that this renunciation *of Prince Antoine* may produce *all* its effect, it *appears* necessary that the King of Prussia associate himself with it, and give us the assurance that he will not authorize anew this candidature. Be good enough to wait immediately upon the King, in order to demand from him this declaration . . . etc." (Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 189).

[363] *Ibid.*, p. 191, note.

despatch that war has been begun. Gramont has deceived the committee, and by it the Chamber and the country." [364]

Talhouet, the member of the committee who read the report to the Chamber, agreed with Dréolle's view.[365] And Thiers, afterwards, when excusing, to the British government, French precipitation of the war, declared (13 September 1870) that neither France nor the Chamber wanted the war, and that France:

"had allowed herself to be swept away only by the very culpable falsehood of a pretended outrage to France." [366]

Sorel, in referring to the incident, says that the Chamber and the public:

"believed, on the faith of the report, that the question of guarantee had been raised on the first day of the negotiations; M. Thiers had contested it; the report affirmed it; it furnished proof of it; that proof was an apocryphal document; and this document was presented to the country as one of the causes of the war. That is a fact. It is one of the most saddening signs of the lightness with which the affairs of France were conducted." [367]

Unable to deny that the committee was misled, Gramont repudiated responsibility for the mistake, but almost admitted it when he said that:

"The committee had been led to this conclusion by the very complete and very clear explications given by the Government of the text of the diplomatic documents which had been passed under their eyes, and the chronological résumé which we have just reproduced is nothing but the summary of these explications." [368]

Gramont was quite capable of the act with which he is charged. His reputation for veracity was bad. In a despatch of 16 July 1870, Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador at Paris, said:

"I am the more alarmed with regard to Gramont, as his reputation for inaccuracy is so universal that there must be some foundation for it." [369]

Ollivier has defended Gramont,[370] but he has disregarded several important facts:

1. He himself affirms that Gramont argued to the committee that the demand for a guarantee was *in effect* made in the first despatch:

"At the outset, we asked the King to counsel or command his relative to renounce, which carried with it implicitly a guarantee that the candidature would not repeat itself. The King having refused to inter-

[364] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 458.
[365] *Ibid.*
[366] Gramont, *op. cit.*, p. 342. *Cf.* Jules Favre: *Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale*, p. 135.
[367] *Op. cit.*, pp. 190–1.
[368] *Op. cit.*, pp. 269–70.
[369] Newton: *Lord Lyons*, I, p. 300.
[370] *Op. cit.*, XIV, p. 458.

vene, and the candidature having disappeared without his knowledge, we asked again, under explicit form, the guarantee implied in our first request. Now, asking the King, before the renunciation, to impose it or to counsel it; or, after the renunciation made without his knowledge, to approve it and to promise that he will not authorize it anew — that was to demand the same thing, suiting the demand, identical as to its object, to the circumstances of the occasion." [371]

That was flimsy enough, but Ollivier tells us that:

"The Committee regarded this second remark as important as the first, and decided that it should be inserted in the report." [372]

Acceptance of argument as to the effect of the despatch does not account for the quotation of an edited telegram of one date as the real telegram of another.

2. Ollivier also overlooked the fact that, during the debate in the Chamber, Gramont offered no correction of the report.[373] Talhouet, the Reporter for the committee, has testified that Gramont was in the Chamber when the report was read.[374] Gramont denied it. He said:

"When I arrived . . . the report of the Commission already had been read. . . . I was only made aware of it the next day by the *Journal Officiel*. But for this circumstance, I should not have failed to point out to the honorable reporter an error, insignificant in itself, and that would have been easy to correct.[375]

The "error" is one he had taken a good deal of trouble to create.

3. Ollivier also overlooked the fact that Gramont published (31 July) in the *Journal Officiel* an account of the negotiations, and, in it, made identically the same misstatement that he made to the committee:

"The first despatch addressed by the Duc de Gramont to Count Benedetti after his arrival at Ems concludes thus: 'In order that the renunciation may be effectual, it is necessary that the King should join in it and give you the assurance that he will not again authorize the Prince's nomination.'" [376]

4. Ollivier also overlooked the fact that, in a circular despatch of 24 July 1870, Gramont said, with reference to his speech in the Corps législatif (6 July):

"I did not admit that this manifestation [377] would have been determined by parliamentary necessities. I explained our language as due to the keenness of the wound which we have received, and I in no way considered the personal position of the ministers as a determining motive

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[371] *Ibid.*, p. 453.
[372] *Ibid.*, pp. 453–4.
[373] *Ibid.*, pp. 456, 464.
[374] Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 191, note.
[375] *La France et la Prusse*, p. 275; Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 191, note.
[376] Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 70, Enc.
[377] He is referring to the declaration in the Chamber on 6 July.

for their conduct. What I said was that no minister could keep, in France, the confidence and support of the Chambers in consenting to an arrangement which did not contain a solemn guarantee for the future." [378]

It will be observed that Gramont here places the determination to demand the guarantee as early as his speech of 6 July — one day earlier than his "first despatch" to Benedetti. It entered his mind only after compliance with his first demand (12 July) had made it "necessary," as he himself said, "to find some new expedient." [379]

5. Finally, Ollivier has admitted that the committee's report was wrong, and that the words, "The first despatch to our Ambassador," should have been followed by "after the renunciation of Prince Antoine." [380] But that would have been to make clearly apparent the fact that Gramont had formulated a new demand after the one already made had been, or was on the point of being satisfied. And that was precisely what Gramont did not wish the committee to know.

The Votes. Acting upon the report, and in the absence of the documents, the Chamber was unaware of the truth when it passed the war-credits. Upon the vote for production of the documents, the ministry was sustained by 159 to 84. The credits were passed almost unanimously. Upon which, de la Gorce comments as follows:

"The thing was done! From a perverse deception that no perspicacity had unmasked, proceeded an entire series of unconscious deceptions; Gramont and the courtiers deceiving the ministry, the ministry deceiving the credits committee, the credits committee deceiving the Chamber, the Chamber, in its turn, deceiving the nation." [381]

15 JULY — THE SENATE

"At twenty minutes past 1 the Duc de Gramont stated in the Senate that, the negotiations with Prussia having failed, the reserves would be called out, and steps would be taken to maintain the honor and interests of France." [382]

In these words, the British Ambassador at Paris, on 15 July, reported to his Foreign Office the official announcement of the determination of the French government to engage in war with Prussia. After passing, with enthusiastic unanimity, the required votes of credit, the Senate waited upon the Emperor, and, through M. Rouher, its President, presented an address to him as follows (in part):

"A dynastic scheme, hurtful to the prestige and to the security of France, had been mysteriously endorsed by the King of Prussia. Without

[378] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 446.
[379] *Ante*, p. 596.
[380] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 455; Benedetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 269–70.
[381] *Histoire du Second Empire*, VI, p. 314.
[382] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 54.

doubt, upon our protest, Prince Leopold had withdrawn his acceptance; Spain, that nation which knows and reciprocates the feelings of friendship that we have for her, has renounced a candidature that injured us. Without doubt, the immediate peril was turned aside, but does not our legitimate demand remain untouched? Was it not evident that a Foreign Power, to the profit of its influence and of its domination, to the prejudice of our honor and of our interests, wished to upset once more the equilibrium of Europe? Have we not the right to demand, from that Power, guarantees against the possible return of similar attempts? These guarantees are refused; the dignity of France is not recognized. Your Majesty draws his sword; the country is with you, trembling with indignation and pride. The errors of an ambition over-elated by a day of great fortune must become apparent soon or late. Not lending himself to hasty impulses, animated by that calm perseverance which is true strength, the Emperor has known how to wait; but, in four years, he has brought the armament of our soldiers to the highest perfection, raised to its full power the organization of our military forces. Thanks to your care, France is ready, Sire, and by her enthusiasm she proves that, like you, she has resolved to tolerate no hasty enterprise." [383]

The address was, naturally, very displeasing to Ollivier.[384] For the Senate had fixed upon the refusal of the guarantee as the only reason for war; had made nothing of the alleged insult to the Ambassador at Ems (whether subsequently rendered "unequivocal" or "altered"); had avowed that France had been awaiting her opportunity for war; and, meanwhile, had been preparing for the struggle. One might have expected that the Emperor in his reply would have disavowed all that, but he did not.[385] One might have expected, too, some correction or protest from Ollivier, but he, for the time, remained silent. Commenting, in his book, he says:

"Our declaration [386] did not disavow the demand for guarantees, because that was impossible, but, on the other hand, it did not glorify it; above all it did not indicate that the cause of the war was based upon the refusal; the sole cause that it gave for the war was the Ems affront, which Rouher did not even mention. We had determined not to enlarge the scope of the debate, to confine it to the Hohenzollern affair, and to present the war as an unforeseen event, suffered and not desired by us; Rouher presented it as the result of a long-felt desire of four years, and of a cherished hope." "Such a prank on the part of a man as calculating as Rouher can be explained only by the design of wresting from us the merit of a victory in his own eyes certain, and of basing his candidature as our successor. We were much annoyed by a language

[383] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 480–1.
[384] *Ibid.*, pp. 482–4.
[385] *Ibid.*, p. 483.
[386] *Ante*, pp. 632–5.

of which the consequences and perils were soon felt. For a moment we thought of contradicting him. But we could find no means of doing that which would not have been an indirect censure of the inadequacy of the Emperor's reply, and we were compelled to submit in silence, to this inexact, compromising, bold commentary on our conduct." [387]

Ollivier omitted to add that when, four days afterwards, he came to prepare the declaration of war, he adopted substantially the attitude of the Senate.

