

༄༅། །དགོངས་པ་ངེས་འགྲེལ།

Unraveling the Intent

Samdhanirmocana

འཕགས་པ་དགོངས་པ་ངེས་པར་འགྲེལ་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོའི་མདོ།

'phags pa dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo

The Noble Sūtra of the Great Vehicle “Unraveling the Intent”

Āryasaṃdhinirmocananāmahāyānasūtra



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SUMMARY

- s.1 In *Unraveling the Intent*, the Buddha gives a systematic overview of his three great cycles of teachings, which he refers to in this text as the “three Dharma wheels” (*tridharmacakra*). In the process of delineating the meaning of these doctrines, the Buddha unravels several difficult points regarding the ultimate and relative truths, the nature of reality, and the contemplative methods conducive to the attainment of complete and perfect awakening, and he also explains what his intent was when he imparted teachings belonging to each of the three Dharma wheels. In unambiguous terms, the third wheel is proclaimed to be of definitive meaning. Through a series of dialogues with hearers and bodhisattvas, the Buddha thus offers a complete and systematic teaching on the Great Vehicle, which he refers to here as the Single Vehicle.

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i.

INTRODUCTION

· Setting and Summary ·

i.1

In *Unraveling the Intent*, the Buddha gives a systematic overview of his three great cycles of teachings, which he refers to in this text as the “three Dharma wheels” (*tridharmacakra*). In the process of delineating the meaning of these doctrines, the Buddha unravels several difficult points regarding the ultimate and relative truths, the nature of reality, and the contemplative methods conducive to the attainment of complete and perfect awakening, and he also explains what his intent was when he imparted teachings belonging to each of the three Dharma wheels. Through a series of dialogues with hearers and bodhisattvas, the Buddha thus offers a complete and systematic teaching on the Great Vehicle, which he refers to here as the Single Vehicle .

i.2

The sūtra is set in an unfathomable palace displayed by the Buddha’s powers and attended by countless beings. The three gates of liberation (emptiness, appearancelessness, and wishlessness) are the entrance to this abode of the tathāgatas, the inconceivable nondual state of a buddha who, possessed of the gnosis (*jñāna*) of the Tathāgata’s liberation, is dwelling in the domain of truth (*dharmadhātu*), together with an immeasurable retinue of hearers and a retinue of bodhisattvas including Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana, Vidhivatparipṛcchaka, Dharmodgata, Suviśuddhamati, Viśālamati, Guṇākara, Paramārthasamudgata, Avalokiteśvara, Maitreya, and Mañjuśrī.

· The Context ·

i.3

The sūtra is structured in the form of a series of dialogues between the Buddha and advanced bodhisattvas or hearers, as well as between bodhisattvas (see [chapter 1](#)). These dialogues deal with both the theory and practice of the entire bodhisattva path. Narrative elements are extremely limited in this teaching. However, a narrative pattern can be found in

chapter 2 and 3, which begin, respectively, with a story about a group of non-Buddhists (*tīrthikas*) and some followers of the Buddha who have gathered to discuss a difficult point regarding the nature of reality and cannot agree on anything. The main protagonists then beg the Buddha to provide an explanation for the quandary these assemblies cannot not resolve, or alternatively to explain his underlying intent when he expounded the teachings that gave rise to conflicting interpretations.

i.4 Each chapter starts with a question on a topic requiring further elucidation: In the first chapter, the bodhisattva Vidhivatparipṛcchaka questions the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasamḍhinirmocana on the inexpressible (*anābhilāpya*) and nondual (*advaya*) ultimate. In the second chapter, the bodhisattva Dharmodgata questions the Buddha on the ultimate beyond speculation (*sarvatarkasamatikrānta*). In the third chapter, the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati questions the Buddha on the ultimate that is beyond being distinct or indistinct (*bhedābhedasamatikrānta*) from conditioned phenomena. In the fourth chapter, Subhūti questions the Buddha on the ultimate that is of a single nature (*ekarasa*) within all phenomena. In the fifth chapter, the bodhisattva Viśālamati questions the Buddha on the secrets of mind (*citta*), thought (*manas*), and cognition (*vijñāna*). In the sixth chapter, the bodhisattva Guṇākara questions the Buddha on the three defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of phenomena. In the seventh chapter, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata questions the Buddha on the three kinds of essencelessness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) as well as on the Buddha's three turnings of the Dharma wheel. In the eighth chapter, the bodhisattva Maitreya questions the Buddha on the practice of mental stillness (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*). In the ninth chapter, the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara questions the Buddha on the stages of the bodhisattva path and the Single Vehicle (*ekayāna*). In the tenth chapter, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī questions the Buddha on the bodies (*kāya*) and activity of the tathāgatas.

i.5 From a broader perspective, it is possible to consider that the teaching imparted in this sūtra is structured in terms of the basis (*āśraya*), the path (*mārga*), and the result (*phala*). The first four chapters on the five characteristics of the ultimate¹ as defined in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras represent a teaching on the abovementioned basis, namely, true reality (*tathatā*) as it is; chapters 5–9, a teaching on the path in terms of practices and stages to attain awakening; and chapter 10, a teaching on the result through the doctrine of the tathāgatas' bodies and activity to awaken beings. All major Tibetan traditions consider chapter 3, focusing on the relation between the two truths, and chapter 8, focusing on meditative practice, to be authoritative. These are among the scriptures most quoted on their respective topics by Tibetan authors regardless of lineage.

· Main Points of the Subject Matter ·

· · The Basis · ·

- i.6 The first four chapters point out the nature of reality by distinguishing the unconditioned from the conditioned, the pure from the afflicted, the ultimate from the conventional, nondual gnosis from mind's elaborations, inexpressible reality from conventional expressions, and the actual from the imaginary. The first chapter thus starts with the distinction between conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, which became a prevalent theme in the various Abhidharmas. Through this distinction, the point is made that the ultimate is inexpressible and nondual. The realization of this inexpressible ultimate is achieved through gnosis alone. Conceptions in terms of conditioned and unconditioned merely exist in the way of a magical illusion. Yet, in order to lead beings to awakening, buddhas have to use such labels. The second chapter elaborates on this very point. Although the ultimate is beyond speculation, the Buddha taught liberation by means of verbal expressions and conventions belonging to the domain of phenomenal appearances and notions.
- i.7 As a consequence, the first two chapters delineate two domains corresponding to the two truths (*satyadvaya*): (1) the pure domain of the ultimate, which, being inexpressible, nondual, and beyond speculation, is the realm of nonconceptual gnosis free from conventional appearance and notions, and (2) the afflicted domain of dualistic conventional expressions and notions, which is the realm of mental elaborations. These domains are respectively labeled by the buddhas as "the unconditioned" and "the conditioned" only for the sake of instructing beings, for the Buddha explains that this distinction between unconditioned and conditioned is only made on the level of the conditioned, namely, from the perspective of dualistic conventions. Within the realm of these conventional expressions, in the context of the path, it follows that these two domains are apparently mutually exclusive, although the Buddha hints at the fact that, from the perspective of the ultimate, the conditioned is not the conditioned and the unconditioned is not the unconditioned.
- i.8 Chapter 3 explains how the relation between the ultimate and conditioned phenomena seen from this higher perspective should be communicated on the level of conventions. From this standpoint, one cannot say whether the ultimate is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. The Buddha shows that positing these two domains as distinct or indistinct is wrong. Since conditioned phenomena are characterized by the fact of being produced by causes and conditions, it is inappropriate to conceive (a) the conditioned and (b) the emptiness of an inherent nature as either identical or

different. On the one hand, being conditioned (i.e., dependent on something other) is identical with being empty of an intrinsic nature; on the other hand, the domain of the conditioned is defined as the realm of afflictions, while the domain of the unconditioned is understood as the pure realm. Some might therefore think that phenomena and the nature of phenomena are distinct, but the Buddha teaches in the fourth chapter that the empty nature of conditioned phenomena, the ultimate, cannot be said to be distinct from those phenomena. As such, this subtle and profound ultimate is indeed of a single character within phenomena whose defining characteristic appears to be diverse. To realize this nature of phenomena, which is unconditioned selflessness, one should only rely on nondual gnosis, not mind.

· · The Path · ·

i.9 Chapter 5 is a presentation of the “secrets of mind, thought, and cognition.” Here the Buddha introduces the concept of “appropriating cognition” (*ādānavijñāna*), also called “subliminal cognition” (*ālayavijñāna*), “mind” (*citta*), or “mind containing all the seeds” (*sarvabījaṃ cittam*). This mind, in which mental events manifest, acts is like a mirror in which reflections appear. It is the basis of previous mental imprints resulting from volitions and actions that create predispositions (i.e., latent dispositions) to experience reality in conventional terms. However, once bodhisattvas cognize in an intuitive and personal way the ultimate by means of gnosis, they no longer perceive this mind.² In the closing verses of this chapter, the Buddha explains that this mind is without a self, since it is conditioned and composed by seeds. Through these definitions, the Buddha de facto delineates two realms: the domain of dualistic mind and the domain of nondual gnosis.

i.10 Chapter 6 is a teaching on the three defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of phenomena: the imaginary defining characteristic (*parikalpitalakṣaṇa*), the other-dependent defining characteristic (*paratantralakṣaṇa*), and the actual defining characteristic (*pariṇiṣpannalakṣaṇa*): (1) The imaginary defining characteristic is the superimposition onto phenomena of an essence or a defining characteristic existing from its own side, by means of designations or conventional expressions. This imaginary characteristic is utterly false in the way of a visual aberration, since phenomena are ultimately devoid of any defining characteristic that makes them what they are. (2) The other-dependent defining characteristic corresponds to the dependent arising of phenomena. It refers to phenomenal appearances upon which an imaginary defining characteristic is superimposed. This point is grasped once the imaginary defining characteristic of phenomena is understood to be a wrong conception. It is worth noting that the other-dependent defining

characteristic delineates the domain of conditioned cognitions, namely, the mind as presented in chapter 5 (this point is made clear in [7.10](#) with regard to karma and rebirth), and as such, represents the domain of affliction (see [6-11](#)).³ (3) The actual defining characteristic is the permanent and immutable reality of phenomena. It is the ultimate unerring object that is manifest once the selflessness of phenomena, the nonexistence of any fictive defining characteristic in phenomena arising dependently, has been realized. Only the actual defining characteristic constitutes the domain of purification, since the other-dependent defines the domain of affliction, namely, the realm of the conditioned. In the closing verses of this chapter, the Buddha gives a quintessential presentation of the path: one should first recognize that phenomena are devoid of imaginary defining characteristics by seeing them as mere designations superimposed on conditioned cognitions. At that time, one will abandon phenomena characterized by affliction, namely, conditioned phenomena in the form of conditioned cognitions, and turn toward phenomena characterized by purification that are in harmony with ultimate reality.

i.11 Chapter 7 begins with Paramārthasamudgata's question: why did the Buddha first teach the defining characteristic of phenomena, their arising, their cessation, and so forth through the notions of the five aggregates, the twelve sense domains, and so on, when he later explained that all phenomena are without an essence? The Buddha answers by teaching the three kinds of essencelessness, namely, essencelessness regarding defining characteristics, essencelessness regarding arising, and essencelessness regarding the ultimate: (1) Essencelessness regarding defining characteristics refers to the imaginary defining characteristic of phenomena. It is the essencelessness of what is utterly nonexistent (i.e., the defining characteristic), which is like a sky flower. (2) Essencelessness regarding arising refers to the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena arising from causes other than themselves. It is presented as the magic illusion of dependent arising, in the context of this teaching the magic illusion of mind. (3) Essencelessness regarding the ultimate has two aspects. The first is the essencelessness of all conditioned phenomena with regard to the ultimate. As a corollary of dependent arising, those phenomena are in fact not born as anything, being dependent on causes and conditions for their arising and therefore impermanent. The second aspect of essencelessness with regard to the ultimate refers to the only unconditioned object of purification, the actual defining characteristic of phenomena, the ultimate selflessness of phenomena, which is like space, itself also

unconditioned. This permanent and immutable nature of phenomena is the primordial state of peace of that which, being without a defining characteristic, is unborn and unceasing, by nature in the state of nirvāṇa.

i.12 In 7.10, the Buddha describes the entire process leading to confusion: beings reify the other-dependent and the actual defining characteristics in terms of the imaginary defining characteristic. Failing to understand that conventional expressions do not refer to actual things, they superimpose an essence on conditioned cognitions and imagine reality to be just as it is described by their linguistic conventions. Figments of imagination become causes and conditions for their mental activities, which will lead them to the afflictions of action and rebirth. The process described here is akin to a world of virtual reality where even the projector, the conditioned mind, is imaginary. As one takes the projected phenomena as real and reifies them, one acts, suffers, dies, and is endlessly “respawned” within this virtual reality. Although this pseudo-reality projected by mind is nonexistent, it will condition one’s mind and one’s future existence as one will act in accordance with one’s state of mind within this virtual reality. In 7.10, the other-dependent is therefore equated with the appropriating mind, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic of phenomena, the object of dreamlike conceptualizations (see also 7.25).

i.13 Next, the Buddha explains how various beings relate to this process and how he has helped them with teachings corresponding to their circumstances and capacities. For example, some can understand on a dualistic level that defining characteristics (i.e., the virtual reality of phenomena) lack an essence, and thus slowly develop repulsion toward conditioned phenomena, even if they are not able to realize the ultimate nature of phenomena, their nondual primordial selflessness which is the domain of gnosis. In accordance with this model of reality, the Buddha declares that there is only the path and journey toward liberation and thus a Single Vehicle for both hearers and bodhisattvas because there is only a single purification.

i.14 In 7.30, Paramārthasamudgata defines the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma. Because this doctrine is included in this specific chapter, it seems logical to interpret the three turnings of the wheel of Dharma in relation to the three kinds of essencelessness: (1) The first turning used the notion that phenomena have a defining characteristic to teach the essencelessness of these defining characteristics in a series of teachings such as the five aggregates, the twelve sense domains, and so on (see also 4.1–6). In our metaphor on virtual reality, one could see these teachings as being expounded on the basis of the very imaginary phenomena conceptualized as truly existing. When children experience a nightmare, their parents show

that the monster does not exist by implicitly, i.e. provisionally, accepting its existence, saying, “Look! It is not there.” (2) The second turning of the wheel teaches the first aspect of essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, stating that phenomena are unborn. From this perspective, the primordial selflessness of phenomena is still taught in relation to dualistic phenomena. As a consequence, Paramārthasamudgata considers this cycle of teachings as provisional. (3) The third turning of the wheel aims at teaching the second aspect of essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in a way that is not limited to the domain of dualistic phenomena. To pursue our metaphor, this third cycle of teachings gives a complete overview of the three defining characteristics of phenomena: the completely imaginary experience of a virtual reality, the magic illusion of the projecting mind, and the primordial domain of gnosis. Paramārthasamudgata declares the third turning to be of definitive meaning.

i.15 It is worth noting that the doctrine of the three defining characteristics can be seen as delineating three great categories of soteriological approaches found in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist traditions: (1) the deconstruction of putative notions of an individual self through mereological and relational strategies; (2) the deconstruction of notions of a self regarding conditioned phenomena through the impossibility of their ultimate arising, since these conditioned phenomena merely exist in dependence; and (3) the pointing out of the nondual ultimate nature of phenomena, which altogether bypasses imaginary mental constructions.

i.16 In the eighth chapter, the famous Maitreya chapter on meditation, the Buddha first gives a series of definitions followed by the description of a process, a pattern frequently used in this sūtra. First, the objects of the practices of mental stillness (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*) are defined as, respectively, an image without and with conceptualization, while their objects, when both practices are combined, are the point where things end (*vastvanta*) and the accomplishment of the goal (*kṛtyānuṣṭhāna*, i.e., the attainment of the path). Mental stillness consists in directing one’s attention (*manasikāra*) inward toward the mind that is directing attention (see 8.3). It follows a state of inner absorption produced by concentrating on a referential object. The practice of insight consists in analyzing, discerning, and differentiating the various cognitive aspects of the image (*pratibimba*) that is the object of concentration. These two practices are neither different nor identical. They are not different in that they take mind as a referential object, but they are not identical because insight takes a conceptual image as its referential object. The Buddha thus explains in an often-cited passage that this image taken as an object of concentration is not different from mind insofar as cognition is constituted by the mere representation (*vijñaptimātra*)

that is the object of this cognition. The mind and the image, which is its object manifesting as a mental event, appear as different, although they are not. All mental images, whether in the context of practice or not, are mere representations. Once one has realized this, directing one's attention toward true reality is the one-pointedness of mind in which mental stillness and insight are unified. A superior way to practice this path is therefore to focus on that which is universal in all the various specific teachings imparted by the Buddha. This approach, which is based on a practice devoid of mental engagement (*vitarka*) and investigation (*vicāra*), directly focuses on the element that converges toward true reality. The ensuing shift in one's basis of existence (*āśrayaparivṛtti*) mentioned in this sūtra does not here refer to a transformation of the subliminal cognition (*ālayavijñāna*). According to 10.2, this shift, once all corruption has been eliminated, consists in nothing other than the bodhisattva's attainment of the truth body (*dharmakāya*).

i.17

The Buddha then explains how one attends to phenomenal appearances in an increasingly nonconceptual way. He also gives an elucidation of the analytical knowledge of designations (*dharmapratiṣaṃvid*) and their objects (*arthapratiṣaṃvid*) attained through the practice of mental stillness and insight. In this context, a few key definitions are given; for example, the true reality of representations is that all conditioned phenomena are mere representations (see 8.20.2.iii). When presented in four aspects, the analytical knowledge of designations and their objects encapsulate the entire path through the four stages of mental appropriation, experience, affliction, and purification. When asked about the nature of gnosis, the Buddha answers that it "consists in the mental stillness and insight that take a universal teaching as a referential object" while "perception consists in the mental stillness and insight that take a specific teaching as a referential object" (see 8.25). Practically, bodhisattvas direct their attention to true reality, discarding the phenomenal appearances of designations and objects of designation. Without taking any essential characteristic as a referential object, they do not pay attention to phenomenal appearances. Their attention is focused on that which is of a single character within all phenomena. The Buddha then gives a list of all the phenomenal appearances eliminated by emptiness, from the emptiness of all phenomena up to the emptiness of emptiness. By letting go of their object of concentration, the phenomenal appearance corresponding to a mental image, bodhisattvas free themselves from the bonds of conditioned phenomenal appearances (*nimitta*). Connecting these instructions on meditative practice with his teaching on the three defining characteristics, the Buddha explains that he taught the defining characteristic of emptiness in the Great Vehicle as the nonexistence and

nonperception of an imaginary defining characteristic with regard to both affliction and purification in the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics of phenomena.

i.18 Practical instructions are also given to overcome obstacles and distractions to the practice of mental stillness and insight. On the ultimate stage of the path, these practices eliminate extremely subtle obstructions resulting in the complete purification of the truth body. The gnosis and vision utterly free from attachment and hindrance are attained. Finally, the Buddha explains how bodhisattvas obtain their great powers by being skillful in the following six points: (1) the arising of the mind, (2) the underlying condition of the mind, (3) the emergence from the mind, (4) the increase of the mind, (5) the decrease of the mind, and (6) skillful means. In this section of the Maitreya chapter, an overview of the *vijñaptimātra* doctrine is given through the notion of cognition, which includes the appropriating cognition as well as the arising cognitions taking various phenomenal appearances as their object. In this context, it is explained that the supramundane mind of the buddhas does not have any phenomenal appearance as its object.

i.19 In chapter 9, the Buddha is questioned on the stages (*bhūmi*) of a bodhisattva and a buddha, the names of these stages, and their adverse factors and specific arising, as well as on the ten perfections (*pāramitā*). A final instruction is imparted regarding the Single Vehicle. As mentioned in previous chapters, the Buddha explains that he taught the essence of phenomena in the vehicle of hearers in terms of the aggregates, the sense domains, and so on, and that he presented these phenomena in the light of a single principle in the Great Vehicle, the domain of truth (*dharmadhātu*). Those who conceptualize these teachings by taking them literally do not understand his underlying intention, which is that both vehicles are in fact teachings based on a single principle.

.. The Result ..

i.20 In the tenth chapter, Mañjuśrī questions the Buddha on the defining characteristic of the truth body of the tathāgatas. The Buddha explains the truth body in the sense of a result attained through the practice of the stages and perfections. This attainment consists in a shift in one's basis of existence. From the perspective of beings belonging to the domain of mental elaborations and conditioned phenomena, the truth body is therefore inconceivable, being utterly beyond mental elaborations,. Here again the Buddha delineates two distinct realms.

i.21 The tathāgatas, who appear as emanation bodies (*nirmāṇakāya*), are said to be like a manifestation, an apparition. Through their skillful means and sovereign power (*adhiṣṭhāna*), they liberate beings by imparting three kinds of teaching: the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the māṭṛkās (generally taken as more or less equivalent to the Abhidharma and related literature): (1) The sūtras teach what was heard, how to take refuge, the training, and the awakening. (2) The Vinaya teaches the precepts and prātimokṣa vows to hearers and bodhisattvas. (3) The māṭṛkās are systematic teachings on important doctrinal points, such as the defining characteristic of the conventional and the ultimate, the defining characteristic of referential objects consisting of the awakening factors and their features, and so forth. In the section of the māṭṛkā pertaining to the ascertainment of the qualities of cognitive objects, the Buddha goes into a lengthy discussion on logical analysis according to the four principles of reason (*yukti*): (1) the principle of reason based on dependence (*apekṣāyukti*), (2) the principle of reason based on cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇayukti*), (3) the principle of reason based on logical proof (*upapattisādhanayukti*), and (4) the principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena itself (*dharmatāyukti*). The explanation given by the Buddha on the third *yukti* of this list (cf. [10.7.4.vii.c](#)) is very extensive and resembles a short treatise on epistemology in which the notion of means of knowledge or valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is meticulously investigated. In this section, the Buddha explains the characteristics of valid and invalid reasonings. He concludes by stating that three types of valid cognition should be accepted: direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), and authoritative scriptures (*āptāgama*).

i.22 The Buddha next elucidates “the meaning of the *dhāraṇī* through which bodhisattvas comply with the underlying intention of the profound Dharma expounded by the tathāgatas, the complete meaning of the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the māṭṛkās.” This quintessential teaching encapsulating the meaning of the entire Dharma states that beings are in truth beyond activity and beyond being afflicted or purified. It is only because of their reification of illusory phenomena in terms of identity and essence that they conceive their reality in the way they do, which leads them to suffering. Abandoning this “body afflicted by corruption” (*dauṣṭhulyakāya*),⁴ they obtain the truth body that is inconceivable and unconditioned (i.e., the *dharmakāya*). In this context, the Buddha concludes by explaining that the tathāgatas are not characterized by mind, thought, and cognition. Their mind arises without effort in the way of an emanation (*nirmāṇa*). In their case, one cannot say whether their mind exists or not, their domain consisting of pure realms. It follows that the tathāgatas are characterized by nonduality: “They are neither completely and perfectly awakened nor not completely and perfectly

awakened; they neither turn the wheel of Dharma nor do not turn the wheel of Dharma; they neither attain the great parinirvāṇa nor do not attain the great parinirvāṇa. This is because the truth body is utterly pure and the emanation body constantly manifests.” Once the truth body has been purified through the practice focusing on the domain of truth (*dharmadhātu*), “the great light of gnosis manifests in beings, and innumerable emanated reflections arise.” One should keep in mind, though, the teachings imparted in Chapter 3 on the conventional and ultimate truths. From the perspective of the ultimate, nothing has ever been purified by anybody, as the concluding verses of the formula in Chapter 10 make clear:

i.23 “The possessors of qualities resulting from affliction and purification
Are all without movement and without a person;
Therefore, I declare them to be without activity,
As they are neither purified nor afflicted, be it in the past or the future.

i.24 “Relying on views resulting from their latent dispositions,
On account of which they wrongly conceive the body afflicted by
corruption,
They reify [the ego through concepts such as] ‘I’ and ‘mine.’
As a consequence, notions arise, such as ‘I see,’ ‘I eat,’ ‘I do,’ ‘I am
afflicted,’ and ‘I am purified.’

i.25 “Thus, those who understand this fact as it really is
Abandon the body afflicted by corruption and instead
Will obtain a body that is not a support for any defilement,
Being free from mental elaborations and unconditioned.”

· Source Text and Various Versions ·

i.26 The only complete extant versions of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (Samdh.) are Chinese and Tibetan translations produced from Sanskrit manuscripts. All the recensions of the sūtra in Tibetan include a prologue followed by ten chapters. In addition to the various Kangyur editions, the sūtra is also quoted in full in the *Viniścayaśaṅgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The list of the available recensions of the text across Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan include:⁵

1. Sanskrit (including Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit)

- **Buescher 2007: 102–104** (quotations in TrBh, 33.25–34.4 drawn from Samdh. 5.5 and 5.7; see also Lévi 1925: 33–34)
- **Matsuda 1995** (complete reconstruction from manuscript of Samdh. 9.1–6)

- **Matsuda 2013** (fragments of Saṃdh. 2.4 and 3.1, fragments of 8.39–40, complete reconstruction from manuscript of 8.41)
- **Nagao 1964: 43** (gives the list of the seven kinds of *tattva* mentioned in Saṃdh. 8.20.2 and quoted in the *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*)
- Nagao 1982–1987: I.4, I.7.⁶
- **Tucci 1971: 1** (two verses from Saṃdh. 3.7 that are quoted in Kamalaśīla’s *Bhāvanākrama: nimittabandhanāḥ jantur atho dauṣṭhulabandhanāt / vipaśyanāḥ bhāvayitvā śamathāḥ ca vimucyata iti*) and *ibid.*, p. 22 (a sentence drawn from 7.15 also quoted in the *Bhāvanākrama: ekāntasattvārthavimukhasya ekānta-saṃsārābhisaṃskāravimukhasya [nā] uttarā samyaksambodhir uktā mayeti*)

2. Chinese

- 相續解脫地波羅蜜了義經 (Taishō 678) and 相續解脫如來所作隨順處了義經 (Taishō 679) translated by Guṇabhadra (394–468 CE) between 435 and 443 CE (these two texts include respectively chapters 9 and 10)
- 深密解脫經 (Taishō 675) translated by Bodhiruci (fl. 508–535 CE) in 514 (includes a prologue followed by ten chapters as in the Tibetan versions of the text)
- 佛說解節經 (Taishō 677) translated by Paramārtha (498–569 CE) in 557 (mentioned in Wonch’uk’s commentaries on the sūtra; the prologue is different from those translated by Bodhiruci and Xuanzang; only the first four chapters are translated)
- **解深密經 (Taishō 676) translated by Xuanzang (596–664 CE) in 647** (a complete translation of the prologue and the ten chapters)

3. Tibetan

a. Tshalpa group

- K_B116 mdo sde, ca 1b1–71a1 (vol. 57)⁷
- **C747 mdo sde, ca 1b1–71a7 (vol. 29)**
- **D106 mdo sde, ca 1b1–55b7 (vol. 49)**
- **J51 mdo sde, ca 1b1–59b8 (vol. 44)**
- **Kq774 mdo sna tshogs, ngu 1b1–60b7 (vol. 29, p. 1)**
- **R106 mdo sde, ca 1b1–55b7 (vol. 49)**
- **U106 mdo sde, ca 1b1–55b7 (vol. 49)**
- **VD D4038 mdo ’grel (sems tsam), zi 44a–97b**
- **VG GT3542 mdo ’grel (sems tsam), ’i 59b–136a**
- **VP Kq5539 mdo ’grel (sems tsam), ’i 47b–109a**

b. Thempangma group

- **L82 mdo sde, na 1b1–80b1 (vol. 42)**
- **S106 mdo sde, na 1b1–80b1 (vol. 63)**
- **T107 mdo sde, na 1b1–70b1 (vol. 68)**
- **V156 mdo sde, na 1b1–69b6 (vol. 65)**

- Z137 mdo, na 1b1–93a6 (vol. 59)
- c. Mustang group
- X mdo sde, wa 66a–132a
 - He64.6 mdo, wa 62b5–125b8
- d. Bhutan group
- Cz082-001 mdo, na 1b1–82a5
 - Dd031-001 mdo, ca 1b1–69b2
 - Dk034-001 mdo, na 1b1–87b1
 - Gt028-001 mdo, na 1b1–72b3
 - Np012-001 mdo, na 1b1–87a7
 - Pj043-001 mdo, ca 1b1–62b4
 - Pz045-001 mdo ca 1b1–61a5
- e. Mixed/Independent editions
- F156 mdo sde, ba (tsha) 1b1–72a7 (vol. 68)
 - H109 mdo sde, ca 1b1–87b7 (vol. 51)
 - Lg11.8 mdo, da-L74 224b5–276a2
 - N94 mdo sde, ca 1–81a7 (vol. 51)
 - Ng13.07 mdo pa dgongs 111b3–162a8
 - O23 mdo sde, cha
- f. Other canonical collections
- Ablakit collection IOM, RAS Tib.979/117
 - Go19,01 ka 1b–36a6 (vol. 19)
 - Bd3.7 vol. 3 (ta) pha 1b1–84a6
 - Do mdo sde, da 196a–246b
- g. Dunhuang manuscripts
- Saṃdh_{DH}: Stein Tib. n°194 (49 folios); Stein Tib. n°683 (1 folio) (these folios cover ca. 40% of the sūtra; see Hakayama 1984–1987)⁸

i.27 In addition, five commentaries have been composed on the *Saṃdhnirmocana-sūtra*:

- Asaṅga's *Āryasaṃdhnirmocanabhāṣya* (dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i rnam par bshad pa) D3981 mdo 'grel (mdo), ngi 1b–11b
- Wonch'uk's **Āryagambhīrasaṃdhnirmocanasūtraṭīkā* (dgongs pa zab mo nges par 'grel pa'i mdo rgya cher 'grel pa) D4016 mdo 'grel (mdo), ti 1b–di 175a⁹
- Jñānagarbha's *Āryasaṃdhnirmocanasūtre āryamaitreyakevalaparivartabhāṣya* (dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo las 'phags pa byams pa'i le'u nyi tshe bshad pa) D4033 mdo 'grel (sems tsam), bi 318b–345a
- Changchup Dzutriül (*byang chub rdzu 'phrul*)'s **Āryasaṃdhnirmocana-sūtravyākhyāna* (*bstan bcos sna tshogs*), D4358 mdo 'grel, co 1b–jo 183b

- Trisong Detsen (*khri srong lde brtsan*)'s **Samyagvāḱpramāṇoddhṛtasūtra* (*bka' yang dag pa'i tshad ma las mdo btus pa*) D4352 mdo 'grel (bstan bcos sna tshogs), co 173a–205b

· Translation Issues and Academic Research ·

i.28 I applied various methods and followed a series of steps during the process of translating the *Samḁdhinirmocanasūtra* from the Tibetan:

· · 1. Identifying and organizing source texts · ·

i.29 I first collated all the available Tibetan editions of *Samḁdhinirmocana*: Bd, C, D, Dunhuang (Hakayama 1984–87), Do, F, H, L, N, S, Kḱ, U, VD, X, and Z, as well as the various extant Sanskrit fragments found in Buescher (2007), Levi (1925), Matsuda (1995, 2013), Nagao (1964), and Tucci (1971). For the Chinese, we used Xuanzang's translation.¹⁰ I then produced a critical edition of the text prologue (*nidāna*) to get a sense of the textual variations across major available editions of the Tshalpa (*tshal pa*), Thempangma (*them spangs ma*), mixed Kangyurs, and independent Kangyur groups. In addition, Dr. Kojirō Katō (Tokyo University), who is editing the *Samḁdhinirmocanasūtra*, kindly sent me his critical edition of the seventh chapter.¹¹ His work has proved invaluable to confirming the findings of my own work on the prologue. The editions belonging to the Thempangma differ significantly from those included in the Tshalpa line of transmission. As an independent Kangyur close to the Thempangma line, the Phukdrak (*phug brag*) edition offers very interesting readings on the level of syntax and lexicography compared to the editions of the Tshalpa group. It also diverges from the Thempangma witnesses in many locations. In the absence of colophons mentioning the translators' and editors' names across the available editions, it remains difficult to understand the history of these witnesses from the perspective of the underlying translation and editing process. As a consequence of its palatable variant readings compared to the Tshalpa and Thempangma editions, I used the Phukdrak witness quite extensively while translating the Degé edition, as well as the Stok edition and the Degé version of the *Viniścayasamḁgrahaṇī*, to examine more thoroughly difficult passages. The available Sanskrit fragments were on occasion also useful to determine the Sanskrit equivalent of a Tibetan technical term. They, however, did not reveal major variations from the Tibetan texts. I referred to the Dunhuang recension sporadically, as Schmithausen warned us not to follow it blindly.¹² I also referred to Xuanzang's translation regarding a few difficult passages of the text. This translation is similar to those of the Tshalpa group and might

have been carried out on the basis of a Sanskrit manuscript similar to the one (or those) used for the translation upon which the Tibetan Tshalpa editions are based.

· · 2. Evaluating the available translations · ·

i.30 The *Sam̐dhinirmocanasūtra* is a major text of Indian Buddhism that has early on attracted the attention of Buddhist Studies scholars. It has been translated into French, English, and German (partially). Lamotte (1935) provided a critical edition of *Sam̐dhinirmocana* and a translation from Tibetan (N) and Chinese (Taishō 676) into French. He also attempted to reconstruct or identify technical terms in Sanskrit, which have for the most part been confirmed by subsequent finds of Sanskrit fragments.¹³ Lamotte's work is a major resource for the study of *Sam̐dhinirmocana*. It has been until now the standard edition and translation of this text on account of its accuracy and methodological academic approach. As a side note, I followed Lamotte's segmentation of the text into paragraphs. His French translation is generally reliable, although some technical passages can be significantly improved, particularly in the case of chapter 8 on meditation and chapter 10 on the result of the path. Frauwallner (1969) gives a partial translation of *Sam̐dhinirmocana* (i.e., chapters 6 and 7) from Tibetan into German. As one would expect, Frauwallner's academic translation of these two chapters aims at accuracy over readability. Kawasaki 1976 is also a partial translation of chapter 8 into English (§6.1–9). This translation does not improve Lamotte's. Powers' (1995) translation from Tibetan (D) into English, in spite of its merit, could be widely improved upon in terms of methodology, accuracy, and readability.¹⁴ Brunnhölzl 2018 offers a partial translation of chapter 7, as well as a few key passages from chapter 5.

i.31 Translations by Cleary (1999) and Keenan (2000) are from the Chinese (Taishō 676) into English. I used Keenan's work to get a sense of the Chinese text while translating the Degé edition but only referred to Cleary occasionally. Keenan's work seems to me more accurate than Cleary's, although the latter was useful for unraveling difficult passages, since his style is more free and primarily intends to communicate the meaning of the text. Cornu (2005) has provided a translation of the text from Tibetan (D) into French that mainly follows Powers 1995, a somewhat regrettable fact since Lamotte's (1935) is more accurate. Schmithausen's (2014) work contains numerous difficult passages of *Sam̐dhinirmocana* translated from various Tibetan and Chinese editions into English. It is an invaluable resource for

the study of *Sam̐dhnirmocana*. In addition, it offers useful Sanskrit reconstructions of important technical terms. Together with Lamotte's translation, it has been a constant companion while translating the text.

· · 3. Checking intertextual patterns and delineating the scope of primary sources · ·

i.32 The *Sam̐dhnirmocanasūtra* is part of a larger network of texts, both in the Kangyur and the Tengyur:

i.33 1. The nidāna of *Sam̐dhnirmocana* almost exactly matches those of the *Buddhabhūmisūtra* (D275) and the *Tathāgataguṇajñānācintyaṛiṣayāvātāranirdeśasūtra* (D185). The *Buddhabhūmisūtra* is a very short text that was also translated into Chinese by Xuanzang in 646 (see Keenan 1980, p. 336ff.). Textual parallelisms of this kind are useful to double check some passages or gathering more background information about the source text.

i.34 2. As mentioned above, *Sam̐dhnirmocana* is also found *in extenso* in the *Viniścayasam̐grahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and is therefore part of a tradition of texts sharing common ideas.¹⁵ This point should be kept in mind while translating, particularly when one has to evaluate the potential impact of terminological choices from the perspective of a more philosophical approach to the text, which, in the case of *Sam̐dhnirmocana*, should be a major concern. For example, one should pay attention to the fact that interpreting “representation-only” (*vijñaptimātra*) as a strong form of idealism essentializing mind could be misleading from the perspective of a cultural translation of the worldview propounded in *Sam̐dhnirmocana* since mind, just as much as the external object, is explicitly declared to be empty of any own-being, essence, or intrinsic nature (see chapter 8 on the three kinds of *niḥsvabhāvatā*) in this text.¹⁶

i.35 3. Another important point is the presence of the aforementioned five commentaries on *Sam̐dhnirmocana* found in the Tengyur (D).¹⁷ I occasionally referred to these works while finalizing the final draft of the translation. However, I first focused on the available editions of *Sam̐dhnirmocana* itself as I did not want to be influenced by the interpretations of later authors. Instead, I attempted to go through all possible logically meaningful readings according to the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources without any preconceptions resulting from my reading of later commentarial traditions.

i.36 4. In the same vein, one should note that *Sam̐dhnirmocana* has played a major role in Tibetan hermeneutical debates. For centuries, it has been considered a central scripture referred to extensively in the writings of Tibet's great luminaries, such as Jé Tsongkhapa (*rje tsong kha pa*, 1357–1419) or Jamgön

Mipham Gyatso (*'jam mgon mi pham rgya mtsho*, 1846–1912). While it would certainly be fascinating to study the impact of *Samḍhinirmocana* in the context of Tibetan Madhyamaka,¹⁸ I chose not to take into account Indian or Tibetan commentaries or exegeses of the sūtra in order to focus on the source text itself.

· · 4. Collating academic research · ·

i.37 I proceeded to search all articles and monographs referring to *Samḍhinirmocana* I could find at the very beginning of this translation project. In this quest for relevant academic research, I benefited from the excellent bibliography found in Delhey 2013 regarding research done on the *Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, which I expanded with a list of complementary reference works (see the bibliography). Among the existing academic literature on *Samḍhinirmocana*, Schmithausen 2014 stands out and, unsurprisingly, proved to be a major resource for this translation project.

· · 5. Organizing academic resources according to the text structure and specific translation issues · ·

i.38 1. The translation of the title of the text became the object of several discussions among scholars regarding the meaning of the Sanskrit words *saṃdhi* and *nirmocana* as a consequence of Lamotte's first complete translation of the text.¹⁹ Among the various available options, I opted for simplicity and translated the Sanskrit *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra* with "The Sūtra Unraveling the Intent," which I believe renders accurately the meaning and structure of the text. Various interlocutors indeed ask the Buddha repeatedly to explain difficult points in order to clarify the purpose of his seemingly contradictory or complex doctrines on the nature of reality.

i.39 2. Regarding the content of the sūtra itself, I proceeded to organize secondary sources by chapter and referenced this research in the notes accompanying my translation.²⁰ The last chapter of *Samḍhinirmocana* includes a very technical passage on valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) whose definitions predate Dignāga's system of logic. Translating Trisong Detsen's **Samyagvāk-pramāṇoddhṛtasūtra*, which is a commentary on the teaching on the four principles of reason (*rigs pa bzhi*), would help us better understand pre-Dignāgean Buddhist logic.²¹

· · · Translating the text · · ·

- i.40 In this stage of the overall process, I followed Jean-François Billeter's pragmatic approach to the translation of classical Chinese texts. This approach consists in five operations:²²
- i.41 1. The first stage of the translation process is purely analytical. A passage is translated on the basis of lexicographical resources (e.g., dictionaries) and syntactic rules (e.g., grammars). During this operation, it is important to distinguish what is understood and what still remains problematic. All options should be kept open. Interpretations or eisegetical readings should be rejected. From a practical perspective, I systematically used the *Mahāvīyūtpatti* to find the Sanskrit terms behind general Tibetan expressions. For technical terms, I relied on Schmithausen (2014) and the academic research mentioned above.
- i.42 Our Tibetan text is itself a translation. This somewhat complicates our task since we have to decipher the Sanskrit behind the Tibetan in order to make sense of some difficult sentences or passages. However, this approach is necessary on a lexicographical and syntactic level as can be seen in the following examples: One should read the Tibetan *brtsams pa* as *ārabhya*, a Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit expression that has the meaning of "referring to/having to do with" and not "beginning with."²³ Likewise, *rab tu phyed ba* stands for *prabhāvita*, which in the *Samādhinirmocana* means "consisting in/characterized as/characterized by" and not "distinguished."²⁴ The problem is even more acute in the case of Sanskrit compounds that have been translated into Tibetan according to the way they were formulated in Sanskrit. As an illustration of this, compounds ending with *lakṣaṇa* (Tib. *mtshan nyid*) often make more sense in *Samādhinirmocana* as *bahuvrīhis* than *karmadhārayas* or *tatpuruṣas*, not to mention *dvandvas*. Lamotte thus reads *rtog ge kun las 'das mtshan nyid (sarvataṛkasamatikrāntalakṣaṇa)* as a *bahuvrīhi*,²⁵ which I believe is appropriate in the context of the passage in question.
- i.43 2. Once a "technically correct" translation of the source text has been produced, Billeter advises us to bring together the various elements of a sentence or a passage until we obtain a clear picture of what is said in the source text. This step therefore consists in understanding the meaning of the translated passage by literally *seeing* (or visualizing) its meaning. In a way, the first operation is about *das Erklären* ("explanation"), while the second concerns *das Verstehen* ("understanding"). In this sense, the latter uses the resources of one's imagination and metalinguistic knowledge to establish connections with a web of meaning that is not restricted to the translated sentence or passage alone.

i.44 The second operation is therefore a synthesis, a recognition of relations between meaning units of various orders (one would think here of the idea conveyed by *saṃjñā* and similar terms in which the *upasarga sam-* plays a central role), whereas the first phase is analytical (in the sense of *vicāra*, *vicāraṇa*, and *vijñāna*, in which the *upasarga vi-* expresses the notion of taking apart). In fact, translators translate into the target language their comprehension of the source text. They actually never translate the text itself but their understanding or representation of ideas, situations, and emotions conveyed by a text. To illustrate this point, one could mention the problem, encountered by scholars, of translating terms related to meditative practice. The Maitreya chapter of *Samdhinirmocana* is probably the most difficult to understand if one is not familiar with Buddhist practice. Lamotte translates *manasikāra* with “réflexion,” while Frauwallner uses “Beobachtung” (lit. “observation”). Both these translation choices obfuscate the meaning of what the term “directing one’s attention” actually denotes. This is not in itself a major issue, but if such inaccuracies proliferate in the same passage or chapter, the meaning of the translation becomes unclear, although it may well be technically correct on a syntactic level and lexicographical perspective (at least when it comes to correctly identifying Tibetan technical terms on the basis of the Sanskrit).

i.45 In the context of pre-Dignāgean Buddhist logic, chapter 10 represents another case in point. This chapter is indeed replete with abstruse concepts not belonging to the well-researched and documented later systems of Buddhist logic. In this case, translating the many occurrences of the connective particle *kyi* in long compounds with the English preposition “of” will not help the reader much, though it will certainly give the translators the peace of mind of having produced a “technically correct” translation. However, I believe that translators have only two options here: (a) take a risk and, for example, tell us if they actually understand the connective *kyi* in the sense of “belonging to,” “resulting from,” “consisting of,” and so on; or (b) admit that they do not understand the source text. In the case of the technical compounds found in chapter 10, I therefore tried to ask myself what these terms actually referred to, what could have been the system of logic presented in these pages. For example, I read *gzhan gyi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba’i mtshan nyid (anyajātīyadr̥ṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa)*²⁶ as rendering into Tibetan a Sanskrit bahuvrīhi. As a consequence, I translated this long compound with “[The logical proof] characterized by a demonstration through an instance belonging to a different class [of phenomena]”

i.46 It goes without saying that these translations are at this stage provisional, as further research on the subject matter is necessary. But in order to translate these technical terms, we cannot just give a technically correct

translation of a succession of words. Beyond the first phase of the work, which is purely analytical, we still need to develop a mental representation of the situation presented in the text by establishing relations with a context that might go beyond the text.

i.47 3. In the third operation, Billeter insists on the necessity for translators to become writers. They should formulate in the target language their understanding of the source text as accurately and naturally as possible. At this stage, translators should focus on literary elements of the translation, such as idioms, voice, and figures of speech. According to Billeter, difficulties in writing accurately and naturally in the target language are often the direct consequence of not having performed the second operation. The translation might well be technically correct, but it still does not make sense, an experience all translators go through when they fail to understand the meaning (or visualize the situation) referred to by the source text.

i.48 4. In the fourth operation, translators should reflect on the role played by linguistic constraints and conventions in the formulation of the source text as well as those imposed by the target language. What options did the author of the text have in terms of expression? How would someone express the same ideas in the target language? As a consequence, the notion of form and pragmatics in the target language becomes central. To detail the various operations leading to an actual translation, Vinay and Darbelnet's model is useful.²⁷ Translators should first identify the units of translation in relation to the translation process: the lexicon (e.g., semantic values, objective and affective aspects, lexical associations and modulations), the syntactic structure (e.g., transpositions between word classes, supplementation of pronouns or conjunctions, modifications in terms of gender, number, characterization, tenses, voice, modality, and verbal aspects), and the message (e.g., meaning, stylistics, pragmatics, topicalization, figures of speech, metalinguistic aspects, specific segmentation of reality). Then, they should examine the descriptive, affective, and intellectual content of the units of translation in the source text to reconstitute the situation at the origin of the message. These two first steps correspond to Billeter's two first operations. Finally, translators still have to formulate the message in the target language without omitting any relevant element from the source language.

i.49 To achieve this, Vinay and Darbelnet argue that translators have only two methods: direct and oblique translation. Direct translation includes three strategies:

- a. Borrowing: the term in the source language is used in the target language to overcome an insuperable metalinguistic lacuna, or it is used because the term is also commonly used in the target language. For instance, I use the Sanskrit *bodhisattva* and *nirvāṇa* in my English translation.
- b. Calque: I translated *bodhicitta* with “awakening mind,” which is both a lexical and structural calque.
- c. Literal translation: most lists and simple sentences are for instance relatively unproblematic direct translations of the source language.

i.50 When a Literal translation fails to render the message, is structurally impossible, or misleads the reader due to the lack of a corresponding expression belonging to the same register, one should turn to an oblique translation method among the following strategies:

- d. Transposition: one replaces a word class by another. For example, the frequent nominalizations of Sanskrit and Tibetan are turned into verb clauses. The highly technical nature of some terms makes it necessary to reflect the Sanskrit as much as possible while “unpacking” what is a condensed compound. As an illustration, I translated *tadanyavairūpyopalabdhi* with “a perception that does not conform with anything other than the [thing to establish],” in which *vairūpya* is translated as a verb.

Our text is mostly written in the same way as a treatise (*śāstra*), reflecting what is referred to as the nominal style in Sanskrit, or scholastic Sanskrit, in which the nominalization of verbal clauses by means of compounds or suffixes is common. As is often the case in technical or hyperspecialized environments, processes or conceptual frameworks are encapsulated as technical terms (often nouns) implying a complex or recurring pattern. As an analogy, think of a medical term such as hemiglossectomy standing for a removal of a part of the tongue. The passive impersonal phrase “a hemiglossectomy was performed on the patient at 11 pm” includes the nominalization of an action through a compound (hemiglossectomy). It could be rewritten as “[the surgeon] removed a portion of the patient’s tongue at 11 pm.” As can be seen from the translations of Lamotte and Frauwallner, nominalization seems to be less of a problem in French and German than it is in modern (American) English in which readability is more of a concern. When translating the *Samādhinirmocana*, I therefore tried to turn nominal compounds common in scholastic Sanskrit into English verbal sentences by transposing these compounds into verbal sentences. However, since the text is very technical (particularly from Chapter 7 onward), I decided in some cases to keep nominal compounds that were

indicative of a technical term and not just a nontechnical action or state of affairs. For example, the text mentions throughout a “concept” being referred to a “X” (see for instance [7.3–6](#)). Just like the surgical term above, such complex nominal compounds stand for a specific action or concept and are part of a “specialist’s jargon.” Turning these compounds into verbal sentences might have the counterproductive effect of erasing an essential feature of this kind of literature consisting in endless lists of often technical terms. Therefore, in this particular case, it would probably be best to avoid transposition.

- e. Modulation: this strategy implies a change of perspective or standpoint made in order to avoid an awkward rendering of the source language. In its simplest form, translating *sla ba ma yin* (D, folio 25.b, [7.32](#)) with “it is difficult” is an illustration of an optional modulation. Any change of syntactic subject for the sake of clarifying a sentence would be a modulation. Whether this decision is appropriate or not on the part of the translator is something that one should evaluate on a case-by-case basis.

I would like to illustrate this point with issues related to the *nidāna* of the *sūtra*, in which topicalization plays an important role. The first paragraph of the prologue is a presentation of the place where the Buddha is dwelling. The topicalization of the temple (*khang*) is achieved through a succession of compounds, mainly *bahuvrīhis*. Lamotte’s translation reflects this thematization to perfection. In contrast, Powers fails to topicalize the palace to the same degree. In his translation, the logical subject of the several clauses describing this palace is sometimes ambiguous. In this case, one should consider the fact that the Sanskrit structure of this paragraph is built on a process of topicalization that we can easily render in English. In a word, we have no reason to alter this literary device by inducing a modulation of the translation through a change of perspective induced, for example, by a modification of the grammatical or logical subject in the target language.

- f. Equivalence: the same situation can be expressed both in the source language and the target language in completely different stylistic and structural ways due to the necessity to resort to idioms in order to convey the message of the source text. For example, I translated *evam etat (de de bzhin te/no)* literally with “so it is” in English, which is a slightly pompous and old-fashioned expression no one would probably use today. Instead, one would probably say in an actual dialogue something like “You are right, Dharmodgata” or “This is true, Dharmodgata.”²⁸

- g. Adaptation: this method aims at replacing altogether a reference to a situation in the source language if it is completely unknown in the target language. I generally try to avoid adaptations while translating, for the

simple reason that one has to be certain that, for instance, two different metaphors or examples refer to the same situation or object.