The comment of *The Times* (London) of 18 July was as follows:

"Those who were prepared for many things on the part of French officialdom will be surprised at the audacious avowal contained in the address of M. Rouher. One, indeed, looked for something of the sort, but one did not believe that they would be able in France to make acknowledgement of it so imprudently." [388]

WHY FRANCE DECLARED WAR

For what reason did France declare war? For answer, let us compare the ministerial declaration in the Chamber on the 15th July; Ollivier's explanation of it; the address of the Senate (all of which have already been noted); the declaration of war itself; and various subsequent pronouncements. The declaration of war (delivered to Prussia 19 July) gave as its reasons the following:

"The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of the French being unable to consider the proposal to raise a Prussian Prince to the Throne of Spain otherwise than as an attempt against the territorial security of France, was compelled to ask the King of Prussia for an assurance that such an arrangement could not be carried out with his consent. His Majesty the King of Prussia, having refused to give this assurance, and having, on the contrary, given the Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of the French to understand that he intended to reserve for this eventuality, and for every other, the power of acting according to circumstances, the Imperial Government could not but see in the King's declaration a reservation threatening to France and to the general balance of power in Europe. This declaration was further aggravated by the notification made to the Cabinets of the refusal to receive the Emperor's Ambassador, and to enter into any new explanation with him." [389]

On the 20th July, the following declaration was made by the French government both in the Senate and in the Chamber:

"The statement made to you at the sitting of the 15th has made

[387] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, pp. 482–3, 4.
[388] The *Daily News* made similar comment.
[389] Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 9, Enc.

known to the Senate and the Corps Législatif the just causes of the war against Prussia. According to usage and by order of the Emperor, I have invited the Chargé d'Affaires of France to notify to the Cabinet of Berlin our resolution to seek by arms the guarantees we have failed in obtaining by discussion. This step has been taken, and I have the honor to announce to the Senate and the Corps Législatif that in consequence a state of war exists from the 19th of July between France and Prussia. This declaration applies equally to the allies of Prussia who may afford her armed assistance against us." [390]

The notification to the British government was in the following form:

"His Majesty the Emperor of the French has felt himself obliged in order to defend the honor and interests of France, as well as to protect the balance of power in Europe, to declare war against Prussia, and against the Allied States which afford her the co-operation of their arms against us." [391]

The Emperor's proclamation to the people of France (22 July) stated the reason for war as follows:

"In presence of the new pretensions of Prussia, we made known our protests. They were evaded and were followed on the part of Prussia by contemptuous acts. Our country resented this treatment with profound irritation, and immediately a cry for war resounded from one end of France to the other. It only remains for us to leave our destinies to the decision of arms." [392]

Having now before us the relevant documents containing the various official assertions, we ought to be able to ascertain why it was that France declared war. Observe, however, the difficulty:

1. The ministerial declaration of 15 July [393] referred to the King's refusal to give a future guarantee, but added:

"Although this refusal seemed to us unjustifiable, such was our desire of preserving to Europe the blessings of peace that we did not break off the negotiations."

Then follow the three grounds for war: (1) the King's refusal to receive the ambassador, given "an unequivocal character" by the Berlin proceedings; (2) Werther's "orders to go on leave"; and (3) "armaments were being effected in Prussia."

2. In his explanation of this declaration, Ollivier said that his government:

"were invoking as a decisive reason neither the refusal to us of a guarantee for the future by a simple word, nor the refusal to clothe in official form an altogether private approbation, nor even the refusal to receive and hear our Ambassador. We were revolting against that

[390] Br. Blue Bk., C.-167, No. 121.
[391] *Ibid.*, No. 120.
[392] Br. Blue Bk., C.-210, No. 11, Enc.
[393] *Ante*, pp. 632-5.

refusal of audience solely because it had become a palpable outrage by divulgence of the telegram posted in the streets, addressed to the legations and to the newspapers. In other words, our declaration was only a reply to the slap of the Ems despatch — a reply which Germany herself, while awaiting it, seemed to counsel us as inevitable." [394]

3. In the debate in the Chamber on the 15th, "the haughty rupture" was prominently assigned as the reason for war. The refusal of the future guarantee became important only in connection with Gramont's misrepresentation to the committee.

4. The formal declaration of war of 19th July proceeded upon totally different lines. The reasons assigned in it [395] were: the refusal to give the future guarantee; the reservation by the King of future liberty of action; and the aggravation of that reservation by Bismarck's notification to the cabinets "of the refusal to receive the Emperor's Ambassador." In other words, "the haughty rupture" now became a mere matter of aggravation, subsidiary to a complaint of the King's attitude with reference to a future guarantee.

5. The ministerial statement,[396] of the next day (20th) is consistent with the declaration of war. But, while declaring "our resolution to seek by arms the guarantees we have failed in obtaining by discussion," it is notably silent as to aggravation.

6. The notification to the British government [397] alleged defence of "the honor and integrity of France," and protection of "the balance of power in Europe" as the reasons for war.

7. The Emperor's proclamation [398] asserted evasion of:
"our protests," which "were followed on the part of Prussia by contemptuous acts."

Omitting, as of negligible importance, the assertions as to Werther's recall and Prussian armaments,[399] we may observe:

1. According to the ministerial statement (15th) and Ollivier's explanation of it, the reason for war was "the haughty rupture," either rendered unequivocal or changed in character by its publication; while refusal of the future guarantee was not deemed of sufficient importance to provoke war.

2. According to the declaration of war (19th), refusal of the guarantee and the Emperor's reservation of future liberty of action were the main grounds of complaint; while the "haughty rupture" is treated as a matter of aggravation.

If, now, we take the declaration of war as the more authoritative of the documents, we shall have to say that refusal to comply with the demand for the future guarantee was the main ground upon which France asserted her justification for declaring war — a demand framed

[394] *Ante*, p. 636.
[395] *Ante*, p. 649.
[396] *Ante*, pp. 649–50.
[397] *Ante*, p. 650.
[398] *Ante*, p. 650.
[399] See *ante*, pp. 634, 6.

after the original cause of complaint had been removed;[400] a demand improvised because, as Gramont says, "it was evidently necessary to find some new expedient";[401] a demand formulated by the Emperor and Gramont in the absence of any other member of the Council;[402] a demand which Ollivier disapproved and declared "could be interpreted only as a desire to bring about war";[403] a demand which, Ollivier says, the Council on the 13th had determined, upon the happening of conditions (afterwards realized), to withdraw;[404] a demand, non-compliance with which (Ollivier says) the Council, in preparing the ministerial declaration of 15 July, had determined not to invoke "as a decisive reason for war";[405] a demand which, in that declaration, was treated as not of sufficient importance to warrant interruption of the negotiations;[406] and, finally, a demand which the British government disapproved. It was (belief is difficult) because of:

"the refusal of the King of Prussia to give the guarantee which France was obliged to ask, in order to prevent dynastic combinations dangerous to her safety,"

that the French government (19 July) declined to accept the British offer of mediation.[407]

Gramont's Circular. In a circular despatch of 21 July, Gramont summarized the reasons for war as follows:

"Prussia, to whom we did not fail to recall these precedents, appeared at the moment to yield to our just demands. Prince Leopold desisted from his candidature; one was able to flatter himself that peace would not be disturbed. But this hope soon gave place to new apprehensions; then to the certainty that Prussia, without withdrawing seriously any of her pretensions, sought only to gain time. The language, at first hesitating, then decided and haughty, of the chief of the house of Hohenzollern, his refusal to pledge himself to maintain the next day the renunciation of the previous, the treatment inflicted upon our Ambassador, to whom a verbal message interdicting all new communication with reference to the object of his mission of conciliation, finally the publicity given to this unusual proceeding by the Prussian journals and by the notification which had been made to the cabinets, all these successive symptoms of aggressive intentions had terminated doubt in the most prejudiced minds. Can mistake be possible when a sovereign who commands a million soldiers, declares, his hand on the hilt of his sword, that he reserves the right to take counsel of himself alone and the circumstances? We were led to that extreme limit where a nation who feels what it owes to itself no longer traffics with the exigencies of its honor."[408]

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[400] *Ante*, p. 596.
[401] *Ante*, p. 596.
[402] *Ante*, p. 602.
[403] *Ante*, p. 603.
[404] *Ante*, pp. 605–6.
[405] *Ante*, pp. 632–5.
[406] *Ante*, p. 634.
[407] *Post*, p. 661.
[408] Gramont, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

Readers of what has already been said will know: (1) that the language of the King was not "at first hesitating" — that it was unmistakably clear; (2) that it had in no respect been "haughty"; (3) that the King's conduct had been "irreproachable"; (4) that there had been no "treatment inflicted upon our Ambassador"; and (5) that, according to Gramont himself, so far from "placing his hand on the hilt of his sword," the King, "by his language, by his attitude, rather sought to safeguard peace than to kindle the flames of war." [409]

POPULAR DEMAND AND EXCITEMENT

The French Emperor threw the responsibility for war upon the French people. It may, indeed, be true, as he said to the Corps Législatif,

"that it is the whole nation which has, by its irresistible impulse, dictated our decisions";[410]

but it must be added that the "irresistible impulse" had been created by those who had for four years taught the people to believe that "the wrong" of Sadowa and Prague must be repaired; by Gramont's threatening speech of the 6th July; by the misrepresentation of what had occurred at Ems; by Gramont's misleading of the parliamentary committee; by the concealment of the documents which would have revealed the truth; by all that had been done for the purpose of influencing the public mind.

The picture presented, by the documents, of the interaction of government and people is familiar enough. Within the cabinet are men who desire war; others who would avoid it; and still others uncertain and timid. Outside: the foolish crowd, the populace-pleasing press, and the wild denunciators of the "pacifists." Yielding to clamor, the Cabinet addresses the Chamber in language and tone, not only provocative but by the Emperor deemed to be excessive. Then street demonstrations, "strident cries, violent gestures, protestations against the diplomatic delays." Then (all in one day) government resolution for war; "seized with fright," resolution for peace; intervention of the ladies; wobble back to war, for otherwise "mud would be thrown at our carriages and we should be hooted"; "there will be an immense burst of laughter" in the Chamber; eager searchings for a war-declaration formula, and wide disagreement thereon.

It was into a mass of "inflammable material" that Gramont, by reading, in the Corps Législatif on the 6th July, the declaration which had been agreed to by the Emperor and his Council, threw "the spark which was to light the conflagration" — in other words, presented to

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[409] *Ante*, p. 614.

[410] Br. Blue Bk., C.–210, No. 12, Enc.

Prussia that which Ollivier characterized as "an ultimatum." [411] When Lord Lyons said to Gramont (7 July) that he could not:

"help thinking that milder language would have rendered it more easy to treat both with Prussia and with Spain for the withdrawal of the pretensions of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern,"

the reply was (as Lyons reported):

"that he was glad I had mentioned this, as he wished to have an opportunity of conveying to your Lordship an explanation of his reasons for making a public declaration in terms so positive. Your Lordship would, he was sure, as Minister in a constitutional country, understand perfectly the impossibility of contending with public opinion. The nation was, he said, so strongly roused upon this question that its will could not be resisted or trifled with. He had seen me in the Chamber when he had made his declaration. I had therefore myself witnessed the extraordinary enthusiasm and unanimity with which the announcement of the determination of the Government to repel the insult offered to the nation had been received. He had kept within bounds, or he might have provoked a still more remarkable explosion of feeling. Now, the indignation out of doors was equally violent and equally general. Nothing less than what he had said would have satisfied the public. His speech was, in fact, as regarded the interior of France, absolutely necessary; and diplomatic considerations must yield to the public safety at home." [412]

Gramont was right in saying that the announcement of Prince Leopold's acceptance of the Spanish crown had already excited public opinion — had rendered, he might have said, the inflammable material still more sensitive to the match. And his view that "nothing less than what he said would have satisfied the public" was probably correct. But the question remains, whether he ought to have endeavored to increase the excitement by issuing an ultimatum to Prussia, or to allay it; to pillory Prussia, or to make representation to Spain; to welcome the candidature as providing an opportunity for war, or to endeavor to procure its cancellation. He thought that "diplomatic considerations must yield to public safety at home" [413] — and by "safety at home" he meant the greater security of the dynasty and the continuation in office of the government of which he was a member. To these objects, the danger of war with Prussia was subordinated. That attitude of mind is not unique.

The ministerial declaration of the 6th July in the Chamber was received, Ollivier tells us, with long and repeated applause.[414] That was as anticipated and counted upon.

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[411] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 11; Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 110.
[412] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 11.
[413] *Ante*, p. 654.
[414] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 110.

"The enthusiasm at the reading of our declaration was not less throughout the nation than it had been in the Assembly. From all parts, proofs of it flowed toward the Emperor." [415]

The police report of the 7th July indicated the extent of the enthusiasm amongst the people;[416] and the report of the 9th emphasized its continuation. Ollivier, after referring to various dates, has written as follows:

"It is difficult, the police reports of the 9th told us, to depict the animation which the expectancy of decisive news maintains in Paris. The day is passed in quest for news. Each evening our boulevards present the most agitated aspect. Spectators and journalists crowd about the edges of the entry to the Opera to follow the fluctuations of the Bourse, or mingle there to collect or spread reports more or less doubtful." [417]

"The organ of the war party [418] expressed itself in language which in violence exceeded all that is permitted to the inarticulate tumults of the deputies of the Right: 'Prussia . . . is between menace and shame. Let her choose. It is in vain that she should try to hide herself under explanations more or less plausible, she is shut up in a dilemma brutal and insurmountable.'" [419]

"Those who accuse us of having lacked coolness ought to re-read the collection of the journals of the time, the legislative debates: they would then praise us for having preserved an almost heroic coolness; scarcely one of these excitements made us raise our voice inopportunely, and turned us from the four negotiations for peace already begun." [420]

"That which rendered our deliberations more difficult was that the walls of the ministry were assailed by a tempest of indignation which demanded extreme resolutions. Public opinion, much less mistress of her sentiments than we had been of ours, manifested once more the salient feature of our character pointed out by the observers of all times: 'The decisions of the Gauls are sudden and unforeseen, and they decide rapidly for war (*mobiliter et celeriter*),' wrote Julius Cæsar." [421]

"Above all, the generals were among the warmest in approval. Maréchal Vaillant went to the Emperor and said to him: 'At last there is lifted the shroud of Sadowa which has been stifling us for four years. Never again will you find a finer opportunity. It is necessary to profit by it, Sire, the nation will follow you.'" [422]

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[415] *Ibid.*, p. 115. And see p. 143; and Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 10. The influence of the press throughout the episode is referred to in Sorel, *op. cit.*, pp. 64, 67, 69.

[416] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 115–6.

[417] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[418] The organ of Paul de Cassagnac.

[419] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 146.

[420] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

[421] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[422] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

"The press was, this time again, the faithful reflection of the public emotion." [423]

"Nowhere was there resounding opposition except in the journal of the old Bonapartist party, *le Public*, edited by the deputy Dréolle, under the lofty inspiration of Rouher." [424]

The arrival of Prince Antoine's telegram communicating the news of the withdrawal of Leopold, and its disclosure to members of the Chamber on the 12th, aroused great indignation in that body.[425] Ollivier relates that:

"The Right, not hoping to come to the end of my resistance, furiously tore me to pieces. I was accused of lack of courage, of patriotism, and of foresight." [426]

"This unchaining of anger did not move me." [427]

"During the sitting of the Chamber, until late in the night, the 13th, the mental ferment, in the absence of definite news from Ems and Berlin, became each moment more violent in Paris. Our response to the interpellation raised an almost general reprobation." [428]

"However, the Right organized a coalition with the Left to destroy us. Clement Duvernois preserved the old relations of friendship with Gambetta; they passed the evening together; Gambetta promised to support the order of the day in favor of disarmament which would be proposed by Duvernois, and of which the consequences, if the Chamber adopted it, would be war." [429]

On the same day, Lord Lyons wrote to Lord Granville that Gramont had said to him:

"On the one hand, public opinion was so much excited in France that it was doubtful whether the Ministry would not be overthrown if it went down to the Chamber to-morrow, and announced that it regarded the affair as finished, without having obtained some more complete satisfaction from Prussia." [430]

Expressing his own opinion, on the same day, to Lord Granville, Lord Lyons said:

"It is quite true that the nation is extremely impatient, and as time goes on the war party becomes more exacting. It has, in fact, already raised a cry that the settlement of the Hohenzollern question will not be sufficient, and that France must demand satisfaction on the subject of the treaty of Prague." [431]

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[423] *Ibid.*, p. 118.
[424] *Ibid.*, p. 121.
[425] *Ibid.*, pp. 229–238.
[426] *Ibid.*, p. 256.
[427] *Ibid.*, p. 258.
[428] *Ibid.*, p. 337.
[429] *Ibid.*, p. 353.
[430] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 30; *Ann. Reg.*, 1870, p. 201.
[431] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 28.