To conclude on this point, it seems to me that a number of fixed or technical expressions in the Kangyur could be translated in a systematic way following Vinay and Darbelnet's approach. This research would establish a set of solid conventions that would improve accuracy and readability.

i.51 Returning to Billeter's schema, in his fourth operation the translator should verify that what has been translated into the target language corresponds to the meaning of the source text. Do the two texts express the same idea? Do they produce the same effect on the reader? To answer these questions, Billeter recommends reading one's text aloud. During this operation, translators should also check whether the translation fits within a specific cultural register in the target language. Discourses take place within a corpus of existing literature that is culturally determined by centuries of textual production. Some statements from a different cultural background resonate through a web of meaning, discursive practices, or literary figures of speech once expressed in the target language. In fact, the web of meaning of the target language within which the translation is received finds its parallel in the web of meaning within which the source text was produced. Within the source text and culture, concepts, ideas, and references resonate throughout sentences, paragraphs, chapters, works, and genres. For example, some philosophical definitions can represent intratextual and extratextual variations on a theme for which there is no metalinguistic context in the target language. Translators therefore need to understand the text not only as a whole and in relation to its various components, but also in connection with both the source and the target cultures. This is of course particularly true of more "philosophical" texts for which it is essential to evaluate how the translation interacts with the webs of meaning of the source and target cultures. Practically, it is important to cross check the consistency (or lack thereof) of meaning units across the text while keeping in mind that the translation is also obviously culturally situated. This process is fundamental because it facilitates the validation (or invalidation) of translation hypotheses resulting from the two first steps of the translation process.

i.52 In the context of *Samdhinirmocana*, the problem is compounded by the fact that the sūtra can be read as a collection of independent texts that would have been put together during the third or fourth century CE. The academic community considers the sūtra as a highly composite compilation lacking coherence from a philological perspective.²⁹ Lamotte explains that the first four chapters represent a *Prajñāpāramitā* for the reasons mentioned above. He

sees chapters 5 through 7 as forming a second group of ideas found in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature that influenced the Yogācāra school. Finally, he considers chapters 8 through 10 to be later additions.

i.53

It is undeniable that the various recensions in Tibetan and Chinese refer to texts that are quite different in structure. For instance, Paramārtha's translation includes only the first four chapters, which, according to Lamotte, might have originally formed an independent sūtra. In addition, it is obvious that the ten chapters of *Samdhinirmocana* do not follow a consistent textual pattern. The first six have no title. They are concluded by a few summarizing *gāthās* and a standard formula indicating the name of the person who questioned the Buddha and the number of the chapter (e.g., "This was the chapter of Guṇākara—the sixth chapter"). Chapter 7 has a whole summary of the chapter in the form of a supplement right after the concluding *gāthās*, while in chapter 10 the Buddha is questioned on complementary topics once the concluded *gāthās* have been proclaimed. Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10 each come to an end with a *nītārthanirdeśa* (instruction of definitive meaning) on the chapter topic. This *nītārthanirdeśa* is referred to as a *Samdhinirmocana* and used as the chapter title. On account of this, Lamotte surmises that there might have originally been several independent *Samdhinirmocanasūtras* that came to be grouped together as the text we know today.

i.54

One should also note that the dialogue structure of chapters 1 through 7 differs from that of chapters 8 through 10. In the first group, the Buddha elaborates on a topic in the form of a monologue once his interlocutor has questioned him on a specific topic, whereas in the second group a dialogue takes place through short questions and answers. As a consequence of all these philological divergences, one has to conclude that the text is rather composite in nature and probably the result of a succession of additions and adjustments. In a word, I agree with Schmithausen that *Samdhinirmocana* is not an organic whole that would have been composed from the onset in its present form and that its chapters are not mutually dependent.³⁰ However, this hypothesis should ideally be the object of further research by a team following an approach similar to that of Professor Jonathan Silk's European Research Council project "Open Philology — The Composition of Buddhist Scriptures" at the University of Leiden, to which I have had the good fortune to take part. The multiformity and intertextuality of Mahāyāna sūtras are not the result of a linear development from an Ur-text but the expression of oral-formulaic processes of composition and transmission. For our research program focusing on the *Ratnakūṭa* collection of sūtras, we have been developing digital and philological tools to identify, analyze, and map the fluidity and modularity of Mahāyāna texts. By using these tools, we could

better understand the historical development of the complex textual environment of the *Samḍhinirmocana*, which includes several translations and many witnesses of this work.

i.55

From the perspective of the narrative and doctrinal content of the Tibetan translation, a somewhat different picture emerges. Even if each chapter does not depend on all others in terms of meaning, there is definitely a progression with regard to the flow of thought in *Samḍhinirmocana* insofar as later chapters do depend on the definitions and lines of thinking posited in the former chapters, a central fact for translators of this complex text. We can perceive this continuity in the intratextual cross-references that create a terminological resonance echoing throughout the text. Unraveling these cross-references is as important during the translation process as noting the textual variations indicating a deviation from a specific literary pattern. While translating I thus tried to evaluate the text in terms of regularities and discontinuities in the use of definitions and the flow of meaning unfolding throughout the text. One should therefore temper the impression that the text has been “patched” together on the basis of loosely related texts on the basis of philological arguments whose significance is difficult to assess. For example, the fact that chapter 1 is the only chapter in which a dialogue occurs between two bodhisattvas has never been mentioned by any researcher as a textual inconsistency preventing them from considering the first four chapters as a coherent whole. Minor divergences should therefore not deter us from asking ourselves why these chapters were taught or put together in the first place. I would like to illustrate with a few concrete examples the doctrinal coherence of the text. The term *ādānavijñāna* in 5.3 is also found in 8.37.1.i; the model of the three kinds of essencelessness (*niḥsva-bhāvata*) of chapter 7 corresponds to the model of the three defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of chapter 6, of which two are foreshadowed in 1.2 through the terms *parikalpa* (*kun tu rtog pa*) and **apariniṣpanna* (*yongs su ma grub pa*); the other-dependent defining characteristic (*paratantralakṣaṇa*) introduced in chapter 6 is mentioned in 7.10; chapter 8 presupposes chapters 5 and 6;³¹ the concluding paragraphs of 7.33 and 8.41 are almost identical; as noted by Schmithausen, *saṃskāranimitta* is referred to in similar ways in both 1.5 and 7.25–27;³² **viśuddhyāmbana* is mentioned with the same function in 4.8, 7.6, 7.25–27, and 8.20; 10.7.2 refers to the seven aspects of true reality (*tathatā*) defined in 8.20.2; 8.21 and 10.7.4.ii contain the same formulation; the famous quote “Whether tathāgatas . . .” is found in 4.10, 7.9, and 10.7.4.vii.d; 10.9 mentions the enumeration *citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* exactly in the way it is expressed in 5.1–6; 10.9 enumerates the domains as in 8.23.

- i.56 On account of the elements adduced above and with Davidson's principle of charity in mind, I would like to formulate the hypothesis that there is a good reason why these chapters are found in this order: the structure of the text as we know it today is necessary to provide Mahāyāna practitioners with a systematic teaching on (1) ultimate reality qua basis, which is the nondual inexpressible domain of gnosis (chapters 1 through 4), (2) the path to awakening from the domain of mind to the domain of gnosis (chapters 5 through 9), and (3) ultimate reality qua result of the path, which represents a shift in one's basis of existence as one attains the domain of gnosis (chapter 10).
- i.57 Indeed, it seems impossible to deny that, considered as a single text (and not as a succession of independent texts), the *Samdhanirmocana* aims at providing a systematic teaching on the Single Vehicle through the three aspects of basis, path, and result in order to solve seeming contradictions and quandaries in doctrines that were of primary importance for followers of the Great Vehicle (e.g., the two truths in chapter 3 and meditative practice in chapter 8). Now, if we read the *Samdhanirmocana* as a single text, we have to confront the web of meaning found in this text in its entirety with the web of meaning of the target culture in order to avoid potential misunderstandings.
- i.58 This operation has a major impact on the translation of some key terms, such as *vijñaptimātra*. Since idealism (in the sense that mind is an unchanging essence) is not an option given the teaching imparted in this sūtra, I tried to avoid any potential confusion resulting from an unfortunate choice of terminology. In a word, I would rather stay on the safe side than insert in my translation a potentially misleading term. As a consequence, I decided to translate *vijñaptimātra* as "a mere representation" instead of using nominalizations such as "cognition-only." The first expression is relatively unambiguous in the target culture as it minimizes the risk of misunderstanding the message of the text. Another option would be "just a representation." These formulations mitigate the risk of superimposing an essence on what is meant by *vijñapti*.³³ The formulation "cognition-only" in the sense of "pure cognition" is in contrast ambivalent. It could also (but not necessarily) signify that only cognition truly exists and by extension, that only mind exists as an essence.
- i.59 In the last step of the translation process, Billeter recommends that translators perform various operations aiming at polishing the translation, such as replicating the possible effects of semantic resonance throughout the text, improving the connection between sentences and paragraphs, modifying the order of clauses, solving problems of euphony, or editing the translation to make it clearer and simpler by chunking long sentences or eliminating repetitions. To illustrate one of these various tasks in the context

of the present project, I decided to review all the terminology pertaining to the semantic field of insight (*vipaśyanā*) after I had finished translating the entire text. I took as a starting point [8.4](#), in which *vipaśyanā* is defined by means of a series of technical terms, such as *pratyavekṣaṇa*, *vibhājanā*, *pravicaya*, *paritarka*, *parimīmāṃsā*, *nitīraṇa*, and *vitarka*. I first tried to find the best translation for each term in the context of this chapter. Next, I checked the usage of all these terms and other related concepts (e.g., *pratisaṃkhyā*) throughout the text to standardize the corresponding English terminology. I also tried to minimize the use of square brackets indicating additions to the text when these additions were logically implied by the source text. A typology of such situations would include various operations, such as breaking down a compound, clarifying an abbreviated form corresponding to a well-attested collocation, stating a logical subject, object, or verb that is elided in the source text, mentioning the number of a technical term that usually comes as a list of individual items.

i.60 Through all these operations, my aim has been to maximize both accuracy and readability while maintaining the consistency of the very systematic presentation of the Great Vehicle developed in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. This text is important in this spiritual tradition since it condenses all aspects of Mahāyāna. I hope that this translation will contribute to improve our understanding of the interplay between liberation as a path and primordial freedom as the ground of being.

The Translation

The Noble Great Vehicle Sūtra

Unraveling the Intent

p.

Prologue

[F.1.b]

Homage to all buddhas and bodhisattvas!

p.1

Thus have I heard at one time. The Blessed One was dwelling in an unfathomable palace, built with the blazing seven precious substances,³⁴ that emitted³⁵ great light rays suffusing countless universes.³⁶ Each of its rooms was well arranged and its design was infinite. It was the indivisible maṇḍala, the domain transcending the three worlds. Arising from the supreme roots of virtue of the one who transcends the world,³⁷ it was characterized by the perfectly pure cognition of the one who has achieved complete mastery.³⁸ Abode of the Tathāgata where the assembly of innumerable bodhisattvas gathered, it was attended by countless gods, nāgas, [F.2.a] yakṣas, gandharvas, demigods, garuḍas, kinnaras, mahoragas, humans, and nonhumans. Supported by the great joy and bliss of savoring the Dharma and designed to accomplish the complete welfare of all beings, it was free of any harm caused by the stains of afflictions and clear of any demon. Surpassing all manifestations, this unfathomable palace was displayed by the sovereign power of the Tathāgata. Mindfulness, intelligence, and realization were its pathway;³⁹ mental stillness and insight were the vehicle leading to it; the great gates of liberation—emptiness, appearancelessness, and wishlessness—were its entrance. It was set on foundations adorned with an infinite accumulation of excellent qualities, which were like great kings of jeweled lotuses.⁴⁰

p.2

The Blessed One had a perfectly realized mind and was free from dualistic behavior. Absorbed in the Dharma of the nonexistence of defining characteristics, he was residing in the domain of the buddhas. He had attained equality with all buddhas. His realization was unobstructed and his qualities⁴¹ were irreversible. He could not be overcome by objects of experience.⁴² His abode was inconceivable.⁴³ Perfectly skilled in the

sameness of the three times,⁴⁴ his five bodies were present in all worlds. His knowledge of all phenomena was free from doubt. He understood all practices. His knowledge of phenomena was without uncertainty. [F.2.b] His body was unimaginable. He possessed the gnosis bodhisattvas vow to accomplish.⁴⁵ He had attained the nondual abode of the buddhas, the sublime perfection, the supreme indivisible gnosis of the Tathāgata's liberation.⁴⁶ He had realized the sameness [of all phenomena], the state of a buddha in which there is neither a center nor a periphery,⁴⁷ and reached the ultimate within the domain of truth, the point where the sphere of space ends.⁴⁸

p.3 The Blessed One was accompanied by the entire immeasurable assembly of hearers. Children of noble family, they were the heirs of the Buddha. Their minds were liberated, their wisdom was emancipated, and their discipline was completely pure. They happily gathered with those who longed for the Dharma. They had heard much, kept in mind what they had heard, and accumulated [merit from] what they had heard. They excelled in thought, speech, and deeds. Their wisdom was swift, quick, sharp, emancipating,⁴⁹ discerning,⁵⁰ vast, extensive, profound, and unequaled. They possessed the jewel of wisdom and the three forms of knowledge. They had attained the supreme state of happiness in this life. The purity of their merit,⁵¹ the excellence of their peaceful conduct, their patience, and their gentleness were vast.⁵² They were fully engaged in the teaching of the Tathāgata.

p.4 The Blessed One was also accompanied by all the innumerable bodhisattvas assembled from various buddha realms. Firmly settled and engaged in a vast state, they had gone forth through the Dharma of the Great Vehicle. Impartial toward all beings, they were free from all conceptions, conceptualizations, and fabrications. Victorious over all demons and opposition, they were not involved with the considerations of the hearers and solitary realizers. [F.3.a] Steadfast through the great joy and happiness of savoring the Dharma, they were free from the five great fears. Solely progressing toward the stages from which there is no regression, they had perfectly actualized the stage in which one pacifies the torment of beings. Among them were thus the bodhisattva mahāsattvas Gambhīrārthasamḍhinirmocana, Vidhivatparipṛcchaka, Dharmodgata, Suviśuddhamati, Viśālamati, Guṇākara, Paramārthasamudgata, Āryāvalokiteśvara, Maitreya, and Mañjuśrī.

1.

CHAPTER 1

1.1

At that time, the bodhisattva Vidhivatparipṛcchaka questioned the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasamḍhinirmocana on the ultimate whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and nondual.⁵³ “O son of the Victorious One, when it is said that all phenomena are nondual, what are these phenomena? In what way are they nondual?”

Gambhīrārthasamḍhinirmocana replied, “Noble son, all phenomena, what we refer to as *all phenomena*, are of just two kinds: conditioned and unconditioned. With respect to these, the conditioned is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The unconditioned is neither unconditioned nor conditioned.”

1.2

Vidhivatparipṛcchaka inquired, “O son of the Victorious One, why is the conditioned neither conditioned nor unconditioned and the unconditioned neither unconditioned nor conditioned?”

Gambhīrārthasamḍhinirmocana answered, “Noble son, the term *conditioned* is a word, a label used by the Teacher. Words that are labels used by the Teacher are conventional expressions arising from imagination. These conventional expressions arising from imagination are always unreal⁵⁴ conventional expressions arising from imagination in its diversity. Therefore, the term *conditioned* is not the conditioned. [F.3.b] Noble son, the term *unconditioned* is also included within conventions, just as expressions other than *conditioned* and *unconditioned* are and will [always] be. One might object that there is, however, no expression in the absence of the object [to which it refers]. What is then this object? It is the complete and perfect awakening to inexpressible [reality] through the sublime gnosis and vision⁵⁵ of the noble ones.⁵⁶ But in order⁵⁷ to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, the Teacher labels this object with the term *conditioned*.

1.3 “Noble son, the term *unconditioned* is also a word, a label used by the Teacher. Words that are labels used by the Teacher are conventional expressions arising from imagination.⁵⁸ These conventional expressions arising from imagination are always conventional expressions deprived of any actuality that arise from imagination in its diversity. Therefore, the term *unconditioned* is not the unconditioned. Noble son, the term *conditioned* is also included within conventions, just as expressions other than *conditioned* and *unconditioned* are and will [always] be. One might object that there is, however, no expression in the absence of the object [to which it refers]. What is then this object? It is the complete and perfect awakening to inexpressible [reality] through the sublime gnosis and vision of the noble ones. But in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, the Teacher labels this object with the term *unconditioned*.”

1.4 Vidhivatparipṛcchaka asked, “O son of the Victorious One, as the noble ones completely and perfectly awaken to inexpressible [reality] through their sublime gnosis and perception, why do they [F.4.a] label this object with the terms *conditioned* and *unconditioned* in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena?”

Gambhīrārthasaṃdhanirmocana replied, “Noble son, it is like the following example: A magician or his skillful apprentice, finding himself at the juncture of four great roads, assembles grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones and produces all kinds of magic illusions, such as regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as an abundance of wealth and grain in treasuries and granaries. At that time, in the presence of these illusions, those who are naive, slow-witted, or confused, not perceiving the grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones, see and hear those magical tricks and think that whatever appears exists—that these regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, exist. Clinging to these magical illusions according to the way they see and hear things and strongly believing in them, they express themselves through conventions, such as ‘This one is true but the other is false.’ They still need to examine these illusions.

“Those who are not naive or confused but have wisdom perceive the grass, leaves, twigs, pebbles, or stones. They see and hear those magical tricks and understand that whatever appears does not exist—that these regiments of elephants, horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, do not exist. [F.4.b] Yet, they understand

that the conception of an elephant regiment exists since its manifestation as a conception through an expedient⁵⁹ exists, as do the manifestations as conceptions of regiments of horses, chariots, and soldiers or collections of jewels, pearls, beryl, seashells, crystal, and coral, as well as this abundance of wealth and grain, treasuries and granaries, together with other similar manifestations. So they understand that all those magical illusions, these magic illusions deceiving the eye, exist [in the way magical illusions do].⁶⁰ Thinking in this way, [these wise beings] do not express themselves through conventions, such as 'This one is true but the other is false,' on account of clinging to these magical illusions in the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them.⁶¹ However, they do express themselves through conventions in order to convey the true nature⁶² [of these illusions to others], although they do not need to further examine these illusions.⁶³

1.5 Likewise, some childish or ordinary beings have not attained the transcendent sublime wisdom. They have not understood that the nature of all phenomena is inexpressible. When those beings perceive conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, they believe that whatever appears as a conditioned or unconditioned phenomenon exists, and they express themselves through conventions, such as 'This one is true but the other is false,' on account of clinging to these appearances according to the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. They still need to examine these appearances.

"With regard to this, some beings who are not childish and have seen the truth have attained the transcendent sublime wisdom. They have understood that the nature of all phenomena is inexpressible. When they perceive conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, they believe that whatever appears as a conditioned or unconditioned phenomenon does not exist. However, with respect to these appearances, they think that the conceptions in terms of conditioned and unconditioned, [F.5.a] the manifestation of conceptions through an expedient in terms of conditioned and unconditioned, the occurrence of conceptualization, and the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena exist in the way magical illusions do. That which deludes the mind exists [in the way magical illusions do].⁶⁴ Thinking in that way, they do not express themselves through conventions, such as 'This one is true but the other is false,' on account of clinging to these appearances according to the way they see and hear things and thus strongly believing in them. However, they do express themselves through conventions in order to convey the true nature [of these appearances to others], although they do not need to further examine these appearances.

“Noble son, the noble ones are thus completely and perfectly awakened to inexpressible [reality] through their sublime gnosis and vision of this object, but in order to lead [others] to the perfect realization of this very inexpressible nature of phenomena, they label this object with the terms *conditioned* and *unconditioned*.”

1.6 At that time, the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana recited these verses:

“The profound, which is inaccessible to foolish beings,
Inexpressible and nondual, has been taught by the Victorious One.
Yet, fools deluded by ignorance
Take delight in mental elaborations and dwell on duality.

“Deprived of understanding, afflicted by misunderstanding,
They will be reborn as sheep or oxen.
Casting aside the words of the wise,
They will wander in saṃsāra for a great length of time.”

This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana—the first chapter.

2.

CHAPTER 2

2.1 Then the bodhisattva Dharmodgata spoke these words: “Blessed One, very long ago in ancient times, beyond as many universes as there are grains of sand in seventy-seven Ganges rivers, I was residing in the world Kīrtimat of the tathāgata Viśālakīrti. There I saw 7,700,000 non-Buddhists, together with their teachers, who had gathered in one place to consider the ultimate defining characteristic of phenomena.⁶⁵ [F.5.b] Although they had examined, analyzed, investigated, and considered in detail the ultimate defining characteristic of phenomena, they did not understand it. They had changing opinions, lacked certainty, and were slow-witted as well as argumentative. Insulting one another with harsh words, they became abusive, agitated, unprincipled, and violent. Then, Blessed One, I thought to myself, ‘This is so sad, and yet, how marvelous, how wonderful are the manifestations of the tathāgatas in the world and, through their manifestations, the realization and actualization of the ultimate whose defining characteristic is beyond all speculation!’ ”⁶⁶

2.2 The Blessed One answered to the bodhisattva Dharmodgata: “So it is, Dharmodgata. So it is. I have completely and perfectly awakened to the ultimate characterized as being beyond all speculation. Yet,⁶⁷ after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings. One might ask why I did this. I have explained that the ultimate is what is cognized by noble beings in a personal and intuitive way,⁶⁸ whereas ordinary beings’ knowledge [resulting from interacting] with one another belongs to the domain of speculation.⁶⁹ Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate represents the domain in which there is no phenomenal appearance,⁷⁰ whereas speculation is the domain of phenomenal appearance. Therefore,

Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the [F.6.a] ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is inexpressible, whereas speculation is the domain of verbalization. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is free from all conventions, whereas speculation is the domain of conventions. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation. Moreover, Dharmodgata, I have explained that the ultimate is devoid of argumentative disputation, whereas speculation is the domain of argumentative disputation. Therefore, Dharmodgata, you should know in this way through this approach that the ultimate is what is characterized as transcending all speculation.⁷¹

2.3 “Dharmodgata, it is like this: beings who have only tasted pungent or bitter flavors their entire lives cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the taste of honey and sugar. Those who have indulged in desire and have been burnt by the torment of desire for a long time cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the inner happiness of the recluse, which is independent from all phenomenal appearances related to form, sound, smell, taste, and contact. Those who have indulged and taken delight in conversations for a long time cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the inner happiness of the noble beings who remain silent. Those who have indulged and taken delight in conventions for a long time through seeing, hearing, discriminating, and cognizing cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the cessation of all conventions, the nirvāṇa that is the [F.6.b] extinction of transitory aggregates. Dharmodgata, it is like this: Those who have indulged and taken delight in argumentative disputations for a long time on account of their attachment to the self cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate that there is no attachment to the self and no argumentative disputations in Uttarakuru.

“Dharmodgata, likewise, those who [have indulged for a long time in] speculation cannot imagine, infer, or appreciate the ultimate whose defining characteristic transcends all speculation.”

2.4 Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:

“It is the domain whose characteristic must be intuitively cognized,
Beyond all expressions, apart from all conventions,
And free from argumentative disputations—⁷²
Such is the ultimate whose characteristic transcends all speculation.”⁷³

This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Dharmodgata—the second chapter.

3.

CHAPTER 3

3.1

Then the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati addressed the Blessed One, “Blessed One, at an earlier time, you spoke these words: ‘The ultimate is subtle and profound. Characterized as transcending what is distinct or indistinct⁷⁴ [from conditioned phenomena], it is difficult to understand.’ How wonderful indeed are these words of yours! Blessed One, regarding this point, I once saw many bodhisattvas who, having attained the stage of engagement through aspiration,⁷⁵ assembled in one place to discuss in the following way whether conditioned phenomena and the ultimate are distinct or indistinct. Among them, some declared, ‘The defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct.’⁷⁶ Others replied, ‘It is not the case that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct, for they are distinct indeed.’ [F.7.a] Some others, who were perplexed and lacked certainty, said, ‘Some pretend that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct. Some pretend that they are indistinct. Which bodhisattvas speak the truth? Which speak falsity? Which are mistaken? Which are not?’ Blessed One, I thought to myself, ‘So, none of these noble sons understands the ultimate whose subtle defining characteristic transcends whether it is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. These bodhisattvas are truly⁷⁷ naive, confused, dull, unskilled, and mistaken.’ ”

3.2

The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati, “So it is, Suviśuddhamati. So it is. Indeed, none of these noble sons understands the ultimate whose subtle defining characteristic transcends whether it is distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena. These [bodhisattvas] are truly naive, confused, dull, unskilled, and mistaken. Why is this so? Suviśuddhamati, it is because those who analyze conditioned phenomena in this way neither realize nor actualize the ultimate.

“Why? *Suviśuddhamati*, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were indistinct, [even] spiritually immature people—all ordinary beings—would, as a consequence, realize the truth. As mere ordinary beings,⁷⁸ [F.7.b] not only would they attain *nirvāṇa*, the unsurpassable good,⁷⁹ but they would also fully and completely awaken to unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening.

“If the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, even those who realize the truth would, as a consequence, not be detached from the phenomenal appearances of conditioned phenomena. Since they would not be detached from the phenomenal appearances of conditioned phenomena, they would also not be liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearances. If they were not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearances, they would not be liberated from the bondage of corruption. If they were not liberated from these two kinds of bondage, those who realize the truth would neither attain *nirvāṇa*, the unsurpassable good, nor fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening.

“*Suviśuddhamati*, ordinary beings do not realize the truth and,⁸⁰ as mere ordinary beings, neither do they attain *nirvāṇa*, the unsurpassable good, nor do they fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. For these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those who consider the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate to be indistinct are not right but wrong.

“*Suviśuddhamati*, it is not the case that those who realize the truth are not detached from the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, for they are indeed detached from it.⁸¹ Neither are they not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearance, for they are indeed liberated from it. Nor are they not liberated from the bondage of corruption, for they are indeed liberated from it. Since they are liberated from these two kinds of bondage, [F.8.a] not only do they attain *nirvāṇa*, the unsurpassable good, but they will also fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening.⁸² For all these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those who consider the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate to be distinct are not right but wrong.

3.4 “Moreover, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were indistinct, then, just as the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena is encompassed by the defining characteristic of affliction, so too would the defining characteristic of the ultimate be included in the defining characteristic of affliction.

“However, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, then the defining characteristic of the ultimate could not be the universal defining characteristic within all the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena.

“Suviśuddhamati, the defining characteristic of the ultimate is not encompassed by the defining characteristic of affliction, and the defining characteristic of the ultimate is the universal defining characteristic within all the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena. For these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are either indistinct or distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through this approach that those pretending that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct or distinct are not right but wrong.

3.5 “Moreover, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were not distinct, [F.8.b] then, just as the defining characteristic of the ultimate is not specific to any defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena, so too would all defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena not be specific to any conditioned phenomenon, and yogis would also not look for the ultimate beyond whatever they see, hear, distinguish, or know with regard to conditioned phenomena.⁸³

“However, Suviśuddhamati, if the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate were distinct, then, the mere selflessness and essencelessness of conditioned phenomena would not be the defining characteristic of the ultimate. The defining characteristic of affliction and the defining characteristic of purity themselves would be simultaneously established as distinct defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena.

“Suviśuddhamati, the defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena are specific and not unspecific to conditioned phenomena; yogis do look for the ultimate beyond whatever they see, hear, distinguish, or know with regard to conditioned phenomena; the ultimate is indeed characterized by the mere selflessness and essencelessness of conditioned phenomena; and

the defining characteristic of affliction and the defining characteristic of purity also are not simultaneously established as distinct defining characteristics of conditioned phenomena. For all these reasons, it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are neither indistinct nor distinct. Regarding this point, you should know through these approaches that those pretending that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct or distinct are not right but wrong.

3.6 “Suviśuddhamati, it is like this: It is not easy to decide⁸⁴ whether the whiteness of the conch is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of the conch, likewise with the yellowness of gold. It is not easy to decide whether the quality of the sound produced by a *vīṇā* is [F.9.a] distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of sound, likewise with aloe and its fragrance, pepper and its heat, myrobalan and its astringency, cotton and its softness, and clarified butter and butter. Thus it is not easy to decide whether the impermanence of all conditioned phenomena is distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena, likewise with the suffering of all beings with outflows and the defining characteristic of beings with outflows, as well as the selflessness of all phenomena and the defining characteristic of phenomena.

“Suviśuddhamati, it is like this: It is not easy to decide whether the defining characteristic of restless desire and the defining characteristic of afflictions are distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic of desire. You should know it is just like this with anger and delusion too. Likewise, Suviśuddhamati, you should not see anything good⁸⁵ in deciding whether the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct or indistinct. In this way, Suviśuddhamati, I have completely and fully awakened to the ultimate that is subtle, extremely subtle, [profound], extremely profound, difficult to understand, extremely difficult to understand, and characterized as transcending being distinct or indistinct from conditioned phenomena.⁸⁶ Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and [F.9.b] imparted teachings.”⁸⁷

3.7 Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:

“The defining characteristics of the domains of conditioned phenomena and
of the ultimate

Are free from being distinct or indistinct.⁸⁸

Those who imagine them to be distinct or indistinct are mistaken.

“As beings practice mental stillness and insight,
They will be liberated from the bonds of corruption
And the bonds of phenomenal appearance.”⁸⁹

This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Suviśuddhamati—the third chapter.

4.

CHAPTER 4

4.1 Then the Blessed One spoke these words to Subhūti: “Subhūti, do you know how many beings in the world⁹⁰ display their knowledge⁹¹ under the influence of conceit? Do you know how many beings in the world display their knowledge without conceit?”

Subhūti answered, “Blessed One, according to my knowledge, there are only a few in the world of beings who present their knowledge without conceit, but countless, innumerable, and inexpressible in number are those who do so under its influence. Blessed One, at one time I was staying in a hermitage set in a great forest. There were many monks living in the vicinity who had also established themselves there. At sunrise, I saw them gather together. They showed their knowledge and revealed their understanding by taking various aspects of phenomena as referential objects.⁹²”

4.2 “Some showed their knowledge by taking the five aggregates as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their arising, their disintegration, [F.10.a] their cessation, and the acknowledgment of their cessation. In the same way, some showed their knowledge by taking the twelve sense domains as referential objects, some by taking dependent arising as a referential object. Some showed their knowledge by taking the four kinds of sustenance as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their arising, their disintegration, their cessation, and the acknowledgment of their cessation.

4.3 “Some showed their knowledge by taking the four noble truths as referential objects: their defining characteristic, the comprehension of suffering, the abandoning of the cause of suffering, the actualization of the cessation of suffering, and the practice of the path.

4.4 “Some showed their knowledge by taking the eighteen constituents as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their varieties, their manifoldness, their cessation, and the actualization of their cessation.

- 4.5 “Some showed their knowledge by taking the four applications of mindfulness as referential objects: their phenomenal appearance, their adverse factors, their antidotes, their practice, their arising from having been non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing. In the same way, some showed their knowledge by taking as referential objects the four correct self-restraints, as well as the four bases of supernatural powers, the five faculties, the five forces, and the seven branches of awakening. Some showed their knowledge by taking as referential objects the eight branches of the noble path: [F.10.b] their phenomenal appearance, the antidotes to their adverse factors, their practice, their arising from having been non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing.⁹³
- 4.6 “Then I thought to myself, ‘These venerable monks displayed their knowledge by revealing their understanding by taking various aspects of phenomena as referential objects, but they have not perceived the ultimate, whose defining characteristic is of a single nature⁹⁴ everywhere.’ These venerable persons have conceit and, without doubt, display their knowledge under the influence of conceit. Blessed One, at an earlier time, you spoke these words: ‘The ultimate is subtle, profound, difficult to understand, extremely difficult to understand, and characterized as being of a single nature everywhere.’ How wonderful indeed are these very words of yours! Blessed One, if even those who practice your teaching, such as these beings who became monks, find it difficult to understand in this way the ultimate whose defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere, what need is there to mention how difficult it is for those outsiders who do not follow your teaching?’”
- 4.7 The Blessed One replied, “So it is, Subhūti. So it is. I have completely and fully awakened to the ultimate that, being characterized as being of a single nature everywhere, is subtle, extremely subtle, profound, extremely profound, difficult to understand, and extremely difficult to understand. Yet, after I attained complete and perfect awakening, [F.11.a] I communicated through words, gave explanations, established distinctions, expressed myself through conventions, and imparted teachings. One might ask why I did this.
- 4.8 “Subhūti, it is because I teach that the ultimate is the referential object conducive to purification⁹⁵ within the aggregates, as well as within the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and, Subhūti, the eightfold path. This referential object conducive to purification within the aggregates is of a single nature everywhere and its

defining characteristic is not different from theirs. It is just the same from the sense domains up to the eightfold path: the referential object conducive to purification within these various referential objects is of a single nature everywhere and its defining characteristic is not different from theirs. Subhūti, through this approach, you should thus know that what is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere is the ultimate.⁹⁶

4.9 “Moreover, Subhūti, once renunciants who practice yoga have realized in reference to a single aggregate the selflessness of phenomena, which is the ultimate reality,⁹⁷ they do not look for this ultimate reality, this selflessness, individually within the other aggregates or in the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the eightfold path. Instead, they rely upon the nondual gnosis⁹⁸ that is in accordance with true reality. Through this alone,⁹⁹ [F.11.b] they infallibly ascertain and realize the ultimate, characterized as being of a single nature everywhere. Subhūti, through this approach, you should thus know that what is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere is the ultimate.

4.10 “Moreover, Subhūti, if ultimate reality itself, the selflessness of phenomena, had a defining characteristic distinct [from the defining characteristics of phenomena] in the way the aggregates, the sense domains, dependent arising, the sustenances, the truths, the constituents, the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the eightfold path have defining characteristics distinct from one another, then, on account of this, ultimate reality itself, the selflessness of phenomena, would have causes and arise from causes. If it arose from causes, it would be conditioned. If it were the conditioned, it would not be the ultimate. If it were not the ultimate, one would need to look for some other ultimate. Subhūti, this ultimate, the selflessness of phenomena, does not arise from causes. It is not conditioned. Neither is it the case that it is not the ultimate. One must [therefore] not look for an ultimate other than that ultimate. Thus, whether tathāgatas manifest or not, because it is the case that it permanently and immutably abides within phenomena, only this nature of phenomena, this constituent abiding in phenomena, is constant.¹⁰⁰ Subhūti, for all these reasons, you should know through this approach that the ultimate is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere.

4.11 “Subhūti, it is like this: although there are many varieties of forms with distinct defining characteristics within space, since space itself is free from phenomenal appearances, [F.12.a] devoid of conceptions, and without change, its defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere. Likewise,

Subhūti, you should know that the ultimate is characterized as being of a single nature everywhere, within all phenomena whose defining characteristics are distinct from one another.”

4.12 Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:

“As proclaimed by the buddhas,
This ultimate is not distinct from phenomena,
And its defining characteristic is everywhere of a single nature.
Those who imagine it to be distinct from phenomena
Are conceited and deluded.”

This was the chapter of Subhūti—the fourth chapter.

5.

CHAPTER 5

5.1 Then, the bodhisattva Viśālamati asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas who are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition are called ‘skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition,’ what does it mean?¹⁰¹ When they are designated in this way, what does it refer to?”

The Blessed One answered, “Viśālamati, you are asking this for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Viśālamati. I will explain to you in which way bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition.

5.2 “Viśālamati, when such and such beings are reborn and manifest¹⁰² in this saṃsāra comprised of six destinies, in any class of beings or state of birth, be it egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born, [F.12.b] or spontaneously generated,¹⁰³ there is first a twofold appropriation: the appropriation of the physical sense faculties together with their supports, and the appropriation of mental imprints producing the elaboration of conventional expressions with regard to phenomenal appearances, names, and conceptualizations. In dependence upon this twofold appropriation, the mind containing all the seeds matures, merges [with the embryo], grows, increases, and expands.¹⁰⁴ This twofold appropriation occurs in the realm of form but it does not appear in the realm of the formless.¹⁰⁵

5.3 “Viśālamati, this cognition is also called ‘appropriating cognition’ because it grasps and appropriates the body. It is also called ‘subliminal cognition,’ because it dwells and lies hidden in this body, sharing a common destiny. It is also called ‘mind,’ because it is accumulated¹⁰⁶ and developed by visual forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangible objects, and phenomena.¹⁰⁷

- 5.4 “Viśālamati, taking this appropriating cognition as support and basis, the six kinds of cognition,¹⁰⁸ that is, visual, auditive, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental cognitions, arise. Among these, a visual cognition arises on the basis of the eye, which is connected with a visual cognition and a visual form. Simultaneously and in conformity with this visual cognition, a mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises at the same time, having the same object. [Likewise,] Viśālamati, an auditive, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile cognition arises on the basis of a sense faculty connected to a cognition, such as the ear, nose, tongue, or body, and a sound, smell, flavor, or tangible object. Simultaneously and in conformity with this auditive, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile cognition, a mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises at the same time, having the same object. If only one visual cognition arises at one time, [F.13.a] then only one mental cognition that conceptualizes the object arises simultaneously, having the same object. If two, three, four, or five cognitions arise simultaneously, then also in that case, having the same object as the group of five cognitions, only one mental cognition that conceptualizes this object arises simultaneously.¹⁰⁹
- 5.5 “Viśālamati, it is like this: If the conditions for the arising of a single wave in a large stream of water are present, then only one wave arises.¹¹⁰ If the conditions for the arising of two or many waves are present, then two or many waves arise.¹¹¹ However, the river [itself] neither stops as a stream of water nor becomes exhausted. If the conditions for the arising of a single reflection in a perfectly polished mirror are present, then only one reflection arises.¹¹² If the conditions for the arising of two or many reflections are present, then two or many reflections arise.¹¹³ However, the mirror neither transforms itself into the object corresponding to the reflection nor manifests reflections by being in close contact [with the reflected objects].¹¹⁴ Viśālamati, similarly, taking this appropriating cognition as support and basis, as in the examples of the river and the mirror, if the conditions for the arising of one visual cognition are present, then only one visual cognition arises. If the conditions for the simultaneous arising of up to five cognitions are present, then up to five cognitions simultaneously arise.
- 5.6 “Viśālamati, taking in this way the knowledge¹¹⁵ of this doctrine as a support and basis, bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition. Yet, when the Tathāgata designates [F.13.b] the bodhisattvas as skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition, they are not designated as completely skilled merely on account of this. Viśālamati, I call bodhisattvas ‘skilled in the ultimate’ as soon as¹¹⁶ they, by themselves and in their own experience,¹¹⁷ neither perceive the appropriation nor the appropriating cognition but [instead perceive] in accordance with the truth; as soon as they neither perceive the subliminal nor the subliminal cognition;

neither the accumulated nor the mind;¹¹⁸ neither the eye, nor the form, nor the visual cognition; neither the ear, nor the sound, nor the auditive cognition; neither the nose, nor the smell, nor the olfactory cognition; neither the tongue, nor the flavor, nor the gustatory cognition; and neither the body, nor the tangible object, nor the tactile cognition. Viśālamati, I call bodhisattvas ‘skilled in the ultimate’ as soon as they, by themselves and in their own experience, neither perceive thought, nor phenomena, nor mental cognition but instead perceive in accordance with the truth. Viśālamati, the Tathāgata designates as skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition the bodhisattvas who are skilled in the ultimate. Viśālamati, for this reason, bodhisattvas are skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition. Also, when the Tathāgata designates them as such, it is for this reason.”

5.7 Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:

“Profound and subtle is the appropriating cognition.
Containing all the seeds, it flows like a stream of water.
I did not teach it to the immature,
Lest they would imagine it to be a self.”¹¹⁹

This was the chapter of Viśālamati—[F.14.a] the fifth chapter.

6.

CHAPTER 6

6.1 Then, the bodhisattva Guṇākara asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas who are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena are called ‘skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena,’ what does it mean? Moreover, when the Tathāgata designates them as such, what does it refer to?”

6.2 The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Guṇākara, “Guṇākara, for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans, you are asking this. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Guṇākara, I will explain to you in which way bodhisattvas are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena.

6.3 “Guṇākara, the defining characteristics of phenomena are three. What are these three? They are the imaginary defining characteristic, the other-dependent defining characteristic, and the actual defining characteristic.¹²⁰

6.4 “Guṇākara, what is the imaginary defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is what is nominally and conventionally posited¹²¹ as the essence or the distinctive [characteristic] of phenomena, even just¹²² in order to designate¹²³ [them].¹²⁴

6.5 “Guṇākara, what is the other-dependent defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is the dependent arising of phenomena. It is like this: ‘When this is, that arises; because this arises, that arises.’ It is also from ‘[in dependence upon ignorance as a condition,] conditioning mental factors [arise]’ up to ‘thus, the whole great mass of suffering comes to be.’ [F.14.b]

6.6 “Guṇākara, what is the actual¹²⁵ defining characteristic [of phenomena]? It is their true reality, namely, the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening that is finally attained by bodhisattvas as they realize this [true reality] through their diligence and correct application of mind and then become perfectly familiar with the realization of this [true reality].¹²⁶

6.7 “Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the imaginary defining characteristic to be just like¹²⁷ the falsity of the visual aberrations [perceived] by someone suffering from the timira visual disorder.

“Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like the phenomenal appearances manifesting to this very person suffering from the timira disease, such as [actually nonexistent] hairs, flies, sesame seeds, [or patches of] blue, yellow, red, or white [in their visual field].

“Guṇākara, it is like this: you should consider the actual defining characteristic to be just like the original and unerring visual object seen by the same person when their vision is healthy and free from the visual aberrations resulting from the timira disease.

6.8 “Guṇākara, it is like this: when a pure crystal is in contact with something blue, it appears to be a sapphire. Because people perceive it by mistake as a sapphire, they are deceived by it. When this pure crystal is in contact with something red, green, or yellow, it appears to be a ruby, an emerald, [F.15.a] or gold. Because people perceive it by mistake as a ruby, an emerald, or gold, they are deceived by it.

6.9 “Guṇākara, it is like this: You should consider the mental imprint of conventions in terms of an imaginary defining characteristic¹²⁸ upon the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like the contact of colors with a pure crystal. Thus, you should consider the perception of an imaginary defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like the mistaken perception of a sapphire, ruby, emerald, or gold [superimposed] on the pure crystal.

Guṇākara, it is like this: You should consider the other-dependent defining characteristic to be just like this pure crystal itself. Thus, you should consider the actual defining characteristic as the permanent and immutable lack of any actuality or essence in the imaginary defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic,¹²⁹ just as there is permanently and immutably no actuality or essence in the defining characteristic of a sapphire, ruby, emerald, or gold [superimposed] on a pure crystal.

6.10 Thus, Guṇākara, bodhisattvas distinctly perceive¹³⁰ the imaginary defining characteristic on the basis of names denoting phenomenal appearances.¹³¹ They distinctly perceive the other-dependent defining characteristic on the basis of the erroneous conception¹³² [that superimposes] an imaginary defining characteristic¹³³ on the other-dependent defining characteristic.¹³⁴ They distinctly perceive the actual

defining characteristic on the basis of the nonexistence of any erroneous conception [that superimposes] an imaginary defining characteristic on the other-dependent defining characteristic.

6.11 “Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the imaginary defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena exactly as it is, they distinctly perceive the phenomena devoid of any defining characteristic exactly as they are. [F.15.b] Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the other-dependent defining characteristic exactly as it is, they distinctly perceive the phenomena characterized by affliction exactly as they are. Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the actual defining characteristic exactly as it is, they distinctly perceive the phenomena characterized by purification exactly as they are. Guṇākara, when bodhisattvas distinctly perceive the phenomena devoid of a defining characteristic [superimposed] on the other-dependent defining characteristic exactly as they are, they abandon the phenomena characterized by affliction. Once they have abandoned the phenomena characterized by affliction, they will obtain the phenomena characterized by purification. Guṇākara, since bodhisattvas distinctly perceive in this way the imaginary, other-dependent, and actual defining characteristics of phenomena exactly as they are, they distinctly perceive the phenomena devoid of a defining characteristic, those characterized by affliction, and those characterized by purification exactly as they are.¹³⁵ Having distinctly perceived the phenomena devoid of a defining characteristic exactly as they are, they abandon the phenomena characterized by affliction. Once they have abandoned the phenomena characterized by affliction, they will obtain the phenomena characterized by purification. For all these reasons, bodhisattvas are skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena. Moreover, when the Tathāgata designates the bodhisattvas as ‘skilled in the defining characteristics of phenomena,’ it is for these reasons.”

6.12 Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:

“Once the phenomena devoid of defining characteristics have been
distinctly perceived,

The phenomena characterized by affliction will be abandoned. [F.16.a]

Once the phenomena characterized by affliction have been abandoned,

The phenomena characterized by purification will be obtained.

“Careless beings, overcome by wrongdoing and indulging in laziness,

Do not realize the imperfection of conditioned phenomena.

Falling apart in the midst of fleeting phenomena,

They deserve¹³⁶ compassion.”

This was the chapter of Guṇākara —the sixth chapter.

7.

CHAPTER 7

7.1

At that time, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when I was alone in a secluded place, I had the following thought: ‘The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the five aggregates, mentioning the defining characteristic of their arising, disintegration, abandonment, and comprehension.¹³⁷ In the same way, he spoke of the twelve sense domains, dependent arising, and the four kinds of sustenance. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic of the four noble truths, mentioning the comprehension of suffering, the abandoning of the cause of suffering, the actualization of the cessation of suffering, and the practice of the path. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the eighteen constituents, mentioning their varieties, manifoldness, abandonment, and comprehension. The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the four applications of mindfulness, mentioning their adverse factors, antidotes, practice, their arising from being non-arisen, their remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing. Similarly, he also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the four correct self-restraints, the four bases of supernatural powers, the five faculties, the five forces, and the seven branches of awakening. [F.16.b] The Blessed One also spoke in many ways of the defining characteristic specific to the eight branches of the path, mentioning their adverse factors, antidotes, and practices, their arising from being non-arisen and remaining after they arose, and their maintaining, resuming, or increasing.’

“When the Blessed One further said, ‘All phenomena are without an essence,¹³⁸ unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ what was the underlying intent of the Blessed One? I would like to ask the Blessed One about this point: what was

the Blessed One thinking when he said, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa?’”

7.2 The Blessed One replied to the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata, “Paramārthasamudgata, this reflection of yours arose virtuously and appropriately. It is excellent indeed. You are asking this for the benefit and happiness of many beings, out of compassion for the world, and for the welfare, benefit, and happiness of all beings, including gods and humans. Your intention is excellent when questioning the Tathāgata on this specific point. Therefore, listen, Paramārthasamudgata. I will explain to you what my underlying intent was when I declared, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, [F.17.a] primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’¹³⁹

7.3 “Paramārthasamudgata, the essencelessness of all phenomena has three aspects. Having in mind essencelessness regarding defining characteristics, essencelessness regarding arising, and essencelessness regarding the ultimate, I thus taught what is called *the essencelessness of all phenomena*.

7.4 “Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to defining characteristics? It is the imaginary defining characteristic [of phenomena]. Why? Because as much as this defining characteristic is nominally and conventionally posited, it is not posited¹⁴⁰ on the basis of an essence or a distinctive [characteristic].¹⁴¹ Therefore, it is called *the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to defining characteristics*.

7.5 “Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to arising? It is the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena. Why? Because this is [the defining characteristic] arising on account of causes other [than itself] and not by itself. Therefore, it is called *essencelessness with regard to arising*.

7.6 “Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena with regard to the ultimate? Phenomena arising in dependence upon causes, which lack an essence on account of lacking an essence in terms of arising and also lack an essence on account of lacking an ultimate essence. Why? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, I showed that the referential object conducive to purification within phenomena is the ultimate, but the other-dependent defining characteristic is not the referential object conducive to purification. Therefore, this essencelessness is called *essencelessness with regard to the ultimate*.

“Moreover, Paramārthasamudgata, the actual defining characteristic of phenomena should also be referred to as *essencelessness with regard to the ultimate*. Why? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, the selflessness of

phenomena is called *the essencelessness of phenomena*, which is the [F.17.b] ultimate, but the ultimate is characterized by¹⁴² the essencelessness of all phenomena. Therefore, it is called *essencelessness with regard to the ultimate*.¹⁴³

7.7 “Paramārthasamudgata, it is like this: consider essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics to be exactly like a [nonexistent] sky flower; consider essencelessness with regard to arising, as well as essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in one of its aspects, to be exactly like a magic illusion;¹⁴⁴ consider essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect, which consists in the selflessness of phenomena and pervades everything, to be exactly like space, which consists in the essencelessness of form and pervades everything.¹⁴⁵

7.8 “Paramārthasamudgata, with this threefold essencelessness in mind, I taught what is called *the essencelessness of all phenomena*. Paramārthasamudgata, having in mind essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ Why? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, what lacks a specific defining characteristic is unborn. What is unborn is unceasing. What is unborn and unceasing is primordially in the state of peace. What is primordially in the state of peace is naturally in the state of nirvāṇa. For what is naturally in the state of nirvāṇa, there is nothing in the slightest that passes into the state of nirvāṇa. Therefore, having in mind essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’

7.9 “Paramārthasamudgata, having in mind essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, [F.18.a] which is characterized by selflessness, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ Why? Because essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, which is characterized by selflessness, indeed abides permanently and immutably. As the nature of phenomena, it is unconditioned and free from all afflictions. What permanently and immutably abides as the very nature of phenomena, being unconditioned, is unborn and unceasing due to being unconditioned. Because it is free from all afflictions, it is primordially in the state of peace and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, having in mind essencelessness with regard to the ultimate, which is characterized by selflessness, I taught, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’

7.10 “Paramārthasamudgata, I did not designate three kinds of essencelessness because those in the world of beings consider that the imaginary essence and the other-dependent essence, as well as the actual essence, are different by nature.¹⁴⁷ Rather, I did so because they superimpose an imaginary essence on the other-dependent essence and the actual essence and because they designate the other-dependent essence and the actual essence as the defining characteristics of an imaginary essence. While they designate them in this way, their minds,¹⁴⁸ which are saturated with designations, become confined to such designations and predisposed¹⁴⁹ toward them. On this basis, they wrongly conceive the other-dependent essence and the actual essence as the defining characteristics of an imaginary essence. [F.18.b] Wrongly conceiving them in this way, with their wrong conception of the other-dependent essence as the defining characteristic of an imaginary essence acting as a cause and condition, they will give rise in the future to an other-dependent essence.¹⁵⁰ As a result of this, they will be afflicted by the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth. Because they will not pass beyond saṃsāra, they will transmigrate and wander among hell beings, animals, hungry ghosts, gods, demigods, and humans for a very long time.

7.11 “Among these beings, Paramārthasamudgata, some do not produce roots of virtue from the very beginning. They do not clear obstructions or bring their mental continuums to maturity. Their confidence in my teaching is limited and they have not accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. I impart to those beings the teaching on essencelessness with regard to arising. Once they have heard this teaching, they understand that conditioned phenomena arising in dependence on causes are of an impermanent, unstable, and unreliable nature. They develop aversion and repulsion towards conditioned phenomena. Once they have done this, they turn away from wrongdoing. Not committing any wrongdoing, they establish themselves in virtue. With this as a cause, they produce the roots of virtue that were yet to be produced. They clear obstructions that were yet to be cleared. They bring their mental continuums, which were not yet mature, to maturity. As a result, their confidence in my teaching becomes vast, and they will accomplish the accumulations of merit and gnosis.

7.12 “Although such beings have produced in this way roots of virtue up to the accomplishment of the accumulation of merit and gnosis, they [F.19.a] do not understand essencelessness with regard to arising just as it is, as the essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics and the essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in its two aspects. For this reason, they will not be completely repulsed by all conditioned phenomena, completely free from desire, or completely liberated. They will not be

completely liberated from all the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth. It is therefore for them that the Tathāgata imparts the teaching on the essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics and the essencelessness with regard to the ultimate. He does so in order to make them feel repulsion towards all conditioned phenomena, as well as to free them from desire, to completely liberate them, and to take them perfectly¹⁵¹ beyond the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth.