On the 14th, before Paris had become aware of the Bismarck document (published in Berlin the previous evening), Lord Lyons again reported that:

"The public excitement was so great, and so much irritation existed in the army, that it became doubtful whether the Government could withstand the cry for war, even if it were able to announce a decided diplomatic success." [432]

The prevailing attitude was reflected in the despatches which Gramont, from time to time, sent to Benedetti. In the original instructions of 7th July, Gramont said that he enclosed various documents and, among them,

"The declaration which, urged by public sentiment, we believed we ought to carry to the tribune of the Corps Législatif." [433]

On the 10th July, Gramont telegraphed:

"And besides, I tell you plainly, public opinion is ablaze and goes ahead of us. It is necessary for us to commence." [434]

During the night of 10–11 July, he again telegraphed:

"You cannot imagine to what a pitch public opinion is raised. It breaks over us from all sides, and we are counting the hours. It is absolutely necessary to insist upon obtaining a response from the King, negative or affirmative. We need it for to-morrow, the day after to-morrow would be too late." [435]

On the 12th July, Gramont telegraphed:

"In spite of the renunciation, which is now known, the vivacity of feeling is such that we do not know whether we shall be able to control it." [436]

On the 13th, he telegraphed:

"As I have told you, French sentiment is over-excited to such an extent that it is with the greatest difficulty that we have been able to obtain till Friday to give some explanations." [437]

During his interview with Werther on the 12th, Gramont gave as a reason for requesting a letter from the King of Prussia, in the form above referred to,[438] the necessity of appeasing public opinion. He said:

"Up to this point, my language has been inspired by purely political and diplomatic considerations; but it is necessary in a situation so tense, to take account, very particularly, of public opinion, since that acquires, in these moments of crisis, a force greater than that of the cabinets which deal with it. That is so true that we believe ourselves in a position to affirm that no ministry, whatever it might be, will be able henceforth

[432] *Ibid.*, No. 60.
[433] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, p. 316.
[434] *Ibid.*, p. 347.
[435] *Ibid.*, p. 348.
[436] *Ibid.*, p. 369.
[437] *Ibid.*, p. 384.
[438] *Ante*, p. 599.

to keep the confidence of the Chamber and of the opinion in consenting to an arrangement which does not contain some guarantee for the future." [439]

Benedetti, in stating his view of the situation on the evening of the 12th, said:

"We had in truth asked the King to invite the Prince to renounce the crown of Spain; the King restricted himself to giving his acquiescence to a decision which the Prince had, one might say, taken of his own accord. Should we consider as insufficient the satisfaction which had been accorded to us in that way? For my part, I did not think so, and nothing in the despatches which were being sent to me at the time from Paris made me suppose that the government of the Emperor judged otherwise. To my mind, that which it was important we should obtain was the renunciation of the Prince, validated by the approval of the King, and that result we were assured of securing. But certainly nobody has forgotten how this solution was received in Paris. In the Chambers, in the press, among the people of all classes, as I shall recall at greater length before closing this publication, the wish was to see in the renunciation of the Prince of Hohenzollern only a derisive success, and the Government, forced to take account of the state of feeling, judged it necessary to demand of the King of Prussia a new guarantee, in the conviction that thereby it would be enabled to disarm the excitement of public opinion." [440]

Comment. The above quotations afford much justification for the plea of the Emperor (already noted) that:

"it is the whole nation which has, by its irresistible impulse, dictated our decision";

but the earlier part of the same sentence, "We have done all in our power to avoid the war," is certainly not true. Secondly, in view of the extracts, it cannot be pretended that "the Ems telegram" had any bearing upon the state of public opinion as indicated in the quotations, for they are all of a date prior to knowledge by the Parisian public of that document. And thirdly, the quotations make clear that had there been no "Ems telegram" war would, none the less, have ensued. The French government would not have withdrawn its demand for a future guarantee, nor would the German government have retracted the refusal to concede it. Bismarck, moreover, was ready with his counter-demands.

UNDECLARED REASON FOR THE WAR

If we are to understand the outbreak of the 1870–1 war, we must (as already asserted with reference to the war of 1914–18) distinguish between its predisposing causes (its roots) and its precipitating cause;

[439] Gramont, *op. cit.*, p. 126; Sorel, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
[440] Benedetti, *op. cit.*, pp. 368–9.

and we must relegate the second to a position of subordinate importance. But for a previously prepared international situation, the nomination and, within five days, the withdrawal of Leopold would have passed into history almost unnoticed. That the candidature resulted in war was due solely to the French attitude of hostility to Prussia, based upon the "grievances" of Sadowa and Prague — more correctly, upon jealousy of the expanding power of Prussia. A few quotations (in addition to those already noted) will help to make clear why it was that although none of the above-recited declared reasons for the war stands examination, nevertheless war ensued.

Commenting, in his book, upon the proceedings in the Corps Législatif, in connection with the Duvernois interpellation of 12 July, Ollivier said:

"The work of pacification at which I was painfully laboring is compromised; in place of a resigned public sentiment, we are going to be confronted with an irritated public opinion; the Hohenzollern question is relegated to the second place, and they talk of exacting from Prussia guarantees for the faithful execution of the treaty of Prague; shall we have the strength to arrest this movement?" [441]

At the Council meeting on the morning of the 13th July, the Emperor said:

"We have many grievances against Prussia other than this Hohenzollern affair." [442]

La Gazette de France, the organ of the *Légitimistes*, regretting the probability of peace, said on the same date:

"Peace triumphs. There will not be war. Prussia keeps the fruits of Sadowa. All France thought that the government, having resolved to take its revenge for Sadowa, believed the moment come for engaging in a serious quarrel against Prussia." [443]

During the debate on the 15th July, Thiers said:

"More than anyone else, I repeat, I desire reparation for the events of 1866; but I find the occasion detestably chosen." [444]

". . . and we, who have deplored Sadowa, who have always desired that it be repaired, we have always said and repeated that there would come a day difficult, supremely difficult for Prussia, and that would be when she would wish to lay hands on the States of Germany that are yet independent. That is the day, we have said without cessation, that is the day that we must know how to wait for." [445]

M. Kératry, a member of the Left, separating himself, for the moment, from Thiers and his other friends, said:

"For four years I have heard constantly regretted the fact of Sadowa.

[441] *Op. cit.*, XIV, p. 248.
[442] *Ibid.*, p. 287.
[443] *Ibid.*, p. 339.
[444] *Ibid.*, pp. 406–7.
[445] *Ibid.*, p. 434.

Well, at this moment, France has, not simply a pretext, but a decisive occasion; M. Thiers says that it is necessary to await a favorable opportunity, but here is a peremptory motive for declaring war." [446]

During the same debate, Ollivier, turning upon his opponents, reminded them of their propaganda.[447] And in his book, he wrote:

"If, among us, anyone could have been accused of having brought about the war, that would be Thiers. By his persistence in speaking of the humiliation of France, or representing Sadowa as a national catastrophe, he had created that restless, susceptible, suspicious, excited state of mind from which the war had fatefully developed." [448]

Referring to the indifference with which the Chamber regarded the Leopold affair, Ollivier wrote:

"The Assembly listened to my new developments with visible coldness and barely concealed dissatisfaction. With regard to the events of 1866, it was more in sympathy with the opinions of Thiers than with mine; and it desired that, adopting the proposition of the Right, I should make the Hohenzollern affair a secondary matter and invoke the necessity of rectifying the error of 1866, of preventing the creation of Germanic unity." [449]

As further evidence of the concentration of public thought upon Sadowa, Ollivier noted (as already quoted) that "the generals were among the warmest in approval." [450]

Writing to Ollivier after the war, the Emperor said:

"Show that it is Thiers and Jules Favre who, since 1866, have so continually repeated in every tone, that France had depreciated by the success of Prussia; that revenge was necessary; that it has sufficed, on the first occasion, to cause an outburst of public opinion. They have amassed the incendiary materials, and a spark has been sufficient to kindle a great fire." [451]

As Ollivier puts it, the Empress was convinced "that France had been sick since Sadowa." [452]

Comment. Probably enough has now been said to indicate (1) that the French public had been steadily taught that they had grievances against Prussia which at some good time must be repaired; (2) that the Emperor shared that view; (3) that public opinion was in such a condition that it could easily be stirred into war-fervor; and (4) that it was so stirred.

BRITISH OFFER OF MEDIATION

Earl Granville the British Foreign Secretary, counselled the antagonists to avail themselves of the 23d protocol of the international arrangements of 1856, which provided for recourse, in case of difficul-

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[446] *Ibid.*, p. 447.
[447] *Ante*, p. 639.
[448] *Op. cit.*, XIV, p. 412.
[449] *Ibid.*, p. 432.
[450] *Ante*, p. 655.
[451] *Ibid.*, p. 413.
[452] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

ties, "to the good offices of a friendly Power"; and declared, in a letter to the British Ambassadors at Paris and Berlin (15 July 1870), that the British government was "ready to take any part which may be desired in the matter." [453] In reporting Gramont's reply, Lord Lyons wrote (18 July):

"M. de Gramont went on to say that he presumed that I should not be surprised to hear that the French Government had been unable to agree to the suggestion which Her Majesty's Government has based on the 23d Protocol of the Congress of 1856. It appeared, indeed, to him that the present case was one to which the reservation that each nation was the sole judge of its honor and its interests, was peculiarly applicable." [454]

The next day, the French Ambassador at London communicated the same determination to Lord Granville, who wrote to Lord Lyons as follows:

"The Imperial Government, he said, appreciated the utility of the rule laid down in the last paragraph but one of the Protocol of the 12th April 1856, No. 23, but he reminded me of the reserve made on the subject, and recorded in the same Protocol, namely, 'Que le vœu exprimé par le Congrès ne saurait, en aucune cas, opposer des limites à la liberté d'appréciation qu'aucune Puissance ne peut aliéner dans les questions qui touchent à sa dignité';[455] and he proceeded to say that, much as France would be inclined to accept the good offices of a friendly Power, and particularly of England, the refusal of the King of Prussia to give the guarantee which France was obliged to ask, in order to prevent dynastic combinations dangerous to safety, and the care of her dignity, prevented her from taking any other course than that which she had adopted." [456]

Observe "the refusal of the King of Prussia to give the guarantee." Bismarck's reply (18 July) was as follows:

"But the possibility of entering into a negotiation of this nature could only be acquired by a previous assurance of the willingness of France to enter into it also. France took the initiative in the direction of war and adhered to it, after the first complication had, in the opinion also of England, been settled by removal of the cause." [457]

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[453] Letter Granville to Lyons: Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 57; and see Nos. 49, 97; *Ann. Reg.*, 1870, p. 204.

[454] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 107. And see No. 123.

[455] "That the wish expressed by the Congress could not in any case set limits to the liberty of appreciation — which no Power can relinquish — with reference to questions which affect its dignity."

[456] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 99; Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 498–9.

[457] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 115, Enc. See No. 49; and C.–210, No. 23.

OPINION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

British opinion, both official and popular, while divided as to the reasonableness of French objection to the accession of Leopold to the Spanish throne, somewhat unanimously condemned all the actions of the French government in dealing with the subject. On the 9th July, Granville wrote to Lyons that the government were

"not able to perceive that the nomination of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to the Throne of Spain is a matter of such importance to a great and powerful nation like France as to warrant carrying to extremes a national feeling of resentment." [458]

Some of the English newspapers did not share this official view. Passages quoted by Ollivier (in his book) indicate that in the opinion of *The Times*, *The Standard*, *The Daily Telegraph*, and *The Pall Mall Gazette*, the French objection to the establishment of a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne was both reasonable and natural.[459] With that view the present writer concurs.

On the other hand, the truculent character of the ministerial declaration read in the Corps Législatif on 6 July was strongly disapproved by the British government. On the 7th, Lord Lyons called on Gramont, and afterwards wrote to Lord Granville as follows:

"I observed to the Duc de Gramont this afternoon that I could not but feel uneasy respecting the declaration which he had made the day before in the Corps Législatif. I could not, I said, help thinking that milder language would have rendered it more easy to treat both with Prussia and with Spain for the withdrawal of the pretensions of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern." [460]

Gramont's reply has been already noted.[461]

Replying, on the 9th, to Lord Lyons' intimation of French commencement of military preparations, Granville said (as already noted):

"Her Majesty's Government have continued to regret the tenor of the observations successively made in the French Chamber and in the French press, which tend to excite rather than to allay the angry feelings which have been aroused in France, and may only too probably call forth similar feelings in Germany and in Spain; and their regret has been increased by the intimation now given to you by the Duc de Gramont that military preparations would forthwith be made in France." [462]

When Gramont said to Lord Lyons (as already noted) that Leopold's renunciation had "put an end to the original cause of the dispute," Lyons' reply was:

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[458] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 16.
[459] XIV, pp. 123–6.
[460] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 11.
[461] *Ante*, p. 590–1.
[462] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 17.

"that the renunciation wholly changed the position of France. If war occurred now, all Europe would say that it was the fault of France; that France rushed into it without any substantial cause — merely from pride and resentment. . . . In fact, I said that France would have public opinion throughout the world against her, and her antagonist would have all the advantage of being manifestly forced into the war in self-defence to repel an attack." [463]

In a despatch of the next day (the 13th), Lord Granville said:

"Her Majesty's Government learned with great concern, by your telegram of yesterday evening, which I received at midnight, that notwithstanding the renunciation of the Spanish Throne made on behalf of his son by the Prince of Hohenzollern, which the French Government admitted to dispose of any question between France and Spain, the Duc de Gramont intimated to you that the French Government continued to be dissatisfied with the communication which they had received from the King of Prussia, and held over for further deliberation this day the course they would take under the circumstances. Your Excellency very properly immediately urged that the renunciation should be held to put an end to the dispute with Prussia as well as to that with Spain; but I thought it my duty at once to request you, by telegraph, to renew your representation before the French Council, summoned for to-day, assembled, and to remind the Duc de Gramont that the Imperial Government had, at the outset of the business, requested Her Majesty's Government to exert their influence to prevent the serious consequences which it was apprehended might ensue. The Imperial Minister alluded in public to this fact, and I am sure would acknowledge that it was impossible that their efforts could have been more promptly or more energetically employed. Under these circumstances, Her Majesty's Government, I informed your Excellency, felt bound to impress upon the Government of the Emperor the immense responsibility that would rest on France if she should seek to enlarge the grounds of quarrel by declining to accept the withdrawal by Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern of his candidature as a satisfactory solution of the question." [464]

Lyons immediately communicated that statement to Gramont, who, at the moment (13 July), was sitting in ministerial council.[465] On the same day, Lord Granville asked the French Ambassador:

"to represent to his Government that Her Majesty's Government thought, after their exertions at the request of France, they had a right to urge on the Imperial Government not to take the great responsibility of quarrelling about forms, when they had obtained the full substance of what they had desired." [466]

[463] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 30; *Ann. Reg.*, 1870, p. 201.
[464] Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 33.
[465] Letters to Lord Granville, 14 July: *ibid.*, Nos. 39, 40.
[466] *Ibid.*, No. 35. And see No. 36.

Mr. Disraeli, the leader of the Opposition, in his speech of 11 July 1870 (as summarized by the *Annual Register*):

"dwelt on the necessity, at such a crisis, of 'more frank communication between the House and the Ministry; more precision of knowledge; and more clearness of opinion.' As for the pretexts that had been made for the war, they were so 'ephemeral and evanescent,' so 'merely the semblance of causes,' that they had already disappeared, and its real origin had become apparent enough in the 'vast ambitions striving in Europe,' which made it 'our duty to ascertain as clearly as we can our position with respect to the belligerent powers.'" [467]

In reporting to the Queen (15 July), Mr. Gladstone, the Prime Minister, said that Mr. Disraeli:

"expressed opinions strongly adverse to France as the apparent aggressor." [468]

On 12 July, Mr. Gladstone wrote to Lord Granville saying that:

"it is our duty to represent the immense responsibility which will rest upon France, if she does not at once accept as satisfactory and conclusive, the withdrawal of the candidature of Prince Leopold." [469]

On 14 July, Mr. Gladstone suggested to Lord Granville that a telegram should be sent to the British Ambassador declaring that, if questions were to be asked in parliament:

"it will be impossible for us to conceal the opinion that the cause of quarrel having been removed, France ought to be satisfied." [470]

On 15 July, the French Ambassador called upon Lord Granville and said:

"It was necessary to have some guarantee for the future that the Prince would not again renew his candidature, and their representations to the King of Prussia still remained unanswered."

Commenting upon this, Granville said:

"I did not think it necessary to do more than to repeat to M. de Lavalette my opinion that after the question had been reduced to such narrow limits, France was not justified in going to the last extremity." [471]

Lord Granville, when afterwards pressed by M. Thiers to intervene in favor of defeated France, refused, and repeated to him the Prussian suggestion that such a step would be undignified:

"when the French had begun an unjustifiable and aggressive war against our advice, in despite of our successful efforts to remove the cause of quarrel." [472]

Mr. Gladstone, in September 1870, wrote as follows:

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[467] *Ann. Reg.*, 1870, p. [98.

[468] Morley, *op. cit.*, II, p. 335.

[469] *Ibid.*, p. 328.

[470] *Ibid.*, p. 329.

[471] Lord Granville to Lord Lyons, 15 July 1870: Br. Blue Bk., C.–167, No. 56.

[472] Fitzmaurice: The Life of Lord Granville, II, p. 56.