7.13 “Once they have heard this teaching, they do not wrongly conceive the other-dependent essence as the defining characteristic of an imaginary essence. As a result, they accept the essencelessness with regard to arising as the essencelessness with regard to defining characteristics and the essencelessness with regard to the ultimate in its two aspects. They discern and understand it exactly as it is. It is like this: Their minds,¹⁵² which are no longer saturated with designations, are not confined to these designations or predisposed toward them. As a result, by attaining the powers of wisdom in this life and perfectly cutting off the continuity [of the aggregates] into a future existence, they will put an end to the other-dependent defining characteristic. On this basis, they will be completely repulsed by all conditioned phenomena, completely free from desire, and completely liberated. [F.19.b] They will be completely liberated from all the afflictions of defilements, karma, and birth.

7.14 “Moreover, Paramārthasamudgata, even those belonging to the lineage of the hearers’ vehicle attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable happiness, through this very path and journey,¹⁵³ as do those belonging to the lineage of the solitary realizers’ vehicle and the lineage of the tathāgatas. This is why it is the single path of purification for hearers, solitary realizers, and bodhisattvas. Since there is only a single purification, there is no other. Therefore, with this in mind, I taught the Single Vehicle. Yet, it is not the case that those in the world of beings are not of various types corresponding to their capacities, be they weak, average, or sharp in accordance with their nature.

7.15 “Paramārthasamudgata, even if they were to exert themselves as all buddhas did,¹⁵⁴ individuals belonging to the hearers’ lineage with the state of peace as their sole journey could not reach the heart of awakening and attain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening. Why? Because, having limited compassion and a great fear of suffering, they belong to a lineage that is by nature inferior. Thus, having limited compassion, they avoid striving for beings’ welfare. Being afraid of suffering, they stay clear from the conditioning process of the mental factors.¹⁵⁵ However, I did not teach that avoiding striving for beings’ welfare and staying clear from the

conditioning process of the mental factors was the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening. Therefore, these individuals are called *those who have the state of peace as their sole journey*.

7.16 “I taught that hearers who evolve toward awakening belong to the [F.20.a] category of bodhisattvas because, liberated from the obscuration of defilements and inspired by the tathāgatas, they liberate their minds from the obscuration of cognitive objects. It is [only] because they first liberated themselves from the obscuration of defilements for their own sake that the Tathāgata designated them as *the lineage of hearers*.

7.17 “Thus, Paramārthasamudgata, there are beings with various degrees of confidence in my Dharma and my Vinaya, which are well proclaimed, well imparted, pure in their intention, and well communicated. In this teaching, Paramārthasamudgata, the Tathāgata, having in mind the three kinds of essencelessness, teaches through a discourse of provisional meaning: ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’

7.18 “Among such beings, Paramārthasamudgata, some have produced roots of virtue, purified their obscurations, and brought their mental continuum to maturity. They have much confidence in my teaching and have accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. Once they have heard my teaching, they understand my explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is. Moreover, they recognize that this teaching is the truth.¹⁵⁶ Through their wisdom, they realize its meaning exactly as it is. By also engaging in the practice of this realization, they will very quickly attain the ultimate state. They will develop faith in these teachings, and think, ‘Amazing! The Blessed One is completely and perfectly awakened. Through him, one becomes perfectly awakened with respect to all phenomena.’

7.19 “Among such beings, some have not produced roots of virtue, purified their obscurations, and brought their mental continuums to maturity. Their confidence in my teaching is limited and [F.20.b] they have not accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. They are honest and sincere. Unable to evaluate and refute¹⁵⁷ [others’ views], they do not consider their own as supreme. Once they have heard my teaching, although they do not understand my explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is, they still develop confidence and faith in these teachings: ‘The Tathāgata’s discourse is profound and has the appearance of profundity. [Because] emptiness is the topic of this discourse, it is difficult to perceive and difficult to understand. Being beyond judgment, it does not belong to the domain of speculation. It can [only] be known by intelligent scholars well versed in the subtle.’¹⁵⁸ They think, ‘We do not understand the

meaning of this sūtra and these teachings that were taught by the Blessed One. Profound is the awakening of the Buddha and the nature of phenomena. Only the Tathāgata understands them. We, however, do not. The Dharma taught by the tathāgatas arises according to the various inclinations of beings. Their gnosis¹⁵⁹ and perception are infinite, whereas ours are merely like the [shallow] hoofprints left by a cow.' Filled with devotion for these discourses, they also write them down. Having written them down, they also keep them in mind, read them, propagate them, venerate them, expound them, recite them, and chant them aloud. However, because they do not understand these profound teachings in accordance with my underlying intent, they are unable to engage themselves in the various aspects of practice. As a consequence of this, they will further develop their accumulation of merit and gnosis, and those whose mental continuums are still immature will bring them to maturity.

7.20 “Other beings have not perfectly completed these stages up to the great accumulation of merit and gnosis. [F.21.a] They are dishonest and insincere. Capable of evaluating and refuting [others’ views], they consider their own as supreme. Once they have heard my teaching, they do not understand my profound explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is. Although they have confidence in this teaching, they wrongly conceive it according to its literal meaning: ‘All phenomena are *only* without an essence, *only* unborn, *only* unceasing, *only* primordially in the state of peace, and *only* naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.’ As a consequence of this, they acquire the view that all phenomena are inexistent and the view that they are without defining characteristics. Then, once they have acquired these views, they negate all phenomena by [negating] all defining characteristics, thereby negating the imaginary defining characteristic as well as the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics. Why is it said that they negate all three defining characteristics? Because, Paramārthasamudgata, if the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics are accepted, then the imaginary defining characteristic also will be distinctly perceived. Now, those who consider the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics as inexistent have already negated the imaginary defining characteristic. This is why they are called *those who negate all three defining characteristics*. They consider my teaching to be the truth while considering some nonsense to be its meaning. Those who consider my teaching to be the truth while considering some nonsense to be its meaning cling to my teaching as the truth while at the same time clinging to some nonsense as its meaning. Since they have confidence in my teaching, they will progress by developing virtuous qualities. However, because they wrongly conceive some nonsense

to be the meaning of my teaching, they will stray from wisdom. Straying from wisdom, [F.21.b] they will stray from the vast and immeasurable virtuous qualities.

7.21 “Others hear from those beings that my teaching is the truth while some nonsense is its meaning. Then, delighted by this view, they accept that my teaching is the truth and some nonsense is its meaning. Thus, they wrongly conceive my teaching as the truth with some nonsense as its meaning. As a consequence of this, you should know that they will likewise stray from virtuous qualities.

7.22 “Others who take no delight in this view are overcome by fear and anxiety when they hear that all phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa. They then say, ‘These are not the words of the Buddha but the words of Māra!’ Thinking in this way, they reject this discourse, disparage it, denigrate it, and criticize it. As a consequence of this, they will obtain the great misfortune as well as the great karmic obscuration [of rejecting the truth].¹⁶⁰ This is precisely why I said, ‘Those who mislead the multitude of beings into obtaining the great karmic obscuration, who consider all defining characteristics as nonexistent and teach some nonsense as the meaning of my teaching, are burdened with great karmic obscuration [of rejecting the truth].

7.23 “Paramārthasamudgata, among such beings, some have not produced roots of virtue, purified their obscurations, and brought their mental continuum to maturity. Their confidence in my teaching is limited, and they have not accomplished the accumulations of merit and gnosis. They are dishonest and insincere. Although they are unable to evaluate and refute [others’ views], they consider their own as supreme. When they hear my teaching, they neither understand my explanations in accordance with my underlying intent exactly as it is, nor do they develop confidence in this teaching. They accept that my teaching is not the truth and its meaning is some nonsense. They say, ‘These are not the words of the Buddha [F.22.a] but the words of Māra!’ Thinking in this way, they reject this discourse, disparage it, denigrate it, criticize it, and distort [its meaning]. In many ways, they apply themselves to discarding, undermining, and subverting this discourse, considering as enemies those who are devoted to it. From the very beginning, they are affected by the karmic obscuration [of rejecting the truth]. As a consequence of this, they also cause [others] to be obscured by this karmic obscuration. Although it is easy to determine the beginning of this karmic obscuration, it is difficult to know how many myriad eons it will last.

“Thus, Paramārthasamudgata, those are the various degrees of confidence in my Dharma and my Vinaya,¹⁶¹ which are well proclaimed, well imparted, pure in their intention, and well communicated.”

7.24 Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:

“All phenomena are without an essence, unborn,
Unceasing, primordially in the state of peace,
And naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.
What wise person would say this without an underlying intent?

“I have spoken of essencelessness
With regard to defining characteristics, arising, and the ultimate.
No wise person who understands my underlying intent
Will travel the path leading to corruption.

“There is only one path of purification for all beings,
As there is only one purification, not two.
This is why, even if there are various lineages of beings,
I proclaimed the Single Vehicle.

“In the world of beings, innumerable are
The solitary beings who attain nirvāṇa,
While rare are those who have attained nirvāṇa
And possess the energy and compassion to not turn away from beings.

[F.22.b]

“Subtle, inconceivable, and undifferentiated
Is the uncontaminated domain of those who are liberated.
Nondual and inexpressible, blissful and immutable,
It is the accomplishment of all [intentions], the release from all suffering and defilements.”

7.25 Then, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata said to the Blessed One, “Blessed One, the speech expounding the underlying intent of the buddhas is subtle, extremely subtle, profound, extremely profound, difficult to understand, and extremely difficult to understand. How marvelous, how wonderful it is!

“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization,¹⁶² is nominally and conventionally posited as an essential characteristic or a distinctive characteristic,¹⁶³ for example as the aggregate of form, its arising, its cessation, its abandonment, or the comprehension of this aggregate. What is posited in this way is the imaginary defining

characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to the defining characteristics of phenomena. The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is the other-dependent defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to both the arising of phenomena and the ultimate in one of its aspects.

“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: this very phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is devoid of any actuality or essence as that which has an imaginary defining characteristic.¹⁶⁴ [F.23.a] On account of this, this essencelessness or selflessness of phenomena, true reality, the referential object conducive to purification, is the actual defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to the essencelessness of phenomena with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect.

“One should proceed in exactly the same way with the remaining aggregates as well as with each of the twelve sense domains, the twelve factors of conditioned existence, the four kinds of sustenance, and the six and eighteen constituents.

7.26

“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is nominally and conventionally posited as an essential characteristic or a distinctive characteristic, for example as the noble truth of suffering or the comprehension of suffering. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to the defining characteristics of phenomena. The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is the other-dependent defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to both the arising of phenomena and the ultimate in one of its aspects.

“This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: This very phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is devoid of any actuality or essence as that which has an imaginary defining characteristic.¹⁶⁵ [F.23.b] On account of this, this essencelessness or selflessness of phenomena, true reality, the referential object conducive to purification, is the actual defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to the essencelessness of phenomena with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect.

“As with the noble truth of suffering, one should proceed in exactly the same way with the other truths. As with the truths, so one should proceed in exactly the same way with each of the applications of mindfulness, the self-restraints, the bases of supernatural powers, the faculties, the forces, the branches of awakening, and the branches of the path.

7.27 “This is how I understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is nominally and conventionally posited as an essential characteristic or a distinctive characteristic, for example as correct concentration,¹⁶⁶ its adverse factors and antidotes, its practice, its arising from being non-arisen, its remaining after it arose, and its maintaining, resuming, increasing, or expanding. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to the defining characteristics of phenomena. The phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is the other-dependent defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to essencelessness with regard to both the arising of phenomena and the ultimate in one of its aspects.

“This is how I [F.24.a] understand the meaning of the words spoken by the Blessed One: This very phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, namely, the basis of the imaginary defining characteristic, the object of conceptualization, is devoid of any actuality or essence as that which has an imaginary defining characteristic. On account of this, this essencelessness or selflessness of phenomena, true reality, the referential object conducive to purification, is the actual defining characteristic. For this reason, Blessed One, you referred to the essencelessness of phenomena with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect.

7.28 “Blessed One, thus it is said, for example, that dried ginger should be added to all medicinal powders and elixirs. Likewise, this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by¹⁶⁷ the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,¹⁶⁸ should also be added to all the discourses of provisional meaning.¹⁶⁹

“Blessed One, it is like this: for example, the canvas for a painting, whether blue, yellow, red, or white, is identical for all painted figures and thus perfectly clarifies their contours. Likewise, this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the

state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,' is identical in all discourses of provisional meaning and thus perfectly clarifies their interpretable intent.

"Blessed One, it is like this: for example, adding clarified butter to all sorts of stews, meat dishes, and porridge is delicious. Likewise, it is delightful to add to all discourses of provisional meaning this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, 'All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.' [F.24.b]

"Blessed One, it is like this: for example, space is identical everywhere and, [being empty and free from all obstruction,] does not hinder any endeavor. Likewise, this teaching of definitive meaning expounded by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, 'All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,' is identical in all discourses of provisional meaning and does not hinder any endeavor in the course of the hearers', solitary realizers', or bodhisattvas' vehicle."

7.29 Following these words, the Blessed One complimented the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata: "Excellent, Paramārthasamudgata, this is excellent! You have understood my explanation in accordance with the Tathāgata's underlying intent. Your examples of the dried ginger, painting, clarified butter, and space perfectly illustrated its point. Paramārthasamudgata, so it is, and not otherwise. Therefore, keep in mind this teaching in this way."

7.30 Then, the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata spoke again to the Blessed One: "In the deer park of Ṛṣivadana in Vārāṇasī, the Blessed One first set in motion the wonderful wheel of Dharma by teaching the four noble truths to those who were engaged in the hearers' vehicle. Not a single god or human in the world had previously ever turned such a wheel of Dharma. However, this turning of the Dharma wheel by the Blessed One was surpassable and adapted to the circumstances. Being of provisional meaning,¹⁷⁰ it became a topic of dispute. Then, for those who were engaged in the Great Vehicle, [F.25.a] you turned the second, even more wonderful, wheel of Dharma in the form of a teaching on emptiness: 'All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa.' However, this turning of the Dharma wheel by the Blessed One was surpassable and adapted to the circumstances. Being of provisional meaning, it became a topic of dispute. Then, for those who were engaged in all vehicles,¹⁷¹ you turned the third wonderful Dharma wheel of excellent discernment in reference to the statement, 'All phenomena are without an

essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and by nature in the state of nirvāṇa.¹⁷² This turning of the Dharma wheel by the Blessed One was unsurpassable and not limited to the circumstances.

7.31 “Blessed One, when sons or daughters of noble family have heard the teaching of definitive meaning taught by the Blessed One in reference to the statement, ‘All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa,’ they develop devotion for this teaching and commission its transcription into writing. Once it has been put into writing, they keep it in mind, read it, venerate it, propagate it, expound it, chant it aloud, contemplate it, and apply it in their practice. As they do so, how much merit will they produce?”

7.32 The Blessed One answered, “Paramārthasamudgata, these sons and daughters of noble family will produce immeasurable and [F.25.b] incalculable merit. Although it is difficult to illustrate this with examples, I will briefly explain it to you. Paramārthasamudgata, it is like this: Compared to the amount of earth, the amount of dirt at the tip of a fingernail does not come close to a hundredth, a thousandth, a one hundred thousandth of it, or anything implying calculation, partition, numeration, analogy, or comparison. Compared to the amount of water contained in the four great oceans, the amount of water contained in the hoofprint of an ox does not come close to a hundredth, a thousandth, a one hundred thousandth of it, or anything implying calculation, partition, numeration, analogy, or comparison. Likewise, Paramārthasamudgata, compared to the amount of merit accumulated by developing confidence in my teaching of definitive meaning up to applying it in one’s practice, the amount of merit accumulated by developing confidence in my teaching of provisional meaning . . . up to applying it in one’s practice does not come close to a hundredth, a thousandth, a one hundred thousandth of it, or anything implying calculation, partition, numeration, analogy, or comparison.”

7.33 The bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata inquired, “Blessed One, what is the name of this teaching as a Dharma discourse that unravels the Tathāgata’s intent?¹⁷³ How should I keep it in mind?”¹⁷⁴

The Blessed One answered: “Paramārthasamudgata, this is a teaching of definitive meaning on the ultimate. Therefore, keep it in mind as *The Teaching of Definitive Meaning on the Ultimate*.”

As the Blessed One expounded this teaching of definitive meaning on the ultimate, six hundred thousand beings produced the mind directed at the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening;¹⁷⁵ three hundred thousand hearers purified the Dharma eye from impurities and contaminations; one

hundred and fifty hearers who were without attachment liberated their minds from all outflows; and seventy-five thousand bodhisattvas attained the acceptance that phenomena are non-arisen. [F.26.a]

This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata—the seventh chapter.

8.

CHAPTER 8

8.1 Then, the bodhisattva Maitreya asked a question to the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas practice mental stillness and insight in the Great Vehicle, what is their support and basis?”

The Blessed One answered, “Maitreya, their support and basis are the discourses teaching Dharma and the constant aspiration to attain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening.

8.2 “The Blessed One taught that four things are the referential objects of mental stillness and insight: the image with conceptualization; the image without conceptualization; the point where phenomena end; and the accomplishment of the goal.”

“Blessed One, how many referential objects of mental stillness are there?”

“There is [only] one, namely, the image without conceptualization.”

“How many are the referential objects of insight?”

“There is only one, namely, the image with conceptualization.”

“How many are the referential objects of both combined?”

“There are two, namely, the point where phenomena end and the accomplishment of the goal.”

8.3 “Blessed One, once bodhisattvas have taken as a support and basis these four things that are the referential objects of mental stillness and insight, how do they dedicate themselves to mental stillness? How do they become skilled in the practice of insight?”

“Maitreya, I have given to the bodhisattvas discourses teaching Dharma in the following twelve collections of teachings: sūtras, discourses in prose and verse, prophecies, poetic discourses, aphorisms, discourses for specific beings, narratives, parables, discourses on previous lives, extensive discourses, teachings on miracles, and instructions. [F.26.b] Once bodhisattvas have properly heard these explanations, once they have memorized them well, recited them, examined them, and understood them by means of discernment, they remain alone in seclusion and settle

themselves in a state of inner absorption. Then, they direct their attention in that (1) they direct their attention toward the teachings they have properly contemplated¹⁷⁶ and (2) continuously direct their attention inwardly toward the mind that is directing attention. As they repeatedly engage themselves in this way, their bodies and minds become flexible. The occurrence of this physical and mental flexibility is what is called *mental stillness*. This is how bodhisattvas dedicate themselves to mental stillness.

8.4 “Once they have obtained¹⁷⁷ this physical and mental flexibility, they settle in this very state and abandon some aspects of mind [corresponding to mental stillness].¹⁷⁸ Then, they apply themselves to analyzing the image that is the object of their concentration according to the teachings they have properly contemplated. Differentiating, discerning, considering, and examining in this way the cognitive aspects of the image that is the object of their concentration, accepting and wishing to do so, and distinguishing, scrutinizing, and investigating [this discerning mind in the same way] is what is called [*the practice of*] *insight*. This is how bodhisattvas are skilled in insight.”

8.5 “Blessed One, when bodhisattvas direct their attention inwardly toward the mind that takes the mind as its referential object but have not yet attained physical and mental flexibility, what do you call their practice of directing attention?”

“Maitreya, this is not yet mental stillness. So you should refer to it as a practice aspiring to mental stillness.”

“Blessed One, when bodhisattvas direct their attention toward the image that is the object of their concentration according to the teachings they have properly contemplated, but they have not yet attained physical and mental flexibility, what do you call their practice of [F.27.a] directing attention?”

“Maitreya, this is not yet insight. So you should refer to it as a practice aspiring to insight.”

8.6 “Blessed One, should we refer to the path of mental stillness and the path of insight as being distinct or indistinct from one another?”

“Maitreya, we should refer to them as neither distinct nor indistinct. Why are they not distinct? Because mental stillness takes mind, which is the referential object of insight, as its object. Why are they not indistinct? Because insight takes a conceptual image as its referential object.”

8.7 “Blessed One, what image do bodhisattvas focus on as their object of concentration? Should we consider it as distinct from mind or not?”¹⁷⁹

“Maitreya, we must consider that it is not distinct from mind. Why? Because this image is merely a representation. Maitreya, I have explained that cognition is constituted¹⁸⁰ by the mere representation that is the referential object [of this cognition].”¹⁸¹

“Blessed One, if this image that is the object of concentration is not distinct from the mind, how does this very mind investigate itself?”

“Maitreya, [ultimately] no phenomenon whatsoever investigates any phenomenon at all. However, the mind that arises as [if it were conscious of an object] appears as [if it were investigating itself]. Maitreya, it is like this: based on a form [in front of a mirror], you see that same form on the clear surface of this mirror and realize that you are seeing a reflection, an image in which this reflection and the form [it is based on] appear to be distinct objects. Likewise, the mind arising as [if it were conscious of an object] and what is called its image, the object of concentration, appear as if they were distinct objects.”¹⁸²

8.8 “Blessed One, should we say that mental images naturally present to beings, such as the appearance of material form and so forth, [F.27.b] are also not distinct from mind?”¹⁸³

“Maitreya, we should say that they are not distinct. However, foolish beings with erroneous ideas do not understand just as it is that [mental] images are mere representations. As a consequence, their minds are mistaken.”

8.9 “Blessed One, when do the bodhisattvas practice only insight?”

“Whenever they direct their attention¹⁸⁴ toward mental appearances¹⁸⁵ without interruption.”

“When do the bodhisattvas practice only mental stillness?”

“Whenever they direct their attention toward the unimpeded mind without interruption.”

“When do they combine both insight and mental stillness and unite them evenly?”

“Whenever they direct their attention toward the one-pointedness of mind.”

“Blessed One, what is a mental appearance?”

“Maitreya, this is the referential object of insight, the conceptual image that is the object of concentration.”

“What is the unimpeded mind?”

“Maitreya, it is the referential object of mental stillness, the mind that takes the image as an object.”

“What is one-pointedness of mind?”

“[One-pointedness of mind is] realizing in regard to the image that is the object of concentration, ‘This is merely a representation,’ and, on realizing that, directing one’s attention toward true reality.”¹⁸⁶

8.10 “Blessed One, how many kinds of insight are there?”

“Maitreya, there are three: insight arising from phenomenal appearance, insight arising from inquiry, and insight arising from awakening.”¹⁸⁷

“What is insight arising from phenomenal appearance?”

“It is the insight in which attention is directed exclusively toward a conceptual image, the object of concentration.”

“What is insight arising from inquiry?”

“It is the insight in which attention is directed in order to perfectly understand whatever phenomena were not yet understood by means of wisdom.”¹⁸⁸ [F.28.a]

“What is insight arising from awakening?”

“It is the insight in which attention is directed on whatever phenomena one perfectly understood by means of wisdom in order to attain the happiness of liberation.”

8.11 “How many kinds of mental stillness are there?”

“There are three kinds of mental stillness corresponding to the unimpeded mind. Maitreya, it is also said to be of eight kinds: the first, second, third, and fourth meditative absorptions, the domain of the infinity of space, the domain of infinite cognition, the domain of nothingness, and the domain of neither conception nor lack of conception. It is also of four kinds: immeasurable loving-kindness, immeasurable compassion, immeasurable joy, and immeasurable equanimity.”

8.12 “Blessed One, you have mentioned ‘mental stillness and insight that are established in Dharma’ and ‘mental stillness and insight that are not established in Dharma.’ What do these terms mean?”

“Maitreya, the mental stillness and insight that are established in Dharma are the mental stillness and insight whose object is in agreement with phenomenal appearance as presented in the teachings that bodhisattvas have understood and contemplated.

“You should know that the mental stillness and insight that are not established in Dharma are the mental stillness and insight whose object, being unrelated to the teachings that bodhisattvas have understood and contemplated, is based on other instructions or precepts, such as taking as referential objects putrefying or festering corpses as well as any other similar objects, the impermanence of all conditioned phenomena, the suffering [inherent to all conditioned phenomena], the selflessness of all phenomena, and nirvāṇa as the state of peace.”¹⁸⁹

“Maitreya, regarding this, I consider those bodhisattvas who follow the teaching based on the mental stillness and insight established in Dharma to possess sharp faculties. As for those faithfully following the teaching based on the mental stillness and insight that are not established in Dharma, I consider them to possess inferior faculties.” [F.28.b]

8.13 “Blessed One, you also mentioned ‘the mental stillness and insight with a specific¹⁹⁰ teaching as a referential object’ and ‘the mental stillness and insight with a universal teaching as a referential object.’ What do these terms mean?”

“Maitreya, suppose that bodhisattvas practice the mental stillness and insight that take as a referential object an individual teaching, such as a specific discourse, among all the teachings they have understood and contemplated. This is called *mental stillness and insight with a specific teaching as a referential object*.

Now, suppose that bodhisattvas unify, condense, subsume, or gather teachings from various discourses into a single one, thinking that all these teachings converge toward true reality, lean toward true reality, and tend toward true reality; converge toward awakening, lean toward awakening, and tend toward awakening; converge toward nirvāṇa, lean toward nirvāṇa, and tend toward nirvāṇa; and converge toward a shift in one’s basis of existence,¹⁹¹ lean toward a shift in one’s basis of existence, and tend toward a shift in one’s basis of existence. Thinking that all these teachings actually refer to the immeasurable and infinite virtuous truth,¹⁹² they direct their attention [toward their referential object]. This is [called] *mental stillness and insight with a universal teaching as a referential object*.”

8.14 “Blessed One, you also mentioned mental stillness and insight ‘with a fairly universal teaching as a referential object,’ ‘with a highly universal teaching as a referential object,’ and ‘with an infinitely universal teaching as a referential object.’ What do these terms mean?”

“Maitreya, suppose the bodhisattvas gather together [the meaning of] each of the twelve collections of my teaching, from the sūtras up to the extensive discourses, the teachings on miracles, and the instructions. [F.29.a] Having done so, they direct their attention toward this referential object. This should be known as *the mental stillness and insight with a fairly universal teaching as a referential object*.

When the bodhisattvas gather together¹⁹³ all the teachings or discourses they have understood and contemplated and then direct their attention onto this referential object, this should be known as *the mental stillness and insight with a highly universal teaching as a referential object*.

“When the bodhisattvas gather together the teachings imparted by the tathāgatas that refer to the infinite truth,¹⁹⁴ the infinite words and letters expressing it, and the ever-increasing infinite wisdom and eloquence of the tathāgatas and then direct their attention toward this referential object, this should be known as *the mental stillness and insight with an infinitely universal teaching as a referential object*.”

8.15 “Blessed One, how do bodhisattvas obtain mental stillness and insight with a universal teaching as a referential object?”

“Maitreya, you should know that they obtain them through five causes: (1) At the time of directing their attention, they destroy all supports of corruption in every moment. (2) After giving up the variety of conditioned phenomena, they rejoice in the joy of Dharma. (3) They perfectly know the immeasurable and unceasing brilliance of Dharma in the ten directions. (4) They bring together, without conceptualizing them, the phenomenal appearances that are imbued with the accomplishment of the goal and in harmony with the element conducive to purification. (5) In order to attain, perfect, and accomplish the truth body, they seize the most supreme and auspicious cause.”

8.16 “Blessed One, how should we know at which point the bodhisattvas cognize and obtain the mental stillness and the insight that have a universal teaching as a referential object?”

“Maitreya, you should know that they cognize them on the first bodhisattva stage, Utmost Joy, and obtain them on the third stage, Illuminating. Maitreya, in spite of this, even beginners among bodhisattvas should not abstain from training in them and directing their attention toward their referential object.”

8.17 “Blessed One, in what way do mental stillness and insight become a concentration associated with mental engagement¹⁹⁵ and investigation? [F.29.b] In what way do they become a concentration not with mental engagement but with investigation only? In what way do they become a concentration without either mental engagement or investigation?”

“Maitreya, when mental stillness and insight attend to experiences of the manifest and coarse¹⁹⁶ phenomenal appearances mentioned in the teachings the bodhisattvas have understood, investigated, and examined, this is the concentration associated with mental engagement and investigation.

“When mental stillness and insight do not consist in attending the experiences corresponding to the manifest and coarse phenomenal appearances mentioned in their teachings but consist in being merely mindful of appearances, namely, in attending the experience of subtle phenomenal appearances,¹⁹⁷ this is a concentration not with mental engagement but with investigation only.

“When mental stillness and insight consist in practicing by directing one’s attention toward the experience of the effortless Dharma with regard to each and every phenomenal appearance mentioned in these teachings, this is a concentration without either mental engagement or investigation.

“Moreover, Maitreya, mental stillness and insight arising from inquiry consist in a concentration associated with mental engagement and investigation. The mental stillness and insight arising from awakening is a concentration not with mental engagement but with investigation only.¹⁹⁸ The mental stillness and insight taking a universal teaching as its referential object consist in a concentration without either mental engagement or investigation.”

8.18 “Blessed One, what is the cause of mental stillness? What is the cause of setting the mind? What is the cause of equanimity?”

“Maitreya, when one feels excited or feels one might become excited, one directs one’s attention toward phenomena that induce sorrow and the unimpeded mind.¹⁹⁹ This is what is called *the cause of mental stillness*.

“Maitreya, when one feels drowsy or feels one might become drowsy, one directs one’s attention toward phenomena that induce joy and mental appearance.²⁰⁰ This is what is called *the cause of setting the mind*.

“Maitreya, whether one is devoted to mental stillness or insight only, [F.30.a] or practices them in union, when one applies one’s mind without being affected by these two secondary defilements,²⁰¹ [namely agitation and drowsiness,] one directs one’s attention spontaneously. This is what is called *the cause of equanimity*.”

8.19 “Blessed One, the bodhisattvas who practice mental stillness and insight possess the analytical knowledge of designations as well as the analytical knowledge of the objects of designation.²⁰² In what way do they possess these analytical knowledges?”

“Maitreya, the analytical knowledge of designations comprises five points: names, phrases, letters, their individual apprehension, and their collective apprehension. What is a name? It is that which superimposes a so-called essential or distinctive characteristic on the phenomena conducive to affliction and purification for the sake of communication. What is a phrase? It is that which is based on a collection of those very names taken as its support and basis in order to designate objects of affliction and purification. What are letters? They are phonemes acting as the basis for both names and phrases. What is the analytical knowledge that apprehends them individually? It is the analytical knowledge resulting from directing one’s attention toward a specific referential object. What is the analytical knowledge that apprehends them collectively? It is the analytical knowledge resulting from directing one’s attention toward a general referential object. When all these five points are put together, this should be known as *the analytical knowledge of designations*. This is how bodhisattvas possess the analytical knowledge of designations.

“Maitreya, the analytical knowledge of the objects of designation comprises ten points: the diversity of things and the nature of things,²⁰³ the apprehending subject and the apprehended object; the abodes and objects of enjoyment; wrong view and correct view; and the object conducive to affliction and the object conducive to purification. [F.30.b]

1. “Maitreya, all²⁰⁴ the various divisions of phenomena conducive to affliction and purification according to their aspects represent the diversity of things, namely, the fivefold enumeration of the aggregates, the sixfold enumeration of the internal sense domains, the sixfold enumeration of the external sense domains, and so on.

2. “Maitreya, the true reality of all these very phenomena conducive to affliction and purification is the nature of things itself. It has seven aspects:²⁰⁵ (i) the true reality of arising in the sense that all conditioned phenomena are without beginning and end; (ii) the true reality of defining characteristics in the sense that everything, person or phenomenon, is without a self; (iii) the true reality of representations in the sense that all conditioned phenomena are mere representations;²⁰⁶ (iv) the true reality of existence in the sense of the truth of suffering that I have taught; (v) the true reality of mistaken action²⁰⁷ in the sense of the truth of the origin of suffering that I have taught; (vi) the true reality of purification in the sense of the truth of cessation [of suffering] that I have taught; (vii) the true reality of correct action in the sense of the truth of the path that I have taught.

“Maitreya, on account of the true reality of arising, defining characteristics, and existence, all beings are similar and equal. Maitreya, on account of the true reality of defining characteristics and representations, all phenomena are similar and equal. Maitreya, on account of the true reality of purification, the awakening of the hearers, the awakening of the solitary realizers, and the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening are similar and equal. Maitreya, on account of the true reality of correct action, similar and equal too are the wisdoms encompassed by the mental stillness and insight that take as a referential object a universal teaching that has been heard, contemplated, and practiced.²⁰⁸ [F.31.a]

3. “Maitreya, the apprehending subject consists in the phenomena of the five physical sense domains, mind, thought, cognition, and mental states.

4. “Maitreya, the apprehended object consists in the six external sense domains. In addition, Maitreya, apprehending subjects are also apprehended objects.

5. “Maitreya, the objects corresponding to abodes are the worlds of beings, which manifest wherever there are beings: as one, one hundred, one thousand, or one hundred thousand villages; as one, one hundred, one thousand, or one hundred thousand continents; as one, one hundred, one

thousand, or one hundred thousand great continents of Jambudvīpa; as one, one hundred, one thousand, or one hundred thousand times the four great continents; as one, one hundred, one thousand, or one hundred thousand universes of a thousand worlds; as one, one hundred, one thousand, or one hundred thousand bichiliocosms; as one, one hundred, one thousand, one hundred thousand, ten million, one billion, ten billion, one hundred billion, or ten trillion trichiliocosms; as one, one hundred, one thousand, one hundred thousand times an incalculable number of them; or as many as the number of atoms present in one hundred thousand times an incalculable number of trichiliocosms.

6. "Maitreya, I have taught that objects of enjoyment are the assets and belongings owned by beings for the sake of their enjoyment.

7. "Maitreya, a wrong view is a mistaken conception, thought, or view conceiving the impermanent as permanent, suffering as happiness, impurity as purity, or selflessness as self with regard to notions such as an apprehending subject. [F.31.b]

8. "Maitreya, a correct view, being the opposite of a wrong view, is its antidote.

9. "Maitreya, the object conducive to affliction is of three kinds: the object conducive to the affliction comprising the defilements of the three worlds, to the affliction of karma, and to the affliction of arising.

10. "Maitreya, the object conducive to purification consists of all that is in harmony with awakening on account of being free indeed from the three sorts of affliction.

"Maitreya, you should know that all objects of designation are included in these ten points.

8.21 "Moreover, Maitreya, the analytical knowledge of these objects of designation comprises five items. What are they? They are the topics to be comprehended, the objects of designation to be comprehended, comprehension, the result of comprehension, and the communication of this result.

1. "Maitreya, the topics to be comprehended consist of anything that is knowable or perceptible, such as what is referred to as the aggregates, the internal and external sense domains, and so forth.

2. "Maitreya, the objects of designation to be comprehended consist of [all] cognitive objects, however diverse they appear and as they really are: the conventional and the ultimate; shortcomings and qualities; conditions and time; the defining characteristics of arising, abiding, and disintegrating; sickness, old age, and death; suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path leading to the cessation of suffering; true reality, the ultimate limit of existence, and the domain of truth; condensed and

detailed teachings; categorical, analytical, interrogative, and dismissive answers; and secret instructions and proclamations. You should know that these are the objects of designation to be comprehended.

3. “Maitreya, comprehension is grasping both [F.32.a] the topics and the objects of designation to be comprehended, any factor that is in harmony with awakening, such as the applications of mindfulness, the correct self-restraints, and so forth.

4. “Maitreya, the result of comprehension consists of disciplining and completely eliminating desire, anger, and delusion, as well as in actualizing the results of the path of the recluse together with the virtuous qualities of the hearers and tathāgatas I have described as mundane and supramundane, ordinary and extraordinary.

5. “Maitreya, communicating this result consists in revealing what brings about liberation²⁰⁹ on the basis of²¹⁰ the very teachings one has actualized, as well as in propagating these teaching for the sake of others.²¹¹

“Maitreya, you should know that all objects are subsumed within these five points.

8.22 “Maitreya, the bodhisattvas’ analytical knowledge of the objects of designation includes four topics. What are they? They are mental appropriation, experience, affliction, and purification. Maitreya, you should know that all the objects of designation are also included within these four topics.

8.23 “Maitreya, the bodhisattvas’ analytical knowledge of the objects of designation is also presented according to three topics. What are they? They are letters, meanings, and contexts.

1. “Maitreya, you should understand the letters as forming collections of names.

2. “Maitreya, meanings comprise ten aspects: the defining characteristic of true reality, the defining characteristic of comprehension, the defining characteristic of abandonment, the defining characteristic of realization, the defining characteristic of practice, the defining characteristic consisting of these very five defining characteristics, the defining characteristic of the relation between the support and the supported, [F.32.b] the defining characteristic of the phenomena undermining comprehension and so forth, the defining characteristic of the phenomena in harmony with comprehension, and the defining characteristic of the benefits and shortcomings resulting respectively from having comprehension or not.

3. “Maitreya, there are five contexts: the context of the surrounding universe, the context of beings, the context of Dharma, the context of discipline, and the context of methods of discipline.

“Maitreya, you should know that all objects of designation are also included within these three topics.”

8.24 “Blessed One, what differences are made between the comprehension of the objects of designation that is produced by the wisdom arising from hearing the Dharma, the comprehension of the objects of designation that is produced by the wisdom arising from contemplating the Dharma, and the comprehension of the objects of designation that is produced by the wisdom arising from practicing mental stillness and insight?”

“Maitreya, through the wisdom arising from hearing the Dharma, the bodhisattvas rely on the literal meaning of words but not on their underlying intent, which they do not understand; although they are in harmony with liberation, their comprehension is [limited to] the objects of designation that do not liberate them.

“Maitreya, through the wisdom arising from contemplating the Dharma, the bodhisattvas do not rely exclusively on the literal meaning of words but also on the underlying intent, which they understand; although they are in great harmony with liberation, their comprehension is [still limited to] the objects of designation that do not liberate them.

“Maitreya, through the wisdom arising from practicing mental stillness and insight, the bodhisattvas, relying on the literal meaning of words or not, rely on the underlying intent, which they understand by means of an image, an object of concentration corresponding to a cognitive object; they are in great harmony with liberation, and their comprehension includes the objects of designation that liberate them. Maitreya, such is the difference between them.” [F.33.a]

8.25 “Blessed One, what is the gnosis²¹² of the bodhisattvas who practice mental stillness and insight and who comprehend designations as well as objects of designation? What is their perception?”

“Maitreya, I have explained their gnosis²¹³ and perception in many ways, but I will give you a concise explanation. Gnosis consists in the mental stillness and insight that take a universal teaching as a referential object. Perception consists in the mental stillness and insight that take a specific teaching as a referential object.”

8.26 “Blessed One, as bodhisattvas practice mental stillness and insight, which kinds of phenomenal appearance do they discard? How do they direct their attention to achieve this?”

“Maitreya, they discard the phenomenal appearance of designations and objects of designation by directing their attention on true reality. They discard names by not taking the essence of names as a referential object and by not paying attention to the phenomenal appearance that constitutes their basis. You should know that just as it is with names, so it is also with words,

letters, and all objects of designation. Maitreya, they discard letters, meanings, and contexts by not taking their essence as a referential object and by not paying attention to the phenomenal appearance that constitutes their basis.”²¹⁴

8.27 “Blessed One, is phenomenal appearance also discarded with regard to the analytical knowledge of the object of designation corresponding to true reality?”

“Maitreya, if the analytical knowledge of the object of designation corresponding to true reality does not have a phenomenal appearance and does not take a phenomenal appearance as its referential object, then what would be discarded in that case? Maitreya, the analytical knowledge of the object of designation corresponding to true reality disposes of all the phenomenal appearances of designations and objects of designation. But I did not teach that anything at all could dispose of this analytical knowledge.”

8.28 “Blessed One, you have explained by way of analogy that it is impossible to discern one’s own appearance²¹⁵ in a container filled with muddy water, a dirty mirror, or an agitated pond surface, [F.33.b] but that it is possible in a container filled with clear water, a well-polished mirror, or a quiet pond. You have explained that, likewise, the mind of those who do not practice cannot know true reality exactly as it is, whereas the mind of those who do practice can indeed. In reference to this statement, what is this mental inspection?²¹⁶ What true reality do you have in mind here, and what is the meaning of this statement?”

“Maitreya, I spoke those words in reference to the three kinds of mental inspection: the mental inspection arising from hearing the Dharma, the mental inspection arising from contemplating the Dharma, and the mental inspection arising from practicing the Dharma. I taught this having in mind the true reality of representations.”²¹⁷

8.29 “Blessed One, how many kinds of phenomenal appearances did you teach to the bodhisattvas who possess the analytical knowledge of designations and objects of designation and who engage in eliminating phenomenal appearances?”

“Maitreya, there are ten kinds of phenomenal appearances, and these bodhisattvas eliminate them by means of emptiness. What are these ten?

1. “The diverse phenomenal appearances in the way of words and letters through which designations and objects of designation are analytically known—these phenomenal appearances are eliminated by means of the emptiness of all phenomena.”²¹⁸

2. “The phenomenal appearances corresponding to a continuum of arisings and cessations or abidings and transformations through which the object designated as the true reality of existence is analytically known—these phenomenal appearances are eliminated by means of the emptiness of defining characteristic and by the emptiness of what is without beginning and end.

3. “The phenomenal appearances resulting from the belief in a perduring self or the thought, ‘I am,’ through which the object designated as the apprehending subject is analytically known—these phenomenal appearances are eliminated by means of the emptiness of the inner subject and the emptiness of what is not taken as a referential object.²¹⁹

4. “The phenomenal appearances resulting from the belief in objects of enjoyment through which the object designated as the apprehended object is analytically known—these phenomenal appearances are eliminated by means of the emptiness of the outer object.²²⁰

5. “The phenomenal appearances of pleasure within the inner subject and of beauty regarding the outer object through which courtesans²²¹ and possessions are analytically known as objects of enjoyment—these phenomenal appearances are eliminated by means of the emptiness of the outer object and the emptiness of essence. [F.34.a]

6. “The innumerable phenomenal appearances through which objects of designation corresponding to states of existence are analytically known—these phenomenal appearances are eliminated by means of the great emptiness.

7. “With formlessness as a support, the phenomenal appearances of the liberation brought about by inner peace are analytically known—these phenomenal appearances are eliminated by means of the emptiness of conditioned phenomena.

8. “The phenomenal appearance of the selflessness of persons and phenomena, the phenomenal appearance of what is merely a representation, and the phenomenal appearance of the ultimate through which the object of designation corresponding to the true reality of defining characteristics is analytically known—these phenomenal appearances are eliminated by means of the emptiness of the limitless, the emptiness of the substanceless, the emptiness of essence of the substanceless, and the emptiness of the ultimate.

9. “The phenomenal appearances of what is unconditioned and changeless through which the object of designation corresponding to the true reality leading to purification²²² is analytically known—these phenomenal appearances are eliminated by means of the emptiness of the unconditioned and the emptiness devoid of rejection.

10. "The phenomenal appearances of emptiness resulting from directing one's attention toward this very emptiness as an antidote to phenomenal appearances are eliminated by means of the emptiness of emptiness."

8.30 "Blessed One, when bodhisattvas eliminate these ten kinds of phenomenal appearances, which phenomenal appearances do they eliminate and from which binding phenomenal appearances will they be free?"

"Maitreya, by eliminating the object of concentration, the phenomenal appearance corresponding to an image,²²³ bodhisattvas will be free from phenomenal appearances consisting in the phenomenal appearances of affliction, which they will also eliminate.

"Maitreya, you should know that these various kinds of emptiness are the direct antidotes to these various kinds of phenomenal appearance. But it is not the case that each of them is not an antidote to all phenomenal appearances. Maitreya, it is like this: ignorance does not [directly] bring about all afflictions up to old age and death [with regard to the twelve factors of conditioned existence]. Yet, because it is indeed the closely or very closely related condition [for their arising, it does bring them about indirectly]. This is why it is taught that ignorance directly brings about conditioning mental factors. You should consider the present topic in the same way. [F.34.b]

8.31 "Blessed One, what is it that bodhisattvas realize in the context of the Great Vehicle? What is then inherent to the defining characteristic of emptiness that causes bodhisattvas to not deviate from it because of pride?"

Then, the Blessed One said, "Excellent, Maitreya. You question the Tathāgata on this point so that bodhisattvas will not deviate from emptiness. This is excellent indeed. Why? Because, Maitreya, bodhisattvas who deviate from emptiness will also deviate from the entire Great Vehicle. Therefore, listen well, Maitreya, and I will explain to you what is inherent to the defining characteristic of emptiness.

"Maitreya, emptiness as taught in the Great Vehicle means that the other-dependent and actual defining characteristics are completely devoid of the imaginary defining characteristic of affliction and purification and that bodhisattvas do not take this imaginary defining characteristic as a referential object."²²⁴

8.32 "Blessed One, how many types of concentration are included within mental stillness and insight?"

"Maitreya, you should know that they include all the types of concentration of the hearers, bodhisattvas, and tathāgatas that I have taught."

"Blessed One, from which causes do mental stillness and insight arise?"

“Maitreya, they arise from a pure discipline and a pure view resulting from hearing and contemplating [the Dharma] as their causes.”

“Blessed One, please explain what their results are.”

“Maitreya, a pure mind and a pure wisdom are their results. You should know that all mundane and supramundane virtuous qualities of the hearers, the bodhisattvas, and the tathāgatas are also their results.” [F.35.a]

“Blessed One, what is the activity of mental stillness and insight?”

“Maitreya, they liberate one from the two kinds of bonds: the bonds of phenomenal appearance and the bonds of corruption.”

8.33 “Blessed One, among the five obstacles mentioned by the Blessed One, which are obstacles to mental stillness, which are obstacles to insight, and which are obstacles to both?”

“Maitreya, caring²²⁵ about the body and objects of enjoyment is an obstacle to mental stillness. Not obtaining instructions from noble beings as desired is an obstacle to insight. Living in a state of confusion and being content with bare necessities are obstacles to both.²²⁶ On account of the first of these, one will not exert oneself. On account of the second, one will not exert oneself through to the completion of practice.”

“Blessed One, among the five obstructions mentioned by the Blessed One, which are obstructions to mental stillness, which are obstructions to insight, and which are obstructions to both?”

“Maitreya, agitation and remorse are obstructions to mental stillness. Laziness, lethargy, and doubts are obstructions to insight. Craving for desired objects and malicious thoughts are obstructions to both.”

“Blessed One, when is the path of mental stillness purified?”

“At the time when agitation and remorse have been conquered.”

“Blessed One, when is the path of insight purified?”

“At the time when laziness, lethargy, and doubts have been conquered.”²²⁷

8.34 “Blessed One, how many kinds of mental distractions will bodhisattvas engaged in mental stillness and insight experience?”

“Maitreya, they will experience five kinds of mental distractions: the mental distraction with regard to the way one directs one’s attention, the mental distraction with regard to outer objects, the mental distraction with regard to the inner subject, the mental distraction produced by phenomenal appearances, [F.35.b] and the mental distraction resulting from corruption.

1. “Maitreya, if bodhisattvas forsake the way attention is directed in the Great Vehicle²²⁸ and fall into the way hearers and solitary realizers direct their attention, then this is mental distraction regarding the way one directs one’s attention.

2. "If bodhisattvas let their minds wander among the five external objects of desire, entertainments, phenomenal appearances, conceptualizations, defilements, secondary defilements, and external referential objects, then this is mental distraction with regard to outer objects.

3. "If bodhisattvas sink into laziness and lethargy, experience the taste of absorption, or become stained by any secondary defilement related to absorption, then this is mental distraction with regard to the inner subject.

4. "If bodhisattvas direct their attention toward the phenomenal appearance that is the inner subject's object of concentration by relying upon the phenomenal appearances of outer objects, then this is mental distraction produced by phenomenal appearances.

5. "If bodhisattvas become conceited by identifying themselves with the body afflicted by corruption with regard to sensations arising in the course of directing the inner subject's attention, this is mental distraction ensuing from corruption."

8.35 "Blessed One, for which obstacles do mental stillness and insight serve as antidotes from the first stage of the bodhisattva path up to the stage of a tathāgata?"

1. "Maitreya, on the first stage, mental stillness and insight are antidotes to the defilement of bad destinies as well as to the affliction of karma and birth.

2. "On the second stage, they are antidotes to the arising of confusion resulting from subtle transgressions.

3. "On the third stage, they are antidotes to attachment for desirous objects.

4. "On the fourth stage, they are antidotes to craving for absorption and Dharma.

5. "On the fifth stage, they are antidotes to the exclusive rejection of saṃsāra and exclusive inclination toward nirvāṇa.

6. "On the sixth stage, they are antidotes to the abundant arising of phenomenal appearances.

7. "On the seventh stage, they are antidotes to the subtle arising of phenomenal appearances.

8. "On the eighth, they are antidotes to exerting oneself toward what is without phenomenal appearance as well as to not having mastery over phenomenal appearances.

9. On the ninth, they are antidotes to not having mastery in teaching the Dharma in every aspect. [F.36.a]

10. "On the tenth, they are antidotes to not having obtained the perfect analytical knowledge of the truth body.

11. "Maitreya, on the stage of a tathāgata, mental stillness and insight are antidotes to the extremely subtle defiling obstructions and the even more subtle cognitive obstructions.²²⁹ By fully eliminating these obstructions, one abides within the truth body that has been completely purified. As a consequence, one obtains the realization of the object corresponding to the accomplishment of the goal—the gnosis and vision that are utterly free from attachment and hindrance."²³⁰

8.36 "Blessed One, in what way do bodhisattvas obtain mental stillness and insight, so that they will attain the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening?"²³¹

"Maitreya, once bodhisattvas have obtained mental stillness and insight, they consider the seven aspects of true reality.²³² With their minds concentrated on the doctrine that has been heard and contemplated, they direct their attention inwardly toward the true reality that has been well²³³ understood, contemplated, and focused upon. As they direct their attention in this way on true reality, their minds then remain in complete equanimity²³⁴ toward each and every subtle phenomenal appearance that manifests, not to mention coarse ones.

"Maitreya, these subtle phenomenal appearances include the phenomenal appearances appropriated by mind; the phenomenal appearances of experiences, representations, affliction, and purification; the internal or external phenomenal appearances and those that are both internal and external; the phenomenal appearances related to the notion that one must act for the benefit of all beings; the phenomenal appearances of knowledge and suchness; the phenomenal appearances of the four noble truths of suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering, and the path;²³⁵ the phenomenal appearances of the conditioned, the unconditioned, the permanent, the impermanent, and the nature inherent to what is subject to suffering and change [F.36.b] or what is not subject to change; the phenomenal appearance distinct or indistinct from the defining characteristic specific to the conditioned; the phenomenal appearance of everything as a result of having the notion of 'everything' in reference to anything; and the phenomenal appearance of the selflessness of the person and of phenomena. The bodhisattva's mind remains in complete equanimity toward all these phenomenal appearances as they manifest.