"Wonder rises to its climax when we remember that this feverish determination to force a quarrel was associated with a firm belief in the high preparation, and military superiority, of the French forces; the comparative inferiority of the Germans; the indisposition of the smaller states to give aid to Prussia; and even the readiness of Austria, with which from his long residence at Vienna the Duc de Gramont supposed himself to be thoroughly acquainted, to appear in arms as the ally of France." [473]

Lord Granville, in a letter to Lord Hartington, several years after the war (28 March 1880), said:

"We pressed as strongly as possible upon the Emperor that he had no cause for war with Germany." [474]

Lord Morley in his *Life of Gladstone* has the following:

"Of the diplomacy on the side of the government of France anterior to the war, Mr. Gladstone said that it made up 'a chapter which for fault and folly taken together is almost without a parallel in the history of nations.' [475] On July 6 the French ministers made a precipitate declaration to their Chambers, which was in fact an ultimatum to Prussia. The action of Spain was turned into Prussian action. Prussia was called to account in a form that became a public and international threat, as Bismarck put it, 'with the hand on the sword-hilt.' These rash words of challenge were the first of the French disasters." [476]

The *Annual Register* for 1870 contains the following:

"The first speeches in Parliament upon the war were clear indications of the prevailing feeling in England. In the brief interval of suspense which separated the nomination of the Hohenzollern Prince for the Spanish crown, and the declaration of war, Mr. Disraeli asked whether the Queen's Government had used their undoubted right of intervention, whether they had tried to prevent the 'precipitate settlement' of long existing difficulties, whether they had in fact done their best to prevent 'melodramatic catastrophes' belonging to the last century.

"Mr. Gladstone said in answer, that there was 'nothing in the differences which had arisen to justify, in the judgment and conscience of the world, a breach of the general peace.' Both the States concerned had admitted to the full the right of her Majesty's Government to exercise its title to friendly intervention, but the result had thus far not been favorable.

"In both speeches was clearly manifest a grave disapproval of the conduct of France." [477]

Professor Huxley, in a letter to Dr. Dohrn (18 July 1870), said:

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[473] Morley: Life of Gladstone, II, p. 337.

[474] Fitzmaurice, *op. cit.*, II, p. 70; *ante*, pp. 662–4 .

[475] Quoted from *Gleanings*, IV, p. 222. Lord Morley's comment on the quotation is: "Modern historians do not differ from Mr. Gladstone."

[476] II, pp. 326–7.

[477] P. [96.

"If you Germans do not give that crowned swindler, whose fall I have been looking for ever since the coup d'état, such a blow as he will never recover from, I will never forgive you. Public opinion in England is not worth much, but at present it is entirely against France. Even the *Times*, which generally contrives to be on the baser side of a controversy, is at present on the German side." [478]

Mr. Justin McCarthy, a contemporary historian, was of opinion that: "it was a fatal mistake of the Emperor Napoleon to force the quarrel on such a pretext as the fact that the Spanish people had invited a distant relation of the King of Prussia to become sovereign of Spain. Louis Napoleon managed to put himself completely in the wrong. The King of Prussia at once induced his relative to withdraw from the candidature [479] in order not to disturb the susceptibilities of France; and then the French Government pressed for a general pledge that the King of Prussia would never on any future occasion allow of any similar candidature. When it came to this, there was an end to negotiations. It was clear then that the Emperor had resolved to have a quarrel. Count Bismarck must have smiled to himself a grim smile. His enemy had delivered himself into Bismarck's hands." [480]

Mr. W. H. Dawson, a careful student of history, has recently said:

"When the war broke out France had been cold-shouldered by all Europe as a mischievous disturber of the peace." [481]

Mr. Archibald Hurd, by no means an apologist for Germany, has recently declared that:

"the thoughts of most knowledgeable Englishmen, at the moment, were expressed by Mr. Gladstone" — in the passage quoted above.

And Mr. Hurd agrees with the view of Mr. Justin McCarthy as to the "sympathies of the English people." [482]

CESSION TO GERMANY OF ALSACE AND LORRAINE

Protest of Alsace-Lorraine. During the negotiations for peace, the French parliament held its sessions at Bordeaux. Among the representatives were the members for Alsace-Lorraine, and they, on 17 February 1871, adopted the following resolution:

"The representatives of Alsace and Lorraine, prior to any negotiations for peace, laid on the table of the National Assembly a declaration most solemnly stating, in the name of both Provinces, their wish and right to remain French.

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[478] *Life of Huxley*, by his son Leonard, I, p. 492.

[479] That statement is inaccurate: See Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, pp. 206–9.

[480] *A History of Our Own Times*, IV, p. 264.

[481] *The German Empire*, II, p. 79.

[482] *Fortnightly Rev.*, Feb. 1917, pp. 246–7. English sympathy veered somewhat upon news of the bombardment of Paris and the nature of the dictated terms of peace.

"Having been handed over, contrary to all justice, and through an odious abuse of power, to the domination of the foreigner, we have one last duty to perform.

"We once again declare to be null and void a treaty which disposes of us without our consent.

"The revindication of our rights remains forever open to each and all, according to the dictates of our conscience.

"On leaving these precincts, where our dignity will not allow us to remain any longer, and despite the bitterness of our sorrow, the supreme thought, which lies at the bottom of our hearts, is one of gratitude to those who, for the last six months, have unceasingly defended us, as also of unalterable attachment to the Mother country from which we have been so violently torn.

"We shall still be with you in our prayers, and shall wait, with full confidence in the future, for regenerated France to resume the course of her great destiny.

"Your brothers of Alsace and Lorraine, albeit separated for the time being from their common family, will retain for France, absent though she be from their homes, a filial affection until the day when she returns to take again her place therein." [483]

Victor Hugo, one of the members of parliament, indulged in a prediction which must have sounded theatrical at the time:

"The time will come when France will rise again invincible, and take not only Alsace and Lorraine, but the Rhineland, with Mayence and Cologne, and in return will give to Germany a republic, so freeing her from her emperors as an equivalent for the dethronement of Napoleon." [484]

And now, at the close of another war, comes another protest — this time from the government at Berlin, in the form of a proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of the provinces which, by the peace treaty, have been separated from Germany:

"The unfortunate ending of this war has left us without defence against the arbitrary will of an adversary who has imposed upon us in the name of peace the heaviest sacrifices, the first of which is the renunciation of the German provinces in the east, in the west, and in the north, without regard to the principles of the right of peoples to decide their fate, and by which hundreds of thousands of our German compatriots are placed under foreign domination.

"German brothers and sisters: Not only at the hour of *adieu*, but for-

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[483] Tardieu: *The Truth about the Treaty*, p. 234. When, in the following week, British intervention with reference to the amount of the indemnity was being asked, nothing was said as to the cession of territory: Lord Granville to Lord Lyons, 25 Feb. 1871 (*Ann. Reg.*, 1871, pp. 266, 267). The peace preliminaries were signed the next day.

[484] Quoted by W. H. Dawson: *The Fortnightly Rev.*, Aug. 1919, pp. 161–2.

ever, grief for your loss will fill our hearts. We swear in the name of the whole German people that we will never forget you. You, on your side, will never forget your common German country; of this we are well aware." [485]

The British Cabinet. Upon the British policy with reference to the German demand, at the close of the 1870–71 war, for the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine, Mr. Gladstone disagreed with his cabinet. He had no doubt as to the culpability of France, and as to the right of Germany to impose commensurate terms upon the defeated nation. His point, as he expressed it, was:

"that the transfer of territory and inhabitants, by mere force, calls for the reprobation of Europe, and that Europe is entitled to utter it, and can utter it with good effect." [486]

He quite agreed in condemning the refusal of France to surrender "either an inch of her territory or a stone of her fortresses"; and he declared to his cabinet that:

"it cannot be right that the neutral Powers should remain silent, while this principle of consulting the wishes of the population is trampled down, should the actual sentiment of Alsace-Lorraine be such as to render the language applicable." [487]

The view of the majority of the cabinet, however, was expressed by the Duke of Argyll, when he said that, although he had:

"never argued in favour of the German annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, but only against our having any right to oppose it otherwise than by the most friendly dissuasion,"

yet he held that the German did not exceed the acknowledged right of nations in successful wars, when he said to Alsace and Lorraine:

"Conquest in a war forced upon me by the people of which you form a part, gives me the *right* to annex, if on other grounds I deem it expedient; and for strategic reasons I do so deem it.

The Duke believed, as Lord Morley interprets him:

"that the consent of populations to live under a particular government is a right subject to a great many qualifications, and it would not be easy to turn such a doctrine into the base of an official remonstrance." [488]

British Public Opinion. As some indication of British feeling upon the subject, it may be noted that the *Daily News*, on 20 August 1870, had the following:

"There is no longer any question as to whether the Germans will take or rather retake Alsace, but rather as to whether having got it, they will give it up again. Some 200 years back Louis XIV stole it. The lapse of years may hide a theft, but not the justification of re-conquest.

[485] Quoted by *Le Devoir*, Montreal.
[486] Morley, *op. cit.*, II, p. 346.
[487] *Ibid.*, p. 347.
[488] *Ibid.*, pp. 347, 348.

The population of Alsace is German by origin, by language, and by custom." [489]

Thomas Carlyle (the historian of the French revolution) wrote to *The Times* in December 1870:

"No people has had such a bad neighborhood as Germany has possessed during the last four hundred years in France. Germany would have been mad had she not thought of erecting such a frontier-wall between herself and such a neighbor — of erecting such a frontier-wall when she had the opportunity. I know of no law of nature, no heavenly Act of Parliament, by which France alone of all earthly beings was not obliged to restore a part of stolen territories if the owners from whom they were snatched had an opportunity of reconquering them." [490]

The Times, on 14 September of the same year, had the following:

"Till the French are ready to recognize that they have acted unjustly towards their neighbours, and to offer sureties against a repetition of such conduct, the fair demands of the Germans (40 milliards and Alsace-Lorraine) cannot be considered unsatisfactory. We can assure France, if she finds these conditions hard, that there are many persons in Germany who consider them remarkably light, and who would be only too pleased to complain at their hereditary enemy getting off so lightly. Alsace-Lorraine — we mean German Lorraine, in other words the possession of Metz and a small strip of Lorraine with the Vosges and Alsace — is the minimum condition the peace-loving German can accept as a basis of peace." [491]

In *The Times* of 10 December of the same year appeared a further, and particularly interesting, article:

"In the present crisis it is not the duty of the Germans to show high feeling in sympathy, or magnanimously to forgive their defeated enemy. The question rather is of a simple piece of business and of prudence. What will the enemy do after the war when he has recovered his strength? People in England have but a faint recollection of the numerous cruel lessons which Germany has had from France during the last centuries. For 400 years no nation has had such bad neighbors as they have found in the French, who were always unsociable, irreconcilable, greedy of territory, not ashamed to take it, and always ready to assume the offensive during the whole time Germany endured the encroachment and insubordination of France. To-day when she has won the victory and has conquered her neighbor, it would, in our opinion, be very foolish of her not to take advantage of the situation, and not to acquire for herself a boundary likely to secure peace for her in the future. As far as we know there is no law in the world entitling France to retain

[489] Quoted in *Cambridge Magazine*, 20 Oct. 1917.

[490] The passage was quoted by Count Hertling in the "Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace" (24 Jan. 1918).

[491] Quoted in *Cambridge Magazine*, 20 Oct. 1917.

the territories which were formerly annexed by her, after the owners from whom they were taken have laid their hands upon the stave. The French complain bitterly to those who listen to them that they are exposed to losses which threaten their honor, and they incessantly and earnestly entreat people not to dishonor France, to leave her honor unstained. Will her honor, however, be preserved if France refuses to pay for her neighbor's word which she has broken? The real fact is that she lost her honor when she broke her neighbor's word, and only her deep repentance and her honest determination not to repeat the offence can restore it."

"We believe that Bismarck will take as much of Alsace-Lorraine, too, as he chooses, and that it will be the better for him, the better for us, the better for all the world except France, and the better in the long run for France herself. Through large and quiet measures, Count von Bismarck is aiming with eminent ability at a single object: the well-being of Germany and of the world, of the large-hearted, peace-loving, enlightened and honest people of Germany growing into one nation; and if Germany becomes mistress of the Continent in place of France, which is light-hearted, ambitious, quarrelsome, and over-excitable, it will be the most momentous event of the present day, and all the world must hope that it will soon come about. The political significance of this change in the situation cannot be estimated too highly. An immense revolution has been accomplished in Europe, and all our old-fashioned traditions have suddenly grown out of date. Nobody can foretell the relations which must establish themselves between the Great Powers, but it is easy to see what, in its broader features, is the tendency of the epoch on which we are about to enter. There will be a strong and united Germany at the head of which stands a family representative of the interest of the German Fatherland, and its military reputation. On the one side, this Germany touches Russia, a strong and vigilant power; on the other France, which will either patiently abide the time when her destiny will once more change, or, burning with the thirst for vengeance, will lie in wait for an opportunity. She will certainly not be in a position for a long time to resume the great part she played in Europe, and which was conceded to her during the splendid period of the Napoleonic restoration." [492]

American and European Opinion. Sorel testifies that:

"The sympathies of North America for Prussia had been declared since the beginning of the crisis. They were fortified by the victories of the German allies. . . . Mr. Bancroft, American Minister at Berlin, wrote on the 29th September, after the Ferrières interview [negotiations]: 'In the opinion of Europe, the conditions offered were moderate. Strasbourg had surrendered one hundred and eighty-nine years, day for day,

[492] Quoted in *The Socialist Rev.*, Oct.–Dec., 1919, p. 354–6.

after Louis XIV. had taken possession of it. It is very difficult to understand what can be the hopes of the French government.' " [493]

LA REVANCHE

Gambetta's Advice. "Pensons-y toujours, n'en parlons jamais," [494] was the advice to the French people of Léon Gambetta, who, in some respects, was the leading spirit in the deposition of the Emperor, in the establishment of a government of national defence, and in the further prosecution of the war. But it was a counsel impossible of perfect observance. It was disregarded, as to the "parlons," at various periods — notably during the Jules Ferry administrations (1880–1; 1883–5); the Boulanger period (1886–7);[495] the Schnaebele incident (1887);[496] the Dreyfus incident (1894–9); and also, from time to time, as the friendship between France and Russia and between France and the United Kingdom acquired strength — as the solidarity of the Triple Entente developed. The thinking, as we might expect, kept pace with the changes in the prospects of fulfilment.[497] Since the close of the war, Marshal Foch, for example, in a published interview has said:

"From the age of 17, I dreamed of revenge, after having seen the Germans at Metz. And when a man of ordinary capacity concentrates all of his faculties and all of his abilities upon one end, and works without diverging, he ought to be successful." [498]

Not France only, but all Europe, kept in mind, between 1871 and 1914, with varying intensity, the prospect — one might say the assumed certainty — of the recurrence of the Franco-Prussian war. Every change in the European situation raised apprehension of its imminence, and the most important of the international occurrences had direct reference to its anticipated arrival. If, for example, we were to select from Bismarck's foreign policy his principal purpose, it would be that

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[493] *Op. cit.*, II, pp. 13–14.

[494] "Let us think of it always, let us speak of it never": Quoted by Sir Thomas Barclay, *Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876–1906*, p. 50.

[495] "C'est Boulanger qu'il nous faut," was the popular song. *Cf.* Prof. J. V. Fuller: *Bismarck's Diplomacy at its Zenith*, pp. 60–2, 129–49, 153–8.

[496] During the Boulanger period, M. Schnaebele (a French Commissary of Police) having crossed the boundary between France and Alsace, in pursuance of a request from a German Commissary, was arrested by police agents sent specifically for that purpose from Leipsic. Boulanger was Minister for War, and, eagerly desirous for war, commenced the concentration of troops on the eastern fortresses. Better counsels prevailed. Schnaebele was released, and the German government admitted that the request to enter German territory implied a safe conduct (*Ann. Reg.*, 1887, p. [213. *Cf.* Fuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 171–84.

[497] By furthering French colonial expansion, Bismarck succeeded, between 1878 and 1885, in displacing, to a large extent, even the "pensons": Dawson, *The German Empire*, II, pp. 108–11.

[498] *N. Y. Times*, 2 Jan. 1920.

France should be kept isolated; while, on the other hand, the endeavor of French statesmen (speaking generally) was to secure alliances without which France would be helpless. For forty-three years, Germany and France believed that the fate of Alsace-Lorraine would be settled by war (they still think so) and both countries arranged for the struggle as best they could, by alliances, by understandings, and by military preparations.

WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR OF 1870–71?

The Cause of the War. In the *Œuvres posthumes et autographes inédits de Napoléon III en exil*, par le Comte de La Chapelle, we may read, as from the Emperor:

"that our effectives were inadequate, our armaments in course of transformation, our Headquarters Staff ill-prepared, at the moment when the skilful tactics of Bismarck put the policy of France in the wrong, and drew it on to the declaration of war." [499]

That France was "in the wrong" is certain, but that she ought to be excused on the ground of "the skilful tactics of Bismarck" is by no means clear. France, in the opinion of the present writer, was justified in making objection to a Hohenzollern being seated upon the Spanish throne, but was absolutely wrong in accompanying the announcement of her objection with a publicly declared ultimatum to Prussia. The tactics of Bismarck were not responsible for that; nor, when Leopold's candidature had been withdrawn and all cause of quarrel ended, for the demand for a future guarantee.

Bismarck, admittedly, was anxious for war, and, that it might not escape him, fabricated a document which he believed would "have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull." But, as it happened, no incitement was necessary. Before the document reached Paris, war had become inevitable. The existing excitement, based as it was very largely upon previous antagonism toward Prussia, and inflamed as it was by French statesmen, made impossible that the French government would withdraw its demand for a future guarantee;[500] and the existence of that demand made war certain. If, in its then temper, Paris could not tolerate the Prussian announcement of the refusal of the King to receive the French Ambassador, it would certainly have become delirious over a Prussian announcement that a peremptory demand, presented by the French Ambassador, had been withdrawn because rejected at Berlin. All the world would have been made aware of a Prussian diplomatic victory; and Paris would have wreaked her rage on those responsible for her humiliation. Napoleon, Ollivier, Gramont, Lebœuf, and others

[499] Quoted by Hanotaux: *Contemporary France*, I, p. 12.