"Continually practicing in this way, they will in due time purify their minds from obstacles, obstructions, and distractions. In the course of this practice, the seven aspects of the cognition that is personal and intuitive, the gnosis²³⁶ that is the awakening²³⁷ to the seven aspects of true reality, will arise. Such is the bodhisattvas' path of seeing. By obtaining it, bodhisattvas have entered the faultless state of truth,²³⁸ are born into the lineage of

tathāgatas, and, upon obtaining the first stage, enjoy all the advantages of this stage. Because they have already obtained mental stillness and insight, they have attained their two referential objects: the image with conceptualization and the image without conceptualization. Thus, having obtained the path of seeing, they attain the point where phenomena end.²³⁹

“In the higher stages, they enter the path of practice and direct their attention toward their threefold referential object.²⁴⁰ It is like this: in the way one uses a smaller wedge to pull out a larger one and thus drives out a wedge by means of a wedge, they eliminate all phenomenal appearances related to affliction by eliminating internal phenomenal appearances. When they eliminate them, they also eliminate corruption. By getting rid of phenomenal appearance and corruption, they gradually purify their minds in the higher stages in the way gold is refined. They will attain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening and also obtain the realization of the object corresponding to the accomplishment of the goal.²⁴¹ Thus, Maitreya, [F.37.a] once bodhisattvas have achieved mental stillness and insight in this way, they will attain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening.”

8.37 “How do bodhisattvas practice so that they accomplish the great powers of a bodhisattva?”

“Maitreya, the bodhisattvas who are skillful with regard to these six topics accomplish the great powers of a bodhisattva: (1) the arising of the mind, (2) the underlying condition of the mind, (3) the emergence from the mind, (4) the increase of the mind, (5) the decrease of the mind, (6) and skillful means.

1. “How are they skillful with regard to the arising of the mind? They are skillful with regard to the arising of the mind as it is if they know the sixteen ways in which mind arises:²⁴² (i) the representation that is a support and receptacle, for example, the appropriating cognition;²⁴³ (ii) the representation that is a variegated image of a referential object, for example, the mental cognition of conceptualizations that simultaneously apprehends forms and so on, or that simultaneously apprehends outer and inner objects, or that in a single instant simultaneously settles in several states of concentration, perceives numerous buddha fields, or sees many tathāgatas—being nothing but the mental cognition of conceptualizations; (iii) the representation taking limited phenomenal appearances as its object, for example, the mind related to the [realm of] desire; (iv) the representation taking vast phenomenal appearances as its object, for example, the mind related to the [realm of] form; (v) the representation taking immeasurable phenomenal appearances as its object, for example, the mind related to the domain of limitless space and limitless cognition; (vi) the representation taking subtle phenomenal appearances as its object, for example, the mind related to the domain of

nothingness; (vii) the representation taking ultimate phenomenal appearances as its object, for example, the mind related to the domain of neither conception nor lack of conception; (viii) the representation that does not have phenomenal appearance [as its object], for example, the supramundane mind and the mind having cessation as its object; [F.37.b] (ix) the representation involving suffering, for example, the mind of hell beings; (x) the representation involving mixed sensations, for example, the mind experienced in the [realm of] desire; (xi) the representation involving joy, for example, the mind belonging to the first and second meditative absorptions; (xii) the representation involving bliss, for example, the mind belonging to the third meditative absorption; (xiii) the representation involving neither suffering nor bliss, for example, the mind belonging to the fourth meditative absorption up to the domain of neither conception nor lack of conception; (xiv) the representation involving defilements, for example, the mind associated with defilements and secondary defilements; (xv) the representation involving virtue, for example, the mind associated with faith and so on; and (xvi) the neutral representation, for example, the mind that is not associated with either defilement or virtue.

2. "How are they skillful with regard to the underlying condition of the mind? They are skillful when they cognize the true reality of representations as it truly is."²⁴⁴

3. "How are they skillful with regard to the emergence from the mind? They are skillful when they cognize the as they truly are the two bonds, namely, the bonds of phenomenal appearance and corruption.

4. "How are they skillful with regard to the increase of the mind? They are skillful when they cognize as such the arising and increase of the mind at the moment when the mind that is the antidote to phenomenal appearance and corruption arises and increases.

5. "How are they skillful with regard to the decrease of the mind? They are skillful when they cognize as such the decrease and decline of the mind at the moment when the mind afflicted by the adverse factors of phenomenal appearance and corruption decreases and declines.

6. "How are they skilled in terms of means? They are skillful when they practice the eight liberations, the eight domains of mastery, and the ten domains of totality.

"Maitreya, in this way bodhisattvas have accomplished, do accomplish, and will accomplish the great powers of a bodhisattva. [F.38.a]"

8.38

"The Blessed One said that all sensations have come to complete cessation in the domain of the nirvāṇa with no aggregates remaining. What are then those sensations?"²⁴⁵

“Maitreya, in brief, two kinds of sensations cease: (1) the sensations²⁴⁶ arising from corruption incumbent on being alive and (2) the sensations arising from their resulting objects.

1. “Among those, the sensations arising from corruption related to one’s existence are of four kinds: (i) sensations arising from physical corruption, (ii) sensations arising from nonphysical corruption, (iii) sensations arising from corruption currently brought to fruition, and (iv) sensations arising from corruption not yet brought to fruition.

“Sensations arising from corruption brought to fruition refer to present sensations, whereas sensations arising from sensations not yet brought to fruition refer to sensations that are the causes for future sensations.

2. “The sensations of their resulting objects are also of four kinds: (i) sensations related to places, (ii) sensations related to necessities, (iii) sensations related to enjoyments, and (iv) sensations related to relations.

“Moreover, there are sensations in the domain of the nirvāṇa with aggregates remaining. Although these include sensations not yet brought to fruition,²⁴⁷ their opposites, the experience of sensations arising from present sensations, have not completely ceased. They are experienced as a mixture of pleasant and unpleasant sensations. Both kinds of sensation already brought to fruition have completely ceased. Only the category of sensations arising from present sensations are experienced. In the domain of the nirvāṇa with no aggregates remaining, even this will cease when one passes into parinirvāṇa. This is why I said that all sensations have come to a complete cessation in the domain of the nirvāṇa with no aggregates remaining.”

8.39 Thereupon, the Blessed One spoke these words to the bodhisattva Maitreya: “Maitreya, you questioned the Tathāgata with determination and skill regarding the perfect and pure path of yoga. This is excellent. I taught that this path of yoga is perfect and pure, and exactly²⁴⁸ so I have [F.38.b] taught and will teach all the perfect buddhas of the past and the future. The sons and daughters of noble family should devote themselves to this path with great effort.”²⁴⁹

8.40 Then, at that moment,²⁵⁰ the Blessed One spoke these verses:

“This presentation of the teachings by means of designations
Is thoughtful and of great significance for [the practice of this] yoga.²⁵¹
Those who, by relying on this Dharma,
Correctly devote themselves to this yoga will attain awakening.²⁵²

“Those who, seeking liberation, study the entire Dharma
By looking for faults and disputing it
Are, Maitreya, as far from this yoga
As is the sky from the earth.²⁵³

“Wise²⁵⁴ and skilled in the real meaning²⁵⁵ of benefiting beings
Is the one who does not strive to benefit beings thinking they will reward
him.²⁵⁶

The one expecting a reward will indeed²⁵⁷ not obtain
The joy that is both²⁵⁸ supreme and free from covetousness.²⁵⁹

“Those who grant Dharma instructions [to obtain] desirous objects
Have renounced desirous objects and yet²⁶⁰ still accept them.
Although these fools have obtained the priceless and faultless²⁶¹ jewel of
Dharma,
They wander like beggars.²⁶²

“Therefore, with great effort
Strive to abandon disputation, distractions, and mental elaborations.
In order to liberate the world of beings including the gods,
Devote yourself to this yoga.”

8.41 Then, the bodhisattva Maitreya asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, what is the name of the teaching imparted in this Dharma discourse that unravels the Tathāgata’s intent? How should I keep it in mind?”²⁶³

The Blessed One answered, “Maitreya, this is a teaching of definitive meaning on yoga. Keep it in mind as *The Teaching of Definitive Meaning on Yoga*.” As the Blessed One expounded this teaching, six hundred thousand beings produced the mind directed at the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening, three hundred thousand hearers [F.39.a] purified the Dharma eye from impurities and contaminations; one hundred and fifty hearers who were without attachment liberated their minds from all outflows; and seventy-five thousand bodhisattvas attained the state wherein their attention was directed toward the great yoga.²⁶⁴

This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Maitreya—the eighth chapter.

9.

CHAPTER 9

9.1 Then the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara addressed the Blessed One, “Blessed One, the ten stages of the bodhisattva are called (1) Utmost Joy, (2) Stainless, (3) Illuminating, (4) Radiant, (5) Hard to Conquer, (6) Manifest, (7) Far Reaching, (8) Immovable, (9) Excellent Intelligence, and (10) Cloud of Dharma. When taken together with the eleventh, [called] Buddha Stage, in how many kinds of purification and subdivisions are they included?”

9.2 The Blessed One answered, “Avalokiteśvara, you should know that they are included in four kinds of purification and eleven subdivisions.

“Avalokiteśvara, you should know that the first stage is included in the purification of intention; the second, in the purification of superior discipline; and the third, in the purification of superior mind; while stages four to eleven are included in the purification of superior wisdom, which gradually leads to perfection from stage to stage. These stages are thus included in four kinds of purification.

9.3 “What are the eleven levels—the subdivisions including the ten stages of the bodhisattva and the Buddha Stage?

1. “On the first level consisting of actions based on superior²⁶⁵ devotion, bodhisattvas cultivate superior devotion and patience²⁶⁶ by engaging in the ten practices related to Dharma.²⁶⁷ Once they have passed beyond this stage, they will enter the faultless state of truth of the bodhisattvas.²⁶⁸

2. “Although the first level is accomplished by these practices, [F.39.b] the second level is not, because the bodhisattvas are still unable to act while being aware of confusion resulting from subtle transgressions. By striving to accomplish this level, they will succeed.

3. “Although the second level is accomplished by this practice, the third level is not, because the bodhisattvas are still unable to settle into a perfect mundane concentration and recollect what they have heard. By striving to accomplish this level, they will succeed.

4. “However, the fourth level is not thereby accomplished, because the bodhisattvas, who frequently engage in practicing the awakening factors²⁶⁹ in the way they obtained them, are still unable to settle their minds due to attachment to states of absorption and the teaching.²⁷⁰ By striving to accomplish this level, they will succeed.

5. “Although the fourth level is accomplished through this practice, the fifth level is not, because the bodhisattvas are still unable to fully examine the truths or settle in superior equanimity regarding saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, which they exclusively reject or focus upon, respectively. They are still unable to practice the awakening factors in conjunction with skillful means. By striving to accomplish this level, they will succeed.

6. “Although the fifth level is accomplished by this practice, the sixth level is not, because, even once they have recognized the activities of conditioned states for what they are, the bodhisattvas are still unable to maintain for long an aversion toward them. They are also still unable to remain for long directing their attention toward what lacks phenomenal appearances. By striving to accomplish this level, they will succeed.

7. “Although the sixth level is accomplished by this practice, the seventh level is not, because the bodhisattvas are still unable to remain without hindrance and interruption while directing their attention toward what lacks phenomenal appearance. By striving to accomplish this level, they will succeed. [F.40.a]

8. “Although the seventh level is accomplished by this practice, the eighth level is not, because the bodhisattvas are still unable to rest in equanimity while striving to abide in what lacks phenomenal appearance. They are also still unable to attain mastery over phenomenal appearance. By striving to accomplish this level, they will succeed.

9. “Although the eighth level is accomplished by this practice, the ninth level is not because the bodhisattvas are still unable to masterfully teach the Dharma in all its aspects by using synonyms, definitions, explanations, and categories. By striving to accomplish this level, they will succeed.

10. “Although the ninth level is accomplished by this practice, the tenth level is not because the bodhisattvas are still unable to obtain the analytical knowledge of the perfect truth body. By striving to accomplish this level, they will succeed.

11. “Although the ninth level is accomplished by this practice, the tenth level is not because the bodhisattvas are still unable to obtain the gnosis and vision that are utterly free from attachment and hindrance regarding all cognitive objects.²⁷¹ By striving to accomplish this level, they will succeed.

“Since this level is accomplished by this practice, all levels are accomplished. Avalokiteśvara, you should know that all the stages are included in these eleven levels.”

9.4 “Blessed One, why is the first stage called Utmost Joy? Why are the other stages up to the Buddha Stage called what they are?”

1. “The first stage is called Utmost Joy because there is a supreme and immense joy in attaining the immaculate and sublime purpose, the supramundane mind.

2. The second stage is called Stainless because it is free from all stains consisting in [even] subtle transgressions or faulty discipline.²⁷²

3. The third stage is called Illuminating because it is the very state of concentration and recollection imbued with the immeasurable light of gnosis.²⁷³ [F.40.b]

4. The fourth stage is called Radiant because the fire of gnosis produced by the practice of the awakening factors is set ablaze²⁷⁴ in order to burn the fuel of afflictions.

5. The fifth stage is called Hard to Conquer because it is difficult indeed to master the practice of these very awakening factors in conjunction with skillful means.²⁷⁵

6. The sixth stage is called Manifest because the activity of conditioning mental factors becomes manifest, as does the bodhisattvas’ attention that is repeatedly directed toward what lacks phenomenal appearance.

7. The seventh stage is called Far Reaching because once the bodhisattvas engage for a long time without hindrance and interruption while directing their attention toward what lacks phenomenal appearance, this stage is connected with the subsequent stages of purification.

8. The eighth stage is called Immovable because what lacks phenomenal appearance is spontaneously accomplished and the bodhisattvas are unshaken by the manifestation of defilements resulting from phenomenal appearance.

9. The ninth stage is called Excellent Intelligence because the bodhisattvas obtain a vast intelligence that flawlessly masters all aspects related to teaching the Dharma.

10. The tenth stage is called Cloud of Dharma because the body afflicted by corruption, which is as empty as the sky, is pervaded and covered by the accumulation of Dharma²⁷⁶ that is like a [great] cloud.²⁷⁷

11. The eleventh stage is called Buddha Stage because once one has abandoned the most subtle defiling and cognitive obstructions, one completely and perfectly awakens and knows all aspects to be known,²⁷⁸ without attachment and hindrance.”

“Blessed One, how many kinds of delusion and adverse factors of corruption are there on these stages?”

“Avalokiteśvara, there are twenty-two kinds of delusion and eleven adverse factors of corruption:

1. “On the first stage, there is the delusion of wrongly conceiving the person and phenomena, the delusion of bad destinies, and the adverse factor of the corruption resulting from these.

2. “On the second stage, there is the delusion of confusion resulting from subtle transgressions, [F.41.a] the delusion related to the various aspects of the maturation of karma, and the adverse factor of the corruption resulting from these two.

3. “On the third stage, there is the delusion of desire, the delusion of perfectly remembering what was heard, and the adverse factor of the corruption resulting from these.

4. “On the fourth stage, there is the delusion of attachment to the states of absorption, the delusion of attachment to Dharma, and the adverse factor of the corruption resulting from these.

5. “On the fifth stage, there is the delusion of attending to saṃsāra as exclusively negative or positive, the delusion of attending to nirvāṇa as exclusively negative or positive, and the adverse factor of the corruption resulting from these.

6. “On the sixth stage, there is the delusion of making manifest the activity of conditioning mental factors, the delusion of the many manifesting phenomenal appearances, and the adverse factor of corruption resulting from these.²⁷⁹

7. “On the seventh stage, there is the delusion of the manifestation of subtle phenomenal appearances, the delusion toward skillful means since one’s attention is exclusively directed toward what lacks phenomenal appearance, and the adverse factor of the corruption resulting from these.

8. “On the eighth stage, there is the delusion of exerting oneself toward what lacks phenomenal appearance, the delusion of not having mastery over phenomenal appearances, and the adverse factor of the corruption resulting from these.

9. “On the ninth stage, there is the delusion of having mastery in the boundless teaching and expression of Dharma, the delusion of having mastery in continuously keeping it in mind in terms of wisdom and eloquence,²⁸⁰ the delusion of having command of eloquent speech, and the adverse factor consisting in the corruption resulting from these two types of delusion.

10. "On the tenth stage, there is the delusion with regard to the sublime superior knowledge, the delusion of engaging in what is secret and subtle, and the adverse factor consisting of the corruption resulting from these two.

11. "On the Buddha Stage, there is the delusion of the extremely subtle attachment to cognitive objects, the delusion of the extremely subtle hindrance related to defilements, and the adverse factor consisting of the corruption resulting from these two. [F.41.b]

"Avalokiteśvara, this is a presentation of the stages according to twenty-two kinds of delusion and eleven types of corruption. The unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening does not have any of them."

"In which case,²⁸¹ Blessed One, the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening, the most sublime blessing and result, is truly wondrous! Once bodhisattvas have torn the great net of delusion in this fashion and gone beyond the vast jungle of corruption, they will awaken to the complete and perfect enlightenment."²⁸²

9.6 "Blessed One, through how many kinds of purifications are these stages presented?"

"Avalokiteśvara, they are presented through eight purifications: (1) the purification of intention, (2) the purification of the mind, (3) the purification of compassion, (4) the purification of the perfections, (5) the purification of the vision of buddhas and of their veneration, (6) the purification of bringing beings to maturity, (7) the purification of birth, and (8) the purification of power.

"Avalokiteśvara, you should know that the purifications on the first stage, from the purification of superior intention up to the purification of power, as well as the purifications on the higher stages including the Buddha Stage, from the purification of superior intention up to the purification of power, become more and more intense.²⁸³ Thus, if one excepts the purification of birth on the Buddha Stage, the qualities on the first stage seem similar to those of the higher stages. However, you should know that the qualities of each higher stage are superior to those on the former stage. You should also understand that the qualities on the ten stages of a bodhisattva can be surpassed, whereas the qualities on the Buddha Stage are unsurpassable."

9.7 "Blessed One, why did you declare that, among all kinds of birth, the birth of a bodhisattva is supreme?" [F.42.a]

"Avalokiteśvara, it is supreme for four reasons: (1) it accomplishes the great purification of one's roots of virtue, (2) it is appropriated as a result of mental inspection, (3) it is imbued with the compassion that protects all beings, and (4) it is not itself afflicted, but it repels the afflictions of others."

9.8 “Blessed One, why did you declare that bodhisattvas practice with a vast aspiration, are sublime, have a sublime aspiration, and possess the force of aspiration?”

“Avalokiteśvara, [I declared this] for four reasons: (1) bodhisattvas are skilled with respect to the blissful state of nirvāṇa, (2) they are able to attain it swiftly, (3) they have both given up this swift attainment and this blissful state, and (4) without wavering or being compelled,²⁸⁴ they mentally produce the aspiration to go for a long time through many kinds of suffering for the sake of beings. Therefore, I said that bodhisattvas possess a vast aspiration, a sublime aspiration, and the force of aspiration.”

9.9 “Blessed One, how many foundations of training do the bodhisattvas have?”

“Avalokiteśvara, they have six: generosity, discipline, patience, diligence, meditative absorption, and wisdom.”

“Blessed One, among those six, how many constitute the training in superior discipline, how many constitute the training in superior mind, and how many constitute the training in superior wisdom?”

“Avalokiteśvara, you should know that the first three constitute the training in superior discipline, meditative absorption constitutes the training in superior mind, wisdom constitutes the training in superior wisdom, and diligence is present in each of these trainings.” [F.42.b]

“Blessed One, how many of these foundations of training constitute the accumulation of merit? How many constitute the accumulation of gnosis?”

“Avalokiteśvara, the training in superior discipline constitutes the accumulation of merit. The training in superior wisdom constitutes the accumulation of gnosis. Diligence and meditative absorption are present in both.”

“Blessed One, how do bodhisattvas train in these six foundations of training?”

“Avalokiteśvara, they train in these six foundations of training according to five points: (1) by having devotion from the beginning for the teaching of the pure Dharma, for the teaching of the six perfections, and for the collection of teachings on the bodhisattva [path]; (2) by accomplishing next the wisdom arising from hearing, contemplating, and practicing [the truth] through the ten activities related to Dharma; (3) by preserving the awakening mind; (4) by relying upon a virtuous friend; and (5) by continuously practicing virtue.”

“Blessed One, why are the foundations of training known in terms of a sixfold classification?”

“Avalokiteśvara, there are two reasons: (1) they benefit beings and (2) they are antidotes to defilements. You should know that, among them, three benefit beings while three are antidotes to defilements.

1. “Through their generosity, bodhisattvas benefit beings by providing them with what is necessary to life; through their discipline, they benefit beings by not impoverishing them, harming them, or ridiculing them; and through their patience, they benefit beings by enduring impoverishment, harm, and ridicule. Thus, they benefit beings through these three foundations of training.

2. “Through their diligence they apply themselves to the virtue that completely overcomes defilements and eliminates them, since defilements are unable to deflect them from this practice; through their meditative absorption [F.43.a] they destroy defilements; and through their wisdom they put an end to their latent dispositions. Thus, these three foundations of training are antidotes to defilements.”

9.10 “Blessed One, why are the other perfections known in terms of a fourfold classification?”

“Avalokiteśvara, it is because they assist these six perfections:

1. “With the first three perfections, bodhisattvas benefit beings. Then, they establish beings in virtue through the skillful means consisting of the four methods of conversion. Therefore, I taught that the perfection of skillful means assists the first three perfections.

2. “Avalokiteśvara, suppose the bodhisattvas are unable to practice at all times in this life as a result of their many defilements. Suppose they are unable to focus their minds within due to the weakness of their superior intention as a result of their limited experience²⁸⁵ and aspiration. Suppose they are unable to accomplish the supramundane wisdom because they did not practice the meditative absorption based on the referential objects corresponding to the teachings on the bodhisattva path they have heard. However, since they have accumulated merit, even to a limited extent, they produce with their minds the aspiration that their defilements will decrease in the future. This is the perfection of aspiration. Because defilements decrease and bodhisattvas are able to exert their diligence through this perfection, the perfection of aspiration therefore assists the perfection of diligence.

3. “Then, relying on a noble being and on hearing the Dharma, they attain the state in which they direct their attention on discipline. Once they have turned away from having a superior intention whose power is limited, they obtain the power of intention of the heavenly realms.²⁸⁶ This is the perfection

of power. Because bodhisattvas are able to focus on their minds within through this perfection, the perfection of power therefore assists the perfection of meditative absorption. [F.43.b]

4. "The bodhisattvas settle in meditative absorption as they practice the referential objects corresponding to the teachings on the bodhisattva path they have heard. This is the perfection of wisdom. Because bodhisattvas are able to accomplish supramundane wisdom through this perfection, the perfection of gnosis therefore assists the perfection of wisdom."

9.11 "Blessed One, why should one know that the six perfections are taught in this order?"

"Avalokiteśvara, it is because the former is the support on which the latter is established, and so on and so forth. By not fixating on their bodies and possessions, bodhisattvas acquire discipline. By maintaining their discipline, they take possession of patience. Through patience, they engage in diligence. By having engaged in diligence, they establish meditative absorption. Once meditative absorption is established, they will obtain the supramundane wisdom."

9.12 "Blessed One, of how many kinds are these perfections?"

"Avalokiteśvara, each of these perfections is of three kinds:

1. "The three kinds of generosity are the gift of Dharma, the gift of material objects, and the gift of fearlessness.

2. "The three kinds of discipline are the discipline that turns away from what is not virtuous, the discipline that engages in virtue, and the discipline that engages in benefiting beings.

3. "The three kinds of patience are the patience of enduring harm, the patience of not considering [one's own] suffering, and the patient acceptance of Dharma by means of reflection.²⁸⁷

4. "The three kinds of diligence are the diligence that is like armor, the diligence to practice virtue, and the diligence to benefit beings.

5. "The three kinds of meditative absorption are the meditative absorption of blissful abiding that, nonconceptual and peaceful, is an antidote to defilements and suffering, the meditative absorption that brings about good qualities, and the meditative absorption that accomplishes the welfare of beings. [F.44.a]

6. "The three kinds of wisdom are the wisdom that takes the conventional truth as its referential object, the wisdom that takes the ultimate truth as its referential object, and the wisdom that takes the welfare of beings as its referential object."

9.13 "Blessed One, why are the perfections called 'perfections'?"

“Avalokiteśvara, this is for five reasons. The perfections are without attachment, disinterested, free from faults, nonconceptual, and dedication of merit:

1. “Being without attachment, they are completely devoid of attachment to factors adverse to themselves.

2. “Being disinterested, they are free from thoughts fixating on results or on some reward obtained from their accomplishment.

3. “Being free from faults, they are not involved with afflicted phenomena and lack unskillful means.

4. “Being nonconceptual, they are free from any literal assumption of having a defining characteristic specific to them.

5. “Being dedication of merit, they are the aspiration for the result of the bodhisattva path by having produced and accumulated²⁸⁸ these perfections.”

9.14 “Blessed One, what are the factors adverse to the perfections?”

“Avalokiteśvara, you should know that there are six factors: (1) considering as beneficial the joy produced by desirous objects, (2) indulging into pleasurable activities through one’s body, speech, or mind, (3) not enduring contempt with patience, (4) invoking merit to justify one’s lack of diligence, (5) being distracted by occupations, entertainment, and people, and (6) considering as beneficial the conventional mental elaborations arising from what one sees, hears, thinks, or is conscious of.”

9.15 “Blessed One, what is the result of the maturation of these perfections?”

“Avalokiteśvara, [F.44.b] you should know that there are six: (1) great wealth, (2) rebirth in pleasant destinies, (3) happiness and satisfaction from peace and concord, (4) sovereignty over beings, (5) the absence of physical harm, and (6) the renown of having great powers.”

9.16 “Blessed One, how are these perfections involved with afflicted phenomena?”

“Avalokiteśvara, they are involved through four practices: (1) the practice of the perfections without compassion, (2) the improper practice of the perfections, (3) the irregular practice of the perfections, and (4) the negligent practice of the perfections.

“The improper practice of the perfections occurs when the practice of one of these perfections impairs the practice of the other perfections.”

9.17 “Blessed One, what are unskillful means?”

“Avalokiteśvara, the bodhisattvas assist beings by means of these perfections. If they do not establish beings in virtue once they have pulled them from nonvirtuous states and instead are satisfied to merely provide material objects to them, this is unskillful means. Why? Avalokiteśvara, one does not assist beings by merely doing this. It is like this: excrements,

whether in large or small quantity, cannot be made to smell good by any method²⁸⁹ whatsoever. Likewise, no method that merely supports beings with material objects can make happy those who are suffering because their nature is to experience the suffering arising from being conditioned.²⁹⁰ In contrast, establishing them in virtue is the best and only way to benefit them.”

9.18 “Blessed One, how many kinds of purification are [included] in these perfections?”

“Avalokiteśvara, I did not state that there were other purifications apart from the five kinds [I have already mentioned].²⁹¹ However, in relation to what I have already explained, [F.45.a] I will clarify for you the (1) general and (2) specific purifications included in the perfections.

1. “You should know that the general purifications that are common to all perfections include seven points: (1) bodhisattvas do not seek to make a profit from others through the teachings on the bodhisattva path; (2) they do not produce wrong conceptions with regard to these teachings; (3) with respect to these teachings, they do not give rise to indecision or doubts as to whether they will attain awakening or not; (4) they do not praise themselves, nor do they blame others or despise them; (5) they do not generate arrogance or carelessness; (6) they are not satisfied with only limited or inferior attainments; and (7) they are not stingy or envious of others because of these teachings.

2. “You should know that the purifications specific to each perfection also includes seven points:

“The seven points of the purification included in the perfection of generosity are as follows: (1) bodhisattvas practice generosity that is the purification of generosity through the purification²⁹² of the object that is the gift, and (2–7) they practice generosity that is the purification of generosity through the purification of discipline, view, mind, speech, knowledge, and stains. Thus, as I have just explained, the purifications included in the perfection of generosity that bodhisattvas obtain and practice constitute the seven aspects of the purification of generosity.

“The seven points of the purification included in the perfection of discipline are as follows: (1) bodhisattvas are skilled in all aspects of the foundation of training related to vows, (2) they are skilled in removing transgressions, (3) their discipline is free from doubts, (4) they have a firm discipline, (5) they maintain discipline in all circumstances, (6) they engage in discipline at all times, and (7) they engage in the training by correctly practicing the foundations of training. These are the seven aspects of the purification of discipline.

“The seven points of the purification included in the perfection of patience are as follows: (1) when confronted with any kind of adversity, bodhisattvas do not waver because they are confident in the maturation of their karma; [F.45.b] (2) they do not engage in harming others by abusing, insulting, striking, intimidating, or criticizing them in order to retaliate; (3) they do not hold grudges; (4) when accused,²⁹³ they do not give rise to defilements; (5) they themselves do not indulge in accusations; (6) they do not practice patience with a mind that is fearful of consequences or interested; and (7) they do not fail to accomplish others’ benefit. These are the seven purifications of patience.

“The seven points of the purification included in the perfection of diligence are as follows: (1) bodhisattvas understand the equanimity of diligence; (2) with reference to diligence, they neither praise themselves nor deprecate others; (3–6) they are powerful, diligent, enthusiastic, and resolute; and (7) they never cease to be diligent with respect to virtuous qualities. These are the seven purifications of diligence.

“The seven points of the purification included in the perfection of meditative absorption are (1) the meditative absorption in the concentration that understands phenomenal appearance, (2) the perfect meditative absorption in concentration, (3) the meditative absorption in the concentration that has these two aspects, (4) the meditative absorption in the spontaneously arising concentration, (5) the meditative absorption in the concentration without support, (6) the meditative absorption in the concentration that produces flexibility, and (7) the meditative absorption in the concentration in the boundless practice of the referential objects corresponding to the teachings on the bodhisattva path. These are the seven purifications of meditative absorption.

“The seven points of the purification included in the perfection of wisdom are as follows: (1) Once they have abandoned the extremes of superimposition and negation by means of wisdom, bodhisattvas emerge [from cyclic existence] through the middle path. (2) On account of this wisdom, they realize the very meaning of the gate to liberation exactly as it is, namely, the threefold gate to liberation: emptiness, wishlessness, and appearancelessness. (3) They realize exactly as it is the very meaning of essence, namely, the threefold essence: the imaginary, the other-dependent, and the actual. (4) They realize exactly as it is the very meaning of essencelessness, namely, the threefold essencelessness regarding defining characteristics, arising, and the ultimate. [F.46.a] (5) They realize exactly as it is the very meaning of the conventional truth in relation to the five sciences.²⁹⁴ (6) They realize exactly as it is the very meaning of the ultimate truth with respect to the seven aspects of true reality. (7) They frequently

abide in the unique approach of the nonconceptual state free of mental elaborations. By means of the insight that takes countless universal teachings as its referential object, they correctly accomplish the attainment resulting from the practice of the teachings that are in harmony with Dharma. You should know that these are the seven purifications of meditative absorption."

9.19 "Blessed One, what is the function of each of these five purifications?"

"Avalokiteśvara, you should know that the five functions are as follows: (1) Having no attachment, the bodhisattvas continuously practice the perfections in this life. Because they practice them with enthusiasm, they are conscientious. (2) Being disinterested, they obtain the cause for the careful practice of these perfections in their future lives. (3) Free of any wrongdoing, they practice the perfect, pure, and stainless perfections. (4) Unburdened by conceptions, they swiftly perfect the perfections through their skillful means. (5) Because they transfer their merit, they will attain in all their future lives the inexhaustible perfections together with the desirable results produced by the maturation of their karma, until they obtain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening."

9.20 "Blessed One, what is the vastness of the bodhisattvas' practice of these perfections?"

"Avalokiteśvara, bodhisattvas are without attachment and disinterested, and they transfer their merit."

"In what way are they without afflictions?"

"They are free of any wrongdoing and conceptions."

"In what way are they stainless?"

"They act as they mentally inspect."

"In what way are they immovable?"

"They are said to be immovable because this is the nature of those who have entered the stages of a bodhisattva." [F.46.b]

"In what way are the perfections utterly pure?"

"Avalokiteśvara, they are included within the tenth stage and the Buddha Stage."

9.21 "Blessed One, why is the desirable result of the maturation resulting from the practice of the perfections always inexhaustible²⁹⁵ in the case of the bodhisattvas? Why do they obtain this inexhaustibility through the perfections?"

"Avalokiteśvara, it is because they practice each perfection²⁹⁶ in dependence upon the others."

9.22 "Blessed One, why is it that bodhisattvas do not have faith in the desirable result of the maturation resulting from the practice of the perfections in the way they have faith in the perfections?"

“Avalokiteśvara, this is due to five reasons: (1) The perfections are the cause for the highest bliss and happiness, (2) they are the cause for the benefit of oneself and others, (3) they are the cause for the desirable result of their maturation in future lives, (4) they are the foundation of the freedom from afflictions, and (5) they have the nature of immutability.”

9.23 “Blessed One, what are their specific powers?”

“Avalokiteśvara, you should know that their specific powers have the following four qualities: (1) When the bodhisattvas practice the perfections, they eliminate adverse factors, such as greed, faulty discipline, mental agitation, laziness, distraction, and wrong views; (2) they will attain the unsurpassable, complete and perfect awakening; (3) in this life, they will benefit themselves as well as beings; and (4) in future lives they will attain the desirable result of their maturation, which is vast and inexhaustible.”

9.24 “Blessed One, from what cause do these perfections arise? What are their result and benefit?”

“Avalokiteśvara, the perfections have compassion as their cause. As result, they have the desirable result of their maturation and [F.47.a] the result accomplishing the benefit of beings. As benefit, they have the great benefit of accomplishing the great awakening.”

9.25 “Blessed One, if the bodhisattvas have inexhaustible resources as well as compassion for beings, why are there poor people in the world?”

“Avalokiteśvara, this is nothing but the fault resulting from beings’ own karma. If it were not so, if no obstruction were brought about by beings’ own faults, bodhisattvas could at all times engage in compassionate activities toward them. As bodhisattvas have inexhaustible resources, how could the vision of suffering manifest? Avalokiteśvara, it is like this: hungry ghosts whose bodies are tormented by thirst perceive the waters of the ocean as a dry and barren place. This is not the fault of the ocean but the fault resulting from the maturation of nothing but these hungry ghosts’ own karma. Likewise, the absence of result is not the fault of the bodhisattvas’ generosity, which is like the ocean, but the fault of beings themselves, the fault resulting from the karma of those who are like hungry ghosts.”

9.26 “Blessed One, through which perfection do bodhisattvas apprehend essencelessness?”²⁹⁷

“Avalokiteśvara, they apprehend it through the perfection of wisdom.”

“Blessed One, when they apprehend essencelessness through the perfection of wisdom, why then do they not apprehend that essencelessness has an essence?”²⁹⁸

“Avalokiteśvara, I did not declare that essencelessness is apprehended by means of an essence.²⁹⁹ However, if one does not use expressions to teach, it is impossible to explain that this essencelessness is inexpressible and

cognized intuitively. On this basis, I said that they perceive essencelessness.”

9.27 “Blessed One, what is called perfection, immediate perfection,³⁰⁰ and great perfection?” [F.47.b]

1. “Avalokiteśvara, bodhisattvas possess virtuous qualities, generosity and so on, that they have practiced over immeasurable periods of time. But when defilements arise in them, they are unable to overcome them and, instead, are overcome by them. Thus, this inferior and intermediate aspiration on the stage where one proceeds by means of aspiration is called *perfection*.

2. “Then, bodhisattvas possess virtuous qualities that they have practiced during further immeasurable periods of time. When defilements arise in them, these bodhisattvas overcome them and cannot be overcome by them. Thus, taking hold of these qualities beginning with the first stage is called *immediate perfection*.

3. “Next, bodhisattvas possess virtuous qualities that they have practiced during even longer immeasurable periods of time. In the bearer of such qualities, no defilement arises at all. Thus, taking hold of these qualities beginning with the eighth stage is called *great perfection*.”³⁰¹

9.28 “Blessed One, how many kinds of latent dispositions toward defilements are there on the stages?”

“Avalokiteśvara, there are three.”³⁰²

1. “The latent dispositions that destroy the factors conducive to the manifestation of defilements are as follows: on the first five stages, the factors conducive to the manifestation of innate defilements are non-innate defilements. At that point, these factors do not manifest. As a consequence, these latent dispositions are called *latent dispositions that destroy the factors conducive [to the manifestation of defilements]*.

2. “The latent dispositions of limited power are as follows: on the sixth and seventh stages, subtle aspects of the latent dispositions manifest and through practice are suppressed. Therefore, as a consequence of this subtle manifestation, these latent dispositions are called *latent dispositions of limited power*.

3. “The subtle latent dispositions are as follows: on the eighth stage and above, defilements do not manifest at all because there only remain cognitive obstructions to be cleared. Therefore, these latent dispositions are called *subtle latent dispositions*.”

9.29 “Blessed One, how many kinds of elimination of corruption characterize these latent dispositions?”³⁰³

“Avalokiteśvara, there are three kinds:³⁰⁴ (1) the elimination of superficial corruption characterizes the first and the second type of latent dispositions]³⁰⁵ (2) the elimination of deeper corruption characterizes [F.48.a] the third type of latent dispositions, and (3) since the elimination of the innermost corruption is the state in which there are no latent dispositions at all, I have taught that it is the Buddha Stage.”

9.30 “Blessed One, after how many eons are these types of corruption eliminated?”

“Avalokiteśvara, they are abandoned within three incalculable periods of time—within immeasurable eons, seasons, moons, half-moons, days and nights, days, half days, hours, minutes, seconds, or split seconds.”

9.31 “Blessed One, how should the defining characteristic, the fault, and the positive quality of defilements arising in bodhisattvas be known?”

1. “Avalokiteśvara, defilements arising in bodhisattvas have the defining characteristic of nondefilement. Why? Because they fully realize the domain of truth, which is only determined on the first stage. On account of this, the defilements of bodhisattvas arise only with full awareness, not unconsciously. Therefore, [defilements arising in bodhisattvas have] the defining characteristic of nondefilements.

2. “Because they do not have the capacity to produce suffering in [bodhisattvas’] own [mental] continuums, they are faultless.

3. “Because they are the cause dispelling the suffering from the world of beings, they have boundless positive qualities.”

“Blessed One, if even the defilements arising in this way in bodhisattvas outshine the roots of virtue produced by all beings, hearers, and solitary realizers to such an extent, what need is there to mention their other positive qualities?³⁰⁶ The supreme value of the bodhisattvas’ awakening is truly amazing!

9.32 “Blessed One, what was your underlying intention when you declared that the vehicle of the hearers and the Great Vehicle constitute the Single Vehicle?” [F.48.b]

“In the vehicle of the hearers, I taught the essence of various phenomena, such as the five aggregates, the six internal sense domains, the six external sense domains, and so forth. In the Great Vehicle, I presented exactly these same phenomena by teaching them in terms of a single principle, the domain of truth. Therefore, I did not declare that [these two] vehicles are distinct from one another. Those who conceptualize these teachings exclusively according to their literal meaning also conceptualize these [two] vehicles as being distinct—some by superimposing, others by negating. As a

consequence, they think that the two vehicles are contradictory³⁰⁷ and thus refute one another. This is what I had in mind when I taught the Single Vehicle.”

9.33 Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:

“The very teachings on the nature of various phenomena
Taught in the lower and higher vehicles
Are teachings of a single principle.
This is why I did not declare the vehicles to be distinct from one another.

“Those who conceptualize according to the literal meaning of the teachings
Think that these vehicles are contradictory
As a result of their superimpositions and negations,
And so from delusion arise various opinions.

“The buddhas taught as the Great Vehicle
What is included within the stages of a bodhisattva and a buddha,
The names of these stages, and their adverse factors, specific arising,
aspiration, and training.
Those who will exert themselves in this will become buddhas.”

Then, the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, what is the name of the teaching imparted in this Dharma discourse that unravels the Tathāgata’s intent? How should I keep it in mind?”

The Blessed One answered, “Avalokiteśvara, this is a teaching of definitive meaning on the stages and the perfections. Keep it in mind as *The Teaching of Definitive Meaning on the Stages and the Perfections*. As the Blessed One expounded this teaching, seventy-five thousand bodhisattvas obtained the bodhisattva’s concentration, the *light of the Great Vehicle*. [F.49.a]

This was the chapter of the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara—the ninth chapter.

10.

CHAPTER 10

10.1 Then the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī addressed the Blessed One, “Blessed One, when you mention ‘the truth body of the tathāgatas,’ what is the defining characteristic of this truth body of the tathāgatas?”

The Blessed One answered, “Mañjuśrī, the truth body of the tathāgatas is characterized when one has fully achieved a shift in one’s basis of existence, the emergence [from cyclic existence] through the practice of the stages and the perfections.³⁰⁸ Because of the two [following] reasons, you should know that this truth body is characterized by inconceivability: (1) it is beyond mental elaborations and is not produced by intentional action,³⁰⁹ (2) while beings are fixated on mental elaborations and produced by intentional action.”

10.2 “Blessed One, is the shift in the hearers’ and solitary realizers’ basis of existence also designated as the truth body?”

“Mañjuśrī, it is not.”

“Blessed One, how should it be called?”

“Mañjuśrī, it should be called the liberation body.³¹⁰ With regard to the liberation body, the tathāgatas are similar and equal to the hearers and solitary realizers, but, on account of the truth body, they are distinctively superior to them. This being so, they are also distinctively superior to them in terms of the distinctively immeasurable aspect of their positive qualities. This is not easy to illustrate with examples.”

10.3 “Blessed One, how should we consider those who have the characteristic of manifesting themselves through the birth of a tathāgata?”

“Mañjuśrī, those who have the characteristic of the emanation body³¹¹ resemble those who manifest in the world realms. You should see them as those whose characteristic is to be established by the sovereign power³¹² of the buddhas, being fully adorned with the ornaments of the tathāgatas’ qualities. The truth body does not have this manifestation of arising.”

10.4 “Blessed One, how should we consider the skillful means employed by the emanation body [for the sake of liberating beings from cyclic existence]?”³¹³ [F.49.b]

“Mañjuśrī, being conceived in a family renowned to be powerful or honorable in all the buddha fields of the trichiliocosm, taking birth, growing up, enjoying desirous objects, leaving home, displaying immediately the practice of austerities, renouncing them, and displaying all the stages of the complete and perfect awakening should be considered as the skillful means of the emanation body.”

“Blessed One, through which teachings emanating from their sovereign power do the tathāgatas bring to maturity those spiritually immature beings who have been converted? How do they liberate spiritually mature beings by means of the very referential object [taught in the Great Vehicle]?”

“Mañjuśrī, they bring them to maturity through three teachings: the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the mātṛkās.”

10.5 “Blessed One, what are the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the mātṛkās?”

“Mañjuśrī, it is like this: sūtras are teachings that gather the subject matter of various Dharma methods in four, nine, or twenty-nine topics.

1. “What are the four topics? They are (i) what was heard, (ii) taking refuge, (iii) the training, and (iv) the awakening.

2. “What are the nine topics? They are (i) concepts of sentient beings, (ii) their possessions, (iii) their birth, (iv) their existence after birth, (v) their affliction and purification, (vi) their diversity, (vii) the teacher, (viii) the teaching, and (ix) the assembly.

3. “What are the twenty-nine topics? They are the topics related to affliction: (i) [the phenomena] included in the conditioned, (ii) their progressive activity, (iii) the cause of their arising in future lives once they have been conceptualized as a person, and (iv) the cause of their arising in future lives once they have been conceptualized as phenomena.

“They are also the topics related to purification: [F.50.a] (v) the referential objects that are taken as reference points;³¹⁴ (vi) the exertion in [the practice of] these very [objects]; (vii) mental abiding;³¹⁵ (viii) blissful abiding in this very life; (ix) the referential objects that liberate from all suffering; (x) the three kinds of comprehension, which are the comprehension of the basis of error, the comprehension of the basis of error with respect to beings’ conceptions for nonpractitioners, and the comprehension of the basis of humility for those who practice Dharma; (xi) the basis of practice; (xii) the actualization [of practice];³¹⁶ (xiii) the practice; (xiv) [the practice] as the central activity; (xv) its aspects; (xvi) its referential objects; (xvii) the skills in the investigation of what has already been eliminated and what not yet been eliminated; (xviii) [the factors] that are distractions from practice; (xix) [the

factors] that are not distractions from practice; (xx) the source of nondistractedness; (xxi) the yoga of clear mindfulness³¹⁷ that is protected by³¹⁸ the practice; (xxii) the benefit of practice; (xxiii) its stability; (xiv) the unification with the lord of the noble [practice]; (xv) the unification with its retinue and entourage; (xxvi) the realization of true reality; (xxvii) the attainment of nirvāṇa; (xxviii) the fact that the well-expounded Dharma and Vinaya are superior to the correct views of mundane beings and all nonpractitioners; and (xxix) the impairments resulting from not practicing. Thus, Mañjuśrī, without practicing the well-expounded Dharma and Vinaya, impairments will ensue, and this is not because one has faulty views.

10.6 “Mañjuśrī, the Vinaya is my teaching on prātimokṣa for hearers and bodhisattvas, as well as that which is associated with it.” [F.50.b]

“Blessed One, how many topics are included in [the teaching on the] prātimokṣa of bodhisattvas?”

“Mañjuśrī, there are seven topics: (1) the teachings on the ceremony of taking [the vows of the bodhisattva discipline], (2) the teachings on the basis of serious downfalls,³¹⁹ (3) the teachings on the basis of transgressions, (4) the teachings on the nature of transgressions, (5) the teachings on the nature of what are not transgressions, (6) the teachings on the emergence from transgressions, and (7) the teachings on the abandonment of the vows.

10.7 “Mañjuśrī, the mātrkāś are the teachings that I imparted and categorized into eleven topics. What are these eleven topics? They are (1) the defining characteristic of the conventional, (2) the defining characteristic of the ultimate, (3) the defining characteristic of referential objects consisting of the awakening factors, (4) the defining characteristic of their features; (5) the defining characteristic of the [ir] nature, (6) the defining characteristic of their result, (7) the defining characteristic of the description of the experience of them, (8) the defining characteristic of the factors disrupting them,³²⁰ (9) the defining characteristic of the factors conducive to them, (10) the defining characteristic of the defects related to them, and (11) the defining characteristic of their benefit.

1. “Mañjuśrī, consider that the defining characteristic of the conventional has three subtopics: (1) the teaching on persons, (2) the teaching on the imaginary nature, and (3) the teaching on the activity, movement, and action of phenomena.

2. “Consider the defining characteristic of the ultimate in terms of the teaching on the seven aspects of true reality.³²¹

3. “Consider the defining characteristic of referential objects in terms of the teaching on all the things corresponding to cognitive objects.

4. "Consider the defining characteristic of [their] features in terms of the teaching on the eight features of the analysis of cognitive objects. What are these eight? They are (i) the truth of cognitive objects, (ii) their determination,³²² (iii) their faults, (iv) their positive qualities, (v) the methods for analyzing, (vi) the processes related to them, (vii) the principles of reason, and (viii) the condensed and extensive presentations of cognitive objects.

i. "With respect to these eight points, the truth of cognitive objects is true reality.

ii. "The determination of cognitive objects consists in establishing the person or the imaginary essence [F.51.a] or in establishing categorical, analytical, interrogative, and dismissive answers as well as secret instructions.³²³

iii. "The faults of cognitive objects are the defects of phenomena related to affliction, which I have taught in several ways.

iv. "The positive qualities of cognitive objects are the benefits arising from phenomena related to purification, which I have taught in several ways.

v. "The methods for analyzing cognitive objects includes six points: (a) the method for analyzing the meaning of true reality; (b) the method for analyzing attainments; (c) the method for analyzing explanations; (d) the method for analyzing the elimination of the two extremes; (e) the method for analyzing the inconceivable; and (f) the method for analyzing the underlying intention.

vi. "The processes related to cognitive objects are the three times, the three defining characteristics of the conditioned, and the four conditions.

vii. "There are four principles of reason in the analysis of cognitive objects: (a) the principle of reason based on dependence, (b) the principle of reason based on cause and effect, (c) the principle of reason based on logical proof, and (d) the principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena itself.

a. "The arising of conditioned phenomena and the causes for their being expressed through conventions, as well as related causal conditions, constitute the principle of reason based on dependence.

b. "The causes that will bring about a result,³²⁴ a completion, or an action once phenomena have arisen, as well as related causal conditions, constitute the principle of reason based on cause and effect.

c. "The causes establishing the meaning and bringing about the valid understanding of the thesis,³²⁵ the demonstration, and the statement of a proof, as well as related causal conditions, constitute the principle of reason based on logical proof.³²⁶ This logical proof is, moreover, of two kinds: valid and invalid. Among these, five are characterized as valid³²⁷ and seven as invalid. What are the five logical proofs characterized as valid? They are the logical proofs characterized by (I) a perception that is a direct cognition of

the thing to establish,³²⁸ (II) a perception that is a direct cognition of something existing in dependence on the thing to establish,³²⁹ (III) a demonstration through an instance belonging to the same class,³³⁰ [F.51.b] (IV) an actual demonstration, and (V) a citation from a valid scripture.³³¹

“With regard to those five logical proofs:

I. “The logical proof characterized by the perception that is a direct cognition of the thing to establish consists [for example] in perceiving through a direct cognition that all conditioned phenomena are impermanent, suffering, and without a self as well as anything conforming to this.³³²

II. “The logical proof characterized by a direct cognition of something existing in dependence on the thing to establish consists in inferring something not directly perceptible by means of something³³³ [directly perceptible], as well as in anything conforming to this, [for example], (A) the perception as a direct cognition of the principle of impermanence that exists in dependence on the things to establish, [namely,] the momentariness of all conditioned phenomena, the existence of a next life, and the consequence of good and bad deeds,³³⁴ (B) the perception as direct cognition of the diversity of beings that exists in dependence on the thing to establish, [namely,] the diversity of karma; or (C) the direct cognition of the happiness and suffering of beings that exists in dependence on the things to establish, [namely,] virtue and nonvirtue].³³⁵

III. “You should know that the logical proof characterized by a demonstration through an instance belonging to the same class of phenomena³³⁶ consists in anything conforming to this, [for example] in the demonstration of external and internal conditioned phenomena through (A) the perception of death and rebirth, being born and other forms of suffering,³³⁷ and causal dependence,³³⁸ which are established as facts in all worlds or (B) the perception of wealth and misery, which are established as facts in all worlds, including those of future lives.³³⁹

IV. “Thus, you should know that a logical proof characterized by one of the three proofs mentioned above³⁴⁰ is an actual demonstration because it is conclusive with respect to the thing that must be established.

V. “Mañjuśrī, you should know that the logical proof characterized by a citation from a valid scripture consists in the words taught by quoting the omniscient ones, such as ‘Nirvāṇa is peace’ and other similar statements. [F.52.a]

“Therefore, on account of these five kinds of characteristics, an analysis of cognitive objects founded on the principle of reason based on logical proof is valid.³⁴¹ Because such an analysis is valid, you should rely on it.”

“Blessed One, how many qualities do those we should consider as having the defining characteristics of the omniscient tathāgatas have?”

“Mañjuśrī, they have five qualities: (A) wherever they manifest, they are renowned in this world for their omniscience; (B) they have the thirty-two marks of a great being; (C) by means of their ten powers, they eliminate all qualms affecting beings; (D) the words of the Dharma they teach through the four kinds of assurance cannot be refuted or disputed by any opponent; (E) on the basis of their Dharma and Vinaya, the eightfold noble path as well as the four noble truths manifest for those who have renounced cyclic existence.³⁴² Thus, you should know that their manifestation, marks, elimination of doubts, freedom from refutations and disputes, and support [for those who have renounced cyclic existence] constitute the defining characteristic of the omniscient tathāgatas.

“Thus, the principle of reason based on logical proof is valid on account of the five characteristics included within these valid cognitions: direct cognitions, inferences, and authoritative scriptures.³⁴³

“What are the seven logical proofs characterized as invalid? They are the logical proofs characterized by (I) a perception that conforms with something other than the thing to be established,³⁴⁴ (II) a perception that does not conform with anything other than the thing to establish,³⁴⁵ (III) a perception that conforms with all things,³⁴⁶ (IV) a perception that does not conform with anything,³⁴⁷ (V) a demonstration through an instance belonging to a different class of phenomena,³⁴⁸ (VI) a demonstration that is not actually demonstrating anything, and (VII) a citation drawn from an invalid scripture.

“The logical proof characterized by a perception that does not conform with anything³⁴⁹ is ascertained when the defining characteristics of the proof and the premise do not conform with one another because they are incompatible in terms of reason, essence, karma, quality, or cause and effect.³⁵⁰ [F.52.b]

“Mañjuśrī, the logical proof characterized by a perception that does not conform with anything³⁵¹ is comprised by the logical proof characterized by a perception that conforms with something other than the thing to be established³⁵² and similar instances. This proof is therefore inconclusive with respect to the thing to establish.³⁵³ This is called an unestablished logical proof.³⁵⁴

“Moreover, the logical proof characterized by a perception that conforms with all things³⁵⁵ is comprised by the logical proof characterized by a perception that does not conform with anything other than the thing to establish³⁵⁶ and similar instances. This proof is therefore inconclusive with respect to the thing to establish. This is also called an unestablished logical proof.³⁵⁷

“Because these logical proofs are not established, the analysis is invalid according to the principle of reason based on logical proof. Since this analysis is invalid, you should not rely on it. You should know that the logical proof characterized by a citation from an invalid scripture is invalid by nature.

d. “Whether tathāgatas manifest or not, the constancy of the domain of truth, the nature of phenomena, on account of the constancy of phenomena, constitutes the principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena.³⁵⁸

viii. “The condensed and the extensive presentation of cognitive objects consists of first summarizing, then analyzing words and sections of the teaching, and finally concluding the explanation.

5. “The defining characteristic of the nature of awakening factors consists in the apprehension of a referential object together with its aspects, as I have taught, such as the awakening factors, the four applications of mindfulness, and so on.

6. “The defining characteristic of their result is the accomplishment of their result, the mundane and supramundane positive qualities, by abandoning the defilements associated with the mundane or the supramundane phenomena.

7. “The defining characteristic of accounts telling how one experiences them as one proclaims them, explains them, and correctly teach them to others is the analytical knowledge of the gnosis³⁵⁹ that liberates within true reality.

8. “The defining characteristic of the factors disrupting them is the afflicted phenomenon in the form of an obstacle to the practice of these very awakening factors. [F.53.a]

9. “The defining characteristic of the factors conducive to them is the phenomenon useful to [enhancing] them.

10.” The defining characteristic of defects related to them is the fault interrupting them.

11. “Mañjuśrī, you should know that the defining characteristic of their benefit consists in their corresponding positive qualities.”

10.8

Then, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī further said to the Blessed One, “Blessed One, please explain the meaning of the formula through which bodhisattvas comply with the underlying intention³⁶⁰ of the profound Dharma expounded by the tathāgatas, the complete meaning of the sūtras, the Vinaya, and the māṭrkās that is not known by those not following you.”

“Mañjuśrī, listen. I will explain to you the complete meaning of the formula so that bodhisattvas will in this way understand my underlying intention. Mañjuśrī, the possessors of qualities resulting from affliction and purification³⁶¹ are all without movement and without a person. This is why I

taught that all phenomena are in every respect beyond activity. It is not the case that the possessors of qualities resulting from affliction first became afflicted and will then become purified from these afflictions or that the possessors of qualities resulting from purification have become purified from afflictions they previously acquired. Thus, foolish ordinary beings rely on views resulting from their latent dispositions, on account of which they wrongly conceive the body afflicted by corruption as the essence of phenomena and persons. As a consequence, reifying [the ego through concepts such as] 'I' and 'mine,' they mistakenly conceive of the following notions: 'I see,' 'I hear,' 'I smell,' 'I taste,' 'I touch,' 'I am conscious,' 'I eat,' 'I do,' 'I am afflicted,' and 'I am purified.' [F.53.b]

"Thus, those who understand this fact as it really is abandon the body afflicted by corruption and instead obtain the body that is not a support for any defilement, being pure, free from mental elaborations, unconditioned, and unproduced by intentional action. Mañjuśrī, you should know that this is the complete meaning of the formula."

Then, at that moment, the Blessed One spoke these verses:

"The possessors of qualities resulting from affliction and purification
Are all without movement³⁶² and without a person;
Therefore, I declare them to be without activity,
As they are neither purified nor afflicted, be it in the past or the future.

"Relying on views resulting from their latent dispositions,
On account of which they wrongly conceive the body afflicted by corruption,
They reify [the ego through concepts such as] 'I' and 'mine.'
As a consequence, notions arise, such as 'I see,' 'I eat,' 'I do,' 'I am afflicted,'
and 'I am purified.'

"Thus, those who understand this fact as it really is
Abandon the body afflicted by corruption
And instead will obtain a body that is not a basis for any defilement,
Being free from mental elaborations and unconditioned."³⁶³

10.9 "Blessed One, how should we know the defining characteristic of the arising of the tathāgatas' mind?"

"Mañjuśrī, tathāgatas are not characterized by mind, thought, or cognition.³⁶⁴ However, you should know that, similar to an emanation,³⁶⁵ the tathāgatas' mind arises in the way of something that is not produced by intentional action."

"Blessed One, if the truth body of the tathāgatas is not produced at all by intentional action, how then could their mind arise without being produced by intentional action?"³⁶⁶

“Mañjuśrī, their mind arises on account of a previous intentional action, namely, the practice of skillful means and wisdom. Mañjuśrī, it is like this: although awakening from a state of sleep in which there is no thought ensues [spontaneously] without resulting from intentional action, [F.54.a] one will awaken due to previous intentional actions. Although the emergence from the absorption in the state of cessation is not produced by intentional action, one will emerge from it merely due to previous intentional actions. Just as the mind arises from a state of sleep or from the absorption in the state of cessation, you should know that the tathāgatas’ mind also arises due to previous intentional actions such as the practice of skillful means and wisdom.”

“Blessed One, should we say that the mind emanated by tathāgatas exists or not?”

“Mañjuśrī, [their] mind neither exists nor does not exist, because it is causally independent and causally dependent.”³⁶⁷

“Blessed One, what is the sphere of activity of the tathāgatas? What is the domain³⁶⁸ of the tathāgatas? Should we consider these two as distinct?”

“Mañjuśrī, the sphere of activity of the tathāgatas consists in the pure buddha realms, the arrayed ornaments of inconceivable and boundless positive qualities common to all tathāgatas. The domain of the tathāgatas comprises five domains: the domain of the surrounding universe, the domain of beings, the domain of Dharma, the domain of discipline, and the domain of methods of discipline.³⁶⁹ There is a distinction between the two.”

10.10 “Blessed One, how should we understand the defining characteristic of the tathāgatas’ complete and perfect awakening, of their turning of the wheel of Dharma, and of their great parinirvāṇa?”

“Mañjuśrī, the tathāgatas are characterized by nonduality.³⁷⁰ They are neither completely and perfectly awakened nor not completely and perfectly awakened; [F.54.b] they neither turn the wheel of Dharma nor do not turn the wheel of Dharma; they neither [attain] the great parinirvāṇa nor do not attain the great parinirvāṇa. This is because the truth body is utterly pure and the emanation body constantly manifests.”

“Blessed One, why should we consider that the merit produced by beings on account of seeing, hearing, or serving the tathāgatas’ emanation body arises from the tathāgatas?”

“Mañjuśrī, it is because these activities consist in taking a superior referential object thanks to the tathāgatas, and also because the emanation body is the tathāgatas’ sovereign power.”

“Blessed One, since this does not seem to be produced by intentional action, why is it that the great light of gnosis manifests in beings solely through the truth body of the tathāgatas and that innumerable emanated

reflections also manifest [as the tathāgatas' emanation body], while this light and its reflections do not manifest from the hearers' and solitary realizers' liberation body?"

"Mañjuśrī, while this does not seem to be produced by intentional action, on account of the power of very strong beings and the force of beings' karma, a great light manifests to beings from water and fire crystals produced from the disks of the moon and sun. However, it does not manifest from water and fire crystals produced from other sources. From a precious gem that has been well polished through [intentional] action, reflections corresponding to its engraving manifest [when it is placed before a light source]. However, they do not manifest from another unpolished gem. Likewise, because the truth body of the tathāgatas also is established by having been purified through the practice of skillful means and insight focusing on the immeasurable domain of truth, [F.55.a] the great light of gnosis manifests in beings, and innumerable emanated reflections arise. However, they do not manifest from the hearers' and solitary realizers' liberation body."

10.11 "Blessed One, you said that, through the force of the tathāgatas' and bodhisattvas' sovereign power, one can obtain an excellent body in the realm of desire, such as that of a warrior or a brahman, a body that is like a great sāla tree, or the excellent body of a god residing in the realm of desire, the realm of form, or the realm of the formless. Blessed One, what was your underlying intention with regard to this?"

"Mañjuśrī, by means of their sovereign power, tathāgatas teach as they are the path and practices through which one obtains all these excellent bodies. Those accomplishing these path and practices will always obtain all these perfect bodies, while those who reject or denigrate these path and practices, as well as those who have animosity or resentment toward them, will always obtain all kinds of miserable bodies upon their death. Mañjuśrī, on account of this skillful means, you should know in this way that, because of the sovereign power of the tathāgatas, one will be reborn in a perfect body as well as in a miserable one."

10.12 "Blessed One, in the universes that are impure and pure, what is abundant? What is rare?"

"Mañjuśrī, in the universes that are impure, [F.55.b] eight things are abundant and two are rare. Abundant are (1) followers of traditions other than mine; (2) suffering beings; (3) beings who are different in terms of lineages, families, and communities or wealth and poverty; (4) beings engaging into wrongdoing; (5) beings who have lost their discipline; (6) beings in bad destinies; (7) followers of inferior vehicles; and (8)

bodhisattvas with inferior intentions and practices. Rare are (1) the actions of bodhisattvas having superior intentions and practices and (2) the manifestation of tathāgatas.

“Mañjuśrī, in the universes that are pure, it is the opposite of this. You should know that these eight things are rare and these two things abundant.”

Then, the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī asked the Blessed One, “Blessed One, what is the name of the teaching imparted in this Dharma discourse that unravels the Tathāgata’s intent? How should I keep it in mind?”

The Blessed One answered, “Mañjuśrī, this is a teaching of definitive meaning establishing the deeds of the tathāgatas. Keep it in mind as *The Teaching of Definitive Meaning Establishing the Deeds of the Tathāgatas*. As the Blessed One expounded this teaching, seventy-five thousand bodhisattvas obtained the perfect analytical knowledge of the truth body.

After the Blessed One had spoken these words, the prince Mañjuśrī together with the entire retinue of gods, humans, demigods, and gandharvas rejoiced and praised the words of the Blessed One.

The [tenth chapter of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī] called “The Chapter Establishing the Positive Qualities [of the Tathāgatas]” of [the sūtra of] the Great Vehicle called “Unraveling the Intent” is concluded.

ab.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Bd</i>	Bardan (Zanskar) canonical collection
<i>C</i>	Choné xylograph Kangyur
<i>Cbeta</i>	Chinese Electronic Buddhist Association, (www.cbeta.org) (http://www.cbeta.org)
<i>Cz</i>	Chizhi Kangyur
<i>D</i>	Degé xylograph Kangyur
<i>Dd</i>	Dodedrak Kangyur
<i>Dk</i>	Dongkarla Kangyur
<i>Do</i>	Dolpo canonical collection
<i>F</i>	Phukdrak manuscript Kangyur
<i>Go</i>	Gondhla (Lahaul) canonical collection
<i>Gt</i>	Gangteng Kangyur
<i>H</i>	Lhasa xylograph Kangyur
<i>He</i>	Hemis I Kangyur
<i>J</i>	'jang sa tham/Lithang xylograph Kangyur
<i>KB</i>	Berlin manuscript Kangyur
<i>Kq774</i>	Peking 1737 xylograph Kangyur
<i>L</i>	London (Shelkar) manuscript Kangyur
<i>Lg</i>	Lang mdo Kangyur
<i>Mvyut</i>	<i>Mahāvyutpatti</i>
<i>N</i>	Narthang xylograph Kangyur
<i>Ng</i>	Namgyal Kangyur
<i>Np</i>	Neyphug Kangyur
<i>O</i>	Tawang Kangyur
<i>Pj</i>	Phajoding I Kangyur

- Pz Phajoding II Kangyur
- R Ragya Kangyur
- S Stok manuscript Kangyur
- Samdh.* *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*
- Samdh_{dh}* Dunhuang manuscript: Stein Tib. n°194 (49 folios) and Stein Tib. n°683 (1 folio) (Hakamaya 1984–1987)
- T Tokyo manuscript Kangyur
- Taishō* 解深密經, translated by Xuanzang (596–664 CE)
676
- TrBh* Sthiramati's *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣyam*
- U Urga xylograph Kangyur
- V Ulaanbaatar manuscript Kangyur
- VD Degé; xylograph of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* from the Tengyur
- VG Golden; xylograph of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* from the Tengyur
- VP Peking; xylograph of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* from the Tengyur
- VinSg* *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*
- X Basgo manuscript Kangyur
- YBht P* Tibetan translation of Acarya Asanga's *Yogācārabhūmi* from the
'i Peking Tengyur (n°. 5540, sems-tsam, 'i 143aI-382a5 (vol. I 11 : 121-217)
- Z Shey Palace manuscript Kangyur

NOTES

n.

n.1 See glossary entry “ultimate.”

n.2 See Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 1590, n. 89 on this point.

n.3 The numbering of paragraphs of the *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra* follows Lamotte’s critical edition.

n.4 See Radich 2007, p. 1257 on the relationship between *āśrayaparivṛtti* and *dauṣṭhulyakāya*. *Samḍh.* is the only text in the entire Kangyur in which the term *dauṣṭhulyakāya* is found.

n.5 In bold are textual resources I used to translate the text into English.

n.6 See Powers 2015. Unfortunately, I haven’t been able to consult this reference work at the time of completing this translation.

n.7 Here is a list of the sigla I used to identify the various witnesses of *Samḍh.*:

(1) Witnesses of the sūtra found in the available Kangyurs and canonical collections (MsK = manuscript Kangyur, PK = xylograph): Kb: Berlin MsK, C: Choné PK, Cz: Chizhi, D: Degé PK, Dd: Dodedrak, Dk: Dongkarla, F: Phukdrag MsK, H: Lhasa PK, Gt: Gangteng, He: Hemis I, J: ‘jang sa tham/Lithang PK, L: London (Shelkar) MsK, Lg: Lang mdo, N: Narthang PK, Ng: Namgyal, Np: Neyphug, O: Tawang, Pj: Phajoding I, Pz: Phajoding II, Kq: Peking 1737 PK, R: Ragma, S: Stok MsK, T: Tokyo MsK, U: Urga PK, V: Ulaanbaatar MsK, W: Wangli supplement, X: Basgo MsK, Z: Shey Palace MsK. Other canonical collections: Ba: Basgo fragments (Ladakh), Bd: Bardan (Zanskar), Go: Gondhla (Lahaul), Do: Dolpo. Source: <https://www.istb.univie.ac.at/kanjur/rktsneu/sub/index.php> (last accessed on July 20, 2020). I am following the typology of Kangyur groups suggested by rKTs (Vienna University). I would like to warmly thank Professor Helmut Tauscher and Bruno Lainé for making available to me the

editions I used for this translation project. For a general discussion of some Tibetan sources, see Skilling 1994, p. 775.

(2) Xylographs of the *Viniścayaśaṅgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* from the Tengyur: VD Degé, VG Golden, VP Peking. My thanks go to Kojirō Katō for having shared with me the bibliographical detail of these witnesses. The *Viniścayaśaṅgrahaṇī* is also available in Chinese under the following title: 瑜伽師地論卷第七十六攝決擇分.

- [n.8](#) For the reference of possible additional folios, see Chayet 2005, p. 67 (n°615—1 folio, n°590—6 folios).
- [n.9](#) 解深密經疏 (ZZ369) is a text originally composed in Chinese that has been translated into Tibetan. On Wonch'uk's life and works, see Powers 1992a.
- [n.10](#) I would like to warmly thank Zhuoran Xie (Vienna University) for her assistance in reading this text.
- [n.11](#) See also Katō 2011 for textual variations.
- [n.12](#) See Schmithausen 2014, p. 425ff.
- [n.13](#) See Schmithausen 2014, pp. 419–20, n. 1852. On necessary adjustments to Lamotte's rendition of the original Sanskrit terms, see Hakayama 1984, p. 180 and Delhey 2013.
- [n.14](#) See Tillemans 1997 for a review of Powers 1995. From a general perspective, it seems that Powers chose to ignore the work and methodological approach of Lamotte and Frauwallner.
- [n.15](#) See Schmithausen 1987 and 2014, Delhey 2013, and Skilling 2013 on the simile of the illusionist (*māyākāra*), which is also included *inter alia* in the *Māyājāla*, a *sūtra* also quoted in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.
- [n.16](#) On this issue, see Brunnhölzl 2018, pp. 414–18, n. 5.
- [n.17](#) See Steinkellner 1989 and Powers 1992a, 1992b, and 1998. For a review of Powers 1998, refer to Wedemeyer 2003.
- [n.18](#) See for instance Hopkins 1999, 2002, and 2006.
- [n.19](#) See Lamotte 1935, p. 12ff., Ware 1937, Edgerton 1937, Edgerton 1953, p. 558, and later Keenan 1980, p. 126, Powers 1991a, and Powers 1993b, p. 28ff.
- [n.20](#) Research relevant to terminological choices, syntactic reading of complex passages, and interpretation of the meaning includes Powers 1991b, 1991c,

1993b, pp. 41–77 (chapters 1 to 4); Tillemans 1997 (chapter 1); Matsuda 2013 on Sanskrit terms (chapter 2); Wayman 1974, Tillemans 1997, Mathes 2007, Matsuda 2013 (chapter 3); Katō 2002, Lusthaus 2002, Waldron 2003, Buescher 2007, 2008, Muller 2011, Schmithausen 1987 and 2014, Brunnhölzl 2018 (chapter 5); Frauwallner 1969, Takahashi 2006, Schmithausen 2014 (chapter 6); Frauwallner 1969, Tucci 1971, Tillemans 1997, Mathes 2007, Schmithausen 2014, Brunnhölzl 2018 (chapter 7); Takasaki 1966, Lamotte 1970, Lin 2010, Matsuda 2013, Schmithausen 1984, 1987, 2005, and 2014 (chapter 8); Obermiller 1933, Matsuda 1995 (chapter 9); Braarvig 1985, Kapstein 1988, Steinkellner 1989, Sakuma 1990, Yoshimizu 1996, Xing 2005, Lin 2010, Yoshimizu 2010 (chapter 10).

[n.21](#) For a detailed introduction to this text, see Steinkellner 1989.

[n.22](#) See Billeter 2014. I would like to thank Professor Tom Tillemans for having drawn my attention to Billeter’s principles of translation.

[n.23](#) See Edgerton 1953, p. 102.

[n.24](#) See Schmithausen 2014, p. 400, n. 1770.

[n.25](#) See Lamotte 1935, p. 174.

[n.26](#) See Mvyut 4414.

[n.27](#) See Vinay and Darbelnet 1958.

[n.28](#) Or even “Yep,” “I’m with you,” “So true,” etc.

[n.29](#) “Une compilation assez maladroite”; see Lamotte 1935, p. 17. For an extensive discussion on the date and composition of *Samdh.*, see Lamotte, pp. 14–25. See also Schmithausen 2014, p. 354ff. regarding the relation between the various chapters of *Samdh.*

[n.30](#) See Schmithausen 2014, pp. 354–55.

[n.31](#) See Schmithausen 2014, p. 365.

[n.32](#) See Schmithausen 2014, p. 359.

[n.33](#) On the usage and various shades of meaning of *vijñapti*, see Hall 1986.

[n.34](#) *rin po che sna bdun* does not refer to jewels only, as found in Lamotte (1935) and Keenan (2000). I follow here Powers (1995), Cornu (2005), and Cleary (1999).

- n.35 The logical subject of *'jig rten gyi khams dpag tu med pa rgyas par 'gengs pa'i 'od zer chen po shin tu mnga' ba* is the palace (*khang*). Cornu (2005) and Keenan (2000) seem to read this phrase as a qualifier for the seven precious substances.
- n.36 The first paragraph of the *nidāna* is a presentation of the place where the Buddha is dwelling. As already mentioned in the introduction, a succession of compounds, mainly *bahuvrīhis*, enables the topicalization of the temple (*khang*). Lamotte's translation reflects this literary device, contrary to Powers who does not topicalize the palace to the same degree on account of some ambiguities regarding the logical subject of a few clauses describing this palace. To illustrate this point, it seems unclear whether the adjectives "steadfast," "enduring," or "free" in Powers' translation qualify the temple or the beings attending it. Cornu mainly follows Powers here but the grammatical necessity to indicate the gender and number of qualifiers in French limits the risk of confusion, which is obviously not the case in English. Regarding the usage of tenses, Lamotte is the only translator who uses both narrative past and present in this first paragraph. He thus switches from the past tense to the present tense in order to describe the characteristics of the temple, a decision I chose not to follow in the present translation.
- n.37 Lamotte, Cornu, and Powers do not translate the anaphoric pronoun *de* in *'jig rten las 'das pa de'i bla ma'i dge ba'i rtsa ba las byung ba*. Powers explains in a footnote (see Power 1995, p. 313, n. 3) that this pronoun refers to gnosis according to Wonch'uk, although his translation does not reflect this interpretation. Since wisdom has not been mentioned earlier in the text and since the pronoun *de* is anaphoric, I read *de* as referring to the Buddha. Moreover, the concept of "root of virtue" is usually associated with persons and we have a reference to *dbang sgyur ba* in the next qualifying phrase.
- n.38 The clause *dbang sgyur ba'i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par rig pa'i mtshan nyid* is problematic. Lamotte translates it in the following way: "très pur, il se caractérise par une pensée maîtresse de soi." Cornu and Powers follow the reading found in D, folio 2.a; S, folio 4.a; Kṛ, folio 1.a; L, folio 3.a; and H, folio 3.a (*dbang sgyur ba'i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par rig pa'i mtshan nyid*) and render the two occurrences of *rnam par rig pa* by an apposition: "It was characterized by perfect knowledge, the knowledge of one who has mastery." (Powers 1995, p. 5). However, in F, folio 4.b we find a variant reading which, I believe, makes more sense: *dbang byed pa'i rnam par rig pa shin tu rnam par dag pa'i mtshan nyid*. The Tibetan verbal prefix *shin tu rnam par*

is used to render the upasarga *su-* in Sanskrit, like in *suviśuddha*. In Mvyut 351, *blo shin tu rnam par dag pa* thus translates the Sanskrit *suviśuddhabuddhiḥ*.

n.39 *nges par 'byung ba*. In Skt. *niḥsaraṇa* or *niryāṇa*, which have the meaning of setting forth, issue, exit, departure, escape, a road out of town. The analogy here is not about emancipation or renunciation as Powers and Cornu translated it but rather with the metaphor of the journey. In that sense, what is meant here is the departure to reach the palace. Lamotte (1935), Keenan (2000), and Cleary (1999) follow Xuanzang's translation: 大念慧行以為游路 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). Interestingly enough, F does not have *nges par 'byung ba* but just *'byung ba*.

n.40 *rin po che'i pad ma'i rgyal po chen po yon tan gyi tshogs mtha' yas pas brgyan pa'i bkod pa la rten pa na bzhugs te*. This clause has been translated in various ways depending on how one understands the compound *rin po che'i pad ma'i rgyal po chen po yon tan gyi tshogs mtha' yas pas*. Lamotte (1935), Powers (1995), and Cornu (2005) read it as a *dvandva*: "Il est orné de qualités infinies, de joyaux, de lotus et de grands rois" (Lamotte 1935, p. 167); "this pattern was adorned with boundless masses of excellent qualities, and with great kingly jeweled lotuses" (Powers 1995, pp. 5–6); "paré d'infinies qualités et de grands lotus royaux incrustés de pierreries" (Cornu 2005, p. 26). However, it seems to me that it would be better to read this compound as a *karmadhāraya*. Folio 5.a offers a variant reading that could support this interpretation: *yon ten gyi tshogs mtha' yas pas/brgyan pa'i rin po che chen po pad mo'i rgyal po'i bkod pa'i gnas na nyan thos kyi dge 'dun tshad med pa dang / thabs gcig tu bzhugs te*. In addition to this problem, one should note that Lamotte's translation of the compound *rin po che'i pad ma'i rgyal po chen po* as a *dvandva* is inaccurate here. Powers' reading of this term is correct.

n.41 *chos* in the sense of qualities as understood by Lamotte (1935), Powers (1995), and Cleary (1999).

n.42 *spyod yul; gocara*. This term refers here to an object perceived by the six senses, so its semantic field pertains to perception as opposed to meditative practice, in which case it would be close in meaning to *ālambana* ("referential object"). Translating all these terms with "object" would conflate these various semantic fields in the context of the present text.

n.43 *bsam gyis mi khyab pa rnam par 'jog pa* (cf. *rnam par gzhas pa bsam gyis mi khyab pa; acintyavyavasthānaḥ*, see Mvyut 359). Compare with Lamotte: "ses attributs sont inconcevables" (Lamotte 1935, p. 168); Powers: "positing [doctrines] inconceivably" (Powers 1995, p. 7); Cornu: "il était entré dans l'indicible" (Cornu 2005, p. 26).

- n.44 *dus gsum mnyam pa nyid tshar phyin pa; tryadhvasamatāniryātaḥ* (Mvyut 360). The term *niryāta* means here “adept, perfected, perfectly skilled” (see Edgerton 1953, p. 303).
- n.45 *byang chub sems dpa’ thams cad kyis ye shes yang dag par blangs pa*. See Mvyut 366: *ye shes byang chub sems dpa’ thams cad kyis yang dag par mnos pa; sarvabodhisattvasampratīcchitajñānaḥ*. One should follow here the translations of Lamotte (1935), Keenan (2000), and Cleary (1999).
- n.46 *de bzhin gshegs pa ma ’dres pa’i rnam par thar par mdzad pa’i ye shes kyi mthar phyin pa*. See Mvyut 368: *de bzhin gshegs pa ma ’dres pa’i rnam par thar pa’i mdzad pa’i ye shes kyi mthar phin pa/ de bzhin gshegs pa ma ’dres pa’i rnam par thar par mdzad pa’i ye shes kyi mthar phin pa; asaṃbhinnatathāgata-vimokṣajñānaniṣṭhāgataḥ*. See also Mvyut 5192: *dbyer med pa; ma ’dres pa; ma ’dres pa’ m dbyer med pa; asaṃbhedah*. If we understand *ma ’dres pa* in the sense of *dbyer med pa*, or even *zung ’jug* (*yuganaddha*), the meaning of the term is “indivisible/in unity,” conveying the notion of nonduality of the sameness mentioned several times in this introduction. Lamotte translates *ma ’dres pa* with “non diversifié,” Cornu with “distinctement,” Powers with “uniquely,” Keenan with “unified.” I don’t think one should understand *ma ’dres pa* with the meaning of *kevala* in the present case since it is associated with *ye shes* in other contexts where the idea of being exclusive to a particular person (e.g., buddhas) is negated (see Keenan 1980, p. 782ff.).
- n.47 *mtha’ dang dpung med pa’i sangs rgyas kyis mnyam pa nyid thugs su chud pa*. One should read here instead: *mtha’ dang dbus med pa’i sangs rgyas kyi sa mnyam pa nyid bu thugs su chud pa; anantamadyabuddhabhūmisamatādhigataḥ* (see Mvyut 369).
- n.48 D, folio 2.b: *nam mkha’i khams kyi mthas gtugs pa*, which stands in apposition to *chos kyi dbyings kyis klas pa* (“the ultimate within the domain of truth”). See Mvyut 6430: *nam mkha’i dbyings kyi mtha’ gtugs pa, nam mkha’i khams kyi mthar gtugs* for the Sanskrit *ākāśadhātuparyavasānaḥ*. Compare with Mvyut 371: *nam mkha’i khams kyi mtha’ klas pa, nam mkha’i khams kyi mthas klas pa* as Tibetan equivalents of *ākāśadhātuparyavasānaḥ*. In Mvyut 431, *don gyi mthar gtugs pa* and *don gyi mthar thug pa* are Tibetan translations of *paryavasitārthaḥ*.
- n.49 *nges par ’byung ba; niryāṇika* (?). Powers (1995) and Cornu (2005) translate it as “renunciation.”
- n.50 See Mvyut 7450: *nges par rtog pa/ nges par rtogs pa; nirūpaṇā*. Translated by Lamotte with “pénétrante” and by Keenan with “penetrating,” while

Powers and Cornu opted respectively for “certain realization” and “réalisation certaine.”

- n.51 See Mvyut 1113: *yon yongs su sbyong ba chen po; mahādakṣiṇāpariṣodhakaḥ*. D, 4,5; Kṛ, folio 2.b; and H, 7,2 omit *yon*. However, it is present in S, 7,2 and L, folio 5.a: *yon tan*, while F.5.b reads *sbyin pa*.
- n.52 Powers (1995) and Cornu (2005) read *ngeṣ pa*, but one should read here instead the graphically very similar *des pa* (“gentleness”) as in Mvyut 1115 where this expression is also found extensively: *bzod pa dang des pa chen po dang ldan pa; mahākṣāntisauratyasamanvāgataḥ*.
- n.53 *brjod du med pa dang / gnyis su med pa'i mtshan nyid*. I read this compound as a bahuvrīhi. The full clause [*brjod du med pa dang / gnyis su med pa'i mtshan nyid*] + [*don dam pa*] is a karmadhāraya meaning literally “the ultimate that is that whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and absolute.” Powers’ suggestion is also possible here (“the ultimate whose defining characteristic is inexpressible and non-dual”). Lamotte leaves out *mtshan nyid*. Cornu somewhat mixes qualifiers and qualified terms in his rendering of this clause.
- n.54 *yongs su ma grub pa; apariniṣpanna* (?). This paragraph establishes the opposition between the imaginary (*parikalpita*) and the actual (*pariniṣpanna*). These two aspects are found in the teaching on the three kinds of essencelessness: see Saṃdh. chapters 6–8.
- n.55 *shes pa dang mthong ba; jñānadarśana*. D, folio 3.b: *shes pa* but F, folio 6.b; S, folio 5.a; VD, folio 44.b: *ye shes*. I emended the text in this way throughout the sūtra since this expression is repeated several times.
- n.56 Xuanzang’s translation reads 謂諸聖者以聖智聖見離名言故現等正覺 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
- n.57 As noted by Tillemans (1997), Powers reads *phyir* in the sense of “because” here. Keenan and Cleary’s readings of Xuanzang’s translation (為愆令他現等覺故, Cbeta, Taishō 676) agree with Lamotte’s and Tillemans’ understanding of this passage.
- n.58 *ston pas btags pa'i tshig yin te*. VD, folio 44.b: om.
- n.59 *rnam grangs; paryāya*. The Dunhuang manuscript of the sūtra instead has *gzhung du 'du shes* (n°194 folio 62.a; see Hakayama 1984, p. 187).
- n.60 See 1.5.

- n.61 VD, folio 45.b reads the demonstrative pronoun as a plural (i.e., *de dag*) throughout this paragraph.
- n.62 *'di ltar don* in the sense of *yathārtha*.
- n.63 Powers' and Cornu's translations are inaccurate here: "Subsequently they do not make the conventional designations: 'This is true, the other is false.' They make conventional designations because they completely understand the object in this way." (Powers 1995, p. 17). "Comme ils connaissent parfaitement le sens réel de ces phénomènes . . ." (Cornu 2005, p. 32). Lamotte seems to have translated 1.4 on the basis of the Chinese. In addition, *rjes su* should be read as *rjes su tha snyad* for *anuvyavahāra*.
- n.64 Lamotte's rather free translation of 1.5 fails to render the opposition between what does not exist and what does according to the sūtra: *'di snyam du sems te/'dus byas dang / 'dus ma byas snang ba gang yin pa 'di ni med kyi/gang la 'dus byas dang 'dus ma byas kyi 'du shes dang / 'dus byas dang / 'dus ma byas kyi rnam grangs kyi [F.5.a] 'du shes 'byung ba/ rnam par rtog pa las byung ba/ 'du byed kyi mtshan ma sgyu ma lta bu 'di ni yod/ blo rnam par rmongs par byed pa 'di ni yod do*. The first chapter gives an introduction to central concepts, such as conditioned/unconditioned, existent/nonexistent, imaginary/actual. It prefigures the treatment of the two truths (*bden pa gnyis; satyadvaya*) in Saṃdh. chapter 3 as well as that of the three natures/essences and three kinds of nonexistence of nature/essence (*ngo bo nyid (med pa) nyid; (niḥ)svabhāvātā*) expounded in Saṃdh. (cf. chapters 6–8).
- n.65 *brtsams pa; ārabhya* with the meaning of "referring to/having to do with," a frequent occurrence in Saṃdh. See Edgerton 1953, p. 102.
- n.66 *rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par 'das pa; sarvatarkasamatikrānta*. Regarding the translation of the term *rtog ge (tarka)*, Powers 1995, p. 25 suggests "argumentation," but the emphasis in the present context is not on logical reasoning. The term *tarka* denotes here any kind of assumption, presupposition, representation, or conjecture regarding the absolute that is the product of the intellect (*manas*).
- n.67 The English translation of this passage should convey the paradox of the situation. Although the ultimate is inexpressible, the Buddha gave countless teachings. Syntactic connective particles between clauses about the inexpressible ultimate and the domain of expression and reasoning have therefore an adversative meaning in the present paragraph: *ngas ni don dam pa rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas te/ mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas kyang bsnyad cing gsal bar*

byas/ rnam par phyed/ gdags par byas/ rab tu bstan to/ de ci'i phyir zhe na. Lamotte's and Powers' translation do not make this point clear.

n.68 *so so(r) rang rig pa;*
pratyātmavedya/pratyātmavedanīya/pratyātmajñāna/prātyatmam (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 346), in the sense of realizing or understanding for oneself in an intuitive way, as personal experience. Powers' translation does not reflect the meaning of this term: "I have explained that the ultimate is realized individually by the Aryas, while objects collectively known by ordinary beings [belong to] the realm of argumentation." In the sūtra, *so so(r) rang rig pa* is a synonym or a qualifier of *ye shes (jñāna)*.

n.69 Lamotte translates *rtog ge'i spyod yul* by "affaire de tradition"; see Lamotte 1935, p. 173. Beyond the fact that this is wrong, it is worth noting that the opposition here is between the intuitive and personal knowledge of the noble beings and the intellectual and transactional knowledge of ordinary beings, namely, between gnosis and mind. Powers 1995, p. 27 reflects the personal aspect of *so sor rang gi rig* but not its intuitive quality.

n.70 *mtshan ma; nimitta*. Although "notion" would fit well here, one should keep in mind that *nimitta* as a polysemic term denotes phenomenal appearance throughout the sūtra. However, it is clear that "phenomenal appearance" and "notion" are two terms that are joined at the hip from the perspective of the doctrine expounded in Saṃdh.

n.71 In 2.2, the Buddha mentions a paradox. He gives explanations about the ultimate in speculative terms, although the ultimate is inexpressible. This paradox is best rendered in English or French by reading the particle *la* in the statements in question as having an adversative meaning. For example: *chos 'phags gzhan yang don dam pa ni tha snyad thams cad yang dag par chad pa yin par ngas bshad la/ rtog ge ni tha snyad kyi spyod yul yin te*.

n.72 The Turfan Sanskrit fragment found by Matsuda reads *paramārtha[dhar]mā vīgatābhilāpaḥ* at the end of chapter 2's closing gāthā (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013: p. 940 ad Lamotte VIII.41). In D, folio 6.b and F, folio 10.b, we have instead the Tibetan term *rtsod dang bral ba*. It is possible that *brjod med* in line 2 and *rtsod dang bral ba* were inverted *metri causae*.

n.73 Powers reads *don dam pa* and *mtshan nyid* as being in apposition in the sentence *de* [i.e., *don dam pa*] *ni rtog ge kun las 'das mtshan nyid*. Lamotte reads *rtog ge kun las 'das mtshan nyid (sarvatarkasamatikrāntalakṣaṇa)* as a bahuvrīhi, which is much better. See Powers 1995, p. 31 and Lamotte 1935, p. 174.

- n.74 I am using the adjective “indistinct” here in the sense of the first definition given in the Oxford English Dictionary: “1. Not distinct or distinguished from each other, or from something else; not kept separate or apart in the mind or perception; not clearly defined or marked off.” *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, s.v. “indistinct,” accessed July 20, 2020, <https://www-oed-com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2443/view/Entry/94602?redirectedFrom=indistinct#eid>.
- n.75 *mos pa; praṇidhāna*. See *mos pa spyod pa'i sa*. See Mvyut 897: *mos pa spyod pa'i sa; adhimukticaryābhūmiḥ*.
- n.76 Schmithausen reads *don dam pa'i mtshan nyid* (*paramārthalakṣaṇa*) as “the defining characteristic that is the ultimate” in 3.5 (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 558, §512.3). However, Saṃdh. chapter 3 is about conditioned phenomena in relation to the ultimate when their respective defining characteristics are examined. The question here is not to determine whether the ultimate is the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena. Rather, it is to determine whether the conditioned and the ultimate are different by examining their defining characteristics. Therefore, I read *don dam pa'i mtshan nyid* as “the defining characteristic of the ultimate,” namely, as a genitive tatpuruṣa and not as a karmadhāraya.
- n.77 To render *sha stag*.
- n.78 I did not translate the phrase *so so'i skye bo kho nar gyur bzhin du* in an adversative mode (e.g., “though merely ordinary”) because the same phrase is found in the next paragraph in a parallel construction where the syntax in relation to the meaning cannot be interpreted to express contrast. Here *bzhin du* stands for *yathā* in the sense of “as” (i.e., “en tant que” in French).
- n.79 *grub pa dang bde ba; yogakṣema* (see Edgerton 1953, p. 448a,b). Refer to Tillemans 1997, p. 157ff. for a discussion of Powers’ rendering of the term in his translation of Saṃdh. (Powers 1995). Lamotte translates this term with “de sécurité suprême.” See Lamotte 1935, p. 175.
- n.80 I linked the two clauses with “and” because these two clauses are part of the logical argument on being “not different.” We have here a relative-correlative syntactic structure: *gang gi phyir ... de'i phyir* (i.e., *yasmāt ... tasmāt*). The first two clauses linked by “and” represent the *hetu* (“premise” or “reason”) posited by *yasmāt*. The logical structure of the paragraph is “since (a), (b), and (c), therefore (d)” (the conclusion that is stated in the very next sentence “For this reason ...”): “Suviśuddhamati, ordinary beings (a) do not realize the truth and, as mere ordinary beings, (b) neither do they attain

nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, (c) nor do they fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. For these reasons (*de'i phyir*, referring to (a), (b), and (c)), it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are indistinct." D, folio 7.b: *blo gros shin tu rnam dag gang gi phyir so so'i skye bo bden pa mthong ba ma yin/ so so'i skye bo kho nar gyur bzhin du grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa 'thob par yang mi 'gyur/ bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar mi 'gyur ba de'i phyir 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa'i mtshan nyid tha dad pa ma yin zhes bya bar mi rung ste.*

n.81 This entire paragraph is problematic in D: *blo gros shin tu rnam dag gang gi phyir bden pa mthong ba rnams 'du byed kyi mtshan ma dang bral ba ma yin gyi/ bral ba kho na yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba mtshan ma'i 'ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba gnas ngan len gyi 'ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba dang / 'ching ba de gnyi ga las rnam par grol na grub pa dang / bde pa bla na [F.8.a] med pa'i phyir mya ngan las 'das pa 'thob par 'gyur ba dang / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar yang 'gyur ba.* However, Lamotte, Keenan, and Cleary translate the phrases in bold with a double negation. If we look at the same paragraph in F, folio 10.a, we find an interesting textual variant in which the expected double negation is found: *ma bral ba'ang ma yin te* and *ma grol ba'ang ma yin te*, just like in Xuanzang's translation (由此道理當知一切非如理行不如正理善清淨慧。由於今時非見諦者。於諸行相不能除遣。然能除遣非見諦者。Cbeta, Taishō 676). Powers chose to translate this passage without proceeding to any emendation, which makes little sense from the perspective of the argument expounded in this section of the text: "Suviśuddhamati, it is not the case that seers of truth are free from the signs of the compounded; they are simply free. Moreover, seers of truth are not liberated from the bondage of signs, but they are liberated. Seers of truth are not liberated from the bondage of errant tendencies, but they are liberated." (Powers 1995, p. 41).

n.82 We have here again a complex relative-correlative syntactic structure: *gang gi phyir . . . de'i phyir* (i.e., *yasmāt . . . tasmāt*). All the clauses between *gang gi phyir* and *de'i phyir* represent the *hetu* ("premise" or "reason") posited by *yasmāt*. The logical structure of the paragraph is "since (a), (b), (c), (d), therefore (e)" (the conclusion that is stated in the very next sentence, "For all these reasons, . . ."): "Suviśuddhamati, it is not the case that (a) those who realize the truth are not detached from the phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena, for they are indeed detached from it. (b) Neither are they not liberated from the bondage of phenomenal appearance, for they are indeed

liberated from it. (c) Nor are they not liberated from the bondage of corruption, for they are indeed liberated from it. (d) Since they are liberated from these two kinds of bondage, [F.8.a] not only do they attain nirvāṇa, the unsurpassable good, but they will also fully and completely awaken to the unsurpassable complete and perfect awakening. (e) For all these reasons (*de'i phyir* referring to (a), (b), (c), and (d)), it is not correct to say that the defining characteristic of conditioned phenomena and the defining characteristic of the ultimate are distinct." D, folios 7.b–8.a: *blo gros shin tu rnam dag gang gi phyir bden pa mthong ba rnams 'du byed kyi mtshan ma dang bral ba ma yin gyi/bral ba kho na yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba mtshan ma'i 'ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba yin pa dang / bden pa mthong ba gnas ngan len gyi 'ching ba las rnam par grol ba ma yin gyi/ rnam par grol ba dang / 'ching ba de gnyi ga las rnam par grol na grub pa dang / bde ba bla na med pa'i phyir mya ngan las 'das pa 'thob par 'gyur ba dang / bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar yang 'gyur ba de'i phyir 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang / don dam pa'i mtshan nyid tha dad pa zhes byar mi rung ste.*

n.83 On a similar line of thought, see 4.10.

n.84 *gdags pa; prajñapti*. Lamotte translates this term with “dire.” This does not convey the meaning of *gdags pa*, which implies the idea of imputation, intimation, conceptualization, or representation. Here, in the sense of “decide,” see Edgerton 1953, p. 359,1.

n.85 *mi bzod; na kṣamate, na kṣamati* (see Edgerton 1953, p. 199,1). Pāli: *khamati* (see *The Pali–English Dictionary* (Rhys-Davids 1921), p. 234).

n.86 D: *blo gros shin tu rnam dag ngas ni de ltar don dam pa phra ba mchog tu phrag mchog tu zab pa/ rtogs par dka' ba/ mchog tu dka' ba/ tha dad pa dang / tha dad pa ma yin pa nyid las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas te*. I read *tha dad pa ma yin pa nyid las yang dag par 'das pa'i mtshan nyid* as a *bahuvrīhi*, not a *tatpuruṣa*. The terms *don dam pa* and *tshan nyid* are not in apposition in chapter 3, since the two terms are repeatedly connected through a genitive particle: *don dam pa'i mtshan nyid* (which occurs 32 times in folios 5.a, 5.b, 6.b, 7.a, 7.b, 8.a, 8.b, and 9.a). I also understand similar constructions with *don dam pa* and *tshan nyid* in the following chapter as *bahuvrīhis*.

n.87 This phrase is also found in 2.2, 3.6, and 4.7 (see also folios 5.b, 9.a–b, and 10.b–11.a): *mngon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas kyang bsnyad cing gsal bar byas/ rnam par phye/ gdags pa byas/ rab tu bstan to*.

- n.88 Powers translates *mtshan nyid* as singular (see Powers 1995, p. 49). But the question of the identity or difference in this chapter is evaluated from the perspective of two defining characteristics, namely, the defining characteristic of the conditioned and the defining characteristic of the unconditioned.
- n.89 The last two lines are quoted in the *Bhāvanākrama*; see Tucci 1971, p. 1: *nimittabandhanāj jantur atho dauṣṭhulabandhanāt/vipaśyanāṃ bhāvayitvā śamathaṃ ca vimucyata iti.*
- n.90 Lit. “in the world of beings.”
- n.91 F reads here *shes pa* in agreement with D. See F, folio 14.bff.
- n.92 *dmigs pa; ālambana*. I think it is important here to read *dmigs pa* as meaning “object” because in folio 11.a the Buddha contrasts these various objects (aggregates, sense sources, constituents, truths, etc.) with the “object conducive to purification” (*rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa, *viśuddhyālambana*; see Schmithausen 2014, p. 362, §306.5 and n. 1644). Translating *dmigs pa* here as “observing” would weaken the central opposition between (a) the objects taken as a reference point for their practice by those who have not realized the defining characteristic of the ultimate and (b) the object conducive to purification, which is present within all phenomena. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce this fundamental point.
- n.93 This paragraph deals with the thirty-seven branches of awakening (*byang chub kyi yan lag; bodhyaṅgāni*).
- n.94 *ro gcig pa; ekarasa*. I read the compound *thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid; *sarvatraikarasalakṣaṇa* (?) as a bahuvrīhi; see D, folio 12.a: *rab ’byor de bzhin du don dam pa yang mtshan nyid tha dad pa’i chos rnam la thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid yin par blta bar bya’o*. I understand *thams cad du ro gcig pa’i mtshan nyid* to refer here to the defining characteristic of the ultimate since this definition presents *dharma* as having various *lakṣaṇa*. As a consequence, I read this sentence as stating that the ultimate is that whose defining characteristic is always of a single nature in all phenomena that have diverse defining characteristics. See also 4.8, which supports this interpretation.
- n.95 *rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa; *viśuddhyālambana*. Lamotte reads here *rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa* with the meaning of *viśuddhālambana* (“objet pur”), but Schmithausen gives **viśuddhyālambana* as the Sanskrit equivalent for the Tibetan (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 362, §306.5 and n. 1644). It is worth noting that this term is also found in chapter 7, where it is again equated with the

ultimate (*don dam pa*). In this context, it is said that *paratantra* is not an object conducive to purification whereas the actual (*pariniṣpanna*) is. In this sense, one should make the distinction here between *vastu* and *ālambana*. The ultimate is conceived here as the referential object, or support object, of a purification that leads to awakening. The usage of *ālambana* in reference to the ultimate clearly refers to practice in the present chapter.

n.96 Compare D, folio 11.a: *rab 'byor rnam grangs des na khyod kyis 'di ltar thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid gang yin pa de ni don dam pa yin par rig par bya'o* with D, folio 12.a: *rab 'byor de bzhin du don dam pa yang mtshan nyid tha dad pa'i chos rnams la thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid yin par blta bar bya'o* (passim).

n.97 *de bzhin nyid*; *tathatā*. I translate *tathatā* with “true reality” (in the sense of the true state or nature of things) instead of the more usual “suchness” or “thusness.” However, when *de bzhin nyid* is qualified by an adjective such as *don dam pa*, I simply translate it with “reality” to improve readability. See Schmithausen 2014, p. 356, §303.1 (passim), in which *tathatā* is translated with “True Reality” or “Suchness.”

n.98 D reads *gnyis med pa'i shes pa*, while F, folio 16.b reads *gnyis su med pa'i ye shes*.

n.99 *kho na*; *eva*. For a comparison between Buescher’s and Schmithausen’s translations of this sentence, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 380, §324.

n.100 D: *de bzhin gshegs pa rnams byung yang rung ma byung yang rung ste/ rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su chos gnas par bya ba'i phyir chos rnams kyi chos nyid dbyings de ni rnam par gnas pa kho na yin pa*. Lamotte translates *chos gnas par bya ba'i phyir* with “pour le maintien des choses,” but *phyir* does not have a dative function here. Powers’ translation reads, “because phenomena abide in permanent, permanent time and in everlasting, everlasting time, the domain of reality of phenomena alone abides.” This does not make sense either. Conditioned phenomena are impermanent as explained at length in the first four chapters. The argument simply runs as follows: since it is present in all things, this alone is permanent. As for the expression *chos nyid dbyings*, D, folio 11.b reads *chos rnams kyi chos nyid dbyings* while F, folio 17.a has *chos rnams kyi chos nyid/ chos gnas pa'i dbyings*, referring respectively to *dharmatā* and *dharmadhātu* (compare with Mvyut 1719: *chos gnas pa nyid; dharmasthititā*). I am reluctant to translate *dbyings* (*dhātu*) as “realm/domain” here because the meaning of *dhātu* as “constituent” makes so much sense, particularly when reading F, in which *dbyings* is glossed as *chos gnas pa*, “that which abides within phenomena,” “that which is the support/source of phenomena,” or “the condition of phenomena.” Xuanzang’s translation

confirms the suggested translation: 唯有常常時恒恒時如來出世若不出世諸法性安立法界安住 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).