[500] It could not have been withdrawn for the reason that such humiliating action would have meant the disappearance of the Napoleonic dynasty.

were determined to risk the defeat of France rather than face their personal overthrow.

Let any reader reperuse the previous pages dealing with the state of public feeling prior to the 15th July, and ask himself what kind of explanation of a peaceably accomplished solution of the incident, Ollivier could have offered on that day to the Corps Législatif. What could he have said that would have suppressed the popular desire for war which Gramont had aroused by his speech of the 6th July,[501] which threatened, as early as the 10th, to upset the government;[502] which "flows over us from all sides";[503] which on the 11th, in the Chamber, crushed, as by "a veritable tempest," Gramont's attempted explanations;[504] which was not in the least allayed by Leopold's renunciation on the 12th;[505] which on that day, in the Chamber, "tore me [Ollivier] to pieces furiously";[506] which on the 13th was so intense that only "with the greatest difficulty" were two further days obtained for a governmental explanation;[507] which manifested itself by crowds shouting for war, and making difficult the passage of ministers to the Council chamber? What could he have said that would have averted an overwhelming vote of reprobation, and a change of ministry, followed by the consequences forecast by Ollivier himself as follows:

"Following my resignation, a war ministry, all prepared behind the scenes, would have replaced us and responded to the refusal of the King with haughty insistences, which would inevitably have produced war."[508]

Frederick the Great and Napoleon III. As part of his book in refutation of Machiavelli, Frederick the Great wrote:

"Add to these considerations: some troops always ready to act, my savings bank well filled, and the vivacity of my character. These were the reasons that I had for making war on Maria Theresa, Queen of Bohemia and Hungary — ambition, interest, desire that people should speak about me, carried me away, and war was resolved upon."[509]

Between that avowal and the *apologia* of the French Emperor, there is striking contrast:

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[501] *Ante*, *p.* 589.
[502] *Ante*, p. 593. And see pp. 596, 656, 657.
[503] *Ante*, p. 593.
[504] *Ante*, p. 595.
[505] *Ante*, p. 601.
[506] *Ante*, p. 601.
[507] *Ante*, p. 610.
[508] Ollivier, *op. cit.*, XIV, p. 274.
[509] Voltaire, to whom the manuscript of the book was sent for revision, struck out the above passage, probably because it was not a very apt illustration of the writer's condemnation of Machiavelli. But Voltaire preserved the sentences, and placed them in his own *Mémoires*. From there they passed into Lord Brougham's essay on the *Mémoires*. And they came to the present writer's notice by their incorporation in an article in *The Fortnightly Rev.* of Jan. 1921, pp. 117–8.

"There is no doubt," he said, "that though the head of the French government was then only a constitutional sovereign, he could have averted the disaster of 1870. But it should be remembered that if he had done so, he would have lost all popularity, and been greatly blamed for such a course. He would have been told that he was humble with the strong and arrogant with the weak."

Admitting that he:

"should have been wiser than the nation, and should have prevented the war even if I had, by so doing, lost my crown,"

he pleaded that he:

"was carried away by the national outburst; by my great confidence in the strength of the army; perhaps, too, to be perfectly frank, by dreams of military glory; while dreams of territorial aggrandizement may have got the better for the moment of the cool reasoning of the statesman and sovereign. . . . But the truth is that the whole country asked for this war, and I could not resist the current." [510]

Comment. The whole episode affords an excellent view of the usual genesis of war: First, a basis of antipathy, founded either upon grievances (alleged or real) as in the war of 1870–71, the Spanish-American war, and the French share in the recent war; or upon international rivalries, as in the British wars with Spain, Holland, and France, and the British share in the recent war; or upon clashing imperialisms, as in the Crimean war, the Balkan wars, and the Russian *vs.* German and Austrian shares in the recent war. And, secondly, the occurrence of some incident which between friends would disappear in easy accommodation (such as the amputation of Jenkins' ear; the candidature of Leopold; the blowing-up of the *Maine;* and the assassinations at Serajevo), but which, synchronizing with the existence of strained relations, is as a chance spark falling upon easily inflamed tinder. With all but the last sentence of the following opinion of Mr. J. Ellis Barker as to the cause of the war of 1870–71, the present writer agrees:

"Wars are due to direct and indirect causes, and, as a rule, the latter are far more potent than the former. Hence, incidents which are small, if not trivial, in themselves often bring about a long and universally expected outbreak of hostilities. The Franco-German War of 1870–71, for instance, was not caused by Bismarck's alteration of the Ems telegram, but by the pent-up and century-old hatred existing between France and Germany, by the passionate desire of the German States to form a united Empire, and by the determination of Napoleon the Third to prevent such a union and to dominate and rule the continent of Europe.

[510] Comte Fleury: *Memoirs of the Empress Eugénie*, II, pp. 257–9. And see p. 235. Paris, undoubtedly, was wild for war, but "the Prefects of French Departments reported that only 16 declared in favor of war, while 37 were in doubt on the matter, and 34 accepted war with regret" (Dr. J. Holland Rose: *The Development of the European Nations*, p. 48).

The aims of France and Germany were incompatible. The deep-seated Franco-German differences had produced a state of tension and bitterness between the two nations which made war inevitable, and the blustering, blundering, and interfering policy of Napoleon the Third had intensified and accelerated matters and brought them to a crisis. The Ems telegram was merely the last straw." [511]

Prior to " the Ems telegram," French action had made war inevitable.

WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WAR OF 1914–18?

We are now in a position to assign responsibility for the war of 1914–18 — responsibility for its having been a world war rather than a Balkan affair — so far as relates to the Alsace-Lorraine root of that war.

1. France was the aggressor in 1870. Distribution of the responsibility amongst the French Emperor, his ministers, and the French public is immaterial.

2. Was Prussia justified in exacting the cession of the province? At the close of the war, as at the close of the recent war, two mutually exclusive courses of action were open to the victors: either to treat France (as a few years previously Prussia had treated Austria) as a potential friend — no military humiliation, no deprivation of territory, no indemnity; or as the Entente Allies have recently treated Germany — as an irreconcilable enemy against whom military security must be obtained. The fortunes of war placed the option in the hands of Germany in 1871, and in the hands of her enemies in 1918. Both exercised it in the same way. Von Moltke, in 1871, declared that for strategic protection against France, Metz and Strasburg must be Prussian. He was undoubtedly correct. And the right of the victor to protect himself in that way (notwithstanding Gladstone's qualms) is indisputable. Whether King Wilhelm would not have acted more wisely had he foregone military security, and depended, rather, upon the safety to be derived from magnanimity, with a probability of ensuing friendship, was a point for his consideration. Alsace and Lorraine were rightfully his if he chose to demand them. He took them, with the effect inspired by Gambetta, anticipated by Bismarck, and demonstrated by forty-three years of sequel. Whether, within a like period, Germany will take or attempt her *révanche*, no one can say. That it will be delayed only until a fitting opportunity has arrived, there need be little doubt.

ALLIANCES AND COUNTER-ALLIANCES

The German alliances induced by the cession of the two French provinces were as follows:

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[511] *The Foundations of Germany*, p. 174.

1872. The Dreikaiserbund: The Emperors of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia.

1879. The Dual Alliance: Germany and Austria-Hungary. In force, by renewals, at the outbreak of the late war.

1881. The League of the Three Emperors: The Emperors of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Renewed in 1884, and expired in 1887.

1882. The Triple Alliance: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. In force, by renewals, at the outbreak of the late war.

1883–8. The Quadruple Alliance: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Roumania, in 1883; joined by Italy in 1888. In force, by renewals, at the outbreak of the late war.

1887. Bismarck's reinsurance treaty: Germany and Russia. Expired in 1890.

The counter-alliances and *ententes* were as follows:

1891–4. France and Russia: Developed in 1912, and in force at the outbreak of the late war.

1902. France and Italy. In force at the outbreak of the late war.

1904. France and the United Kingdom. In force at the outbreak of the late war.

1907. Russia and the United Kingdom. In force at the outbreak of the late war.

Because of her treaty with Austria-Hungary, Germany supported her ally in the war of 1914–18. Because of her treaty with Russia, France joined her ally in the war. Because of her *entente* arrangements and the reasons which underlay them, the United Kingdom supported France and Russia. It was, therefore, not without good warrant that M. Hanotaux said:

"The war of 1914 is closely associated with the war of 1870";[512] and that Mr. Sydney Brooks said: "so far as the measureless cataclysm in which the whole world is now engulfed can be traced back to any single source, that source is Alsace-Lorraine."[513]

[512] *Ante*, p. 574.

[513] *Ante*, p. 574.

END OF VOLUME ONE.