- n.101 *ji tsam gyis; kiyant*. The complete sentence reads, “In what sense are they skilled in the secrets of mind, thought, and cognition?”
- n.102 D: *blo gros yangs ba 'gro ba drug gi 'khor ba 'di na sems can gang dang gang dag sems can gyi ris gang dang gang du yang sgo nga nas skye ba'i skye gnas sam/ yang na mngal nas skye ba'am/ yang na drod gsher las skye ba'am/ yang na rdzus te skye ba'i skye gnas su lus mngon par 'grub cing 'byung bar 'gyur ba der*. “For whatever sentient beings an individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) comes about and emerges in this saṃsāra comprising six destinations, in whatever community of beings, be it in [the mode of] egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born or spontaneous generation, there . . .” (Schmithausen 2014, p. 177, §149). Regarding *lus mngon par 'grub cing 'byung bar 'gyur ba*, one finds the Sanskrit equivalent *ātmabhāvam abhinirvartayati* for *lus mngon par 'grub 'gyur ba* (see Yokoyama, Kōitsu, and Hirosawa Takayuki, eds., *Index to the Yogācārabhūmi (Chinese-Sanskrit-Tibetan)* (Tokyo: Sankibō Busshorin, 1996)). Schmithausen reads here, “For whatever sentient beings an individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) comes about and emerges” (Schmithausen 2014, p. 177, §149), but it seems to me that we could have had here a causative (*ātmabhāvam abhinirvartayanti*) with the Literal meaning of producing or bringing about a [new] existence, in a word, being reborn (for an instance of this rendering, see *ibid.*, p. 191, n. 812). Otherwise, one would expect a syntactic particle in Tibetan after *sems can gang dang gang dag* to match Schmithausen’s reading, “For whatever sentient beings,” particularly if one understands *'gro ba drug gi 'khor ba 'di na sems can gang dang gang dag* as not in apposition to *sems can gyi ris gang dang gang du*, which I think is the correct way to understand the expression.
- n.103 I follow here the second possible interpretation of the correlative-relative syntactic structure of the sentence as suggested by Schmithausen (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 178, §150), in which *der (tatra)* is read as having a temporal connotation, rendered by the adverb “then.”
- n.104 D: *sa bon thams cad pa'i sems rnam par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro*. See Schmithausen 1987, p. 356, n. 508; and 2014, p. 325, n. 1490 for the Sanskrit reconstruction: *(*sarvabījakaṃ cittam*) *vipacyate saṃmūrccati vṛddhiṃ virūddhiṃ vipulatām apadyate*. See also Waldron 2003, p. 218, n. 13. Lamotte (1973, p. 65ff.) suggests *kalalatvena saṃmūrccati* in his translation of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* I,34. The appended commentary describes how the appropriating cognition enters the mother’s womb by

- uniting with the semen and the blood (*śukraśoṇita*). The embryo with which, from then on, the appropriating cognition shares a common destiny (*ekayogakṣema*) is the result of this “coagulation.” On the topic, see Kritzer 2000.
- n.105 See Waldron 2003, pp. 94–95 for a translation of 5.2. See also Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 1305ff. regarding Asaṅga’s and Wonch’uk’s commentaries on Saṃdh. 5.2–7.
- n.106 *kun tu bsags pa; ācita*. This explanation corresponds to an etymological analysis of the Sanskrit term *citta*. Xuanzang’s translation reads: 由此識色聲香味觸等積集滋長故 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
- n.107 See Schmithausen 2014, p. 157ff. for an extensive discussion of the various testimonies and interpretations of this sentence. See also Waldron 2003, pp. 95–96 for a translation of 5.3, and Tillemans 1997, pp. 157–58 for a discussion of Powers’ translation of 5.3. Powers translates the verb in last sentence with an active form “because it collects and accumulates forms, sounds . . .” (Powers 1995, p. 71). It seems to me that, since this is an etymological explanation of *citta*, a passive is better in the present case.
- n.108 *rnam par shes pa’i tshogs drug po*, lit. “the sixfold group of cognitions.”
- n.109 Waldron’s translation (Waldron 2003, p. 97) seems to follow the Sanskrit and Tibetan found in Sthiramati’s *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣyam* (see TrBh, 33.25–34.4 in Buescher 2007). However, the quote of Saṃdh. in this treatise is drawn from 5.5. It does not quite match the last sentence of 5.4. See D: *gal te rnam par shes pa’i tshogs gnyis sam/ gsum mam bzhi lhan cig gam/ lnga car lhan cig ’byung na yang der rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga po dag dang / spyod yul mtshungs pa rnam par rtog pa’i yid kyi rnam par shes pa yang gcig kho na lhan cig ’byung ngo*. Compare with TrBh, 33.26–27 (Buescher 2007): *gal te rnam par shes pa gnyis sam gsum mam lnga ’byung ba’i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na yang gnyis sam gsum mam lnga’ bar du ’byung bar ’gyur ro*. Sanskrit: *saced dvayos trayānāṃ sacet pañcānāṃ vijñānām utpattipratyayaḥ pratyupasthito bhavati sakṛd yāvat pañcānāṃ pravṛttir bhavati*.
- n.110 For a comparison with the Dunhuang edition of 5.5, as well as for a general evaluation of the relevance of this edition, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 419, n. 1852.
- n.111 D: *gal te rlabs gnyis sam gal te rab tu mang po dag ’byung ba’i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na rlabs rab tu mang po dag ’byung* but VD, folio 54.a: *gal te rlabs gnyis sam gal te rab tu mang po dag ’byung ba’i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na rlabs kyang gnyis*

- sam rab tu mang po dag 'byung*. S, folio 19.a is in agreement with D here (*gnyis sam* is omitted).
- n.112 On the metaphor of the mirror in Buddhist texts, see Wayman 1974.
- n.113 D: *gal te gzugs brnyan gnyis sam gal te rab tu mang po dag 'byung ba'i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na gzugs brnyan rab tu mang po dag 'byung* but VD, folio 54.a: *gal te gzugs brnyan gnyis sam gal te gzugs brnyan rab tu mang po dag 'byung ba'i rkyen nye bar gnas pa gyur na gzugs brnyan yang gnyis sam rab tu mang po dag 'byung*.
- n.114 Lamotte 1935, p. 186 translates *yongs su sbyor bar yang mi mngon* with “ne souffre aucun dommage.”
- n.115 *shes pa*, although it is worth noting that the Dunhuang manuscript reads *ye shes*. See Hakayama 1986, 11 E6 (3).
- n.116 D: *blo gros yangs pa gang gi phyir byang chub sems dpa' rang gi so so nang gi len pa mi mthong / len pa'i rnam par shes pa yang mi mthong la/ de yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du yin pa*. I am following here Schmithausen's reading of *gang gi phyir* (*yataḥ*) in the sense of “as soon as” (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 346–47, n. 1577). This interpretation is confirmed by F, folio 19.b, which reads *nam* instead of *gang gi phyir*.
- n.117 *nang gi so sor rang rig pa; adhyātmaṃ prātyatmam* (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 346–47, n. 1577). See F, folio 19.b: *nang gi so so rang*.
- n.118 “Neither the accumulated nor the mind” is a pun on *ācīta* and *citta*.
- n.119 Sanskrit verses are found in Buescher 2007, see TrBh, 34.2–3. Also translated into English in Waldron 2003, p. 101.
- n.120 *yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid; pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*. I read these compounds as karmadhārayas, not as genitive tatpuruṣas. For an analysis of these compounds, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 359, n. 1626.
- n.121 *rnam par bzhag pa; vyavasthā*, which has the connotation of something being agreed upon, represented, arranged, settled, decreed, or established.
- n.122 Frauwallner and Lamotte do not translate *ji tsam du* (see Frauwallner 1969, p. 285: “um sie im täglichen Sprachgebrauch zu bezeichnen” and Lamotte 1935, p. 188: “permettant de les mentionner dans le langage courant”). The Chinese term 乃至 in Xuanzang's translation (乃至為令隨起言說, Cbeta, Taishō 676) corresponds to the Tibetan *ji tsam du* (for *yāvat* or *kiyat*), which I understand here in the sense of “at least, only, even just.” Interestingly enough, the Go witness has *ci tsam gis* (see Go, folio 12.a); F, folio 20.a reads

gang ji skad du, and He, folio 77.a returns *gang ji snyed du* (while *rjes su* is omitted) for *ji tsam du* in D.

n.123 The Tibetan *rjes su tha snyad gdags pa* and the Chinese 隨起言說 correspond to *anuvyavahāra*.

n.124 D: *ji tsam du rjes su tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir chos rnam kyī ngo bo nyid dam bye brag tu ming dang brdar rnam par gzhas pa gang yin pa'o*. Frauwallner's translation of this passage is slightly ambiguous and could be potentially misleading on account of the German preposition "nach": "Es ist jede Festsetzung eines Namens und einer Vereinbarung für die Gegebenheiten nach Wesen oder Besonderheit, um sie im täglichen Sprachgebrauch zu bezeichnen." (Frauwallner 1969, p. 286). If one reads this sentence as "a determination in terms of being and specific defining characteristic," then the translation is correct. However, if one reads it as meaning "the determination of . . . in accordance with/corresponding to [their] being or specific defining characteristic," then the translation becomes problematic since the point made in the text is precisely that there is no such thing. The determination (Festsetzung) of a name and convention for phenomena (für die Gegebenheiten) is not made according to the essence or defining characteristic of phenomena (nach Wesen oder Besonderheit). Hence the term "imaginary defining characteristic." If this determination occurred according to the essence of phenomena, it would be illogical to call this defining characteristic "imaginary." Lamotte's translation is therefore more accurate in the present case, although his rendering of *rnam par bzhags pa* (*vyavasthāna*) as a present participle qualifying *ming dang brda* slightly modifies the original meaning of the sentence. Sanskrit compounds with *vyavasthāna* can be read as instrumental tatpuruṣa, for example *saṃjñākaraṇavyavasthāna*, *mātrāvyavasthāna*, or *aṅgavyavasthāna*. Xuanzang translates this passage as 云何諸法遍計所執相。謂一切法名假安立自性差別。乃至為令隨起言說。(Taishō 676), in which *nāmasaṃketa* ("names and common references") seem at first glance to be the grammatical passive subject of the main verb of the clause (安立) or an adverb. In fact, F, folio 20.a and He, folio 77.a read *ming dang brdas rnam par bzhag pa* instead of *ming dang brdar rnam par bzhag pa* in D and other witnesses mentioned in the preceding notes. The terminative of the Tibetan *ming dang brdar* could be read adverbially in the sense of "nominally and conventionally" in the sense of "by means of/in terms of names and common references" for *nāmasaṃketa*.

n.125 Regarding the choice of terminology for *pariṇiṣpanna*, Edgerton mentions two possible meanings (see Edgerton 1953, p. 325): (1) "completely perfected" in the sense of "accomplished/attained," which corresponds to

the second clause in the present definition (6.6) in which the *yong su grub pa* is glossed in the sense of *yang dag par 'grub pa* (D) and *yang dag par bsgrub pa* (F). (2) The second meaning of *pariniṣpanna* according to Edgerton is “absolute.” The term is also translated into English as meaning “real.” Understanding *pariniṣpanna* as “established” or “perfected” is indeed problematic. Reality in the sense of *tathatā* cannot be referred to as “perfected,” because it is not perfectible. If it were, it would be conditioned (see Saṃdh. chapter 3). Likewise, *tathatā* cannot be termed “established” because if it were, it would be impermanent, but it is said to be the only permanent reality (see Saṃdh. chapter 4). As a consequence, it appears clearly from the context of the definition given above and Edgerton’s explanations that *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* refers to both the “character accomplished [by bodhisattvas]” in the sense of the accomplishment of the defining characteristic of the ultimate as the ultimate attainment of the bodhisattva’s spiritual path, and the “absolute or real character” in the sense of reality itself (*tathatā*). As emphasized throughout Saṃdh., *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* is indeed none other than the defining characteristic of the ultimate (*don dam pa’i mtshan nyid; paramārthalakṣaṇa*), the object conducive to purification, (*rnam par dag pa’i dmigs pa; *viśuddhyālabana*). In the present translation, I opt for “actual,” a term that fits well with the metaphors found in Saṃdh. chapter 6, to explain the three natures (Lamotte chose “absolu,” and Frauwallner “vollkommen”). The term “actual” obviously induces a clear dichotomy between what is imaginary and what is real, which was most probably at the origin of these terminological choices in the source language. On the opposition between the imaginary and the actual by equating the imaginary with the unreal through the usage of the same terminology (i.e., *pariniṣpanna* and *parikalpa/parikalpita*), see 1.2.

n.126

The syntax of this sentence differs according to the various available editions of the text with little bearing on the meaning of the sentence. For example, compare D; VD, folios 55.a–b: *chos rnams kyi de bzhin nyid gang yin pa ste/byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyis rtun pa’i rgyu dang / legs par tshul bzhin yid la byas pa’i rgyus de rtogs shing de rtogs pa goms par byas pa yang dag par grub pas kyang bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub kyi bar du yang dag par 'grub pa gang yin pa'o*; F, folio 20.a–b: *gang chos rnams kyi de bzhin nyid de/byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyis brtson ba’i rgyu dang / yang dag par tshul bzhin yid la byed pa’i rgyud gang rtogs par 'gyur ba yin te rtogs dang / bsgoms pa bsgrubs pas/ bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub kyi bar du yang dag par bsgrub pa'o*; and S, folio 20.b: *gang chos rnams kyi de bzhin nyid/ gang byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyis brtson ba’i rgyu dang / yang dag par tshul bzhin yid la byed pa’i rgyus rtogs par 'gyur ba yin te/ de rtogs pa goms par byas pa yang dag par grub pas kyang /*

bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi bar du yang dag par 'grub pa'o. Frauwallner reads this passage in the following way: “Es ist die Soheit der Gegebenheiten, ihr Erschauen durch die Bodhisattva auf Grund ihrer Energie und richtigen Beobachtung (*yoniśomanasikārah*), und durch das Zustandekommen der Übung dieses Erschauens schließlich das Zustandekommen der höchsten vollkommenen Erleuchtung.” (Frauwallner 1969, p. 286). Lamotte 1935, p. 189 is similar to Frauwallner’s reading. It is plausible that Frauwallner simply followed Lamotte’s translation of this passage. Schmithausen suggests that the relative clause starting with *gang byang chub* specifies the *tathatā*, which I agree with, although reading the two clauses defining *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* as being in apposition would not negate the fact that the second one merely specifies the first one (*tathatā*) as being that which is attained by bodhisattvas: “(Suchness) into which the bodhisattvas, in consequence of their zeal and in consequence of their appropriate contemplation, obtain direct insight (**prativedha*, cf. Saṃdh_{DH}: *so sor chud pa*), and, through the accomplishment of the repeated practice of this insight, finally attain the Highest Perfect Awakening.” (Schmithausen 2014, p. 540, n. 2241). It is important here to note that *rtogs shing de rtogs pa goms par byas pa* stands on the same level in relation to *yang dag par grub pas*, which is not apparent in Schmithausen’s translation. Thus, “obtain direct insight” (*de rtogs shing*) is part of a larger argument: *rtogs shing de rtogs pa goms par byas pa* (D) or *rtogs par 'gyur ba yin te rtogs dang / bsgoms pa bsgrubs pas* (F). This meaning unit should therefore not be put on the same level as *yang dag par 'grub pa gang yin pa'o* as it is in Schmithausen’s translation, since it is one of the reasons why there is an accomplishment according to the available testimonies. Regarding the translation of *bar du* (*yāvat*), I followed Schmithausen’s way of solving the problem. Powers understands it in its usual sense of “up to,” but it does not work here, since this would imply that what are accomplished are also inferior realizations, which Powers refers to between square brackets as “stages”; see Powers 1995, p. 83. Schmithausen’s reading of the second clause as specifying *tathatā* seems preferable.

n.127 *de lta bur ni; evam eva.*

n.128 Lamotte translates this term with “essentiellement fantaisiste”; see Lamotte 1935, p. 190. This is missing the point that this actually refers to the imaginary defining characteristic.

n.129 D; VD, folio 56.a: *gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid de/ kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid der rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su yongs su ma grub cing ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid blta bar bya'o.* F, folio 21.b: *gzhan gyi dbang de nyid la/ kun brtag brtags pa'i mtshan nyid de rtag pa rtag pa'i dus*

dang / 'khor bar 'khor ba'i dus su ma grub cing rang bzhin med pa nyid ni/ yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid du blta'o; S, folio 21.b: *gzhan gyi dbang de nyid kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid der rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su yongs su ma grub cing rang bzhin med pa nyid ni/ yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid du blta'o*. F and S are helpful here to interpret the syntax of D. The following simple emendation would improve the syntax of D: *gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid de la/ kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid der rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang / ther zug ther zug gi dus su yongs su ma grub cing ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid blta bar bya'o*. Lamotte's translation of 6.9 is more intelligible than that of Frauwallner, who is more literal and strictly follows the syntax found in D. Xuanzang's translation reads: 即依他起相上由遍計所執相於常常時於恆恆時無有真實無自性性圓成實性當知亦爾 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). In my translation I chose to topicalize *yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid* (in agreement with D) because the purpose of this dialogue is to define the three defining characters.

n.130 *rab tu shes; prajānāti* with the meaning of *pratijānāti*; see Edgerton 1953, p. 357. Lamotte translates this term with "repose," which does not convey the meaning of *prajānāti*; see Lamotte 1935, p. 190. In the following paragraph, Lamotte uses the verb "connaître" for the same term.

n.131 *mtshan ma dang 'brel pa'i ming la brten nas*. VD, folio 56.a: *ming dang 'brel ba'i mtshan ma la brten nas*.

n.132 *mngon par zhen pa; abhiniveśa*. Usually with a negative connotation; see Edgerton 1953, p. 53. Powers reads it as meaning "strongly adhering"; see Powers 1995, p. 87.

n.133 See the definition of the imaginary defining characteristic in 6.4: "Guṇākara, what is the imaginary defining characteristic? It is what is nominally and conventionally posited as the essence or the distinctive [characteristic] of phenomena, even just in order to designate [them]." See also 7.4: "Paramārthasamudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena as a defining characteristic? It is the imaginary defining characteristic. Why? Because as much as this defining characteristic is nominally and conventionally posited, it is not posited on the basis of an essence or a distinctive [characteristic]. This is why it is called 'the essencelessness of all phenomena [that is] a defining characteristic.' "

n.134 See 6.5: "Guṇākara, what is the other-dependent defining characteristic? It is the dependent arising of phenomena. It is like this: 'When this is, that arises; because this arises, that arises;' and also: from '[in dependence upon ignorance as a condition,] conditioning mental factors [arise]' up to 'thus, the

whole great mass of suffering comes to be.’ ” And also 7.5: “Paramārtha-samudgata, what is the essencelessness of all phenomena [that is] arising? It is the other-dependent defining characteristic of phenomena. Why? Because this is [the defining characteristic] arising on account of causes other [than itself], and not by itself. This is why it is referred to as ‘essencelessness with regard to arising.’ ”

n.135 I read *mtshan nyid med pa dang / kun nas nyon mongs pa'i mtshan nyid dang / rnam par byang ba'i mtshan nyid* (D) as in the previous clauses, namely, as bahuvrīhis.

n.136 Lamotte 1935: 191: “Ils excitent la pitié.” *A la rigueur*, one could have accepted “ils suscitent la pitié”!

n.137 This enumeration follows the structure found in 4.2.

n.138 D: *thams cad ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa* for *chos thams cad ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa* (D, folio 16.b passim).

n.139 For a list of texts including this sentence, see Lamotte 1935, p. 198.

n.140 *rnam par gnas pa; vyavasthita* (Chinese: 安立).

n.141 See Lamotte’s and Frauwallner’s translations of this passage (Lamotte 1935, p. 194 and Frauwallner 1969, p. 291). Both read *rnam par gnas pa* (“établi,” “beruht”) as the main verb in both clauses, which is syntactically dubious. Xuanzang’s translation concords with D: 善男子云何諸法無自性性謂諸法遍計所執相。何以故。此由假名安立為相非由自性安立為相 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). The complete definition of *parikalpitalakṣaṇa* in 6.4: D should be kept in mind when translating the definition of the *lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*: *yon tan 'byung gnas de la chos rnams kyi kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid gang zhe na/ ji tsam du rjes su tha snyad gdags pa'i phyir chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid dam bye brag tu ming dang brdar rnam par gzhas pa gang yin pa'o*.

n.142 *rab tu phye ba; prabhāvita* (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 400, n. 1770).

n.143 See Schmithausen 2014, p. 559. Schmithausen reads *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* as “lack of own-being [that is] the ultimate reality.”

n.144 For a discussion of the syntactic construction *gcig . . . gcig*, refer to Tillemans 1997, pp. 161–64.

n.145 See Schmithausen 2014, p. 560 on the textual material pertaining to this sentence.

n.146 See Schmithausen 2014, p. 561ff.

n.147 For a complete comparison of this passage across editions, see Kojirō Katō's forthcoming edition of the text. As an example, it is interesting to compare the syntax of D and F. D: *don dam yang dag 'phags pas ni sems can gyi khams na sems can rnam kyis kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid ngo bo nyid kyis tha dad par mthong zhing gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid dang / yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang ngo bo nyid kyis tha dad par mthong na/ de'i phyir ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam pa gsum mi 'dogs kyi*. Interestingly, L, S, and T are in agreement with D, as are C, J, N. P. VD, VG, and VP. Only F offers a variant reading (folio 25.b): *don dam yang dag 'phags sems can gyi khams ni/ sems can rnam kyis kun brtags pa'i rang bzhin ngo bo nyid kyis tha dad par mi mthong / gzhan gyi dbang gi rang bzhin dang / yongs su grub pa'i rang bzhin yang ngo bo nyid kyis tha dad par yang mi mthong ste/ de'i phyir ngas rang bzhin med pa rnam gsum du gzhas go*. F explains why the Buddha taught an *essencelessness* by referring to beings as not perceiving a distinct essence in the three natures: "Paramārthasamudgata, beings in the world of beings do not consider the imaginary essence as different from an essence. They do not even consider the other-dependent essence and the actual essence as different from an essence. As a consequence, I presented the threefold essencelessness." This does not make much sense. I therefore follow the reading found in D. Frauwallner chose to follow D very closely here. He takes as the subject of the verb *mi 'dogs* the Buddha, like Powers and Lamotte: "Ich habe . . . die dreifache Wesenlosigkeit nicht verkündet, weil die Lebewesen in der Sphäre der Lebewesen das vorgestellte Wesen seinem Wesen nach als etwas Verschiedenes ansehen, und weil sie das abhängige Wesen und das vollkommene Wesen seinem Wesen nach als etwas Verschiedenes ansehen." Lamotte's translation (Lamotte 1935, p. 196) reads, "Si j'expose [for 'dogs] la triple Irréalité, ce n'est pas parce que les êtres, dans le monde des êtres, considèrent la nature imaginaire comme une nature distincte, ou les natures dépendante et absolue comme des natures distinctes. Au contraire . . ." With "au contraire," Lamotte expresses the adversative function of the particle *kyi* at the end of the clause *de'i phyir ngo bo nyid med pa nyid rnam pa gsum mi 'dogs kyi*. To achieve this, Lamotte reads *mi 'dogs* in an affirmative mode and in the negative the statement regarding beings, which is in agreement with Xuanzang's translation: 復次勝義生非由有情界中諸有情類別觀遍計所執自性為自性故。亦非由彼別觀依他起自性及圓成實自性為自性故我立三種無自性性。然由有情於依他起自性及圓成實自性上增益遍計所執自性故我立三種無自性性 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).

n.148 *sems; citta*. This is one of the synonyms for the subliminal mind (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa; ālayavijñāna*) as explained in chapter 5. See chapters 5 and 6 on the

- latent disposition of the mind through karmic seeds in the sense of conventions.
- n.149 *bag la nyal; anuśaya*. In the sense of “adhering/sticking” and “being latent/inclined” here (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 687).
- n.150 Powers’ translation does not render the meaning of this sentence: “Due to these causes and conditions, in the future [this view of] the own-being of the other-dependent proliferates.” (Powers 1995, p. 107). The other-dependent in the sense of dependent arising refers here to rebirth and future lives.
- n.151 *yang dag par* (“perfectly”) is important here, as it echoes the statement above and without it the entire paragraph loses its meaning: to achieve perfect liberation, the teaching on essencelessness with regard to both defining characteristics and the ultimate is necessary.
- n.152 L, S, T, and F (e.g., F, folio 27.a) logically confirm *shes pa*, which is interesting since it establishes a distinction between occurrences of *shes pa* and *ye shes*, which D does not do systematically (see Kojirō Katō’s edition of chapter 7). The term here is a synonym for *sems*; see the parallel passage above in 7.10.
- n.153 F, folio 27.a, has *lam ‘di nyid dang ‘grod pa ‘di nyid kyis* instead of D. *lam ‘di nyid dang sgrub pa ‘di nyid kyis grub pa dang*. C, H, J, N, and Kḳ also read *sgrub*; VD, VG, VP: *bsgrub*; L, S: *bgrod*; F, T: *‘grod*. (cf. Kojirō Katō’s edition).
- n.154 *don dam yang dag ‘phags nyan thos kyi rigs can gang zag zhi ba’i bgrod pa gcig pu pa ni sangs rgyas thams cad brtson pa dang ldan par gyur kyang byang chub kyi snying po la bzhag ste*. Brunnhölzl reads the qualifying clause *sangs rgyas thams cad brtson pa dang ldan par gyur* in quite a different way here: “even if all buddhas with [all] their effort] were [to attempt] to establish persons with the śrāvaka disposition . . .” (Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 1522).
- n.155 *‘du byed mngon par ‘du bya ba; saṃskārābhisaṃskaraṇa*. Compare with the Sanskrit sentence in Tucci’s edition of *Bhāvanākrama* (Tucci 1971, p. 22): *ekāntasattvārthavimukhasya ekāntasaṃsārābhisaṃskāravimukhasya [nā]uttarā samyaksambodhir uktā mayeti*, which has *saṃsārābhisaṃskāra* instead of *saṃskārābhisaṃskaraṇa* as found in Tibetan.
- n.156 *chos; dharma*.
- n.157 *drang po dang drang po’i rang bzhin can/rtog pa dang sel mi nus pa*. Powers understands *rtog pa dang sel* as “to remove conceptuality.” (Powers 1995, p. 117). F, folio 28.b reads, *brtag pa dang /bzhig pa mi nus pa*. The problem is that *sel* is a transitive verb. It is therefore syntactically difficult to take *rtog pa* as

the object of *sel*. In the present case, Keenan’s solution based on Chinese is interesting: “to make judgments” (Keenan 2000, p. 42).

- n.158 *zhib mo brtags pa’i mkhas pa dang ’dzangs pas rig pa; sūkṣmaṃ nipuṇapaṇḍitaviññavedanīyaḥ* (see Mvyut 2918). Lit. “It is to be known.” All Sanskrit synonyms for this sentence are found in Mvyut 2013–20.
- n.159 In accordance with the multiple occurrences of this phrase in chapter 2, *shes pa* should be read here as *ye shes* in agreement with F.
- n.160 See Lamotte 1935, p. 201, n. 31: *las kyi sgrib chen po* refers here to *saddharmapratikṣepakarmāvaraṇa*.
- n.161 *chos ’dul ba; dharmavinaya* (read as a dvandva).
- n.162 I read *rnam par rtog pa’i spyod yul kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid kyi gnas ’du byed kyi mtshan ma* (D) as a karmadhāraya, which means that the last compound in the series of three should be topicalized. It seems to me that since the opposition between *nimitta* (“phenomenal appearance”) and *svabhāva* or *svalakṣaṇa* (“unique/specific/particular defining characteristic or essence”) is central throughout the text, reading the compound in this way clarifies the meaning of this definition of the *parikalpita*, which basically results from the operation consisting in attributing an essence to appearance by means of verbal conventions.
- n.163 This definition elaborates on the definition of *parikalpitasvabhāva* formulated in 6.4. In 6.5 and 6.7; that which has the defining characteristic of dependent arising is equated with phenomenal appearance. On the basis of what is dependent on an other, essence is imputed in the sense of a real entity, independent of any other cause to exist as what it is. This corresponds to the imaginary defining characteristic.
- n.164 Lamotte’s translation is built on the same structure but inverts the main clauses of the sentence: In the *nimitta*, the *parikalpita* is unestablished. See Lamotte 1935, p. 204.
- n.165 Lamotte’s translation is built on the same structure but inverts the main clauses of the sentence: In the *nimitta*, the *parikalpita* is unestablished. See Lamotte 1935, p. 204. D: *kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid der yongs su ma grub*. I read *kun brtags pa’i mtshan nyid* as a bahuvrīhi: “that which has the imaginary defining characteristic” or “that which consists in/is characterized by the imaginary.”
- n.166 *yang dag pa’i ting nge ’dzin; samyaksamādhi*.

- n.167 D: *bcom ldan 'das nges pa'i don bstan pa 'di* should be read *bcom ldan 'das kyi* (or *kyis* as in VD) *nges pa'i don bstan pa 'di*, lit. “of the Blessed One,” rendered here as “[expounded] by the Blessed One.” *bcom ldan 'das* is omitted in L, S, T, and F; see Katō’s edition of chapter 7.
- n.168 Lamotte and Powers understand the statement “All phenomena are without an essence, unborn, unceasing, primordially in the state of peace, and naturally in the state of nirvāṇa” to be the teaching of definitive meaning (see Lamotte 1935, p. 206 and Powers 1995, pp. 135–37). However, the entire point of this chapter is that there is an underlying intent of definitive meaning to this statement. This is the reason why it is explained in the next paragraphs that a third turning of the wheel of Dharma was necessary.
- n.169 D: *de bzhin du chos rnam kyī ngo bo nyid ma mchis pa nyid las brtsams/ skye ba ma mchis pa dang / 'gag pa ma mchis pa dang / gzod ma nas zhi ba dang / rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa nyid las brtsams nas/ bcom ldan 'das nges pa'i don bstan pa 'di yang drang ba'i don gyi mdo sde thams cad du stsal bar bgyi pa lags so*. C, H, J, N, Kṡ, VG, VP, L, S, T, and F also read *stsal*; VD: *bstsal* (cf. Kojirō Katō’s edition). Lamotte translates *stsal* with “se recommande” to create a parallel construction with the analogy of the dried ginger (see Lamotte 1935, p. 205). This somehow does not solve our problem. Powers translates *stsal bar gyi* with a past tense “placed” (see Powers 1995, p. 137). Keenan 2000, p. 48 offers a Literal rendering of Xuanzang’s translation that is similar to the Tibetan version of the text (如是世尊依此諸法皆無自性無生無滅本來寂靜自性涅槃無自性性了義言教遍於一切不了義經皆應安處, Cbeta, Taishō 676): “just so, World-Honored One, the explicit teaching that all things have no-essence, no arising, and no passing away, are originally quiescent, and are essentially in cessation *must be put into all the scriptures of implicit meaning.*”
- n.170 D: *drang ba'i don rtsod pa'i gzhi'i gnas su gyur pa lags la* in the sense of *drang ba'i don lags te/ rtsod pa'i gzhi'i gnas su gyur pa lags la* as in *nges pa'i don lags te/ rtsod pa'i gzhi'i gnas su gyur pa ma lags so* (see D, folio 25.a).
- n.171 This is an important statement regarding the intent of the third turning of the wheel, which is to bring together those following the hearers’ and the bodhisattvas’ paths within a single vehicle.
- n.172 By repeating the same statement to describe the second and third turnings, it is made clear that interpreting this statement in terms of emptiness alone is provisional. The underlying intent of the statement corresponds to the teaching found in the third turning.

- n.173 Lit. “Blessed One, what is the name of that which has been taught as a Dharma discourse ascertaining the [Tathāgata’s] intent?”
- n.174 *gzung bar bgyi; dhārayāmi* (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.41). I suggest reading *dhārayāmi*, which is a causative present of *dhṛ-*, as an optative here.
- n.175 This refers to *byang chub kyi sems; bodhicitta*.
- n.176 This paragraph follows the pattern according to which *prajñā* is developed as *śrutamayī prajñā, cintāmayī prajñā, bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. Once the bodhisattvas have heard and contemplated what has been taught, they proceed with practice.
- n.177 Read *thob* instead of *thos*. See F, folio 36.b: *lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa de dag thob pa de’i bar du* and *lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa de dag thob kyi bar du* (8.5).
- n.178 D: *de lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa de thos nas de nyid la gnas te/ sems kyi rnam pa spangs nas ji ltar bsams pa’i chos de dag nyid nang du ting nge ’dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan du so sor rtog par byed mos par byed do*. S, folio 37.b; F, folio 36.a: *des lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang / sems shin tu sbyangs pa de dag thos nas de nyid la gnas te/ ji ltar bsams pa’i chos de dag nyid nang du ting nge ’dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan du sems kyi rnam pa spangs nas/ so sor rtog cing byed mor byed do*.
- n.179 For a detailed discussion of 8.7–9, refer to Schmithausen 2014, p. 391ff.
- n.180 *rab tu phye ba; prabhāvita* in the compound **ālabanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* (see Schmithausen 1984, p. 436; 2014, pp. 400–1 *passim*). On the possible meanings of the Sanskrit term *prabhāvita* in the sense of “consisting of” or “characterized as” as opposed to “characterized by,” refer to Schmithausen 2014, p. 400, n. 1770.
- n.181 The compound *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam; *ālabanavijñaptimātra* can be read as a tatpuruṣa: “the mere representation of a referential object,” or as a karmadhāraya: “a referential object that is a mere representation” or “a mere representation as a referential object” (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 411). If we add to these possibilities the distinction between “characterized as/consists of” and “characterized by” mentioned by Schmithausen in reference to *prabhāvita* (see note 322<markup: immediately preceding note>), it is clear that this important statement can be interpreted in various ways that are consistent with the syntax of this sentence. If one wishes to read the compound **ālabanavijñaptimātra* as a tatpuruṣa, the phrase reads “the mere

representation of a referential object.” However, it seems to me that we should read this compound as a karmadhāraya, since the whole point of this paragraph is to answer Maitreya’s original question about the nature of the image qua object. The answer to this question is that the image (*pratibimba*) that is the object of concentration is not distinct from mind because mind is constituted by a representation that is the actual object of this cognition. With regard to this issue, Xuanzang’s translation reads, 善男子當言無異何以故由彼影像唯是識故善男子我說識所緣唯識所現故 (Cbeta, Taishō 676), which is compatible with the suggested translation. For a complete analysis of these two sentences across selected Chinese and Tibetan editions, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 392ff. and Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 511, n. 139, which contains a detailed summary of Schmithausen’s analysis.

n.182 On VIII.7, see Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 512, n. 141.

n.183 D: *bcom ldan 'das sems can rnam kyis gzugs la sogs par snang ba sems kyis gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa gang lags pa de yang sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags zhes bgyi'am*; S, folio 38.b: *bcom ldan 'das sems can rnam kyis sems kyis gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa/ gzugs la sogs pa gang lags de yang sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags shes bgyi'am*; F, folio 37.a: *bcom ldan 'das sems can rnam kyis sems kyis gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa/ gzugs la tshogs pa de dag kyang sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags shes bgyi'am*.

n.184 D: *mtshan nyid la byed pa*. F, folio 37.b: *mtshan nyid yid la byed pa*.

n.185 *sems kyis mtshan nyid* but *sems kyis mtshan ma* would be better here since Maitreya inquires about *mtshan ma* right after this. Unfortunately, Xuanzang’s translation does not contribute to solving this quandary since 相 can refer to both *lakṣaṇa* and *nimitta* (see 若相續作意唯思维心相, Cbeta, Taishō 676). However, the structure of the paragraph in which questions are asked about definitions of terms found in the Buddha’s previous answer in 8.8 indicates that we should emend *sems kyis mtshan nyid* to *sems kyis mtshan ma*.

n.186 Based on the definitions above, it appears that one-pointedness of mind refers to the state in which appearance (the object of the practice of insight), representation (the object of the practice of mental stillness), and emptiness (the nature of reality as explained in the previous chapters) are in unity.

n.187 *so sor rtog pa* in the sense of “comprehension/realization” (*pratibodha*)

n.188 Compare D: *de dang der shes rab kyis shin tu legs par ma rtogs pa'i chos de dag nyid shin tu legs par rtogs par [F.28.a] bya ba'i phyir yid la byed pa'i lhag mthong gang yin pa'o* with S, folio 39.b: *gang de dang des shes rab kyis legs par ma rtogs pa'i chos de*

dag nyid legs par rtogs par bya ba'i phyir de nyid yid la byed pa'i lhag mthong ngo
and F, folio 38.a: *gang shes rab kyis legs par ma rtogs pa'i chos de dang de dag la legs*
par rtogs par bya ba'i phyir de nyid yid la byed pa'i lhag mthong ngo.

- n.189 The last four meditation objects represent the four seals of Dharma (*phyag rgya bzhi*; *caturmudrā*).
- n.190 *ma 'dres pa'i chos*. On *ma 'dres pa'i chos* and *'dres pa'i chos*, see Brunnhölzl 2018, p. 561, n. 322. Brunnhölzl translates *'dres pa'i chos* as “dharmas in fusion.” Considering dharmas without fusing them means considering them individually. However, 8.14 seems to indicate that *dharma* is used here in the sense of “teaching” rather than “phenomenon.”
- n.191 *gnas gyur pa; āśrayaparivṛtti*. I chose to translate this technical term with “shift in one’s basis [of existence]” or “shift of the basis [of existence]” instead of “transformation of the basis” as is usually the case. The *āśrayaparivṛtti* in Saṃdh. is an attainment that is obtained after the *ālayavijñāna* has ceased (see Schmithausen 1987, p. 198 and Schmithausen 2014, p. 37). In this sūtra, the *ālaya* therefore does not seem to be equated with the *āśraya*. In chapter 10, the basis is evoked in relation to the truth body (*dharmakāya*). According to 10.2 and 8.35.11, it appears that the basis one possesses once all corruption has been eliminated is none other than the truth body after it has been purified of adventitious defilements (see Xing 2005, p. 97), at least in the case of the bodhisattvas. The *dhāraṇī* in 10.8 makes it clear that conceptions of being defiled or purified have in fact no *raison d’être*. From the perspective of true reality, they are completely adventitious. As stated by the Buddha at the conclusion of 10.8, bodhisattvas exchange the body afflicted by corruption for the body of truth or actual body, the *dharmakāya*. In line with this interpretation, *āśraya* is read as a quasi-synonym for *kāya* as in the expression *āśrayapādātr* (on this term, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 331, §272.1). This reading seems to be confirmed, for example, in YBht P ’i 30b4f (see *ibid.*, pp. 521–22, §483), which explains the *āśrayaparivṛtti* as the completely purified *dharmadhātu*, which is permanent and inconceivable. Schmithausen adds, “At the same time, it [this passage of the Ybht] stresses the permanence of *āśrayaparivṛtti* (in the ontological perspective), precluding thereby a causal process in the strict sense.” Elsewhere, Schmithausen refers to this term as “the [accomplished] *āśrayaparivṛtti* or purification of the *tathatā*” (Schmithausen 2014, p. 527, 536ff.). While there is certainly a multiplicity of interpretations with regard to this complex matter, it seems to me that this reading is precisely what is meant in Saṃdh. In that sense, *āśrayaparivṛtti*, as a result (*phala*), corresponds to an unveiling (see Schmithausen 2014, p. 537) or purification of the basis in the form of a return, a restoration, a restitution, or

a re-entry into the *dharmakāya*, *tathatā*, or *dharmadhātu*. The synonyms given in the list above (true reality, awakening, and nirvāṇa) show that *āśrayaparivṛtti* does not refer to afflicted dharmas, which would be the case if the *ālayavijñāna* was meant here. To conclude this discussion, it seems on the basis of Sakuma's work (Sakuma 1990) that we are in presence of (at least) two models of *āśrayaparivṛtti*: (1) an originally ontological model, as found in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, in which the psychophysical base (lit. the basis of existence) of the person practicing śamatha and vipaśyanā is transformed, as *dauṣṭhulya* is replaced by *praśrabdhi*; and (2) a cognitive or epistemic model using this originally ontological terminology to express the purification of the *tathatā*. In this model, the purification as an elimination of the *dauṣṭhulya* alone is the manifestation of the *dharmakāya* that is not the creation of a causal process transforming an entity conceived in ontological terms, as repeatedly stated throughout the later chapters of Saṃdh. In this latter model, the cognitive purification of the *tathatā* as a causal process can only make sense from the perspective of conventional truth (see chapter 3). From the ultimate standpoint of realization, nothing was ever purified by anyone (cf. *dhāraṇī* in 10.8). As a consequence of this (and following William Waldron's suggestion), I would like to make clear that the "shift in one's basis of existence" referred to in Saṃdh. is a cognitive restoration of the basis in which the attainment of gnosis plays a central role, *from the perspective of conventional truth*. In the present context, one should therefore refrain from interpreting the term *āśrayaparivṛtti* as implying any ontological commitment to the process thereby described. To conclude on this point, I understand *āśrayaparivṛtti* in Saṃdh. as implying a "doctrine of (re-)embodiment" as explained in Radich 2007, p. 1109ff. At the end of the path, one has as a basis of existence the truth body in lieu of the body afflicted by corruption as mentioned above, hence the notion of a shift.

n.192 *chos; dharmā.*

n.193 D: *byams pa mdo'i sde nas shin tu rgyas pa'i sde dang / rmad du byung ba'i chos kyi sde dang / gtan la bab par bstan pa'i sde'i bar dag so sor gcig tu bzlums te . . . [F.29.a] mdo'i sde la sogs pa de dag nyid ji snyed bzung ba dang / bsams pa so sor gcig tu bzlums te yid la byed pa ni 'dres pa chen por gyur pa'i chos la dmigs pa yin par rig par bya'o. F, folio 39.a: so sor gcig tu bsdu ba te . . . bsam pa de dag nyid gcig tu bsdu ba byas te. I followed F and did not translate *so sor* in the sentence pertaining to the highly universal teaching (*'dres pa chen por gyur pa'i chos*).*

n.194 On this point, see 8.13 above.

- n.195 *rtog pa; vitarka*. For the translation of *vitarka* and *vicāra*, see Cousins 1992, p. 147.
- n.196 See F, folio 40.a: *gsal zhing che bar myong ba'i rjes su dpyod pa*. This construction is also found in the following sentences in F.
- n.197 Lit. “experienced as subtle,” according to F, or “the experience of the subtle” according to D.
- n.198 On this point, see 8.10.
- n.199 See 8.9: “What is the unimpeded mind? Maitreya, it is the referential object of mental stillness, the mind that takes the image as an object.”
- n.200 See 8.9: “Blessed One, what is a mental appearance? Maitreya, this is the referential object of insight, the conceptual image that is the object of concentration.”
- n.201 *nye ba'i nyon mongs; upakleśa*.
- n.202 These two expressions refer to *dharmapratīsaṃvid* and *arthapratīsaṃvid*. Lamotte and Powers opted for “object” and Keenan for “meaning” for *artha*, while *dharma* is usually translated with “Dharma.” For an interpretation of the term in the sense of the translation suggested above, refer to Nance 2012, pp. 58–59, 72, 74–75, 135, 227–28, and 233–35. The same interpretation is found in Lamotte 1970, p. 1617ff.: *dharma* is translated with “designation” and *artha* with “chose.”
- n.203 *ji lta ba bzhin du yod pa nyid; yathāvadbhāvikatā*. On *yāvadbhāvikatā* and *yathāvadbhāvikatā*, see Takasaki 1966, p. 173.
- n.204 *mthar thug pa; paryanta*, in the sense here of “entirety.”
- n.205 For the Sanskrit of these seven, see Nagao 1964, p. 43.
- n.206 See F, folio 41.a: *rnam par rig pa'i de bzhin nyid ni gang / 'du byed rnam par rig pa tsam mo*.
- n.207 *log par sgrub pa; mithyāpratipatti*. In F, *sgrub pa* is translated with *nan tan* (see for example F, folio 41.b).
- n.208 D: *byams pa de la yang dag par sgrub pa'i de bzhin nyid des ni thos pa thams cad 'dres pa'i chos la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi bsdus pa'i shes rab mtshungs shing mnyam mo*. F, folio 41.b: *byams pa gang yang dag pa'i nan tan de bzhin nyid des ni thos pa dang bsams pa dang / bsgoms pa'i 'dres pa la dmigs pa'i zhi gnas dang*

- lhag mthong gis yongs su zin pa'i shes rab mtshungs shing mnyam mo.* Xuanzang's translation confirms the reading found in D: 聽聞正法緣總境界勝奢摩他毘鉢舍那所受慧平等平等 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). However, F makes sense from the perspective of the meaning of this chapter.
- n.209 See Z, folio 38.a: *rnam par grol bar byed* instead of D: *rnam par grol bar shes*.
- n.210 See Z, folio 37.b, F, folio 43.a: *chos de dag nyid la* instead of D: *chos de dag nyid las*.
- n.211 We find slightly variant readings in F and D. D: *byams pa de la rab tu rig par byed pa ni mngon sum du byas pa'i chos de dag nyid las rnam par grol bar shes pa dang / gzhan dag la yang rgya cher ston pa dang / yang dag par ston pa gang yin pa ste*. F, folio 43.a: *byams pa de la shes par byed pa ni gang mngon sum du byas pa'i chos de dag nyid la rnam par grol bar shes pa dang / rgya cher yang gzhan la ston cing 'chad pa dang / yang dag par ston pa'o*.
- n.212 In accordance with F, folio 44.b, *shes pa* should be read here also as *ye shes*.
- n.213 The phrase is repeated throughout the text. Here *shes pa* should be read as *ye shes*, a reading confirmed by F.
- n.214 See 8.23, in which the three *arthapratiṣaṅvid* are letters, meanings, and contexts.
- n.215 *mtshan ma* corresponds here to a reflection (*gzugs brnyan; pratibimba*).
- n.216 *so sor brtags pa; pratiṣaṅkhyā*. D: *zhes bka' stsal pa gang lags pa de la sems kyis so sor brtag pa ni gang lags*.
- n.217 *rnam par rig pa'i de bzhin nyid*; see 8.20.2, in which the true reality of representations corresponds to the fact that “all conditioned phenomena are just a representation.” In the preceding sentence, I added the term ‘truth’ (*dharma*) to render a frequent collocation that clarifies the meaning of this statement.
- n.218 Lamotte reads *chos dang don* respectively as “Dharma” and “chose” (“thing”); see Lamotte 1935, p. 225. Powers reads them as “doctrine” and “meaning”; see Powers 1995, p. 189. However, as explained above (see 8.19–21), I understand these two technical terms to refer to “designation” and “objects of designations.” Lamotte's rendering of the syntax of the entire passage appears to be inaccurate: “Pour celui qui . . . , il y a . . .”
- n.219 See 8.20.3.

- n.220 See 8.20.4.
- n.221 *skyes pa dang / bud med kyi bsnyen bkur*, probably for *upasthāna-kāri / -kārikā*, “(a woman) serving, doing service to (a man, sexually; said of a courtesan)”; see Edgerton 1953, p. 143.
- n.222 In the case of **viśuddhyālabana*, one can read the Sanskrit compound as a genitive or dative tatpuruṣa; see Schmithausen 2014, p. 363, n. 1648 and p. 362, n. 1644. I read *rnam par dag pa’i de bzhin nyid* as **viśuddhitathatā* in accordance with Schmithausen 2014, pp. 362–63, §306.5, and n. 1647.
- n.223 *gzugs brnyan; pratibimba*; see 8.1–10 for the meaning of the image in the context of contemplative practice.
- n.224 See Schmithausen 2014, p. 366, n. 1664 quoting YBh_tP’i 83a5f: *de de la mi dmigs pa gang yin pa* and F, folio 46.b: *de’ang mi dmigs pa* instead of D, folio 34.b: *de la de dmigs pa gang yin pa*.
- n.225 *lus dang longs spyod la lta ba*; 顧戀身財.
- n.226 This reference remains obscure. Could this point be directed at outcast bodhisattvas (*byang chub sems dpa’ gdol ba; bodhisattvacāṇḍāla*), namely, bodhisattvas taking pride in detachment who practice in the way of hearers? See Conze 1975, p. 438ff.?
- n.227 D has *bcom ldan ’das ci tsam gyis na zhi gnas kyi lam yongs su dag pa lags/byams pa gang gi tshe rmugs pa dang gnyid legs par rab tu choms par gyur pa’o / bcom ldan ’das ji tsam gyis na lhag mthong gi lam yongs su dag pa lags/byams pa gang gi tshe rgod pa dad ’gyod pa legs par rab tu choms par gyur pa’o*, but one should read *bcom ldan ’das ci tsam gyis na zhi gnas kyi lam yongs su dag pa lags/byams pa gang gi tshe rgod pa dad ’gyod pa legs par rab tu choms par gyur pa’o / bcom ldan ’das ji tsam gyis na lhag mthong gi lam yongs su dag pa lags/byams pa gang gi tshe rmugs pa dang gnyid dang the tshom legs par rab tu choms par gyur pa’o*. See F, folio 47.a, which seems to indicate that the list of terms in D is incomplete and in the wrong order.
- n.228 *theg pa chen po dang ldan pa; mahāyānapratisaṃyukta*.
- n.229 *nyon mongs pa dang shes bya’i sgrib pa; kleśajñeyāvaraṇa*.
- n.230 The reading of this passage found in D is problematic on account of the double *la* particle in the second part of the sentence: *de legs par bcom pas thams cad la chags pa med pa dang / thogs pa med pa’i shes pa dang / mthong ba thob cing dgos pa yongs su grub pa’i dmigs pa la chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pa yin no*. Compare with VD, folio 77.a: *de legs par bcom pas chos kyi sku shin tu rnam*

par dag pa la gnas pa na/ dgos pa yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa la/ thams cad du chags pa med pa dang/ thogs pa med pa'i shes pa dang mthong ba thob po. K_o, folio 39.a: *de legs par bcom pas thams cad la chags pa med pa dang / thogs pa med pa'i shes pa dang / mthong ba thob cing dgos pa yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa la cha shas kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pa yin no.* S, folio 51.b: *de legs par bcom pa'i phyir/ chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pas/ dgos pa yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa la thams cad du mi thogs mi chags pa'i ye shes mthong ba rab tu thob bo.* F, folio 48.a: *de bcom pa'i phyir chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pas/ dgos pa yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa la thams cad du mi thogs mi chags pa'i ye shes mthong ba rab tu thob po.* Bd, folio 54: *de legs par bcom pas chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pa na/ dgongs pa yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa thams cad la chags pa med pa dang / thogs pa med pa'i shes pa dang / mthong ba thob po.* L, folio 48.a: *de bcom pa'i phyir/ chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pas/ dgos pa yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa la thams cad du mi thogs mi chags pa'i ye shes mthong ba rab tu thob bo.* (similar to F, folio 48.a). He, folio 102b: *de bcom ldan pa'i phyir chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pas dgongs pa yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa dang/ thams cad du mi thogs mi chags pa'i ye shes mthong ba rab tu 'thob po/*First, a few general remarks: K_o follows the syntax of D with an important variation *cha shas kyi sku* instead of *chos kyi sku* in D. In some other editions, such as F, L, and He as well as in Bd (which seems to be a compromise between D and K_o, on one side, and F and L on the other side), the syntax of the sentence is quite distinct from D and K_o; see for example VD in which entire blocks of text are found in a different order. In addition, we find in other minor variant readings, such as *dgongs pa* in apposition to *yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa* (see Bd) instead of the more usual *dgos pa*. I therefore suggest the following emendations: One should read *ye shes mthong ba* instead of *shes pa dang / mthong ba* since we find in various forms the well-known collocation *ma chags ma thogs pa'i ye shes mthong ba* in Mvyut: *'das pa'i dus la ma chags ma thogs pa'i ye shes gzigs par 'jug go; 'das pa'i dus la ma chags ma thogs pa'i ye shes mthong ba 'jug pa, atīte 'dhvany asaṅgam apratihataṃ jñānadarśanaṃ pravartate* (Mvyut 151) or *da ltar gyi dus la ma chags ma thogs pa'i ye shes gzigs par 'jug go; da ltar gyi dus la ma chags ma thogs pa'i ye shes mthong ba 'jug pa, pratyutpanne 'dhvany asaṅgam apratihataṃ jñānadarśanaṃ pravartate* (Mvyut 153). Based on the fact that *jñānadarśana* results from having discarded the obstructions, a doctrine already present in the Pāli tradition, F and L probably give a better account of the logical sequence of this passage: (1) first, obstructions are eliminated; (2) thereupon, one remains in the *dharmakāya*, which has been completely purified from these obstructions; (3) as a consequence of this, the insight into the accomplishment of the goal/intention, which is the real object, arises together with gnosis free from attachment and hindrance. In this context, *jñānadarśana* is interpreted as a *dvandva* ("gnosis and vision"). My suggestion for this passage would thus

- be quite close to Bd, folio 54: *de legs par bcom pas chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa la gnas pa na* (or *gnas pas*)/ *dgos pa yongs su grub pa'i dmigs pa la thams cad du chags pa med pa dang / thogs pa med pa'i ye shes mthong ba thob po*. (underlined words are additions to Bd. *dang* between *shes* and *mthong ba* was omitted).
- n.231 Some editions (e.g., F) include *ji ltar* in the second clause: “once bodhisattvas have obtained mental stillness and insight, how do they attain the unsurpassable, complete, and perfect awakening?” The difference is not significant because the attainment of the fourth object of mental stillness and insight, the accomplishment of the goal, corresponds to the attainment of awakening (see 8.2).
- n.232 See 8.20.2.
- n.233 F, folio 48.b reads *legs par rtogs pa* instead of D, which has simply *bzung ba*.
- n.234 *lhag par btang snyoms; adhyupekṣya*.
- n.235 See 8.20.2.
- n.236 F, folio 49.a *ye shes* instead of *shes pa* in D.
- n.237 D reads, *de la nang gi so so'i bdag nyid la so sor rang rig pa de bzhin nyid rnam pa bdun so sor rtog pa'i shes pa rnam pa bdun skye bar 'gyur te*. Compare with F, folio 49.a: *de bzhin nyid rnam pa bdun bden bden pa'i rnam pa nang gi so so rang gis shes par bya ba rab tu rtogs pa'i ye shes skye bar 'gyur te*. I think F is more in the spirit of this paragraph than D. The notion of *so sor rtog pa'i shes pa* is at odds with *nang gi so so'i bdag nyid la so sor rang rig pa*, to which it stands in apposition in D. Instead, I'd rather read here *rab tu rtogs pa'i ye shes* as found in F.
- n.238 *yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa* (D) or *yang dag pa mi 'gyur ba* (F); *samyaktvaniyama*.
- n.239 These are the first three of the four objects of mental stillness and insight as explained in 8.2. The fourth is the accomplishment of the goal.
- n.240 This refers to the first three objects of mental stillness and insight; see 8.2.
- n.241 See 8.35.11 above for a more detailed elucidation of this point.
- n.242 Lit. “They are skillful with regard to the arising of the mind as it is if they know the sixteen points of the arising of the mind. The sixteen points of the arising of the mind are the arising of . . .”
- n.243 See 5.3.

- n.244 See 8.20.2.
- n.245 D reads *yang dag pa'i tshor ba*, probably in the sense of *yang dag pa'i don gyi* (or *la tshor ba*, but F, folio 50.a has instead *'gag par 'gyur ba'i tshor ba* (but the sentence in F is not built according to a pronominal relative-correlative structure as it is in D).
- n.246 D reads *rig pa* in the sense of *rnam par rig pa*, while F, folio 50.a has *tshor ba* instead, which makes more sense in the present context. This reading is supported by Xuanzang's reading: 一者所依粗重受二者彼果境界受 (Cbeta, Taishō 676), in which 受 refers to *vedanā*. I therefore emended the entire paragraph accordingly.
- n.247 In the sense of sensations being the cause for future sensations as explained above (see 8.38.1.iv).
- n.248 Sanskrit reads *evam eva*; see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte XIII.39.
- n.249 D: *rigs kyi bu rnam dang / rigs kyi bu mo dag gis 'di la shin tu brtson par bya ba'i rigs so*. Sanskrit: *ayam atra kulaputraih kuladuhitṛbhir vā tīvraṅvyāyāmair bhavitum* (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.39).
- n.250 *de'i tshe, tasyāṃ velāyam* (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.39).
- n.251 D: *chos rnam gdags pa rnam gzhas gang yin pa / de ni rnal 'byor bag yod don chen yin*; in Sanskrit: *dharmāna prajñaptivyavasthito yo hi yoge pramattā na mahā[rtha] so hī*. (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40). The sentence is built according to a correlative-relative structure *yaḥ ... sa ...*, literally "that which is ... is ..." The Sanskrit here is of a hybrid nature as pointed out by Matsuda. Instead of *pramattā na*, *apramāda* would be expected for the Tibetan *bag yod*.
- n.252 D: *gang dag chos der brten nas rnal 'byor 'dir / yang dag brtson pa de dag byang chub 'thob*; Sanskrit: *taṃ dharmam niśrāya ye atra yoge samyakprayukta te labha(ṃ)ti bodhi* (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40).
- n.253 D: *gang dag glags lta de skad rgol ba las / thar bar lta ba chos kun chub byed pa / byams pa de dag rnal 'byor 'di las ni / thag ring gnas sa ring ba ji bzhin no*; Sanskrit: *upāraṃbhaprekṣā iti vādamokṣaprekṣā ye dharmam sarva pu ... /* (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40).
- n.254 *blo ldan; dhīmān* (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40).
- n.255 The Tibetan reads *sems can don zhes* while the Sanskrit has *satvārthasāra* (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40). *Sāra* means both

“real meaning” / “quintessence” and “wealth” / “riches.”

- n.256 D: *blo ldan sems can don zhes de dag las/ /lan byed rig nas sems can don brtson min*; Sanskrit: *satoārthasāro na tu kāra tebhyaṃ viditva satoārthaprayukta dhīmān*.
- n.257 *Eva* in Sanskrit (see Matsuda 2013: p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40).
- n.258 . . . *ca . . . ca* in Sanskrit (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40).
- n.259 *zang zing med pa*; *nirāmiṣa* (in the sense of “disinterested, not expecting a reward”; see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40 for the Sanskrit term).
- n.260 Sanskrit: *punar* (see Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40).
- n.261 *Anagharatna* (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40).
- n.262 *spongs zhing rgyu*; *caraṅti bhikṣāṃ* (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40). The term *bhikṣā* literally corresponds to the French concept of “mendicité.”
- n.263 *gzung bar bgyi*; *dhārayāmi* (cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.41). I suggest reading *dhārayāmi*, which is a causative present, as an optative here.
- n.264 This concluding passage is similar to the one concluding chapter 7 (see 7.33).
- n.265 Sanskrit reads *adhimukti*; see Matsuda 1995, p. 67.
- n.266 Sanskrit reads *suparibhāvitādhimuktikṣanti*; see Matsuda 1995, p. 67.
- n.267 See 7.31: “they develop devotion for [this teaching] and commission its transcription into writing. Once it has been put into writing, they keep it in mind, read it, venerate it, propagate it, expound it, chant it aloud, contemplate it, and apply it in their practice.”
- n.268 D reads *shin tu bsgoms pa’i phyir bzod pas sa de las yang dag par ’das nas byang chub sems dpa’i yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la ’jug go*. The term *bzod pas* appears to be out of place here and should have been found in the preceding clause, as is the case in the Sanskrit text, which in addition contains no parallel to *phyir*.
- n.269 *byang chub kyi phyogs dang mthun pa’i chos*; *bodhyaṅga*. D, folio 39.b reads *byang chub kyi phyogs dang ’thun ba’i chos ji ltar thob pa dag gis*, but F, folio 52.a has *byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos ji ltar thob pa de dag la*.

- n.270 D: 'bad pas yan lag des yongs su rdzogs pa yin yang byang chub kyi phyogs dang 'thun ba'i chos ji ltar thob pa dag gis de la mang du gnas par bya ba dang / snyoms par 'jug pa la sred pa dang / chos la sred pa las sems lhag par btang snyoms su 'jug mi nus pas. The expression *de la mang du gnas par bya ba* corresponds to *tadbahulavīhārin*. Sanskrit: *na tu śaknoti yathāpratīlabdhair bodhipakṣair dharmais tadbahulavīhārī samāpattidharmatṛṣṇāyās ca cittam adhyupekṣitum* (see Matsuda 1995, p. 68). The subject is singular masculine. I used a plural for bodhisattva in this chapter to avoid the gender issue since bodhisattvas include both males and females.
- n.271 See 8.35.11. Sanskrit has a locative singular: *jñeye*; see Matsuda 1995, p. 68.
- n.272 Sanskrit reads *sarvasūksāpattidauṣṭhulyamalaviḡatām* (see Matsuda 1995, p. 69).
- n.273 Sanskrit has *apramāṇajñānāvabhāsenā*. It seems that *jñāna* has been translated by *shes pa* in D while the more frequent corresponding Tibetan term *ye shes* is usually found in F. Sanskrit: *apramāṇajñānāvabhāsenā sannīśrayatām upādāya tasya samādhes tasyās ca śrutadhāraṇyās tṛtīyā bhūmiḡ prabhākarīty ucyate* (see Matsuda 1995, p. 69).
- n.274 The Sanskrit fragment (see Matsuda 1995, p. 69) does not contain the Sanskrit equivalent for *me'i 'od*, which is most probably *agnyarci*, as suggested by Matsuda. In this case, understanding *'od /arci* as “flame” makes more sense. I translated *arcibhūtatva* as “set ablaze.”
- n.275 See 9.3.5.
- n.276 *chos kyi tshogs; dharmasaṃbhāra*. The Sanskrit (see Matsuda 1995, p. 69) differs from the Tibetan (Go, folio 35.a reads *chos kyi tshogs*, just like the more recent witnesses): *nabhopamsya dauṣṭhulyakāyasya mahāmeghopamena dharmakāyena spharanāc chādanatām upādāya daśamī bhūmir dharmameghaty ucyate*. The process described here corresponds to the *āśrayaparāvṛtti* (i.e., the shift in one's basis of existence), which is completed on the eleventh stage.
- n.277 I follow Wonch'uk's *ṭīkā* (vol. thi, folio 269.a) regarding the meaning of the analogy with the sky/space (*nam mkha' lta bu*): *gnas ngan len gyi lus nam mkha' lta bu la chos kyi sku yongs su rdzogs pa sprin chen po lta bus khyab cing khebs pas de'i phyir bcu pa ni chos kyi sprin gyis zhes bya'o zhes bya ba ni bcu pa chos kyi sprin rnam par bshad pa'o /'di ltar bdag dang chos su 'dzin pas yongs su bsgos pa'i sa bon gang yin pa de ni las su mi rung ba'i phyir gnas ngan len zhes bya'o /stong pa nyid rnam pa gnyis dang /bdag med pa'i don la sgrib pa'i phyir mdo las nam mkha' lta bu'o zhes gsungs so /sa bcu po de la chos kyi dbyings rnam pa bcu'i chos kyi sku yongs su rdzogs pa ni sprin chen po dang mtshungs te /chos kyi dbyings mngon du gyur pa ni*

chos kyi sku yongs su rdzogs pa dang / bsgoms pa las byung ba'i chos kyi sku gnas ngan len nam mkha' lta bu la khebs pa'i phyir chos kyi sprin zhes bya'o.

- n.278 *shes bya'i rnam pa thams cad [mkhyen pa]; jñeyasarvākāra[jñātā-]* (see Matsuda 1995, p. 69).
- n.279 On the opposition between affliction and purification in this sentence, see Lamotte 1935, pp. 240–41, n. 13.
- n.280 On the relation between *pratibhāna* and *dhāraṇī*, see Braarvig 1985.
- n.281 *gang la; yatredānīm* (see Matsuda 1995, p. 70).
- n.282 The variant reading found in F differs significantly from the Sanskrit edited by Matsuda in comparison to the Tibetan translation in D. I translated this passage from the Sanskrit (see Matsuda 1995, p. 70): (*āścaryā bhaga*)*van yāvād mahānuśaṃsā mahāphalā anuttarā samyaksambodhī yatredānīm evaṃ ma(hā)saṃmohajālaṃ saṃpracālya mahac ca dauṣṭhulyagahanam samatikramya bodhisatvā anuttarām samyaksambodhim abhisambudhyante.* D: *bcom ldan 'das gang la de ltar/ byang chub sems dpa' rnam de ltar kun tu rmongs pa'i dra ba chen po rab tu dral zhing de'i gnas dan len thibs po chen po las yang dag par 'das te/ bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya ba'i bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub ji tsam du phan yon che zhing 'bras bu che ba ni ngo mtshar lags so.* F, folio 54.b: *bcom ldan 'das ji tsam du bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub de 'bras bu che zhing legs pa che ba dang / de ltar gti mug chen po'i dra ba gsal nas ngan len che zhing sdug pa las yang dag par 'das te/ byang chub sems dpa' rnam bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya ba ni ngo mtshar che'o.*
- n.283 D: *chos rnam par dag pa dang / ches shin tu rnam par dag pa yin par rig par bya'o;* compare with K_Q, folio 55.b: *ches rnam par dag pa dang / ches shin tu rnam par dag pa yin par rig par bya'o.*
- n.284 D: *dgos pa med* for *nirupalepa* (see Mvyut 6672)? F, folio 55.b: *dgongs pa med pa.* D and Xuanzang's translation agree: 無緣無待發大願心 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
- n.285 D: *khams*, but F, folio 56.b reads *mkhas pa*.
- n.286 D; K_Q, folio 47.b: *khams gya nom pa* (syn. *khams bzang po*), *praṇīṭadhātu(kam)* (see Mvyut 7670), 妙界 (see Yokoyama, Kōitsu, and Takayuki Hirosawa, eds., *Sanskrit-Tibetan Index for the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*, accessed August 29, 2016, <http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?q=%E5%A6%99%E7%95%8C>). As a translation for this term, Lamotte (1935, p. 245) suggests “complexion” and Powers (1995, p. 243) gives

“constituents.” However, F, folio 57.a has *dam pa’i dbyings su* instead of *khamsgya nom pa las*. Obermiller (1933, p. 207, n. 3) gives us the context in which *gya nom pa (praṇīta)* is usually used: “Emancipation, in the sense that (the extinction of Phenomenal Existence) represents the state of bliss and purity (which is completely free from the defiling forces of the Phenomenal World).” Xuanzang’s translation reads: 亦能獲得上界勝解 (Cbeta, Taishō 676), in which 上界 refers to the formless and form realms.

n.287 *chos la nges par rtog pa’i bzod pa; dharmanidhyānakśānti*. The term *ksānti* is used here in the sense of “acceptance.” In the *Kīṭāgiri sutta* (M. I, 480), the phrase *dhammanijjhānakkhanti* is glossed in the following way: “Monks, I do not say that the attainment of gnosis is all at once. Rather, the attainment of gnosis is after gradual training, gradual action, gradual practice. And how is there the attainment of gnosis after gradual training, gradual action, gradual practice? There is the case where, when confidence has arisen, one visits the teacher. Having visited, one grows close. Having grown close, one lends ear. Having lent ear, one hears the Dhamma. Having heard the Dhamma, one remembers it. Remembering, one penetrates the meaning of the teachings. Penetrating the meaning, one comes to an agreement through pondering the teachings.” *Kathaṅca bhikkhave anupubbassikkhā anupubbakiriyā anupubbapaṭipadā aññārādhanaṅ hoti: idha bhikkhave saddhājāto upasaṅkamati, upasaṅkamanto payirupāsati, payirupāsanto sotamaṅ odahati, ohitasoto dhammaṅ suṇāti, sutvā dhammaṅ dhāreti, dhatānaṅ dhammānaṅ atthaṅ upaparikkhati, atthaṅ upaparikkhato dhammā nijjhānaṅ khamanti, dhammanijjhānakkhantiyā sati chando jāyati, chandaḍāto ussahati, ussahitoṅ tuletī, tulayitoṅ padahati, pahitatto samāno kāyena ceva paramaṅ saccaṅ sacchikaroti, paññāya ca naṅ paṭivijja passati.”* (Translation and citation are from Punnaḍi 2017).

n.288 *byas shing bsags pa; 造作增長; kṛta-upacita*.

n.289 *rnam grangs* is used here as a synonym for *thabs*.

n.290 Lit., “Likewise, beings who are suffering from being subject to the suffering resulting from being conditioned cannot be made happy by any method consisting in merely assisting them with material objects.”

n.291 According to Lamotte and Keenan, this refers to 9.13: “The perfections are without attachment, disinterested, free from faults, nonconceptual, and dedication of merit.”

n.292 Translating *rnam par dag pa* with “purity” does not work here as can be seen in the case of the following purifications (2–7), which are formulated according to the exact same lexicographical and syntactical structure as (1).

- n.293 *shag kyis 'chags; codanā; 諫誨* (see Yokoyama, Kōitsu, and Takayuki Hiroswawa, eds., *Sanskrit-Tibetan Index for the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*, accessed August 30, 2016, <http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?q=%E8%AB%AB%E8%AA%A8>). For *codanā*, see Edgerton 1953, p. 234.
- n.294 *rigs pa'i gnas lnga po; pañcavidyā*. The five sciences are grammar, logic, philosophy, medicine, and crafts.
- n.295 *ma 'tshal ba* (D), *mi zad pa* (F); *akṣaya*.
- n.296 D: *sar grub pa*.
- n.297 In D consistently expressed through the term *ngo bo nyid*, while in F *rang bzhin* is used instead.
- n.298 D: *ngo bo nyid dang bcas pa nyid kyang ci'i slad du mi 'dzin lags*. F, folio 62.a: *rang bzhin ma mchis pa'i rnam kyang ci'i slad du mi 'dzin*.
- n.299 D: *spyān ras gzigs dbang phyug nga ni ngo bo nyid kyis ngo bo nyid med pa nyid 'dzin par mi smra mod kyī*. Compare with F, folio 62.a: *spyān ras gzigs dbang phyug nga ni rang bzhin med pa nyid la/ rang bzhin med par mi bzhad de*; VD, folio 89.a: *spyān ras gzigs dbang phyug nga ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis ngo bo nyid 'dzin par mi smra mod kyī*; and Xuanzang's translation: 我終不說以無自性性取無自性性 (Cbeta, Taishō 676). The meanings of these translations can be interpreted as being similar, although their phrasing is quite different.
- n.300 *nye ba'i pha rol tu phyin pa*. The prefix *nye ba* (for the upasarga *upa-*) refers here to proximity, intimacy, and immediacy (as defilements manifest in the present case). Reading this term as “subsidiary” or “secondary” does not make sense since the three kinds of transcendence are presented in increasing order from the lesser to the greater.
- n.301 See 9.4.8: “The eighth stage is called Immovable because what lacks phenomenal appearance is spontaneously accomplished and [the bodhisattvas] are unshaken by the manifestation of defilements resulting from phenomenal appearance.” See also 9.5.8.
- n.302 F has only two aspects; see F, folio 63.a. Xuanzang's translation has three: 善男子略有三種 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
- n.303 For Schmithausen's translation of 9.29, see Schmithausen 2014, p. 563.
- n.304 Regarding the fact some editions have *gnyis* (“two”) and others *gsum* (“three”); see Schmithausen 2014, p. 563, nn. 2311–12.

- [n.305](#) See 9.28.1–2.
- [n.306](#) Could this clause, *de las gzhan pa'i yon tan rnam*, refer to those who are not bodhisattvas?
- [n.307](#) See the verses below in D: *de dag 'gal ba snyam du sems pa na/ /rnam par rmongs nas blo gros sna tshogs 'gyur*.
- [n.308](#) See translation of VinSg 16 in Sakuma 1990, p. 202: “Der Dharmakāya der Tathāgatas ist dadurch charakterisiert, daß die [ihn konstituierende] ‘Umgestaltung der Grundlage’ daraus hervorgegangen ist, daß man die [Bodhisattva-]Stufen und Vollkommenheiten durch intensive Übung gemeistert hat.”
- [n.309](#) *mngon par 'du bya ba med pa; anabhisamskāraṇa*.
- [n.310](#) On *vimuktikāya*, see Radich 2007, p. 1254ff.
- [n.311](#) As with the compound in the opening question above, I read *sprul pa'i sku'i mtshan nyid (nirmāṇakāyalakṣaṇa)* as a bahuvrīhi.
- [n.312](#) *byin gyis brlabs; adhiṣṭhita*.
- [n.313](#) F, folio 65.a: *bstan pa la*.
- [n.314](#) *dmigs pa la nye bar gtod pa*.
- [n.315](#) D: *sems can gnas pa*, but F, folio 65.b reads *sems gnas pa*, which corresponds to Xuanzang's translation: 心安住事 (Cbeta, Taishō 676).
- [n.316](#) *mngon du bya ba; sāksātkāra*.
- [n.317](#) *gsal ba; paṭu* (?). See Mvyut 6695: *spyod pa mi gsal ba; apaṭupracāraḥ*. Another possibility for *gsal ba* would be *saṃprakhyaṇa*. Edgerton gives as synonym *asaṃmoṣa* (“absence of confusion”). As an equivalent for *saṃprakhyaṇa*, a Tibetan synonym of *gsal ba* is *dran pa*. See Edgerton 1953, pp. 83 and 576.
- [n.318](#) D: *bsgom pa las yongs su skyob pa'i sbyor ba gsal ba*. Compare with F, folio 66.a: *bsgom pas yongs su skyob pa'i sbyor ba gsal ba*.
- [n.319](#) *pham pa'i gnas lta bu['i chos]; pārājayikasthānīya[dharmāḥ]*. See Edgerton 1953, p. 342.
- [n.320](#) *bar du gcod pa'i chos; antarāyikadharmāḥ* (see Mvyut 9324).
- [n.321](#) See 8.20.2.

- n.322 D, folio 50.b: *gnas pa*. F, folio 67.a: *rnam par bzhag pa*. They are synonyms for *vyavasthāna*.
- n.323 See 8.21, in which the exact same enumeration is found. See D, folio 31.b: *mgo gcig tu lan gdab pa dang / rnam par dbye ba dang / dris te lan gdab pa dang / gzhas pa dang / gsang ba dang*.
- n.324 *'thob pa*. Usually “obtainment” or “attainment.”
- n.325 D: *so so'i shes pa*; compare with F, folio 67.a: *dam bcas* for the Sanskrit *pratijñā*. Yoshimizu opts for “objects that are known” (see Yoshimizu 2010, p. 142), although it is clear that *so so'i shes pa* is the Literal translation into Tibetan of *pratijñā*.
- n.326 Yoshimizu 2010, p. 142 reads the correlative/relative sentence (*yat . . . tat . . . ; . . . gang dag yin pa de dag . . .*) as meaning “Whatever is . . . , that is . . .” Alternatively, this grammatical construction could be literally translated with the following syntactic structure: “That which is . . . is . . .” While Yoshimizu’s translation is technically correct, reading *gang dag yin pa* in the sense of “whatever” in the present case is unnecessary since this grammatical structure is usually used to give a definition of a technical term. As a consequence, we do not need to mirror the Sanskrit correlative/relative structure in English. The result is a more simple and fluid rendering of the text.
- n.327 In this paragraph, I read the compounds ending with *lakṣaṇa* as bahuvrīhis. Yoshimizu translated these compounds as tatpuruṣas. It seems to me that reading them as bahuvrīhis makes the entire passage much easier to understand.
- n.328 *de mngon sum du dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid; tatpratyaḥṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa* (see Mvyut 4405).
- n.329 *de la gnas pa mngon sum du dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid; tadāśritya pratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa / tadāśritya āśritapratyakṣopalabdhilakṣaṇa* (see Mvyut 4406). See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 144: “the characteristic of the direct cognition [of something] depending on the [imperceptible object to be inferred].” The definition of this term reads, according to Yoshimizu, “The characteristic of the direct cognition [of something] depending on the [imperceptible object to be inferred] consists in] such kinds of direct cognition, through which something directly not [cognizable] is inferred.”
- n.330 *rang gi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba'i mtshan nyid; svajātīyadr̥ṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa* (see Mvyut 4407). The term *upasaṃhāra* means

“establishing,” in the way of the *sādhana* with respect to the *sādhya*. It is therefore also translated into Tibetan as *nye bar sgrub*, a synonym for *nye ba sbyar ba*, which is used for the Sanskrit *sādhana* too.

n.331 *lung shin tu rnam par dag pa gtan la phab bar bstan pa'i mtshan nyid*. See Mvyut 4409: *lung shin tu rnam par dag pas gtan la bab par bstan pa'i mtshan nyid/ lung shin tu rnam par dag pas gtan la dbab par bstan pa'i mtshan nyid; suviśuddhāgamopadeśalakṣaṇa*.

n.332 For the sake of readability, I inverted the order of the clauses in the sentences explaining the five points mentioned here. If we translate the Tibetan literally, the pattern would be: [example 1, example 2, etc.] are [the logical proof to be defined].

n.333 D: *gang gis mngon sum du ma gyur pa la rjes su dpag par bya ba dang / de lta bu dang 'thun pa gang yin pa de ni de la gnas pa mngon sum du dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid yin no*. Yoshimizu's translation of this clause seems incorrect: “The characteristic of the direct cognition [of something] depending on the [imperceptible object to be inferred consists in] such kinds of direct cognition, through which something directly not [cognizable] is inferred, as . . .” followed by sentences (1), (2), and (3).

n.334 In this explanation of *tadāśritya pratyakṣopalabdihlakṣaṇam*, I do not understand why Yoshimizu takes elements of sentence (1) into sentence (2), in violation of the Tibetan syntax which is quite clear in the present case. See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 144.

n.335 Yoshimizu adds the concept of *vipraṇa* to this sentence, which is not found in the Tibetan. See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 145.

n.336 The analogies given as examples seem to be instances of [*para*] *prasiddhānumāṇa* ([*tha snyad du gzhan la*] *grags pa'i rjes dpag*) in that the perception of the analogy must be renowned (*grags pa*) in the world (or established from the perspective of the person to be persuaded), thereby offering a certain level of consensus, which is essential for the validity of this kind of logical proof.

n.337 This probably refers to the various kinds of suffering, which includes the suffering inherent to the conditioned phenomena as well as to the twelve factors of conditioned existence.

n.338 *rang dbang med pa; asvatantra*.

n.339 Yoshimizu segments this passage in a different way (see Yoshimizu 2010, p. 145), as it appears that she did not understand its syntactic structure (or

chose not to follow it). The point of these instances in the form of established perceptions for which there is a consensus is to show how one thing (that which must be established) is established from the other (the commonly established perception). The relation here is again of the type *sādhya/sādhana*, this time through an instance belonging to the same class of phenomena. In these sentences, we have the following construction: *X la Y dmigs pa nye bar sbyar ba*. In the present case, X (i.e., external and internal conditioned phenomena) is the *sādhya*, and Y is the *sādhana* (i.e., clauses 1–2), which makes the *svajātīyadr̥ṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇam* look like a type of *prasiddhānumāṇa*.

n.340 These three proofs are (A) a perception that is a direct cognition of the [thing to establish]; (B) a perception that is a direct cognition [of something existing] in dependence on the [thing to establish]; and (C) a demonstration through an instance belonging to the same class.

n.341 See beginning of 10.7.4 above. Yoshimizu translates *rigs pa brtag pa yongs su dag pa* with “the reasoning to be investigated.” See Yoshimizu 2010, p. 145.

n.342 *dge sbyong bzhi* for *dge sbyong chos bzhi*; see Mvyut 8708: *dge sbyong du byed pa'i chos bzhi ming la; catvārah śramaṇakāradharmāḥ*.

n.343 This passage is interesting because the five defining characteristics of the principle of reason are reduced to three core ideas. Since *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* merely refers to the definition of correct reasoning with regard to the other four defining characteristics, it is understandable that it is not included in this list. However, it is fascinating to see that *svajātīyadr̥ṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa* is also excluded here, which might confirm that this proof was considered to be a form of *prasiddhānumāṇa* in spite of its seemingly inductive character resulting from the use of instances or examples upon which there is a consensus. However, the “engine” of the proof in the case of this valid cognition is not an induction but the deduction ensuing from facts that are accepted as conventions by virtue of consensus. As a consequence, one could argue that the *svajātīyadr̥ṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa* has a monotonic aspect explaining why it is not inductive in spite of its empirical aspect. The analogies used in this kind of reasoning are, in a way, carved in marble, in the sense of well-established principles that cannot be refuted by new information drawn from further experience or perception, which is precisely the reason why these reasonings have the capacity to establish the *sādhya*. They are by nature a deduction from a universal law or principle. Hence their possible inclusion in the category of *anumāṇa* as *prasiddhānumāṇa* since they surely do not correspond only to a direct cognition.

- n.344 *de las gzhan dang 'thun par dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid*. See Mvyut 4410: *de las gzhan dang mthun par dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid/ de las gzhan dang mthun par mngon sum du dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid; tadanyasārūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa*.
- n.345 *de la gzhan dang mi 'thun par dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid*. See Mvyut 4411: *de las gzhan dang mi mthun pa mngon sum du dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid/ de las gzhan dang mi mthun par dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid/ de las gzhan dang mi mthun par mngon sum du dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid; tadanyavairūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa*.
- n.346 *thams cad 'thun par dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid*. See Mvyut 4412: *thams cad mthun par dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid; sarvasārūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa*.
- n.347 *thams cad mi 'thun par dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid*. See Mvyut 4413: *thams cad mi mthun par dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid; sarvavairūpyopalabdhilakṣaṇa*.
- n.348 *gzhan gyi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba'i mtshan nyid*. See Mvyut 4414: *gzhan gyi rigs kyi dpe nye bar sbyar ba'i mtshan nyid; anyajātīyadṛṣṭāntopasaṃhāralakṣaṇa*.
- n.349 This refers to point (IV) above.
- n.350 For an examination of similarities between Saṃdh. and *Hetvoidyā*, see Yoshimizu 2010.
- n.351 This refers to point (IV) above.
- n.352 This refers to point (I) above.
- n.353 This point is not easy to unravel. I understand it in the following way. If the perception [of a logical proof] that does not conform with any[thing] could be used to establish the thesis, it also could be used to establish as well something that is not the thesis. As a consequence, it would be included in the reasons proving that which is not the thesis and would be therefore inconclusive. In other words, the perception of the proof would be present in both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa*. The proof of something that does not conform to anything would be necessarily also found in the perception of that which does not conform with that which must be established. As one proceeds to examine the proof, its absence of conformity with the premise is enough to disqualify it, whether it is conforming with something other than the premise or with nothing else.
- n.354 This refers to point (VI) above.
- n.355 This refers to point (III) above.
- n.356 This refers to point (II) above.

- n.357 This point is also not easy to understand. I take it to mean the following: if a perception that conforms with all [things] (i.e., with anything) demonstrates the thesis, it follows that the *dharmin / pakṣa* (all phenomena) constitutes the entire *sapakṣa* and there is not even the possibility of having a *vipakṣa*. The demonstration based on such perceptions is therefore inconclusive because it represents a tautology based on a circular argument that nothing could invalidate in the absence of a *sapakṣa* and a *vipakṣa*.
- n.358 “Whether tathāgatas . . .”; see also 4.10 and 7.9. This quote is found in various other canonical scriptures with minor variations.
- n.359 F, folio 69.b: *ye shes*.
- n.360 *Idem por dgongs pa*.
- n.361 I read *kun nas nyon mongs pa’i chos* and *rnam par byang ba’i chos* as *bahuvrīhis*.
- n.362 The verses might have been corrupted. The prose section (D, folio 53.a) reads, ‘*jam dpal kun nas nyon mongs pa’i chos gang dag yin pa dang / rnam par byang ba’i chos gang dag yin pa de dag thams cad ni g.yo ba med pa gang zag med pa yin te/ de’i phyir ngas chos rnam rnam pa thams cad du byed pa med par bstan to*, which does not match the variant reading found in the verses (D, folio 53.b): *kun nas nyon mongs chos dang rnam par byang ba’i chos/ thams cad byed pa med cing gang zag med pa yin/ de phyir de dag byed pa med par ngas bshad do*.
- n.363 10.8 before the *gāthās*, in which the *dhāraṇī* is given, could be seen as a *mchan ’grel* of these verses (i.e., a ‘fill-in commentary’).
- n.364 See 5.1–6.
- n.365 *sprul pa; nirmāṇa*. From the Sanskrit point of view, the juxtaposition of *anabhisaṃskāra* and *nirmāṇa* must have created a cognitive dissonance as it represents a paradox that can only be solved through the notion of nonduality, the topic of the next paragraph. The term *anabhisaṃskāra* expresses the notion of something that is uncreated, not brought about, and not the result of any conditioning process— something uncontrived, effortless, spontaneous. In contrast, *nirmāṇa* implies creation, construction, emanation, formation, composition, and transformation. A solution to this quandary that would not invoke nonduality is to understand the term *anabhisaṃskāra* as stressing primarily the idea of effortlessness as in the example of the dream given by the Buddha below. Another interpretation could be the apparition in a mirror. A reflection may seem real but is actually neither going nor coming anywhere. It is unproduced and nonexistent, not even “a thing.”

- n.366 The question is to determine how the arising of anything is possible on the level of the relative truth in the absence of a causal process.
- n.367 D: 'jam dpal sems yod pa yang ma yin/ sems med pa yang ma yin te/ sems rang dbang med pa nyid dang / sems kyi dbang nyid yin pa'i phyir ro.
- n.368 *yul; viṣaya.*
- n.369 See 8.23.
- n.370 *Advayalakṣaṇa* can be read in various ways: (1) as a genitive tatpuruṣa: “the defining characteristic of the nondual/of nonduality”; (2) as a karmadhāraya: “the nondual defining characteristic”; or (3) as a bahuvrīhi (which occurs frequently with *lakṣaṇa* as the second member of the compound): “who has the defining characteristic of nonduality / the nondual defining characteristic” or “who is characterized by nonduality.” On the basis of the question and the first part of the answer (D: *bcom ldan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa'i mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa gang lags pa dang / chos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba gang lags pa dang / yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa chen po gang lags pa de dag gi mtshan nyid ni/ ji lta bur rig par bgyi lags/ 'jam dpal gnyis su med pa'i mtshan nyid yin te*), I would tend to read the compound as a genitive tatpuruṣa: “Mañjuśrī, [you should understand it] as the defining characteristic of nonduality.” However, the following sentences in the answer are built with the verb *yin*, implying a series of expressions referring to the tathāgatas through the use of nominalized verbal adjectives such as *byang chub pa* (*bodha*) or *bskor ba*; see D, folio 54.a–b: *mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa yang ma yin/ mngon par rdzogs par byang ma chub pa yang ma yin/ chos kyi 'khor lo bskor ba yang ma yin/ chos kyi 'khor lo mi bskor ba yang ma yin/ yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa chen po yang ma yin/ yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa chen po med pa yang ma yin te/ chos kyi sku shin tu rnam par dag pa nyid kyi phyir dang / sprul pa'i sku kun tu ston pa nyid kyi phyir ro*. Lamotte translated the passage into French according to the structure defined by “il n’y a pas,” which would correspond to the verb *yod* in Tibetan, not *yin*. As a consequence, I chose to translate *advayalakṣaṇa* as a bahuv rīhi qualifying the tathāgatas.

b.

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GLOSSARY

g.

g.1 Abiding in phenomena

chos gnas pa nyid

ཚོས་གནས་པ་ཉིད།

dharmasthititā

g.2 Absorption

snyoms par 'jug pa

སྟོམས་པར་འཇུག་པ།

samāpatti

g.3 Absorption in the state of cessation

'gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa

འགོག་པ་ལ་སྟོམས་པར་འཇུག་པ།

nirodhasamāpatti

See Mvyut 1500 and 1988.

g.4 Accept

len

ལེན།

ādadante

cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.40.

g.5 Acceptance that phenomena are non-arisen

mi skye ba'i chos la bzod pa

མི་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཚོས་ལ་བཟོད་པ།

anutpattidharmakṣānti

- g.6 Accomplishment of the goal
dgos pa yongs su grub pa
 དགོས་པ་ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པ།
krtyānuṣṭhāna
- g.7 Accumulated
kun tu bsags pa
 ཀུན་ཏུ་བསགས་པ།
ācita
- g.8 Accused
shag kyis 'chags
 ཤག་གྱིས་འཆགས།
codanā
- g.9 Activity of conditioning mental factors
'du byed kyi 'jug pa
 འདུ་བྱེད་གྱི་འཇུག་པ།
saṃskārapravṛtti
- g.10 Actual
yongs su grub pa
 ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པ།
pariniṣpanna
 See [n.125](#).
- g.11 Actual defining characteristic
yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid
 ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa
- g.12 Actual essence
yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid · yongs su grub pa'i rang bzhin
 ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད། . ཡོངས་སུ་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན།
pariniṣpannasvabhāva
- g.13 Actualization

mngon du bya ba

མངོན་དུ་བྱ་བ།

sākṣātkāra

g.14 Actually refer to

mngon par rjod pas rjod pa

མངོན་པར་རྗེས་པས་རྗེས་པ།

abhivadamānā · abhivadanti

Mahāvvyutpatti 1290.

g.15 Affliction

kun nas nyon mongs pa

ཀུན་ནས་ཉོན་མོངས་པ།

saṅkleśa

g.16 Aggregate

phung pho

ཕུང་ཕོ།

skandha

The five skandhas (*pañcaskandha*) are: forms (*rūpa*), sensation (*vedanā*), conception (*saṅjñā*), formations (*saṃskāra*), consciousness (*vijñāna*).

g.17 Analysis

brtag pa

བརྟག་པ།

parīkṣā

g.18 Analytical knowledge

so sor yang dag par rig pa

སོ་སོར་ཡང་དག་པར་རིག་པ།

pratisaṃvid

See Har Dayal 2004, p. 260ff.

g.19 Analytical knowledge of designations

chos so sor yang dag par rig pa

ཚོས་སོ་སོར་ཡང་དག་པར་རིག་པ།

dharmapratīsaṃvid

g.20 Analytical knowledge of the objects of designation

don so sor yang dag par rig pa

དོན་སོ་སོར་ཡང་དག་པར་རིག་པ།

āarthapratisaṃvoid

g.21 Analyze

so sor rtog par byed · so sor rtog pa

སོ་སོར་རྟོག་པར་བྱེད། . སོ་སོར་རྟོག་པ།

pratyavekṣaṇa · pratyavekṣa

The term *so sor rtog pa* has two meanings in our text: (1) analysis (*pratyavekṣa*) and (2) comprehension, realization, awakening (*pratibodha*).

g.22 Anumāṇa

—

anumāṇa

Technical term in Buddhist logic.

g.23 Appearance

snang ba

སྟངས།

pratibhāsa

g.24 Appearancelessness

mtshan ma med pa

མཚན་མ་མེད་པ།

animitta

One of the three gates of liberation along with emptiness and wishlessness.

g.25 Applications of mindfulness

dran pa nye bar gzhas pa

དྲན་པ་ཉེ་བར་གཞག་པ།

smṛtyupasthāna

The four foundations of mindfulness refers to the application of mindfulness to: the body, sensations, the mind, phenomena.

g.26 Appropriating cognition

len pa'i rnam par shes pa

ལེན་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ།
ādānavijñāna

g.27 Argumentative disputation

rtsod pa

ཚོད་པ།

vivāda

g.28 Aspiration

smon lam

སྲོན་ལམ།

praṇidhāna

g.29 Aspiration

mos pa

མོས་པ།

praṇidhāna

g.30 Assumption

mngon par zhen pa

མངོན་པར་ཞེན་པ།

abhinivīśanti

g.31 Attaining the powers

stobs bskyed pa

སྟོབས་བསྐྱེད་པ།

balādhāna

g.32 Attending

rjes su dpyod pa

རྗེས་སུ་དཔྱོད་པ།

anucaranti

g.33 Authoritative scripture

yid ches pa'i lung gi tshad ma

ཡིད་ཆེས་པའི་ལུང་གི་ཚད་མ།

āptāgamapramāṇa

g.34 Avalokiteśvara

spyan ras gzigs · 'phags pa spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug

སྤྱན་རས་གཟིགས། . འཕགས་པ་སྤྱན་རས་གཟིགས་དབང་ཕྱུག

Avalokiteśvara · Āryāvalokiteśvara

The bodhisattva who embodies compassion, also mentioned in this text as Āryāvalokiteśvara, the noble Avalokiteśvara.

g.35 Awakening

byang chub

བྱང་ལྡན།

bodhi

g.36 Awakening factors

byang chub kyi phyogs dang mthun pa'i chos

བྱང་ལྡན་གྱི་ཕྱོགས་དང་མཐུན་པའི་ཚོས།

bodhyaṅga

g.37 Awakening mind

byang chub kyi sems

བྱང་ལྡན་གྱི་སེམས།

bodhicitta

g.38 Awareness

shes bzhin

ཤེས་བཞིན།

samprajāna

g.39 Bahuvrīhi

—

bahuvrīhi

Type of Sanskrit compound.

g.40 Bases of supernatural powers

rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa

རྩ་འཕྲུལ་གྱི་རྐང་པ།

ṛddhipādaḥ

The four bases of supernatural powers (*ṛddhipāda*, *rdzu 'phrul gyi rkang pa bzhi*) are: (1) concentration through will (*chanda*, *'dun pa*), (2) concentration through vigor (*vīrya*, *brtson 'grus*), (3) concentration through the mind (*citta*, *bsam pa*), and (4) concentration through investigation (*mīmāṃsā*, *dpyod pa*). See Rahula 2001, p. 163.

g.41 Belief in a perduring self

'jig tshogs la lta ba

འཇིག་ཚོགས་ལ་ལྟ་བུ།

satkāyadr̥ṣṭi

g.42 Beryl

bai dUr+ya

བི་དུ་རྩ།

vaidūrya

g.43 Bichiliocosm

stong gnyis pa bar ma'i 'jig rten gyi khams

སྟོང་གཉིས་པ་བར་མའི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཁམས།

dvitīyamadhyama sāhasralokadhātu

Equal to a thousand universes of a thousand worlds (i.e., a universe of a million worlds).

g.44 Binding

'ching ba

འཇིང་བ།

bandhana

g.45 Blessed one

bcom ldan 'das

བཙེམ་ལྷན་འདས།

bhagavān · bhagavat

An epithet for a buddha.

g.46 Body afflicted by corruption

gnas ngan len gyi lus

གནས་ངན་ལེན་གྱི་ལུས།

dauṣṭhulyakāya

g.47 Branches of awakening

byang chub kyi yan lag

བྱང་ལྡན་གྱི་ཡན་ལག

bodhyaṅgāni

The seven branches of awakening are: (1) correct mindfulness, (2) correct discrimination of dharmas, (3) correct vigor, (4) correct joy, (5) correct flexibility, (6) correct concentration, and (7) correct equanimity.

g.48 Bring together

kun 'byung ba

ཀུན་འབྲུང་བ།

samudaya

g.49 Buddha field

sangs rgyas kyi zhing

སངས་རྒྱས་གྱི་ཞིང་།

buddhakṣetra

Also translated as “buddha realm.”

g.50 Buddha realm

sangs rgyas kyi zhing

སངས་རྒྱས་གྱི་ཞིང་།

buddhakṣetra

Also translated as “buddha field.”

g.51 Buddha Stage

sangs rgyas kyi sa

སངས་རྒྱས་གྱི་ས།

buddhabhūmi

The name of a bodhisattva stage.

g.52 Can [only] be known by intelligent scholars well versed in the subtle

zhib mo brtags pa'i mkhas pa dang 'dzangs pas rig pa

ཞིབ་མོ་བརྟགས་པའི་མཁས་པ་དང་འཛོལ་པས་རིག་པ།

sūkṣmaṃ nipuṇapaṇḍitavijñavedanīyaḥ

Mahāvvyutpatti 2918.

g.53 Causal dependence

rang dbang med pa

རང་དབང་མེད་པ།

asvatantra

g.54 Cause and effect

rgyu dang 'bras bu

རྒྱ་དང་འབྲས་བུ།

hetuphala

g.55 Changing opinions

blo gros tha dad pa

བློ་གྲོས་ཐ་དད་པ།

matibheda

g.56 Characterized by

rab tu phye ba

རབ་ཏུ་ཕྱེ་བ།

prabhāvita

See Schmithausen 2014, p. 557, §512.1. Also translated here as “consisting in” and “constituted.”

g.57 Clarified butter

mar gyi snying khu

མར་གྱི་སྟིང་ཁུ།

sarpirmaṇḍa

Mahāvvyutpatti 5683.

g.58 Clear mindfulness

gsal ba

གསལ་བ།

paṭu

g.59 Cloud of Dharma

chos kyi sprin

ཚོས་ཀྱི་སྤྲིན།

dharmameghā

The name of a bodhisattva stage.

g.60 Cognition

rnam par shes pa

རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ།

vijñāna

g.61 Cognition that is personal and intuitive

so sor rang rig pa

སོ་སོར་རང་རིག་པ།

pratyātmavedya · pratyātmavedanīya · pratyātmajñāna · prātyatmam

g.62 Collection of teachings on the bodhisattva [path]

byang chub sems dpa'i sde snod

བྱང་ཆུབ་སེམས་དཔའི་སྡེ་སྡོད།

bodhisattvapīṭaka

g.63 Communication

ming du bya ba

མིང་དུ་བྱ་བ།

saṃjñāpya

g.64 Complete equanimity

lhag par btang snyoms

ལྷག་པར་བྟང་སྟོམས།

adhyupeksya

g.65 Completely

thams cad kyi thams cad

ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་ཐམས་ཅད།

sarveṇa sarvām

Mahāvvyutpatti 6405.

g.66 Comprehension

yongs su shes pa

ཡོངས་སུ་ཤེས་པ།

parijñā

- g.67 Concentrated
mnyam par bzhag pa
 མཉམ་པར་བཞག་པ།
samāhita
- g.68 Concentration
ting nge 'dzin
 ཉིང་ངེ་འཛིན།
samādhi
- g.69 Conception
'du shes
 འདུ་ཤེས།
saṃjñā
- g.70 Conception
rtog pa
 རྟོག་པ།
kalpanā
- g.71 Conceptualization
rnam rtog · rnam par rtog pa
 རྣམ་རྟོག་ . རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ།
vikalpa
- g.72 Conceptualize
gdags pa
 གདགས་པ།
prajñapti
 Also translated here as “decide.”
- g.73 Conclusive
gcig tu nges pa
 གཅིག་ཏུ་ངེས་པ།
aikāntikaḥ
 Mahāvvyutpatti 7587.

g.74 Conditioned

'du byas

འདུ་བྱས།

saṃskṛta

g.75 Conditioned phenomena

'du byed

འདུ་བྱེད།

saṃskāra

Also translated here as “conditioning mental factors.”

g.76 Conditioning mental factors

'du byed

འདུ་བྱེད།

saṃskāra

Also translated here as “conditioned phenomena.”

g.77 Conditioning process of the mental factors

'du byed mngon par 'du bya ba

འདུ་བྱེད་མངོན་པར་འདུ་བྱ་བ།

saṃskārābhisamskaraṇa

g.78 Conducive

grog

གྲོག་ས།

sahāya

g.79 Confined

rjes su 'brel ba

རྗེས་སུ་འབྲེལ་བ།

anubandha

g.80 Confusion

'khrul pa

འཁྲུལ་བ།

bhrānta

g.81 Consequence

chud mi za ba

ཚུད་མི་ཟ་བ།

avipraṇa

g.82 Consideration

yongs su rtog pa

ཡོངས་སུ་རྟོག་པ།

paritarka

g.83 Consisting in

rab tu phye ba

རབ་དུ་ཕྱེ་བ།

prabhāvita

Also translated here as “characterized by” and “constituted.” See Schmithausen 2014, p. 557, §512.1.

g.84 Constancy of phenomena

chos gnas pa nyid

ཚོས་གནས་པ་ཉིད།

dharmasthititā

Mahāvvyutpatti 1719.

g.85 Constant

rnam par gnas pa

རྣམ་པར་གནས་པ།

vyavasthita

g.86 Constituent

kham

ཁམས།

dhātu

The eighteen constituents are: eye, visual object, visual consciousness; ear, sound, auditive consciousness; nose, smell, olfactory consciousness; tongue, taste, gustative consciousness; body, touch, tactile consciousness; mind, mental objects, mental consciousness. When it refers to six elements, they are: earth, water, fire, air, space, and consciousness.

- g.87 **Constituted**
rab tu phye ba
 རབ་ཏུ་ཕྱི་བ།
prabhāvita
 See Schmithausen 2014, p. 557, §512.1. Also translated here as “characterized by” and “consisting in.”
- g.88 **Contemplation**
bsams pa
 བསམས་པ།
cintā
- g.89 **Convention**
rjes su tha snyad
 རྗེས་སུ་ཐ་སྲིད།
anuvyavahāra
- g.90 **Conventionally**
brda
 བད།
saṃketa
- g.91 **Correct concentration**
yang dag pa'i ting nge 'dzin
 ཡང་དག་པའི་ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན།
samyaksamādhi
- g.92 **Correct self-restraints**
yang dag par spong ba
 ཡང་དག་པར་སྦྱོང་བ།
samyakprahāṇa
 See “four correct self-restraints.”
- g.93 **Corruption**
gnas ngan len
 གནས་ངན་ལེན།
dauṣṭhulya

- g.94 Decide
gdags pa
 གདགས་པ།
prajñāpti
 Also translated here as “conceptualize.”
- g.95 Dedication of merit
yongs su bsngo ba
 ཡོངས་སུ་བསྐྱོ་བ།
pariṇāmanā · pariṇata
- g.96 Deeper
phri · phyi
 སྤྱི་. སྤྱི།
 —
 Lit. “outer.”
- g.97 Deer park
ri dags kyi nags
 རི་དགས་ཀྱི་ནགས།
mṛgadāva
 The forest, located outside of Varanasi, where the Buddha first taught the Dharma.
- g.98 Defilement
nyon mongs pa
 ཉོན་མོངས་པ།
kleśa
- g.99 Defining characteristic
mtshan nyid
 མཚན་ཉིད།
svabhāvalakṣaṇa
- g.100 Defining characteristic
mtshan nyid
 མཚན་ཉིད།

lakṣaṇa

g.101 Delusion

gti mug

གཏི་མུག

moha

g.102 Delusion

kun tu rmongs pa · rnam par rmongs pa

ཀུན་ཏུ་རྫོངས་པ། . རྣམ་པར་རྫོངས་པ།

saṃmoha

Also translated here as “obscuration.”

g.103 Demonstration

bshad pa

བཤད་པ།

deśana

g.104 Description

rnam par bsnyad pa

རྣམ་པར་བསྟན་པ།

vyākhyā

g.105 Designation

btags pa

བཏགས་པ།

prajñāpti

g.106 Determination

rnam par bzhag pa

རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ།

vyavasthā

g.107 Dhāraṇī

gzungs

གཟུངས།

dhāraṇī

Also rendered here as “keeping it in mind,” “formula.”

g.108 Dharma discourse

chos kyi rnam grangs

ཚོས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གྲངས།

dharmaparyāya

g.109 Dharma of the nonexistence of defining characteristics

mtshan nyid med pa'i chos

མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་ཚོས།

alakṣaṇadharmā

Mahāvīyūtpatti 353.

g.110 Dharmodgata

chos 'phags

ཚོས་འཕགས།

Dharmodgata

A bodhisattva mahāsattva.

g.111 Differentiating

rnam par 'byed pa

རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ།

vibhājanā

g.112 Diligence

brtson 'grus

བརྩོན་འགྲུས།

viryā

Also translated here as “vigor.”

g.113 Direct cognition

mngon sum gyi tshad ma

མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ཚད་མ།

pratyakṣapramāṇa

g.114 Direct their attention

yid la byed

ཡིད་ལ་བྱེད།
manasikāra

g.115 Discerning

rab tu rnam par 'byed pa
རབ་ཏུ་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ།
pravīcaya

g.116 Discerning

nges par rtog pa · nges par rtogs pa
ངེས་པར་རྟོག་པ། . ངེས་པར་རྟོགས་པ།
nirūpaṇā
Mahāvīyutpatti 7450.

g.117 Discipline

tshul khrims
ཚུལ་ཁྲིམས།
śīla

g.118 Discourses teaching Dharma

chos gdags pa rnam par gzhas pa
ཚོས་གདགས་པ་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་པ།
dharmaprajñaptivyavasthā(pa)na

g.119 Discriminating

bye brag 'byed pa
བྱེ་བྲག་འབྱེད་པ།
nitīraṇa

Also rendered here as “distinguishing.”

g.120 Discrimination of dharmas

chos rab tu rnam par 'byed pa
ཚོས་རབ་ཏུ་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པ།
dharmapravīcaya

g.121 Distinct

dad pa

དད་ས།
bheda

g.122 Distinctive

bye brag

བྱེ་བྲག།

viśeṣa

g.123 Distinctive characteristic

bye brag gi mtshan nyid

བྱེ་བྲག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

viśeśalakṣaṇa

g.124 Distinctly perceive

rab tu shes

རབ་ཏུ་ཤེས།

prajānāti

g.125 Distinguishing

bye brag 'byed pa

བྱེ་བྲག་འབྲེད་པ།

nitīraṇa

Also rendered here as “discriminating.”

g.126 Diversity of things

ji snyed yod pa nyid

ཇི་སྟེད་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད།

yāvadbhāvikatā

g.127 Domain of truth

chos kyi dbyings

ཚོས་གྱི་དབྱིངས།

dharmadhātu

g.128 Domains of mastery

zil gyis gnon pa'i skye mched

ཟེལ་གྱིས་གཞོན་པའི་སྐྱེ་མཚེད།

abhibhvāyatana

See Buswell & Lopez 2014, p. 2.

g.129 Dvandva

—

dvandva

Type of Sanskrit compound.

g.130 Effortless

lhun gyis grub pa

ལྷན་གྱིས་སྐྱབ་པ།

anābhoga

g.131 Elaboration of conventional expressions

tha snyad 'dogs pa'i spros pa

ཐ་སྐད་འདོགས་པའི་སྐྱོས་པ།

vyavahāraprapañca

g.132 Eloquence

spobs pa

སྐྱོབས་པ།

pratibhāna

g.133 Emanation

sprul pa

སྐྱལ་པ།

nirmāṇa

See [n.365](#).

g.134 Emanation body

sprul sku

སྐྱལ་སྐུ།

nirmāṇakāya

g.135 Emancipation

nges par 'byung ba

ངེས་པར་འབྱུང་བ།

niḥsaraṇa · niryāṇa

Also translated here as “pathway.”

g.136 Emptiness

stong pa nyid

སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།

śūnyatā

g.137 Emptiness devoid of rejection

dor ba med pa stong pa nyid

དོར་བ་མེད་པ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།

anavakāraśūnyatā

g.138 Emptiness of the limitless

mtha' las stong pa nyid

མཐའ་ལས་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།

atyantaśūnyatā

g.139 Emptiness of the substanceless

dngos po stong pa nyid

དངོས་པོ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།

a(sva)bhāvaśūnyatā

g.140 Equanimity

btang snyoms

བཏང་སྟོབས།

upekṣā

g.141 Erroneous conception

mngon par zhen pa

མངོན་པར་ཞེན་པ།

abhiniveśa

g.142 Essence

ngo bo nyid

ངོ་བོ་ཉིད།

svabhāva

g.143 Essencelessness

ngo bo nyid med pa nyid

ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཉིད།

niḥsvabhāvātā

The three kinds of essencelessness are essencelessness regarding defining characteristics, essencelessness regarding arising, and essencelessness regarding the ultimate.

g.144 Essencelessness regarding arising

skye ba ngo bo nyid med pa nyid

སྐྱེ་བ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཉིད།

utpattiniḥsvabhāvātā

g.145 Essencelessness regarding defining characteristics

mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med pa nyid

མཚན་ཉིད་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཉིད།

lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvātā

g.146 Essencelessness regarding the ultimate

don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid

དོན་དམ་པ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་མེད་པ་ཉིད།

paramārthaniḥsvabhāvātā

g.147 Essential characteristic

ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid

ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

svabhāvalakṣaṇa

g.148 Established

rnam par bzhag pa

རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ།

vyavasthā

Also translated here as “posited” and “determination.”

g.149 Examine

rtag

བརྟག

- g.150 Examine
rnam par dpyad
 རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད།
vicārita · vicāraṇa
- g.151 Examine
'jal ba
 འཇམ་བ།
- g.152 Examining
yongs su dpyod pa
 ཡོངས་སུ་དཔྱོད་པ།
parimīmāṃsā · paricāra
- g.153 Excellence of their peaceful conduct
bzod pa dang des pa chen po dang ldan pa
 བཟོད་པ་དང་དེས་པ་ཆེན་པོ་དང་ལྷན་པ།
mahākṣāntisauratyasamanvōgataḥ
 Mahāvvyutpatti 1115.
- g.154 Excellent Intelligence
legs pa'i blo gros
 ལེགས་པའི་བློ་གྲོས།
sādhumatī
 The name of a bodhisattva stage.
- g.155 Excited
bzlums
 བརླུས་ས།
uddhata
- g.156 Expedient
rnam grangs
 རྣམ་གྲངས།
paryāya

In the sūtra, *pariyāya* is used to denote (1) an expedient or a trick in the context of illusions produced by a magician; (2) a method, an approach through which one can practice in accordance with a teaching; or (3) a scripture, a teaching regarding a specific aspect.

g.157 Express themselves through conventions

tha snyad 'dogs

ཐ་སྟེན་འདོགས།

vyavaharanti

g.158 Extent

mthar thug pa

མཐར་སྒྲིག་པ།

paryanta

g.159 Fabrication

yongs su rtog pa

ཡོངས་སྐྱོད་པ།

parikalpa

g.160 Factors of conditioned existence

srid pa'i yan lag

སྲིད་པའི་ཡན་ལག

bhavāṅga

The twelve factors or links of conditioned existence are: ignorance (*avidyā*), mental formations (*saṃskāra*), consciousness (*vijñāna*), mind and matter (*nāmarūpa*), the six sense organs (*ṣaḍāyatana*), contact (*sparśa*), sensation (*vedanā*), craving (*tṛṣṇā*), clinging (*upādāna*), becoming (*bhava*), birth (*jāti*), aging and dying (*jarāmaraṇa*).

g.161 Faculties

dbang po

དབང་པོ།

indriya

See “five faculties.”

g.162 Faith

dad pa

དད་སེལ།
śraddhā

g.163 Falsity
skyon chags pa
སྒྱུན་ཆགས་པ།
duṣṭatā

g.164 Far Reaching
ring du song ba
རིང་དུ་སོང་བ།
dūraṅgamā
The name of a bodhisattva stage.

g.165 Faultless state of truth
yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa
ཡང་དག་པ་ཉིད་སྒྱུན་མེད་པ།
samyaktvanyāma

g.166 Five faculties
dbang po lnga
དབང་པོ་ལྔ།
pañcendriyāṇi
The five faculties are those of (1) faith, (2) vigor, (3) mindfulness, (4) concentration (*samādhi*), and (5) wisdom (*prajñā*). These are similar to the five forces but in a lesser stage of development.

g.167 Five forces
stobs lnga
སྒྲོབ་སེལ་ལྔ།
pañcabalāṇi
Differing only in intensity, the five forces are similar to the five faculties: (1) faith, (2) vigor, (3) mindfulness, (4) concentration (*samādhi*), and (5) wisdom (*prajñā*).

g.168 Five great fears
'jig pa chen po lnga
འཇིག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ལྔ།

pañcamahābhaya

The five great fears are “the fear concerning livelihood, fear of disapproval, fear of death, fear of bad transmigrations, and fear that is timidity when addressing assemblies.” (Powers 1995, p. 316, n. 19).

g.169 Five sciences

rigs pa'i gnas lnga po

རིགས་པའི་གནས་ལྔ་པོ།

pañcavidyā

The five sciences are grammar, logic, philosophy, medicine, and crafts.

g.170 Flexibility

shin tu sbyangs pa

ཤིན་ཏུ་སྦྱངས་པ།

praśraddhi

g.171 Focus their minds within

sems nang du 'jog

སེམས་ནང་དུ་འཇོག།

cittasthāpana

g.172 Foolish being

byis pa

བྱིས་པ།

bāla

g.173 Forces

stobs

སྟོབས།

bala

See “five forces.”

g.174 Formula

gzungs

གཟུངས།

dhāraṇī

“Formula” in the sense of a “mnemonic formula” encapsulating a method or key points in a few words. On the meaning of this term, see Braarvig 1985.

Also rendered here as “keeping it in mind,” “dhāraṇī.”

g.175 Foundations of training

bslab pa'i gzhi

བསྐྱབ་པའི་གཞི།

śikṣāpada

The six foundations of training are generosity, discipline, patience, diligence, meditative absorption, and wisdom.

g.176 Four correct self-restraints

yang dag par spong ba bzhi

ཡང་དག་པར་སྐྱོང་བ་བཞི།

catvāri prahāṇāni

The four correct self-restraints are: giving up nonvirtues, avoiding nonvirtues, generating virtues, developing virtues. See Edgerton 1953, p. 389,2.

g.177 Four kinds of assurance

mi 'jigs pa bzhi

མི་འཇིགས་པ་བཞི།

catvāri vaiśāradyaṇi

The four kinds of assurance of a tathāgata are (1) assurance concerning complete awakening (*abhisambodhivaiśāradya*, *thams cad mkhyen pa la mi 'jigs pa*); (2) assurance concerning the destruction of the impurities (*āsravakṣayavaiśāradya*, *zag pa zad pa mkhyen pa la mi 'jigs pa*); (3) assurance concerning harmful things (*antarāyikadharmavaiśāradya*, *bar du gcod pa'i chos la mi 'jigs pa*); and (4) assurance concerning the path that leads to emancipation (*nairyāṇikapratipadvaiśāradya*, *thob par 'gyur bar nges par 'byung ba'i lam la mi 'jigs pa*). See Rahula 2001, p. 230, in which they are called “perfect self-confidence.”

g.178 Four kinds of sustenance

zas bzhi

ཟས་བཞི།

catvārahārāḥ

The four kinds of sustenance are the sustenance of material ingestion, the sustenance of contact, the sustenance of will, and the sustenance of consciousness.

g.179 Four methods of conversion

bsdu ba'i dngos po bzhi'i ming

བསྐྱུ་བའི་དངོས་པོ་བཞིའི་མིང་།

catvāri saṃgrahavastūni

Mahāvvyutpatti 924. The four methods of conversion are: (1) generosity (*dāna*), (2) kind words (*priyavādita*), (3) being supportive of others (*arthacaryā*), and (4) being consistent with one's own teachings (*samānārthatā*). (see Mvyut 924).

g.180 Four noble truths

'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi

འཕགས་པའི་བདེན་པ་བཞི།

catvāri āryasatyāni

The four noble truths, as stated in this sūtra, are: the comprehension of suffering, the abandoning of the cause of suffering, the actualization of the cessation of suffering, and the practice of the path.

g.181 Four seals of Dharma

phyag rgya bzhi

ཕྱག་རྒྱ་བཞི།

caturmudrā

The impermanence of all conditioned phenomena, the suffering inherent to all conditioned phenomena, the selflessness of all phenomena, and nirvāṇa as the state of peace.

g.182 Free from covetousness

zang zing med pa

ཟང་ཟིང་མེད་པ།

nirāmiṣa

In the sense of “disinterested,” “not expecting a reward.”

g.183 Free of any wrongdoing

kha na ma tho ba med pa

ཁ་ན་མ་ཐོ་བ་མེད་པ།

anavadya

g.184 Gambhīrārthasaṃdhanirmocana

don zab dgongs pa nges par 'grel

དོན་ཟབ་དགོངས་པ་ངེས་པར་འགྲེལ།

Gambhīrārthasaṃdhinirmocana

A bodhisattva mahāsattva.

g.185 Gandharva

dri za

དྲི་ཟ།

gandharva

Type of being in Buddhist cosmogony.

g.186 Garuḍa

—

garuḍa

Type of being in Buddhist cosmogony.

g.187 Gates of liberation

—

—

Emptiness, appearancelessness, and wishlessness.

g.188 Gāthā

—

gāthā

A gāthā is a verse or stanza.

g.189 Generosity

sbyin pa

སྤྱིན་པ།

—

g.190 Gnosis

ye shes

ཡེ་ཤེས།

jñāna

g.191 Gnosis and vision

shes pa dang mthong ba

ཤེས་པ་དང་མཐོང་བ།

jñānadarśana

g.192 Gone forth

nges par 'byung ba

ངེས་པར་འགྱུང་བ།

niryātaka · parivrajaka

Having left one's home to become a wandering mendicant. Also translated here as emancipation and as pathway.

g.193 Great emptiness

chen po stong pa nyid

ཆེན་པོ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།

mahāsūnyatā

The emptiness of the space containing all domains, objects, and locations.

g.194 Guṇākara

yon tan 'byung gnas

ཡོན་ཏན་འགྱུང་གནས།

Guṇākara

A bodhisattva mahāsattva.

g.195 Had realized the sameness [of all phenomena], the state of a buddha in which there is neither a center nor a periphery

mtha' dang dbus med pa'i sangs rgyas kyi sa mnyam pa nyid bu thugs su chud pa

མཐའ་དང་དབུས་མེད་པའི་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ས་མཉམ་པ་ཉིད་བྱ་བུགས་སུ་ཚུད་པ།

anantamadhyabuddhabhūmisamatādhigataḥ

Mahāvyutpatti 369.

g.196 Hard to Conquer

shin tu sbyang dka'

ཤིན་ཏུ་སྤྱད་དཀའ།

sudurjayā

The name of a bodhisattva stage.

g.197 Hearer

nyan thos

ཉན་ཐོས།

śrāvaka

g.198 Hell being

dmyal ba pa

དབྱུང་བ་པ།

nāraka

Type of being in Buddhist cosmogony.

g.199 How

ji tsam du

རི་ཚམ་དུ།

tāvatā · tāvat · yāvāt

With the meaning of “truly, really, indeed.”

g.200 Hungry ghost

yi dags

ཡི་དགས།

preta

Type of being in Buddhist cosmogony.

g.201 Illuminating

'od byed pa

འོ་ད་བྱེད་པ།

prabhākarī

The name of a bodhisattva stage.

g.202 Image

gzugs brnyan

གཟུགས་བརྟན།

pratibimba

Also translated as “reflection.”

g.203 Imaginary

kun brtags pa

ཀུན་བརྟགས་པ།

parikalpita

g.204 Imaginary defining characteristic

kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid

ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

parikalpitalakṣaṇa

The imaginary defining characteristic corresponds to the attribution of an essence, an inherent entity, to that which is by nature dependent on an other (*paratantra*) to exist or appear as what it is perceived to be.

g.205 Imaginary essence

kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid · kun brtags pa'i rang bzhin

ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད། . ཀུན་བརྟགས་པའི་རང་བཞིན།

parikalpitasvabhāva

g.206 Imagination

kun tu rtog pa

ཀུན་རུ་རྟོག་པ།

saṃkalpa · parikalpa

g.207 Immovable

mi g.yo ba

མི་གཡོ་བ།

acalā

The name of a bodhisattva stage.

g.208 In accordance with the truth

yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du

ཡང་དག་པ་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་དུ།

yathābhūtam

g.209 In their own experience

nang gi so sor rang rig pa

ནང་གི་སོ་སོར་རང་རིག་པ།

adhyātmaṃ prātyatmam

g.210 Inconclusive

gcig tu ma nges pa

གཅིག་རུ་མ་ངེས་པ།

anaikāntikaḥ

g.211 Indivisible

dbyer med pa · ma 'dres pa · ma 'dres pa'am dbyer med pa

དབྱེར་མེད་པ། . མ་འདྲེས་པ། . མ་འདྲེས་པའམ་དབྱེར་མེད་པ།

asambhedaḥ

Mahāvvyutpatti 5192.

g.212 Inexhaustible

mi zad pa · ma 'tshal ba

མི་ཟད་པ། . མ་འཚལ་བ།

akṣaya

g.213 Inexpressible

brjod du med

བརྗོད་དུ་མེད།

anabhilāpya

g.214 Inference

rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma

རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པའི་ཚད་མ།

anumānapramāṇa

g.215 Innate

lhan cig skyes

ལྷན་ཅིག་སྐྱེས།

sahaja

g.216 Inner absorption

nang du yang dag bzhag

ནང་དུ་ཡང་དག་བཞག

pratisaṃlāna

g.217 Innermost

snying po

སྙིང་པོ།

—

Lit “heart” or “marrow.”

g.218 Inquiry

yongs su tshol ba

ཡོངས་སུ་ཚོལ་བ།

paryeṣaṇā

g.219 Insight

lhag mthong

ལྷག་མཐོང།

vipaśyanā

g.220 Intelligence

blo gros

སྒོ་གོས།

mati

g.221 Intention

bsam pa

བསམ་བ།

āśaya

g.222 Investigating

rtog pa

རྟོག་བ།

vitarka

Also translated here as “mental engagement.”

g.223 Investigation

dpyod pa

དཔྱོད་བ།

vicāra

In our text, the specific quality of *vicāra* is to remain mindful of *nimitta* in the sense of “mentally watching” or noting them without engaging in a more discursive way.

g.224 Jambudvīpa

'dzam bu gling

འཛམ་བུ་གླིང་།

Jambudvīpa

The continent (*dvīpa*) on which we live which, according to ancient South-Asian cosmology, is shaped like a jambū fruit.

g.225 Joy

dga' ba

དགའ་བ།

prīti

g.226 Karmadhāraya

—

karmadhāraya

Type of Sanskrit compound.

g.227 Keep it in mind

gzung bar bgyi

གཟུང་བར་བགྱི།

dhārayāmi

g.228 Keep it in mind

zung shig

ཟུང་ཤིག།

dhāraya

(cf. Sanskrit text in Matsuda 2013, p. 940 *ad* Lamotte VIII.41). *Dhāraya* is a causative imperative of *dhṛ-*.

g.229 Keeping it in mind

gzungs

གཟུངས།

dhāraṇī

Also rendered here as “*dhāraṇī*,” “formula.”

g.230 Kinnara

—

kinnara

Type of being in Buddhist cosmogony.

g.231 Kīrtimat

grags pa can

གྲགས་པ་ཅན།

Kīrtimat

World of the tathāgata Viśālakīrti.

g.232 Label

ming du btags · 'jig rten gyi ming du btags pa · 'jig rten gyi tha snyad

· 'jig rten gyi tha snyad du btags pa

· 'jig rten gyi tha snyad du btags pa'am 'jig rten gyi tha snyad

· 'jig rten gyi tha snyad du btags pa'am 'jig rten tha snyad · 'jig rten tha snyad

· btags pa'i tshig

མིང་དུ་བཏགས། . འཛིག་རྟེན་གྱི་མིང་དུ་བཏགས་པ། . འཛིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐ་སྟད།

. འཛིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐ་སྟད་དུ་བཏགས་པ། . འཛིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐ་སྟད་དུ་བཏགས་པ་འམ་འཛིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐ་སྟད།

. འཛིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐ་སྟད་དུ་བཏགས་པ་འམ་འཛིག་རྟེན་ཐ་སྟད། . འཛིག་རྟེན་ཐ་སྟད། . བཏགས་པ་འི་ཚོག

lokasaṃjñā

Mahāvvyutpatti 6558.

g.233 Lacked certainty

yid gnyis can

ཡིད་གཉིས་ཅན།

vimati

g.234 Latent disposition

bag la nyal

བག་ལ་ཉལ།

anuśaya

Also translated here as “predisposition.”

g.235 Liberation

rnam par thar pa

རྣམ་པར་ཐར་པ།

vimokṣa

See Hayal 1978: 229.

g.236 Lies hidden

rab tu sbyor bar byed pa

རབ་དུ་སྦྱོར་བར་བྱེད་པ།

pralayanata

g.237 Literal

sgra ji bzhin

སྒྲ་རི་བཞིན།

yathāruta

g.238 Magic illusion

sgyu ma'i las · sgyu ma byas pa

སྒྱུ་མ་འི་ལས། . སྒྱུ་མ་བྱས་པ།

—

g.239 Mahoraga

—

mahoraga

Type of being in Buddhist cosmogony.

g.240 Maitreya

byams pa

བྱམས་པ།

Maitreya

Bodhisattva of loving kindness; the next buddha to follow Śākyamuni..

g.241 Manifest

mngon du gyur pa

མངོན་དུ་གྱུར་པ།

abhimukhī

The name of a bodhisattva stage.

g.242 Mañjuśrī

'jam dpal

འཇམ་དཔལ།

Mañjuśrī

The bodhisattva of wisdom.

g.243 Mātrkā

ma mo

མ་མོ།

mātrkā

An early name for the Abhidharmapiṭaka and also a germinal list or index of topics.

g.244 Meaning of true reality

de kho na'i don

དེའོ་ནའི་དོན།

tattvārtha

g.245 Meditative absorption

bsam gtan

བསམ་གཏན།

dhyāna

See Hayal 1978, p. 221.

g.246 Mental appearance

sems kyi mtshan ma

སེམས་ཀྱི་མཚན་མ།

cittanimitta

g.247 Mental elaboration

spros pa

སྐྱོས་པ།

prapañca

g.248 Mental engagement

rtog pa

རྟོག་པ།

vitarka

Also translated here as “investigating.”

g.249 Mental imprint

bag chags

བག་ཚགས།

vāsanā

g.250 Mental inspection

so sor brtags pa

སོ་སོར་བརྟགས་པ།

pratisamkhyā

g.251 Mental state

sems las byung ba

སེམས་ལས་བྱུང་བ།

caitasika

g.252 Mental stillness

zhi gnas

ཞི་གནས།

śamatha

g.253 Mere representation

rnam par rig pa tsam

རྣམ་པར་རིག་པ་ཅམ།

vijñaptimātra

g.254 Mind

sems

སེམས།

citta

g.255 Mind containing all the seeds

sa bon thams cad pa'i sems

ས་བོན་ཐམས་ཅད་པའི་སེམས།

sarvabhāṇi cittam

Schmithausen translates this term with “all-seed mind,” which can mean both “mind containing all the seeds” or “mind consisting of all the seeds.”

See Schmithausen 2014, p. 65, n. 221.

g.256 Mindfulness

dran pa

སྒོ་ས།

smṛti

- g.257 Nāga
klu
 ལྷ།
nāga
 Type of being in Buddhist cosmogony.
- g.258 Naturally present
rang bzhin du gnas pa
 རང་བཞིན་དུ་གནས་པ།
svabhāvasthita · svabhāvasthita · nisargabhāva
 Schmithausen understands this term as meaning “normal”: “should we [indeed] say that even the normal (*rang bzhin du gnas pa*, **praktisthita*?) images . . .” (Schmithausen 2014, p. 392, n. 1733). I understand the use of *rang bzhin du gnas pa* as implying a context where the object of the cognition is not an object of concentration corresponding to visualization practices as in the case of the *kaṣiṇa*. In the Pāli tradition, *kaṣiṇa* designates a visualization object used as a support for the totality of the meditator’s attention. In this paragraph, *sems can* has the connotation of beings who do not practice the yoga taught in this chapter, that is, ordinary beings.
- g.259 Nature of phenomena
chos nyid
 ཚོས་ཉིད།
dharmatā
- g.260 Nature of things
ji lta ba bzhin du yod pa nyid
 ཇི་ལྟ་བུ་བཞིན་དུ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད།
yathāvadbhāvikatā
- g.261 Negate
skur pa 'debs
 སྐྱར་པ་འདེབས།
apavāda
- g.262 Negation
skur pa 'debs pa
 སྐྱར་པ་འདེབས་པ།

apavāda

g.263 Next life

'jig rten pha rol

འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་རྫོལ།

paraloka

Lit. “the world beyond [death].”

g.264 Nidāna

gleng gzhi

སྐྱེང་གཞི།

nidāna

Introductory part of a sūtra .

g.265 Nirvāṇa

mya ngan las 'das pa

མྱ་ངན་ལས་འདས་པ།

nirvāṇa

g.266 Noble being

'phags pa

འཕགས་པ།

ārya

g.267 Noble truth

'phags pa'i bden pa

འཕགས་པའི་བདེན་པ།

āryasatya

See “four noble truths.”

g.268 Non-Buddhist

mu stegs pa

མུ་སྟེགས་པ།

tīrthika

Heretics or adherents of non-Buddhist schools.

g.269 Nonduality

gnyis su med pa

གཉིས་སུ་མེད་པ།

advaya

Mahāvvyutpatti 1717.

g.270 Object

dnngos po · yul

དངོས་པོ། . ཡུལ།

vastu

g.271 Object conducive to purification

rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa

རྣམ་པར་དག་པའི་དམིགས་པ།

**viśuddhyālabana*

See Schmithausen 2014, p. 362, §306.5 and n. 1644.

g.272 Object of experience

spyod yul

སྟོན་ཡུལ།

gocara

Also translated here as “sphere of activity.” See [n.42](#).

g.273 Obscuration

kun tu rmongs pa

ཀུན་ཏུ་མོངས་པ།

saṃmoha

Also translated here as “delusion.”

g.274 Obscuration of cognitive objects

shes bya'i sgrib pa

ཤེས་བྱའི་སློབ་པ།

jñeyāvaraṇa

g.275 Obstacle

gegs

གཤམ་པ།

vibandha

- g.276 Obstruction
sgrib pa
 གླིབ་པ།
āvaraṇa
- g.277 Of a single nature
ro gcig pa
 རོ་གཅིག་པ།
ekarasa
- g.278 One-pointedness of mind
sems rtse gcig pa nyid
 སེམས་རྩེ་གཅིག་པ་ཉིད།
cittaikāgratā
- g.279 Ordinary being
so so'i skye bo
 སོ་སོའི་སྐྱེ་བོ།
prthagjana
- g.280 Other-dependent
gzhan gyi dbang
 གཞན་གྱི་དབང་།
paratantra
- g.281 Other-dependent defining characteristic
gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid
 གཞན་གྱི་དབང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།
paratantralakṣaṇa
- g.282 Other-dependent essence
gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid · gzhan gyi dbang gi rang bzhin
 གཞན་གྱི་དབང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད། . གཞན་གྱི་དབང་གི་རང་བཞིན།
paratantrasvabhāva
- g.283 Paramārthasamudgata
don dam yang dag 'phags

དོན་དམ་ཡང་དག་འཕགས།

Paramārthasamudgata

A bodhisattva mahāsattva.

g.284 Parinirvāṇa

yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa

ཡོངས་སུ་སྐྱེ་ལས་འདས་པ།

parinirvāṇa

g.285 Pathway

nges par 'byung ba

ངེས་པར་འབྱུང་བ།

niḥsaraṇa · niryāṇa

Setting forth, issue, exit, departure, escape, a road out of town. Also translated here as “emancipated” and “gone forth.”

See also [n.39](#).

g.286 Patience

bzod pa

བཟོད་པ།

—

g.287 Paying attention

yang dag par rjes su mthong ba

ཡང་དག་པར་རྗེས་སུ་མཐོང་བ།

samanupaśyati

g.288 Perfection

pha rol tu phyin pa

ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ།

pāramitā

g.289 Perfection of wisdom

shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa

ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཕ་རོལ་ཏུ་ཕྱིན་པ།

prajñāpāramitā

- g.290 Perfectly pure cognition
blo shin tu rnam par dag pa
སློཾ་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ།
suviśuddhabuddhiḥ
Mahāvyutpatti 351.
- g.291 Perfectly skilled in the sameness of the three times
dus gsum mnyam pa nyid tshar phyin pa
དུས་གསུམ་མཉམ་པ་ཉིད་ཚར་བྱིན་པ།
tryadhvasamatāniryātaḥ
Mahāvyutpatti 360.
- g.292 Phenomenal appearance
mtshan ma
སཚན་མ།
nimitta
- g.293 Phenomenal appearance of conditioned phenomena
—
saṃskāranimitta
- g.294 Point where phenomena end
dngos po'i mtha'
དངོས་པོའི་མཐའ།
vastvanta
- g.295 Point where the sphere of space ends
nam mkha'i khams kyi mthas gtugs pa
ནམ་མཁའི་ཁམས་ཀྱི་མཐའ་གཏུགས་པ།
ākāśadhātuparyavasānaḥ
- g.296 Posited
rnam par bzhag pa
རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ།
vyavasthā

This term has the connotation of something being agreed upon, represented, arranged, settled, decreed, or established. Also translated here as “established” and “posited.”

g.297 Possessed the gnosis bodhisattvas vow to accomplish

ye shes byang chub sems dpa' thams cad kyis yang dag par mnos pa

ཡེ་ཤེས་བྱང་ཚུབ་སེམས་དཔལ་ཐམས་ཅད་རྒྱུས་ཡང་དག་པར་མནོས་པ།

sarvabodhisattvasampraticchūtajñānaḥ

Mahāvvyutpatti 366.

g.298 Prasiddhānumāṇa

—

prasiddhānumāṇa

Technical term in Buddhist logic.

g.299 Prātimokṣa

so sor thar pa

སོ་སོར་ཐར་པ།

prātimokṣa

“Prātimokṣa” is the name given to the code of conduct binding on monks and nuns. The term can be used to refer both to the disciplinary rules themselves and to the texts from the Vinaya that contain them. There are multiple recensions of the *Prātimokṣa*, each transmitted by a different monastic fraternity in ancient and medieval India. Three remain living traditions, one of them the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya of Tibetan Buddhism. Though the numbers of rules vary across the different recensions, they are all organized according to the same principles and with the same disciplinary categories. It is customary for monastics to recite the *Prātimokṣa Sūtra* fortnightly. According to some Mahāyana sūtras, a separate set of prātimokṣa rules exists for bodhisattvas, which are based on bodhisattva conduct as taught in that vehicle.

g.300 Predisposition

bag la nyal

ཐག་ལ་ཉལ།

anusāya

Also translated here are “latent disposition.”

Primordially in the state of peace

g.301 *gzod ma nas zhib*
གཞོན་མ་ནས་ཞིབ།
ādiśānta

g.302 Prince
gzhon nur gyur pa
གཞོན་རུར་གྱུར་པ།
kumārabhūta

g.303 Principle of reason
rigs pa
རིགས་པ།
yukti

The four principles of reason (*yukti*) are : (1) the principle of reason based on dependence (*apekṣāyukti*), (2) the principle of reason based on cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇayukti*), (3) the principle of reason based on logical proof (*upapattisādhanayukti*), and (4) the principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena itself (*dharmatāyukti*).

On “principle of reason” as a translation for *yukti*, see Kapstein 1988, p. 152ff. See also Lin 2010 for an overview of *yukti* in Saṃdh.

g.304 Principle of reason based on cause and effect
bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa
བྱ་བ་བྱེད་པའི་རིགས་པ།
kāryakāraṇayukti

g.305 Principle of reason based on dependence
de la ltos pa'i rigs pa
དེལ་ལྟོས་པའི་རིགས་པ།
apekṣāyukti

g.306 Principle of reason based on logical proof
'thad pas sgrub pa'i rigs pa
འཇགས་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ།
upapattisādhanayukti

g.307 Principle of reason based on the nature of phenomena itself
chos nyid kyi rigs pa

ཚོས་ཉིད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ།
dharmatāyukti

g.308 Producing or bringing about a [new] existence

lus mngon par 'grub cing 'byung bar 'gyur ba

ལུས་མཛོད་པར་འགྲུབ་ཅིང་འབྱུང་བར་འགྲུར་བ།

ātmabhāvam abhiniroartayanti

g.309 Purification

rnam par dag pa

རྣམ་པར་དག་པ།

viśuddhi

g.310 Purity of their merit

yon yongs su sbyong ba chen po

ཡོན་ཡོངས་སུ་སྐྱེད་བ་ཆེན་པོ།

mahādakṣiṇāpariśodhakaḥ

Mahāvyutpatti 1113.

g.311 Quality

chos

ཚོས།

dharma

g.312 Radiant

'od 'phro ba can

འོད་འཕྲོ་བ་ཅན།

arciṣmatī

The name of a bodhisattva stage.

g.313 Reason

rtags

རྟགས།

hetu

g.314 Recluse

dge sbyong

དག་སྐྱོང་།
śrāmaṇa

g.315 Recollect what they have heard

thos pa'i gzungs

ཐོས་པའི་གཟུངས།

śrutidhāraṇī

g.316 Referential object

dmigs pa

དམིགས་པ།

ālambana

g.317 Reflection

gzugs brnyan

གཟུགས་བརྟན།

pratibimba

Also translated as “image.”

g.318 Results produced by the maturation [of their karma]

rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu

རྣམ་པར་སྐྱིན་པའི་འབྲས་བུ།

vipākaphala

g.319 Room

gnas

གནས།

sthāna

g.320 Ṛṣivadana

drang srong smra ba

དང་སྲོང་སྐྱབ་བ།

Ṛṣivadana

A sacred area located outside of Vārāṇasī where many sages are said to have practiced in the past.

g.321 Sapakṣa

—

sapakṣa

Technical term in Buddhist logic.

g.322 Scrutinizing

lta ba

ལྟ་བ།

prekṣate

Mahāvvyutpatti 7470.

g.323 Secondary defilement

nye ba'i nyon mongs

ཉེབའི་ཉོན་མོངས།

upakleśa

g.324 Sense domain

skye mched

སྐྱེ་མཆོད།

āyatana

The twelve sense domains are: eye and visible objects, ear and sound, nose and odor, tongue and taste, body and touch, mind and mental objects.

g.325 Sentient being

sems can

སེམས་ཅན།

sattva

Often rendered simply as “being.”

g.326 Setting

rab tu 'dzin pa

རབ་ཏུ་འཛིན་པ།

pradhāraṇa

g.327 Seven precious substances

rin po che sna bdun

རིན་པོ་ཆེ་སྣ་བདུན།

saptaratna

Unlisted in the present text. Various lists exist of these seven precious substances, including gold, different kinds of gems, pearls, etc.

g.328 Sharing a common destiny

bde ba gcig pa'i don gyis

བདེ་བ་གཅིག་པའི་དོན་གྱིས།

ekayogakṣemārthena

g.329 Shift in one's basis of existence

gnas gyur pa

གནས་གྱུར་པ།

āśrayapariṅṅrtti

See [n.191](#).

g.330 Single Vehicle

theg pa gcig pa

ཐེག་པ་གཅིག་པ།

ekayāna

g.331 Six destinies

'gro ba drug

འགོ་བ་དུག

sadgati

The six destinies correspond to the six realms of Buddhist cosmogony (i.e., gods, demigods, humans, animals, hungry ghosts and hell beings).

g.332 Slow-witted

blo gros ngan pa

བློ་གྲོས་ངན་པ།

kumati

g.333 Solitary realizer

—

pratyekabuddha

g.334 Sovereign power

byin gyi rlabs

བྱིན་གྱི་རླབས།

adhiṣṭhāna · adhiṣṭhita

This term is usually translated into English with “blessings.” However, as explained in Edgerton 1953, p. 15; Eckel 1994, pp. 90–93; Gómez 2011, pp. 539 and 541; and Fiordalis 2012, pp. 104 and 118, *adhiṣṭhāna* conveys the notions of control (of one’s environment as a result of meditative absorption), authority, or protection (see *Abhidharmakośa* VII.51, cf. La Vallée Poussin 1925, p. 119ff.). *Adhiṣṭhāna* is also used to convey the idea of transformation through exerting one’s control over objects, people, and places. The term “sovereign power” seems to cover all these shades of meaning as well as the various usages of the Sanskrit term, for example *satyādhiṣṭhāna* “the sovereign power of truth” and *adhiṣṭhānādhiṣṭita* “empowered by the sovereign power (of the Tathāgata).”

g.335 Space

nam mkha'

ནམ་མཁའ།

ākāśa

g.336 Specific defining characteristic

rang gi mtshan nyid

རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

svalakṣaṇa

g.337 Sphere of activity

spyod yul

སྟོན་ཡུལ།

gocara

Also translated here as “object of experience.”

g.338 Spontaneously accomplished

lhun gyis grub pa

ལྷན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ།

anābhoga

g.339 Stage

sa

ས།

bhūmi

- g.340 Stage of engagement through aspiration
mos pa spyod pa'i sa
 མོས་པ་སྐྱོད་པའི་ས།
adhimukticaryābhūmiḥ
 Mahāvyutpatti 897.
- g.341 Stainless
sbyangs pa
 སྤྲུངས་པ།
uttapta · viśuddha
- g.342 Stainless
dri ma med pa
 ཇི་མ་མེད་པ།
vimalā
 The name of a bodhisattva stage.
- g.343 Subhūti
rab 'byor
 རབ་འབྱོར།
Subhūti
 The name of a hearer.
- g.344 Subliminal
kun gzhi
 ཀུན་གཞི།
ālaya
 See “subliminal cognition.”
- g.345 Subliminal cognition
kun gzhi rnam par shes pa
 ཀུན་གཞི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ།
ālayavijñāna
 See Schmithausen’s groundbreaking work on the topic (1987 and 2014).
 Schmithausen considers the *ālayavijñāna* to be “a continuous subliminal form
 of mind” (Schmithausen 2014, p. 27).

- g.346 Subtle transgression
ltung ba phra mo
 ལུང་བ་ཕྱ་མོ།
sūkṣmāpatti
- g.347 Superficial
lpags shun
 ལྷགས་ལུན།
 —
 Lit. “like the skin.”
- g.348 Superimpose
sgro btags
 སློ་བཏགས།
samāropa
- g.349 Superimposition
sgro 'dogs pa
 སློ་འདོགས་པ།
samāropa
- g.350 Superior knowledge
mngon par shes pa
 མདོན་པར་ཤེས་པ།
abhijñā
- g.351 Superior mind
lhag pa'i sems
 ལྷག་པའི་སེམས།
adhicitta
- g.352 Sustenances
zas
 ཟས།
āhāra
 See “four kinds of sustenance.”

- g.353 Suviśuddhamati
blo gros shin tu rnam dag
 ལྷོ་གྲོ་ས་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྣམ་དག།
Suviśuddhamati
 A bodhisattva mahāsattva.
- g.354 Tathāgata
de bzhin gshegs pa
 དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ།
tathāgata
 An epithet for a buddha.
- g.355 Tatpuruṣa
 —
tatpuruṣa
 Type of Sanskrit compound.
- g.356 Teachings on the basis of serious downfalls
pham pa'i gnas lta bu'i chos · pham pa'i gnas lta bu
 བཅ་པའི་གནས་ལྷ་སུའི་ཚོས། . བཅ་པའི་གནས་ལྷ་སུ།
pārājayikasthānīyadharmāḥ · pārājayikasthānīya
- g.357 Teachings on the basis of transgressions
ltung ba'i gnas lta bu'i chos
 ལྷུང་བའི་གནས་ལྷ་སུའི་ཚོས།
mananāpatti sthānīya[dharmāḥ]
- g.358 Teachings on the ceremony of taking [the vows of the bodhisattva discipline]
[byang chub sems dpa'i tshul khrims kyi sdom pa] yang dag par blang ba
 [བྱང་ལྷུབ་སེམས་དཔའི་རྩྭ་ལ་སྤྲིམས་ཀྱི་སྡོམ་པ་] ཡང་དག་པར་བླང་བ།
[bodhisattvaśīlasaṃvara]samādāna
- g.359 Ten domains of totality
zad par gyi skye mched
 ཟད་པར་གྱི་སྐྱེ་མཚེད།
daśakṛtsnāyatana

This term corresponds to the *kaṣiṇa* of the Pāli tradition, a visualization object is used as a support for the totality of the meditator's attention.

g.360 Ten powers

stobs bcu

སྟོབས་བརྒྱ།

daśabala

The ten powers (*daśabala, stobs bcu*) of the Tathāgata are (1) the power of knowledge of what is possible and what is not possible (*sthānāsthānajñānabala, gnas dang gnas ma yin pa mkhyen pa'i stobs*); (2) the power of knowledge of the individual results of actions (*karmasvakaññānabala, las kyi rnam smin mkhyen pa'i stobs*); (3) the power of knowledge of different practices leading to various destinies (*sarvatragāminīpratipajñānabala, thams cad du 'gro ba'i lam mkhyen pa'i stobs*); (4) the power of knowledge of the different dispositions and tendencies of different beings (*anekadhātunānādhātujñānabala, khams sna tshogs mkhyen pa'i stobs*); (5) the power of knowledge of the different aspirations of beings (*nānādhimuktijñānabala, mos pa sna tshogs mkhyen pa'i stobs*); (6) the power of knowledge of the different degrees of development of the faculties and inclinations of beings (*indriyaparāparyajñānabala, dbang po mchog dang mchog ma yin pa mkhyen pa'i stobs*); (7) the power of knowledge of the absorptions, deliverances, concentrations, and attainments (*dhyānavimokṣasamādhisamāpattijñānabala, bsam gtan dang rnam thar dang ting nge 'dzin dang snyoms par 'jug pa thams cad mkhyen pa'i stobs*); (8) the power of knowledge of previous lives (*pūrvānivāsajñānabala, sngon gyi gnas rjes su dran pa mkhyen pa'i stobs*); (9) the power of knowledge of the deaths and births of beings according to their actions (*cyutyupapādajñānabala, 'chi 'pho bo dang skye ba mkhyen pa'i stobs*); and (10) the power of knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (*āsravakṣayajñānabala, zag pa zad pa mkhyen pa'i stobs*). (Rahula 2001: 229–230, n118).

g.361 That which must be established

grub par bya ba

གྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ།

sādhya

g.362 The sublime perfection, the supreme indivisible gnosis of the Tathāgata's liberation

de bzhin gshegs pa ma 'dres pa'i rnam par thar par mdzad pa'i ye shes kyi mthar phyin pa

དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་མ་འདྲེས་པའི་རྣམ་པར་གྲུབ་པར་མཛད་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་མཐར་ཕྱིན་པ།

asaṃbhinnatathāgata vimokṣajñānaniṣṭhāgataḥ
Mahāvīyutpatti 368.

g.363 Thesis

so so'i shes pa · dam bcas

སོ་སོ་འི་ཤེས་པ། . དམ་བཅས།

pratijñā

g.364 Thing

dn̄gos po · ngo bo

དངོས་པོ། . རོ་བོ།

bhāva

Also translated here as “object.”

g.365 Thinks

bye brag phyed pa

བྱི་བྲག་ཕྱིད་པ།

mata

g.366 Those not following you

slad rol pa

སླད་རོལ་པ།

tīrthika

g.367 Thought

yid

ཡིད།

manas

Regarding the term “thought” as a translation for the Sanskrit *manas*, see Schmithausen 2014.

g.368 Three forms of knowledge

rigs pa gsum

རིགས་པ་གསུམ།

trividya

The three knowledges are the superior knowledge that is the realization of the recollection of former states (*pūrvanivāsanānusmṛtisākṣātkārābhijñā*), the superior knowledge that is the realization of death and rebirth

(*cyutyupapādasākṣātkārābhijñā*), and the superior knowledge that is the realization of the cessation of outflows (*āsravakṣayasākṣātkārābhijñā*). See Powers 1995, p. 316, n. 17.

g.369 Three worlds

khams gsum

ཁམས་གསུམ།

tridhātu · traidhātuka

The three worlds are: the desire realm (*kāmadhātu*, 'dod khams), form realm (*rūpadhātu*, gzugs khams) and the formless realm (*ārūpyadhātu*, gzugs med khams). These three worlds include all of saṃsāra.

g.370 Timira

rab rib pa

རབ་རིབ་པ།

timira

The timira disease includes a variety of eye disorders including myopia, cataract, etc. In the context of Buddhist texts, this term is used to refer to eye floaters (i.e., spots, specks, or strings appearing in one's visual field). This eye disorder is called *myodesopsia* or *muscae volitantes* (Latin for "flying flies").

g.371 To be comprehended

yongs su shes par bya ba'i dngos po

ཡོངས་སུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱ་བའི་དངོས་པོ།

parijñeyavastu

g.372 Trichiliocosm

stong gsum gyi stong chen po'i 'jig rten gyi khams

སྟོང་གསུམ་གྱི་སྟོང་ཆེན་པོའི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཁམས།

trisāhasra mahāsāhasralokadhātu

Equal to a thousand bichiliocosm.

g.373 True nature

'di ltar don

འདི་ལྟར་དོན།

yathārtha

g.374 True reality

de bzhin nyid · de kho na · de nyid

དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད། དེ་ལོན། དེ་ཉིད།

tathatā · tattva

The true state or nature of things. See also [n.97](#).

g.375 Truly

ji tsam du

ཇི་ཙམ་དུ།

yāvat · tāvatā · tāvat

g.376 Truth

bden pa

བདེན་པ།

satya

See the “two truths” and “four noble truths.”

g.377 Truth body

chos kyi sku

ཚོས་ཀྱི་སྐུ།

dharmakāya

g.378 Two truths

bden pa gnyis

བདེན་པ་གཉིས།

satyadvaya

The ultimate and relative, or conventional, truth.

g.379 Ultimate

don dam pa · don dam

དོན་དམ་པ། དོན་དམ།

paramārtha

The ultimate is said to be inexpressible, nondual, transcending speculation, transcending difference and sameness, and of a single nature (i.e., *anabhilāpya, advaya, sarvatarkasamatikrānta, bhedābhedasamatikrānta, ekarasa*).

g.380 Ultimate limit of existence

yang dag pa'i mtha'

ཡང་དག་པའི་མཐའ།
bhūtakoti

g.381 Ultimate reality
de bzhin nyid don dam pa
དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་དོན་དམ་པ།
—

g.382 Ultimate within the domain of truth
chos kyī dbyings kyis klas pa
ཚོས་ཀྱི་དབྱིངས་ཀྱིས་གྲས་པ།
dharmadhātuparamaḥ
Mahāvvyutpatti 6429.

g.383 Unborn
ma skyes pa
མ་སྐྱེས་པ།
anutpanna

g.384 Unconditioned
'du ma byas
འདྲེ་མ་བྱས།
asaṃskṛta

g.385 Underlying condition
gnas pa
གནས་པ།
sthāna
See Edgerton 1953, p. 579.

g.386 Understood all practices
spyod pa thams cad dang ldan pa'i blo
སྟོན་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དང་ལྡན་པའི་བློ།
sarvācaryāsamanvāgatabuddhiḥ
Mahāvvyutpatti 363.

g.387 Unite them evenly

zung du 'jug pa

ལྷ་ཏུ་འཇུག་པ།

yuganaddha

g.388 Universe of a thousand worlds

stong gi 'jig rten gyi kham

སྟོང་གི་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཁམས།

sāhasracūḍikalokadhātu

g.389 Unproduced by intentional action

mngon par 'du bya ba med pa

མངོན་པར་འདུ་བྱ་བ་མེད་པ།

anabhisaṃskāraṇa · anabhisaṃskāra

The term has a double connotation: (1) “without effort” and (2) “unproduced (or brought about) by causes and conditions.” See Edgerton 1953, p. 21.

g.390 Unreal

yongs su ma grub pa

ཡོངས་སུ་མ་གུབ་པ།

apariniṣpanna

lack of [any] actuality, no actuality, deprived of any actuality, devoid of any actuality

g.391 Unsurpassable good

grub pa dang bde ba

གུབ་པ་དང་བདེ་བ།

yogakṣema

See Edgerton 1953, p. 448,1–2; Tillemans 1997, p. 157ff. Lamotte translates this term with ‘... de sécurité suprême’; see Lamotte 1935, p. 175.

g.392 Upasarga

—

upasarga

g.393 Useful

gces spros byed pa

གཅེས་སྐྱོས་བྱེད་པ།

bahukara

See Edgerton 1953, p. 398.

g.394 Utmost Joy

rab tu dga' ba

རབ་ཏུ་དགའ་བ།

pramuditā

The name of a bodhisattva stage.

g.395 Uttarakuru

byang gi sgra mi snyan pa

བྱང་གི་སྒྲུ་མི་སྟན་པ།

Uttarakuru

The name of the northern continent of Jambudvīpa where people live in perfect harmony. See Bhattacharya 2000.

g.396 Valid

yongs su dag pa

ཡོངས་སུ་དག་པ།

pariśuddha

g.397 Valid cognition

tshad ma

ཚད་མ།

pramāṇa

g.398 Vārāṇasī

bA rA Na sI

བ་ར་ས་སྐྱི།

Vārāṇasī

g.399 Vidhivatparipṛcchaka

tshul bzhin kun 'dri

ཚུལ་བཞིན་ཀུན་འདྲི།

Vidhivatparipṛcchaka

A bodhisattva mahāsattva.

g.400 Vigor

brtson 'grus

བརྩོན་འགྲུས།

vīrya

Also translated here as “diligence.”

g.401 Vipakṣa

—

vipakṣa

Technical term in Buddhist logic.

g.402 Viśālakīrti

—

Viśālakīrti

The name of a tathāgata

g.403 Viśālamati

blo gros yangs pa

སློ་སློམ་ཡངས་པ།

Viśālamati

A bodhisattva mahāsattva.

g.404 Vow

sdom pa

སྡོམ་པ།

saṃvara

g.405 Wander like beggars

spongs zhing rgyu

སློང་མ་ཞིང་རྒྱ།

caramti bhikṣāṃ

g.406 Wavering

rgyu ba med pa

རྒྱ་བ་མེད་པ།

apracāra

g.407 Whose defining characteristic is beyond all speculation

rtog ge thams cad las yang dag par 'das pa
རྟོག་གེ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལས་ཡང་དག་པར་འདས་པ།
sarvatarakasamatikrānta

g.408 Whose defining characteristic is of a single nature everywhere

thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid
ཐམས་ཅད་དུ་རོ་གཅིག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
**sarvatraikarasalakṣaṇa*

g.409 Wisdom

shes rab
ཤེས་རབ།
prajñā

g.410 Wishlessness

smon pa med pa
སློན་པ་མེད་པ།
apraṇihita

One of the three gates of liberation along with appearancelessness and emptiness.

g.411 With outflows

zag pa dang bcas pa
ཟག་པ་དང་བཅས་པ།
sāsrava

See Edgerton 1953, p. 102.

g.412 Without a person

zag med
ཟག་མེད།
anāsrava

g.413 Without support

mi gnas pa
མི་གནས་པ།
apratiṣṭhita

g.414 Wrongly conceive

mngon par zhen

མངོན་པར་ཞེན།

abhiniviṣanti

See Edgerton 1953, p. 53. The term has various shades of meaning such as “to be attached to,” “to adhere to,” “to wrongly conceive,” “to hold fast to,” and “to believe in” with a negative connotation.

g.415 Yakṣa

—

yakṣa

Type of being in Buddhist cosmogony.

g.416 Yoga

sbyor ba

སྟོན་བ།

yoga